- Einsteinmonkey
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Member for 19 years, 2 months, and 19 days
Last active Sat, Feb, 27 2016 23:39:31
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Nov 13, 2008Einsteinmonkey posted a message on HGeez MM, you're such a stalker (cf my wiki page). But it's obsolete info.Posted in: Ugstal Urniancepter Doggienavicenewton Bobwebacks
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Oct 1, 2007Einsteinmonkey posted a message on Free trade can be bad?I understand what you're saying. I'm seeing it as such:Posted in: Animated Economics
Protectionist policies are in place. The government has two options: keep the current protectionist measures in place, or abolish them. Although free trade does give more choice to consumers and businesspeople in their capacity as buyers, every working citizen in their capacity as a seller loses business. This looks at each individual in more than one light - one part as a buyer and one part as a seller - so when I say "buyers" and "sellers", the same person can be both a buyer and a seller.
Further, this model is looking at the situation as it stands before the decision, which is what introduces the uncertainty. The buyers clearly gain, but the sellers lose out; but by how much do the sellers lose out? - more precisely, how much do they expect to lose, and what are their probability estimates? - and is it enough to overshadow their gains as buyers?
This question is the crux of the matter. If people do not expect their individual returns from trade to be better than their individual losses, they will obviously not like the decision to abolish protectionist policies. Smith simply demonstrates that it's theoretically possible for this to happen (which is not to say that their fears are necessarily right or reasonable).
Of course, after the decision and its consequences, there will be no uncertainty.
And as you know, I agree with you on the rights issue, though personally, I don't like mixing utility and morality. -
Jun 10, 2007Einsteinmonkey posted a message on SXSW Japan NiteTsumasaki is an awesome song.Posted in: get faded
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I meant that and more. Ostensibly determinism is the issue, but non-deterministic factors are not under our control either, and don't salvage free will. This is what makes the dilemma of determinism a dilemma.
Chance is an external factor (or at least shorthand for a set of them).
It wouldn't make a difference whether it was God or chance that constructed a human in a particular way. For instance, if I subscribed to libertarian (non-)free will, free will would be forthcoming in neither case. That is, it boils down to compatibilism vs non-compatibilism, orthogonal to the issue of God's hand.
That is, when you put in, say,
Stickout (mm) Separation (mm) WFS3 (ipm) Voltage3 (V)
21 17 94 35
(and their interactions), with the coefficients you calculated you will get an output of
Penetration
10.77
But there is only one data point with those inputs, and it has exactly that output, so you have "explained" all of the data perfectly. Of course, this isn't generally meaningful. Usually there will be multiple data points with that same input, and they will have somewhat different outputs due to randomness, and so the error accounts for the deviation between your predicted output and the observed outputs.
What you want is more data. The 17th observation does serve to break out of exact determination, but the result won't be very satisfactory. Adding only one data point means your R^2 will still be unnaturally high and your p-values will be way too large. (Though if you really trust in the data and you're not trying to be precise, the estimated coefficients might suffice, but I'll bet the sheer number of interaction terms will give you weird giant looking effects.)
A better solution (besides collecting more data, which is always desirable) is to reduce the number of predictors. Does including the four-term or three-term (or maybe even two-term?) interactions really help you any? (It depends on whether you have specific reasons for believing the interactions are really meaningful.)
You are right, I do not have a firm grasp on these. For once I did not feel like thinking it through. Here is where I'm coming from.
For us to have rights de facto, we must actively uphold and defend them. But systems of negative rights seem to be less detailed in these respects, of how far we can or should go. We are clearly morally limited in our defences. We don't have carte blanche in wars. Most every life is valuable. But one feeling that seems to surround war is a pervasive sense of sorrow, and regret, a question of "was there another way?" If this regret is pervasive, is it an indication of insufficient consideration or valuation of humanity? And if so, do those who almost categorically refuse to do harm sort of counterbalance this insufficiency? Are they exceptionally virtuous people, if their reluctance forces upon our consciences the true weight of a human life, or is it folly, inhibiting us from making the decisions we have to?
Can we foster Christmas truces? How much should we trust in humanity? How can I tell if I'm making the right call?
I do expect any answer to end with "...but there's no way to know for sure." [edit] I expect them to start, on the other hand, with "what the hell are you talking about?" [/edit]
This may actually fit better into the "To kill a stranger" thread.
Not precise quantification, just "more"/"less"/other or "yes"/"no"/other. Basically, should you be more reluctant to take a mind controlled life as compared to a freely willed one?
And is a person who is more reluctant to take a life in general, even when they may be justified in doing so, a more moral person?
You don't know the future, which is part of the trouble.
This is part of the kind of response I was looking for.
Sorry for my ambiguous phrasing. That is what I meant as well. My question is, does a relevant threshold -- of acceptable risk to yourself, or harm to the other, or required contemplation on how to avoid harming the other -- not change if the other person is innocent?
Sure there are choices. They may not be palatable, or you may consider them obviously bad, but there are choices.
Pretty much everyone here seems to hold that their own life is worth saving even at the cost of another's in these situations. Are there many people who would refuse to kill the other, given that the other may be freed in the future? Would they be saints or fools? Is someone who, all else equal, is more willing to risk their life to preserve their attacker's life a morally better person?
If you had to kill the attacker, would you feel regret? If so, is there any decision which you would not regret? Does it make sense to feel regret no matter what you do?
Well, I suppose if anything "should" feel weighty, it's the act of taking a life. (No, I have not killed anyone, nor do I anticipate having to do so.)
Yes, they are different questions.
How seriously would you entertain it? And how willing would you be to risk damage to them in order to strike at the bad guys who are mind controlling them?
You may not have an entirely free hand, but if the attacker is being mind controlled, is he not an innocent victim too?
How hard should you have to try to avoid the attacker's death at risk of losing your own?
Suppose it's very difficult (though still possible) to reverse the mental changes.
Or suppose you were in a war against an army of these drugged victims.
Or suppose you were part of only a very small group.
How does the acceptable level (if any) of collateral damage vary with parameters of the situation?
A very brief summary.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Experiment
Answering in the affirmative to the evolution question establishes that you don't need a concrete logical proof (100% certainty) to believe something is true (merely good evidence in its favour). If you then claim that you need a concrete logical proof to believe in Nessie, there is a contradiction. The Nessie question does not imply that your belief threshold has actually been reached by the evidence, just that the threshold is set at lower than 100% certainty.
Yes.
Same here. But it feels like some of the questions are written such that their lay interpretation is different than their intended philosophical meaning, so you need an understanding of philosophy to simply understand what the test is trying to make you say. Use of the word "proof", specifically, seems troublesome.
Then again, maybe it's just faulty logical inference like above.
Cobb is supposed to be the best at dream extraction. If anyone is going to navigate the strongest of defenses, it's him.