A debate like this is precisely where you're supposed to show us the level of research you've done. "I reject your position, and I have my reasons" is not going to fly here.
No offense, but a sub-forum of an MTG forum is not where I intend to have vociferous religious debates. I used to spend hours and hours debating theology and philosophy many years ago on a different forum, but am woefully out of practice. I'm not going to engage in every single side topic that is presented, so sometimes, you're just going to have to accept that I disagree and we'll move on. You may then rest on your laurels as victorious because, haha, the less-than-willing opponent did not defend his position. But at the end of the day, my unwillingness to engage in every topic does not mean I am wrong or you are wrong or either of us are right. It just means I didn't choose to engage in every path of the ever-splintering tree of religious discussions.
And no, one does not need to presume ontological facts in order to make a logical argument. The laws of logic are not ontological facts. They're definitions. The practice of logic is nothing more or less than consistently applying the definitions of words and symbols. In particular, the cornerstone of logic, the law of noncontradiction, is simply the definition of the word "NOT". If we have a proposition P, "not-P" means that P is false, that it differs from reality in some way. This is why, if P is true, then not-P is false, and if not-P is true, then P is false. The logic is not a constraint on reality, saying reality must behave this certain way - it's a constraint on us, on our description of reality. Imagine you went through every possible reality, and stuck the label "P" on those of them where P was true. Not-P is by definition simply the ones you didn't label. If you try to stick a "not-P" label on a reality with a "P" label, you're labeling wrong. The reality isn't wrong - it's just doing whatever. But if it does P, then you're wrong to say that it didn't do P.
So when I said that God can't both create the universe and not create the universe, I was being a little bit tricky. I must confess that this was a deliberate rhetorical ploy - the phrase "God can't..." tends to provoke knee-jerk reactions from Christians who will insist that "God can do anything" regardless of what that actually means. And you certainly did not disappoint. But in fact when I say that God can't do this, it's no constraint on God's action but rather on our description of God's action. God can do anything... but whatever he does, we cannot describe it as "both creating the universe and not creating the universe". If God created the universe, then we're wrong to say that he didn't. And if he didn't create the universe, then we're wrong to say that he did. God's not breaking the rules - we're breaking the rules.
We can look at another example. You say that "God is only constrained by that which He chooses to be constrained by." If I were to say, "God is only constrained by that which he chooses to be constrained by, and also constrained by that which he does not choose to be constrained by", you would know that this description of God must be false. False not because of any ontological presumptions you make, but simply because you know the meaning of the word "not".
According to the 1999 Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, laws of thought are laws by which or in accordance with which valid thought proceeds, or that justify valid inference, or to which all valid deduction is reducible. Laws of thought are rules that apply without exception to any subject matter of thought, etc.; sometimes they are said to be the object of logic.
To use an Ayn Rand term, they are axiomatic principles. Or as I stated before, ontological facts. They are presumed to be true. They apply without exception. That Wikipedia article has dozens of great thinkers, all affirming the truth of these fundamental laws of logic. In actuality, I agree with you 100% about God being constrained by the laws of logic. There are plenty of things He cannot do. (Trust me, it was not a knee-jerk reaction... but I'm familiar with the reaction of which you speak. I used to get it all the time when I would discuss God's inability to do things based on the framework of logic.) But, I also affirm that the constraint on God is self-imposed which is why we're having this discussion. To say that we are breaking the rules if we say that God is "both creating the universe and not creating the universe" presumes both the laws of logic and our ability to explain it. Again, it seems nonsensical to us, because we're created this way, but if God chose to create a universe of logical contradictions, where it would be incoherent for us to speak in logical truisms, I believe He is capable of doing so.
No offense, but a sub-forum of an MTG forum is not where I intend to have vociferous religious debates. I used to spend hours and hours debating theology and philosophy many years ago on a different forum, but am woefully out of practice. I'm not going to engage in every single side topic that is presented, so sometimes, you're just going to have to accept that I disagree and we'll move on. You may then rest on your laurels as victorious because, haha, the less-than-willing opponent did not defend his position. But at the end of the day, my unwillingness to engage in every topic does not mean I am wrong or you are wrong or either of us are right. It just means I didn't choose to engage in every path of the ever-splintering tree of religious discussions.
Sure. Time is finite and topics are infinite. But it's kind of fishy for you to jump specifically into a debate about free will, saying "I just love a good free will discussion", and then blankly refuse to engage classical determinism.
Can you be more specific? Although, what you will most likely find with me is that I affirm elements of both subjectivism and objectivism.
You're wearing your subjective presumptions like a badge of honor, rather than trying to ground them in objectivity. Subjective presumptions lead only to subjective conclusions.
To use an Ayn Rand term, they are axiomatic principles. Or as I stated before, ontological facts.
Not the same thing. I never like writing this sentence, but Ayn Rand is correct. They are axioms. An axiom is a definition. Euclid's first axiom, for instance, is defining what he means when he talks about "straight lines". It's not an ontological claim.
That Wikipedia article has dozens of great thinkers, all affirming the truth of these fundamental laws of logic.
And here are dozens of great thinkers all affirming the cycle of reincarnation and the divinity of Brahman. But yes, the laws of logic are true. They can't not be, because they're just definitions (of "is", "or", and "not"). They're true in the same way "God is the omnipotent omniscient omnibenevolent creator of the universe" and "Unicorns are animals that look like white horses with one horn" are true. Now, the concepts of "is", "or" and "not" encode our thoughts much more deeply than "God" and "unicorn", which is why they're much more important definitions. But one can, and logicians have, constructed alternate logical languages with differently-defined operators, and - here's the kicker - those languages can all describe the same reality. They don't constrain reality. Just like the natural human languages can all describe the same reality, and don't constrain it.
To say that we are breaking the rules if we say that God is "both creating the universe and not creating the universe" presumes both the laws of logic and our ability to explain it.
It presumes only that the word "not" (and the other words in the statement) mean something.
Private Mod Note
():
Rollback Post to RevisionRollBack
Vive, vale. Siquid novisti rectius istis,
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Sure. Time is finite and topics are infinite. But it's kind of fishy for you to jump specifically into a debate about free will, saying "I just love a good free will discussion", and then blankly refuse to engage classical determinism.
Are you even a proponent of determinism? Why get into a debate on something that you may or may not even agree with?? Regardless, I've posted some reasons below for why I reject determinism... at least, from what little I can recall about determinism. Seriously, it's been years...
You're wearing your subjective presumptions like a badge of honor, rather than trying to ground them in objectivity. Subjective presumptions lead only to subjective conclusions.
Ok...? My request for specifics was that you provide me statements that I made that were subjective in nature so I could better understand why you're saying this. I don't intuitively recognize the difference between a subjective and an objective statement, and you seem to be able to, so if you could help me out a little...?
Not the same thing. I never like writing this sentence, but Ayn Rand is correct. They are axioms. An axiom is a definition. Euclid's first axiom, for instance, is defining what he means when he talks about "straight lines". It's not an ontological claim.
And here are dozens of great thinkers all affirming the cycle of reincarnation and the divinity of Brahman. But yes, the laws of logic are true. They can't not be, because they're just definitions (of "is", "or", and "not"). They're true in the same way "God is the omnipotent omniscient omnibenevolent creator of the universe" and "Unicorns are animals that look like white horses with one horn" are true. Now, the concepts of "is", "or" and "not" encode our thoughts much more deeply than "God" and "unicorn", which is why they're much more important definitions. But one can, and logicians have, constructed alternate logical languages with differently-defined operators, and - here's the kicker - those languages can all describe the same reality. They don't constrain reality. Just like the natural human languages can all describe the same reality, and don't constrain it.
It presumes only that the word "not" (and the other words in the statement) mean something.
To be clear, your differentiation between the laws of thought and ontology is the differentiation between the concepts of meaning (i.e. language/definition) and the concepts of existing (i.e. being)? At the end of the day, though, it is somewhat of a moot distinction. The only reason we have defintions is because we are using the definitions to organize our observations regarding reality. Euclid's first postulate is a definition that allows him to easily reference an observable reality, namely, a straight line segment. It's no different than the segmenting of time into seconds, minutes, and hours or length into its various units. These have standard definitions, all of which are based on observable realities. The concept of "not" is only meaningful when understanding it as an opposite to something that "is." So then, our definitions, our laws of thought, our axioms, they are but a means of organizing our thoughts about reality into cogent, succinct concepts. The point that I'm trying to make regarding God is that I believe it to be possible for Him to create a different reality where our observations led us to generate a language that centered on illogic rather than logic. This is not a reality that we can envision because it goes against the very core of our language and observable reality. My affirmation is not that I can envision it, only that I believe it to be within the realm of that which He is capable.
To try to tie this back around, one of the main reasons I reject determinism is because determinism denies the concept of a true will. I have spent hours debating with other Christians on the theological implications of determinism, and one of the conclusions I walked away with is that they believe whole-heartedly in the scenario you posited. Choice is determined either out of necessity or by random chance. They affirm necessity. When I denied it, their ultimate question to me was "then how do you make a decision? Is it by chance? If not by chance, what is the mechanism by which it is done?" My answer to them, which is similar to my answer to you, is that God has imbued us as human beings with the creative power to make a decision from our will. It is not a function of necessity or of chance but rather of the very same power that was used to freely create our universe as He saw fit. Free will does not collapse into the probabilistic nature of necessity or chance because it is not a function of probability. It is a function of autonomy. Why did Miley Cyrus choose make a music video of her riding a wrecking ball naked? The world may never know... but the only rational explanation I can provide is that she chose, of her God-given will, to do so. Sure, there were other things influencing her decision (recommendations from other artists, the money aspect, making an impact with image, and so forth), but she at some point in time had to exercise her will to say yay or nay.
The implications of collapsing will into probability is staggering. If decisions are made out of necessity or chance, then we have no control and accountability for actions taken goes right out the window. On what grounds do we hold accountable a man for doing something that was either a) necessitated by all the influences on his desire or b) randomly generated by some unknown function? For our reality to have meaning, and for our sanity as a society, the only viable answer is that we as people make decisions of our will, and that choice is something that we can be held accountable for because it is uniquely identifiable to us. I cannot blame chance or necessity. I can only blame my will, my choice, my decision.
The implications of collapsing will into probability is staggering. If decisions are made out of necessity or chance, then we have no control and accountability for actions taken goes right out the window. On what grounds do we hold accountable a man for doing something that was either a) necessitated by all the influences on his desire or b) randomly generated by some unknown function? For our reality to have meaning, and for our sanity as a society, the only viable answer is that we as people make decisions of our will, and that choice is something that we can be held accountable for because it is uniquely identifiable to us. I cannot blame chance or necessity. I can only blame my will, my choice, my decision.
Daniel
A few thoughts:
1. Saying that our reality only has meaning if we have free will doesn't stand up on its own. You gotta give us a "why" if you want to be convincing. Why wouldn't reality function just fine sans accountability and true decision making? Think of it this way, you are trying to convince me that some sort of unidentified phenomenon provides us with decision-making capabilities that exist outside of the cause-effect cascades that rule the rest of the physical world. I'm open to believing in that thing, as I'm as caught up in free-will (or its illusion) as everyone else. But you have to present a strong case.
2. It isn't that the decisions are made by chance, it is that the decisions themselves are an illusion. You don't have them at all, you just feel like you do. In fact the whole process if far more orderly, less reliant on chance, than the process you would have me believe (i.e. that there is some sort of individual free will mechanism that functions independent of the typical physical influences).
3. Even if you believe in determinism it doesn't mean the end of society. Because you don't have to assign blame to someone to recognize their behavior as problematic and be compelled to correct it. In effect you can still hold individuals accountable, even if you don't believe that they truly made a choice.
Why did I choose to respond to your post? I read your post, found what I considered to be something worth responding to, and elected to respond of my own free will. Is it necessary I respond? No. Is it by chance that I responded? Also no, because I purposefully chose to respond. Hence free will is not subject to the same probabilistic reasoning as you applied above.
BS then pointed out why a classical determinist would disagree. To which you responded with another subjective statement:
I reject classical determinism for Libertarian free will.
Let's imagine we were in a debate thread about Putin's Russia invading Crimea: bitterroot: I think it's a good thing Russia invaded. The Russian form of government is the best in the world, so they should invade all of Ukraine and everyone would be better off. BS: Why do you say the Russian form of government is the best in the world? Some smart people who have thought about this stuff would disagree with you. What would you say in response to their arguments? bitterroot: I reject their arguments. BS: Why? bitterroot: Just because you don't agree with my opinions on things doesn't mean that I didn't think through and weigh the opinions of both perspectives. You don't know me or the level of research I have or haven't done. And I'm certainly entitled to reject perspectives that I disagree with.
Do you see how this is incredibly unproductive? No one on either side has gained anything from the debate. A debate is only worth anyone's time if people actually support their positions and address opposing positions.
Ok...? My request for specifics was that you provide me statements that I made that were subjective in nature so I could better understand why you're saying this. I don't intuitively recognize the difference between a subjective and an objective statement, and you seem to be able to, so if you could help me out a little...?
You write, "My presumption is that God is only constrained by that which He chooses to be constrained by." And that's your emphasis on the "my", not mine. You are, quite literally, putting boldface on the personal nature of your statement. Any conclusions you draw from this statement will be sound only for you, or for other subjects who happen to decide on the same presumption that you have.
The only reason we have defintions is because we are using the definitions to organize our observations regarding reality. Euclid's first postulate is a definition that allows him to easily reference an observable reality, namely, a straight line segment. It's no different than the segmenting of time into seconds, minutes, and hours or length into its various units. These have standard definitions, all of which are based on observable realities. The concept of "not" is only meaningful when understanding it as an opposite to something that "is." So then, our definitions, our laws of thought, our axioms, they are but a means of organizing our thoughts about reality into cogent, succinct concepts.
Exactly. I'm not sure how you think this supports your position, but it's definitely consistent with what I've been saying.
The point that I'm trying to make regarding God is that I believe it to be possible for Him to create a different reality where our observations led us to generate a language that centered on illogic rather than logic.
"Possibility" is itself a logical concept. If a description of reality contains no contradictions, we say it's "possible". If it does, we say it is "impossible". To say that a contradiction is possible is like saying that a unicorn has two horns - you're just using the word wrong. And if we're in the game of using words wrong, I can just as easily say that this description you call "possible" is simultaneously "impossible" - by which I don't mean it contains a contradiction, but something else entirely. What do I mean? You don't know!
To try to tie this back around, one of the main reasons I reject determinism is because determinism denies the concept of a true will.
And you don't see any problem with this statement. And that's a problem.
I'm now going to explain what "begging the question" is in first-week-of-Phil-101 detail. If you think I'm patronizing you, I'm sorry, but at this point I can only say that you have it coming.
A philosophical debate consists in people trying to find the correct answer to a question. In our case, the question is "Do we have free will?" People will propose various answers, develop arguments in support of those answers, and try to refute the arguments for different answers. So we have the determinists saying "No, we don't have free will because [reasons]", and the libertarians looking for mistakes in those reasons. If there is a mistake, then they can reject determinism. Now, you come along and say that you reject determinism because it denies free will. But is that a mistake? It's only a mistake if it's incorrect - if we in fact have free will. So the question becomes: do we have free will? But "Do we have free will?" is exactly the question that we started debating in the first place, and coming back to it like this just brings our debate in a big circle and gets us nowhere - determinists say no, libertarians say yes, and off we go again. Which is why we call this fallacy "begging the question". Or "circular reasoning". Or "assuming the conclusion". Whatever we call it, it is argumentative suicide.
Sure, there were other things influencing her decision (recommendations from other artists, the money aspect, making an impact with image, and so forth), but she at some point in time had to exercise her will to say yay or nay.
What is the substantial difference between what she did and what a flipping coin does? You're not explaining it, you're just asserting it. Tell us what free will is without using the word "will" or any of its synonyms (like "autonomy").
The implications of collapsing will into probability is staggering. If decisions are made out of necessity or chance, then we have no control and accountability for actions taken goes right out the window.
And this is another fallacy called the appeal to consequences. You're saying that a proposition must be true because if it were false, that would lead to undesirable things. This is fallacious because sometimes things actually are undesirable. What you're doing here is a precise formal equivalent to this argument: "If we do not have a cure for cancer, then people will suffer and die of the disease. But it's undesirable for people to suffer and die. Therefore, we must have a cure for cancer."
That's the first problem with this argument. The second is that it's not at all clear that a denial of free will implies a denial of accountability. There are a number of determinist arguments that it doesn't. But even if it does, well, maybe it's just the unfortunate truth that we don't have accountability. We can't disregard that possibility simply because we don't like it.
Private Mod Note
():
Rollback Post to RevisionRollBack
Vive, vale. Siquid novisti rectius istis,
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Here’s my version of the Onotological Argument. It’s silly, but I do believe it points out the flaws in the original.
Basically, god is supposed to be omnipotent and can therefore do ANYTHING and EVERYTHING.
My premise is that a maximally great being that can create the universe and everything in it from a state of non-existence is more powerful than a god who merely exists and does it. Because, you know, this particular god doesn’t exist, and yet it still created the universe! That makes it more powerful than a god that exists.
The second is that it's not at all clear that a denial of free will implies a denial of accountability. There are a number of determinist arguments that it doesn't.
Wait, by what possible measure could ethics exist without free will? Ethics is about saying what we ought to do, and saying someone "ought to do" has no meaning if that person physically cannot possibly do it, right? Doesn't that apply to everything if we remove free will?
Basically, god is supposed to be omnipotent and can therefore do ANYTHING and EVERYTHING.
Within logic, yes.
My premise is that a maximally great being that can create the universe and everything in it from a state of non-existence is more powerful than a god who merely exists and does it. Because, you know, this particular god doesn’t exist, and yet it still created the universe! That makes it more powerful than a god that exists.
Wait, by what possible measure could ethics exist without free will? Ethics is about saying what we ought to do, and saying someone "ought to do" has no meaning if that person physically cannot possibly do it, right? Doesn't that apply to everything if we remove free will?
We can accept the principle of " 'ought' implies 'can' " and still reject free will if we take the "chance" horn of the dilemma. If your actions are determined by dice rolling in your head, then it is possible for you to perform different actions, and coherent to evaluate some actions are better than others.
We can also reject " 'ought' implies 'can' ", or modify how we interpret it. Determinists say that all actions flow from a causal process, but words and ideas may be part of that causal process. Thinking about something causes you to think about something else, which causes you to think about something else, and so on. So thinking about what you ought to do may be what causes you to do it, where otherwise you wouldn't. And if you don't do what you ought to - well, how is that a problem, exactly? People don't do what they ought to all the time under just about any theory of morality.
We can accept the principle of " 'ought' implies 'can' " and still reject free will if we take the "chance" horn of the dilemma. If your actions are determined by dice rolling in your head, then it is possible for you to perform different actions, and coherent to evaluate some actions are better than others.
Not following you here. If it's truly random what action you'll ultimately perform, then "chance" remains antithetical to ethics, because we can sit here evaluating all day which action is most paragon and it won't matter because you don't actually control what you are doing. Therefore, "ought implies can" still applies, because you have no ability to influence the outcome, even if the outcome could have gone differently.
We can also reject " 'ought' implies 'can' ", or modify how we interpret it. Determinists say that all actions flow from a causal process, but words and ideas may be part of that causal process. Thinking about something causes you to think about something else, which causes you to think about something else, and so on. So thinking about what you ought to do may be what causes you to do it, where otherwise you wouldn't. And if you don't do what you ought to - well, how is that a problem, exactly? People don't do what they ought to all the time under just about any theory of morality.
Yeah, but same thing applies: if everything is determined already, then what is the point of saying that anyone "should do" anything? If you can't do anything other than what is already set that you will do, then you have no control over what you will do, right? And if you won't do anything other than what you will do, which you cannot control anyway, there is no "should do," because no other course is physically possible. It is only "will do" or "won't do," but there is no "choose to do," and therefore there is no "should do," because no one has any actual influence over his or her actions.
He's not the first person to advance that rebuttal. It makes about as much sense as the ontological argument itself - which is the point.
Therefore, "ought implies can" still applies, because you have no ability to influence the outcome, even if the outcome could have gone differently.
"Ought implies can" is a simple principle: if it is morally required for an agent to do X, it is possible for them to do X. Looking for an "ability to influence the outcome" beyond that possibility is not part of the principle and begs the question. Define "influence". For that matter, define "you".
If you can't do anything other than what is already set that you will do, then you have no control over what you will do, right?
That may be an overly aggressive reading of determinism. "Already set" is loaded and potentially misleading terminology - determinism is not the same thing as predetermination. And the causal entities directly controlling what you do are, well, parts of you. (Hence "define 'you' " above.)
...there is no "should do," because no other course is physically possible. It is only "will do" or "won't do," but there is no "choose to do," and therefore there is no "should do," because no one has any actual influence over his or her actions.
You're begging the question again here. You're invoking "ought implies can" in order to argue for "ought implies can".
Furthermore, define "should", "choose", and (again) "influence".
Private Mod Note
():
Rollback Post to RevisionRollBack
Vive, vale. Siquid novisti rectius istis,
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
"Ought implies can" is a simple principle: if it is morally required for an agent to do X, it is possible for them to do X.
And contrariwise, if one cannot do X, it is absurd to say one should to do X.
Looking for an "ability to influence the outcome" beyond that possibility is not part of the principle
This is absurd. If I bodyjack someone like in a science fiction movie, is that person morally responsible for everything I force them to do? Of course not, because they are not choosing to act the way they are. They have no choice in their actions. They have no control in what they are doing, and therefore they cannot be morally responsible for their actions.
The same principle applies here. If a random number generator/dice/some other form of chance controls what it is we do, then we are not in control of what we do. Therefore, we cannot be said to have choice in anything. Therefore, we cannot be held morally accountable for our actions.
and begs the question.
In what way?
Define "influence".
You know, the capacity to have an effect on.
For that matter, define "you".
*Sigh* Is this really necessary?
Define "point". Why does it matter whether there is a "point" or not?
What possible meaning could any ethical statement have in a world where no group of people has control over their actions? If one cannot choose an action, then what results is out of one's control, right? So if what results is out of one's control, how can any person be held morally accountable for one's actions?
That may be an overly aggressive reading of determinism. "Already set" is loaded and potentially misleading terminology - determinism is not the same thing as predetermination. And the causal entities directly controlling what you do are, well, parts of you. (Hence "define 'you' " above.)
Ok, I guess we have different definitions of determinism, because I have heard determinism defined by its contrast to free will, that the outcome of a situation is controlled by factors that do not include choice, and that all things are action and reaction based on external factors.
...there is no "should do," because no other course is physically possible. It is only "will do" or "won't do," but there is no "choose to do," and therefore there is no "should do," because no one has any actual influence over his or her actions.
You're begging the question again here. You're invoking "ought implies can" in order to argue for "ought implies can".
What possible meaning could any ethical statement have in a world where no group of people has control over their actions?
Depends how you read ethical statements. Under utilitarianism, for instance, an ethical statement read as a statement of the net utility of a given action is perfectly coherent.
So if what results is out of one's control, how can any person be held morally accountable for one's actions?
The same way they're held accountable if the results are under their control. It's not like we physically can't send people to jail or whatever if they're automata. The jail's still there; it still works just fine. In order to make your case, you need to elucidate the problem with doing this.
Ok, I guess we have different definitions of determinism, because I have heard determinism defined by its contrast to free will, that the outcome of a situation is controlled by factors that do not include choice, and that all things are action and reaction based on external factors.
Well, we've already touched on "external factors" above. And what do we mean by "choice"? Couldn't choice be "action and reaction" of an internal sort? Scientifically speaking, the brain certainly doesn't magically produce impulses out of nowhere; the neural network fires in patterns that are predictable (in principle, although vastly complex and chaotic). Does this mean that we don't have "choice", or does it mean that "choice" isn't what we thought it was? What did we think it was? What would be different about us if we had it?
"Already set" implies that a decision has been made, in the past, by somebody else. That's much more than determinism commits to.
It doesn't seem implausible prima facie that one might have impossible obligations. Indeed, quite a bit of classical literature is based on this premise.
If you found these arguments unconvincing you can do some research into the famous philosophy of religion speech Alving Platinga gave about the two dozen or so non mainstream arguments for God's existence.
You know what peruse them at your own leisure here.
If you found these arguments unconvincing you can do some research into the famous philosophy of religion speech Alving Platinga gave about the two dozen or so non mainstream arguments for God's existence.
Bakgat, you know that William Lane Craig is overwhelmingly just parroting Plantinga, right?
You know what peruse them at your own leisure here.
Lecture notes. Wonderful.
"What is the explanation of the correlation between physical and psychical properties? Presumably there is an explanation of it; but also it will have to be, as Adams and Swinburne say, a personal, nonscientific explanation. The most plausible suggestion would involve our being created that way by God."
That is not an argument.
"Lewis speaks of the nostalgia that often engulfs us upon beholding a splendid land or seascape; these somehow speak to us of their maker. Not sure just what the argument is; but suspect there is one there."
What the actual **** am I supposed to do with that?
...Bakgat, I'll tell you what: why don't you select some of the arguments that you think are most convincing, and post them here in your own words so you can defend them to the best of your ability. It'd be a hell of a lot more productive than me trying to make sense of what Plantinga wrote for his own use (or, for that matter, what Craig wrote just to be a dick to Dawkins).
Private Mod Note
():
Rollback Post to RevisionRollBack
Vive, vale. Siquid novisti rectius istis,
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
The difference is that the random number generator is you.
I don't follow.
If that's the definition, then even a falling rock has influence.
A falling rock has influence over a great many things. The outcome of a Gorn fight. One's position in a race on Choco Mountain. Whether or not a coyote can catch a roadrunner.
However, what a falling rock does not have influence over is whether or not it is falling. A falling rock cannot, by conscious action, be or not be a falling rock. Like just about everything else, once gravity takes hold, it falls.
Indeed, a falling rock cannot take conscious actions. It's not conscious, and even if it were, it has no means of action.
If we're going to be debating internal vs. external causes for action, then yes, figuring out what is internal to you is very necessary.
Ok, I don't know.
Depends how you read ethical statements. Under utilitarianism, for instance, an ethical statement read as a statement of the net utility of a given action is perfectly coherent.
The issue is not the ethical statement's coherency. Yes, utilitarian statements, like any other ethical statement, would have coherency, we could read it and understand what it, but that's not the point. If no one has control over their actions, they have no control over what they will do. If they have no control over what they will do, then saying that they "should do" something has no value. Ethics has a very cypher of a purpose if no one actually can control what they can do.
"Rock is morally incorrect for choosing to fall" is coherent. We can understand what it's saying. It is, however, completely absurd.
The same way they're held accountable if the results are under their control.
That doesn't make any sense. If they perform a morally incorrect action by their own free will, we are justified to hold them accountable. If they perform an action dubbed morally incorrect when they are not in control of their own actions, we are not justified to hold them accountable because they are not accountable. They are not in control of what they do.
Now, granted, we could still hold them accountable without caring whether or not we're morally justified in doing so, but that sort of proves what I've been saying: no free will = **** ETHICS.
Well, we've already touched on "external factors" above. And what do we mean by "choice"? Couldn't choice be "action and reaction" of an internal sort?
That's a stretch.
Scientifically speaking, the brain certainly doesn't magically produce impulses out of nowhere; the neural network fires in patterns that are predictable (in principle, although vastly complex and chaotic). Does this mean that we don't have "choice", or does it mean that "choice" isn't what we thought it was? What did we think it was? What would be different about us if we had it?
I mean, unless you believe that choice can only exist in a dualistic universe and not a materialistic one, I don't see a problem with that.
It doesn't seem implausible prima facie that one might have impossible obligations. Indeed, quite a bit of classical literature is based on this premise.
It is inherently absurd for you to say that the rock is morally wrong for falling. The rock has no power over whether or not it falls. It cannot choose to fall. Therefore, to say the rock has performed a wrongful action by falling is inherently absurd.
"Select" is just a synonym for "choose".
If we're banning synonyms to define something, we might as well throw out dictionaries.
Why, do you have a definition for choose that uses no synonyms for choose?
The difference is that the random number generator is you.
I don't follow.
"If a random number generator/dice/some other form of chance controls what it is we do, then we are not in control of what we do." = "If an engine/some other power source propels a car, then the car is not self-propelled." The car is self-propelled, because the engine is a part of the car, as opposed to a horse-drawn carriage where the horse is external. Likewise, if your brain is controlling you, then you are controlling yourself, because your brain is part of you, as opposed to a marionette where the strings are pulled by someone else. This is true regardless of what's actually going on in the brain, whether it be random, deterministic, or something else.
If they have no control over what they will do, then saying that they "should do" something has no value. Ethics has a very cypher of a purpose if no one actually can control what they can do.
Arguing that something has no value or purpose is very different than arguing that the thing is impossible. It's very possible for something to exist with no value; tons of things do.
"Rock is morally incorrect for choosing to fall" is coherent. We can understand what it's saying. It is, however, completely absurd.
Why? If there's a difference between absurdity and incoherence, I don't know what it is. And what I was saying is that it's not absurd under a certain utilitarian reading. You can compare how much good the rock caused and how much harm the rock caused, concluding that the fall of the rock created negative utility - was morally wrong, under a utilitarian understanding of "morally wrong".
If they perform a morally incorrect action by their own free will, we are justified to hold them accountable. If they perform an action dubbed morally incorrect when they are not in control of their own actions, we are not justified to hold them accountable because they are not accountable. They are not in control of what they do.
Your reasoning here is completely circular. You're using the proposition that we can't be held accountable if we don't have free will to justify the proposition that we can't be held accountable if we don't have free will.
If we're banning synonyms to define something, we might as well throw out dictionaries.
It's absolutely standard philosophical practice. Otherwise, we'd have such illuminating conversations as, "What is a god?" "A deity." "Okay, so what is a deity?" "A god."
Why, do you have a definition for choose that uses no synonyms for choose?
If I don't, that's precisely the problem. In order for the notion of "choice" to be coherent, we have to be able to analyze it - break it down into the properties or components that define it, so we can recognize it more rigorously than just "I know it when I see it".
Private Mod Note
():
Rollback Post to RevisionRollBack
Vive, vale. Siquid novisti rectius istis,
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Yes. The brain is essentially a computer, you're only going to get out what's programmed in. The mistake people always seem to make is that they think somehow a lack of free will undermine morality or ethics, but morality and ethics are a vital part of both the decision making process and the function of society. Society only exists because we've evolved these traits. They're essentially what puts a check on base instincts (our firmware, so to speak) when we make decisions. That morality is defined partially by our environment and partially by our brain's chemistry. When we punish our children for stealing, for instance, we're essentially training the way their brain thinks about their actions.
Part of the problem with 'free will' is that it tends to ignore or gloss over the outliers. Psychopaths have an altered morality because their brains are physically different from the average person's. Psychopaths can be 'trained' to respect social norms, but they don't 'feel' their morality in the same way the rest of us do. So do they actually have free will any more than a dog who has been trained not to poop on the carpet does?
That doesn't make any sense. If they perform a morally incorrect action by their own free will, we are justified to hold them accountable. If they perform an action dubbed morally incorrect when they are not in control of their own actions, we are not justified to hold them accountable because they are not accountable. They are not in control of what they do.
Now, granted, we could still hold them accountable without caring whether or not we're morally justified in doing so, but that sort of proves what I've been saying: no free will = **** ETHICS.
When we assign 'blame' for an action to an individual, it's not because there is an invisible slate tallying our good and bad. We're 'morally' justified in holding people accountable for their actions because the entire point of morality is to perpetuate positive social norms. Holding people accountable for their actions serves to mold their future behavior and reinforce acceptable behaviors in others.
Depends how you read ethical statements. Under utilitarianism, for instance, an ethical statement read as a statement of the net utility of a given action is perfectly coherent.
The issue is not the ethical statement's coherency. Yes, utilitarian statements, like any other ethical statement, would have coherency, we could read it and understand what it, but that's not the point. If no one has control over their actions, they have no control over what they will do. If they have no control over what they will do, then saying that they "should do" something has no value. Ethics has a very cypher of a purpose if no one actually can control what they can do.
"Rock is morally incorrect for choosing to fall" is coherent. We can understand what it's saying. It is, however, completely absurd.
The same way they're held accountable if the results are under their control.
That doesn't make any sense. If they perform a morally incorrect action by their own free will, we are justified to hold them accountable. If they perform an action dubbed morally incorrect when they are not in control of their own actions, we are not justified to hold them accountable because they are not accountable. They are not in control of what they do.
Now, granted, we could still hold them accountable without caring whether or not we're morally justified in doing so, but that sort of proves what I've been saying: no free will = **** ETHICS.
I think BS did a good job of responding to your points, but I just want to add that saying "people don't have free will" is not equivalent to saying "people can't make choices."
For example, let's look at a little bacterium or other single-celled organism. This organism doesn't have a brain or consciousness, and clearly it doesn't have free will. But it's still a complex little biological machine that will respond to stimuli and exhibit "behaviors" we can study.
If you have a single-celled organism in a dish, and you want it to go right instead of left, you can make it do that. You can put some kind of food source to the right, for instance, and it will tend to go toward the food. Alternatively, you can put some kind of irritating or caustic chemical to the left, and it will go right to get away from the chemical.
You can coherently read moral statements as accomplishing the same goals as our incentives for the little organism. If we want people to not lie, for example, we as a society can decide "lying is morally wrong" and teach this fact to people. Since humans are social animals, the mere fact that society condemns lying will act like that caustic chemical in the petri dish. People will choose to lie less because society has deemed it a condemnable behavior, just like the simple little organism "chose" to go right to get away from the bad chemical. If you really want to deter a behavior, you can add extra punishments, like a prison sentence for murder. This creates an even stronger incentive for people to avoid those behaviors.
I think you're reading determinism as a denial of choice. It's clearly not.
Yes. The brain is essentially a computer, you're only going to get out what's programmed in.
This may be one of those technically-true-but-wildly-misleading statements. A massively iterated self-modification loop makes the brain a full-blown chaotic system, unpredictable even though deterministic(ish).
Part of the problem with 'free will' is that it tends to ignore or gloss over the outliers. Psychopaths have an altered morality because their brains are physically different from the average person's. Psychopaths can be 'trained' to respect social norms, but they don't 'feel' their morality in the same way the rest of us do. So do they actually have free will any more than a dog who has been trained not to poop on the carpet does?
Actually, I think the dog displays a canine psychological relative of human morality. We don't want to anthropomorphize, so we need to be careful what we attribute to them, but they clearly respond to social cues in morality-like ways: they get sad when you scold them, and seem capable of feeling shame. (Well, most dogs. Mine is utterly shameless.) Which shouldn't really be surprising, given their kinship to us and their own society-based survival strategy.
Yes. The brain is essentially a computer, you're only going to get out what's programmed in.
This may be one of those technically-true-but-wildly-misleading statements. A massively iterated self-modification loop makes the brain a full-blown chaotic system, unpredictable even though deterministic(ish).
I think that's fair. I don't mean to oversimplify, the brain is definitely a chaotic system. My point was only that humans are going to make decisions largely based on the influence of nature and nurture. Being an organic system, it won't always be consistent. But I also don't think there is some kind of magic other factor that affects someone's thinking.
That said, when we say the brain is 'unpredictable', I think what we mean is 'unpredictable by human beings right now'. It's reasonable to assume with sufficiently advanced technology we could map a brain pretty accurately and create a model that would mimic thought patterns. Our understanding of neuroscience is advancing at a pretty rapid pace.
Part of the problem with 'free will' is that it tends to ignore or gloss over the outliers. Psychopaths have an altered morality because their brains are physically different from the average person's. Psychopaths can be 'trained' to respect social norms, but they don't 'feel' their morality in the same way the rest of us do. So do they actually have free will any more than a dog who has been trained not to poop on the carpet does?
Actually, I think the dog displays a canine psychological relative of human morality. We don't want to anthropomorphize, so we need to be careful what we attribute to them, but they clearly respond to social cues in morality-like ways: they get sad when you scold them, and seem capable of feeling shame. (Well, most dogs. Mine is utterly shameless.) Which shouldn't really be surprising, given their kinship to us and their own society-based survival strategy.[/quote]
I'm glad you brought that up, because dogs are a product of human cohabitation, and they definitely show moral-like behavior. The difference is that the trait is, perhaps, artificially selected. We kept the wolves that seemed more 'human' to us, and selected the traits we preferred.
Many animals do show signs of moral behavior, especially other social omnivores like higher primates or elephants (or even Dolphins, but they're kind of sociopaths). While I wouldn't say as full blown as human morality (as we've gotten REALLY complex), basic empathy is a huge boon for social animals.
I think the issue with 'free will' here is that free will is the definition. I had always thought it was only meant to imply freedom from outside interference, specifically that God would let us make our own choices. I think being able to predict my choices doesn't affect my free will, being able to manipulate those choices does.
I've often wondered why Christians believed that God was an advocate for free will. Even when I was Christian, the bible made it clear that He was in direct opposition to it. If a deity demands that you do X or burn forever, it's absurd to consider that free will. Choosing an ice cream flavor is free will, but having a gun put up to your head and being told what to do and what not to do is not.
And just in case there was any confusion about whether or not God really did promote free will, that was cleared up with comments about how he 'hardened the heart' of the pharaoh and others to influence their decisions.
I've often wondered why Christians believed that God was an advocate for free will. Even when I was Christian, the bible made it clear that He was in direct opposition to it. If a deity demands that you do X or burn forever, it's absurd to consider that free will. Choosing an ice cream flavor is free will, but having a gun put up to your head and being told what to do and what not to do is not.
And just in case there was any confusion about whether or not God really did promote free will, that was cleared up with comments about how he 'hardened the heart' of the pharaoh and others to influence their decisions.
This is even worse when it comes to Islam. The qur’an is filled with verse after verse about how it is god that leads people astray, puts a 'seal' over their hearts so that they won't accept the truth, etc.
No offense, but a sub-forum of an MTG forum is not where I intend to have vociferous religious debates. I used to spend hours and hours debating theology and philosophy many years ago on a different forum, but am woefully out of practice. I'm not going to engage in every single side topic that is presented, so sometimes, you're just going to have to accept that I disagree and we'll move on. You may then rest on your laurels as victorious because, haha, the less-than-willing opponent did not defend his position. But at the end of the day, my unwillingness to engage in every topic does not mean I am wrong or you are wrong or either of us are right. It just means I didn't choose to engage in every path of the ever-splintering tree of religious discussions.
Can you be more specific? Although, what you will most likely find with me is that I affirm elements of both subjectivism and objectivism.
To quote Wikipedia on the Laws of thought:
According to the 1999 Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, laws of thought are laws by which or in accordance with which valid thought proceeds, or that justify valid inference, or to which all valid deduction is reducible. Laws of thought are rules that apply without exception to any subject matter of thought, etc.; sometimes they are said to be the object of logic.
To use an Ayn Rand term, they are axiomatic principles. Or as I stated before, ontological facts. They are presumed to be true. They apply without exception. That Wikipedia article has dozens of great thinkers, all affirming the truth of these fundamental laws of logic. In actuality, I agree with you 100% about God being constrained by the laws of logic. There are plenty of things He cannot do. (Trust me, it was not a knee-jerk reaction... but I'm familiar with the reaction of which you speak. I used to get it all the time when I would discuss God's inability to do things based on the framework of logic.) But, I also affirm that the constraint on God is self-imposed which is why we're having this discussion. To say that we are breaking the rules if we say that God is "both creating the universe and not creating the universe" presumes both the laws of logic and our ability to explain it. Again, it seems nonsensical to us, because we're created this way, but if God chose to create a universe of logical contradictions, where it would be incoherent for us to speak in logical truisms, I believe He is capable of doing so.
Daniel
You're wearing your subjective presumptions like a badge of honor, rather than trying to ground them in objectivity. Subjective presumptions lead only to subjective conclusions.
Not the same thing. I never like writing this sentence, but Ayn Rand is correct. They are axioms. An axiom is a definition. Euclid's first axiom, for instance, is defining what he means when he talks about "straight lines". It's not an ontological claim.
And here are dozens of great thinkers all affirming the cycle of reincarnation and the divinity of Brahman. But yes, the laws of logic are true. They can't not be, because they're just definitions (of "is", "or", and "not"). They're true in the same way "God is the omnipotent omniscient omnibenevolent creator of the universe" and "Unicorns are animals that look like white horses with one horn" are true. Now, the concepts of "is", "or" and "not" encode our thoughts much more deeply than "God" and "unicorn", which is why they're much more important definitions. But one can, and logicians have, constructed alternate logical languages with differently-defined operators, and - here's the kicker - those languages can all describe the same reality. They don't constrain reality. Just like the natural human languages can all describe the same reality, and don't constrain it.
It presumes only that the word "not" (and the other words in the statement) mean something.
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Are you even a proponent of determinism? Why get into a debate on something that you may or may not even agree with?? Regardless, I've posted some reasons below for why I reject determinism... at least, from what little I can recall about determinism. Seriously, it's been years...
Ok...? My request for specifics was that you provide me statements that I made that were subjective in nature so I could better understand why you're saying this. I don't intuitively recognize the difference between a subjective and an objective statement, and you seem to be able to, so if you could help me out a little...?
To be clear, your differentiation between the laws of thought and ontology is the differentiation between the concepts of meaning (i.e. language/definition) and the concepts of existing (i.e. being)? At the end of the day, though, it is somewhat of a moot distinction. The only reason we have defintions is because we are using the definitions to organize our observations regarding reality. Euclid's first postulate is a definition that allows him to easily reference an observable reality, namely, a straight line segment. It's no different than the segmenting of time into seconds, minutes, and hours or length into its various units. These have standard definitions, all of which are based on observable realities. The concept of "not" is only meaningful when understanding it as an opposite to something that "is." So then, our definitions, our laws of thought, our axioms, they are but a means of organizing our thoughts about reality into cogent, succinct concepts. The point that I'm trying to make regarding God is that I believe it to be possible for Him to create a different reality where our observations led us to generate a language that centered on illogic rather than logic. This is not a reality that we can envision because it goes against the very core of our language and observable reality. My affirmation is not that I can envision it, only that I believe it to be within the realm of that which He is capable.
To try to tie this back around, one of the main reasons I reject determinism is because determinism denies the concept of a true will. I have spent hours debating with other Christians on the theological implications of determinism, and one of the conclusions I walked away with is that they believe whole-heartedly in the scenario you posited. Choice is determined either out of necessity or by random chance. They affirm necessity. When I denied it, their ultimate question to me was "then how do you make a decision? Is it by chance? If not by chance, what is the mechanism by which it is done?" My answer to them, which is similar to my answer to you, is that God has imbued us as human beings with the creative power to make a decision from our will. It is not a function of necessity or of chance but rather of the very same power that was used to freely create our universe as He saw fit. Free will does not collapse into the probabilistic nature of necessity or chance because it is not a function of probability. It is a function of autonomy. Why did Miley Cyrus choose make a music video of her riding a wrecking ball naked? The world may never know... but the only rational explanation I can provide is that she chose, of her God-given will, to do so. Sure, there were other things influencing her decision (recommendations from other artists, the money aspect, making an impact with image, and so forth), but she at some point in time had to exercise her will to say yay or nay.
The implications of collapsing will into probability is staggering. If decisions are made out of necessity or chance, then we have no control and accountability for actions taken goes right out the window. On what grounds do we hold accountable a man for doing something that was either a) necessitated by all the influences on his desire or b) randomly generated by some unknown function? For our reality to have meaning, and for our sanity as a society, the only viable answer is that we as people make decisions of our will, and that choice is something that we can be held accountable for because it is uniquely identifiable to us. I cannot blame chance or necessity. I can only blame my will, my choice, my decision.
Daniel
A few thoughts:
1. Saying that our reality only has meaning if we have free will doesn't stand up on its own. You gotta give us a "why" if you want to be convincing. Why wouldn't reality function just fine sans accountability and true decision making? Think of it this way, you are trying to convince me that some sort of unidentified phenomenon provides us with decision-making capabilities that exist outside of the cause-effect cascades that rule the rest of the physical world. I'm open to believing in that thing, as I'm as caught up in free-will (or its illusion) as everyone else. But you have to present a strong case.
2. It isn't that the decisions are made by chance, it is that the decisions themselves are an illusion. You don't have them at all, you just feel like you do. In fact the whole process if far more orderly, less reliant on chance, than the process you would have me believe (i.e. that there is some sort of individual free will mechanism that functions independent of the typical physical influences).
3. Even if you believe in determinism it doesn't mean the end of society. Because you don't have to assign blame to someone to recognize their behavior as problematic and be compelled to correct it. In effect you can still hold individuals accountable, even if you don't believe that they truly made a choice.
Objective: "I think x is true because [evidence, reasoning]."
This is an example of a subjective statement:
BS then pointed out why a classical determinist would disagree. To which you responded with another subjective statement:
Let's imagine we were in a debate thread about Putin's Russia invading Crimea:
bitterroot: I think it's a good thing Russia invaded. The Russian form of government is the best in the world, so they should invade all of Ukraine and everyone would be better off.
BS: Why do you say the Russian form of government is the best in the world? Some smart people who have thought about this stuff would disagree with you. What would you say in response to their arguments?
bitterroot: I reject their arguments.
BS: Why?
bitterroot: Just because you don't agree with my opinions on things doesn't mean that I didn't think through and weigh the opinions of both perspectives. You don't know me or the level of research I have or haven't done. And I'm certainly entitled to reject perspectives that I disagree with.
Do you see how this is incredibly unproductive? No one on either side has gained anything from the debate. A debate is only worth anyone's time if people actually support their positions and address opposing positions.
Exactly. I'm not sure how you think this supports your position, but it's definitely consistent with what I've been saying.
"Possibility" is itself a logical concept. If a description of reality contains no contradictions, we say it's "possible". If it does, we say it is "impossible". To say that a contradiction is possible is like saying that a unicorn has two horns - you're just using the word wrong. And if we're in the game of using words wrong, I can just as easily say that this description you call "possible" is simultaneously "impossible" - by which I don't mean it contains a contradiction, but something else entirely. What do I mean? You don't know!
And you don't see any problem with this statement. And that's a problem.
I'm now going to explain what "begging the question" is in first-week-of-Phil-101 detail. If you think I'm patronizing you, I'm sorry, but at this point I can only say that you have it coming.
A philosophical debate consists in people trying to find the correct answer to a question. In our case, the question is "Do we have free will?" People will propose various answers, develop arguments in support of those answers, and try to refute the arguments for different answers. So we have the determinists saying "No, we don't have free will because [reasons]", and the libertarians looking for mistakes in those reasons. If there is a mistake, then they can reject determinism. Now, you come along and say that you reject determinism because it denies free will. But is that a mistake? It's only a mistake if it's incorrect - if we in fact have free will. So the question becomes: do we have free will? But "Do we have free will?" is exactly the question that we started debating in the first place, and coming back to it like this just brings our debate in a big circle and gets us nowhere - determinists say no, libertarians say yes, and off we go again. Which is why we call this fallacy "begging the question". Or "circular reasoning". Or "assuming the conclusion". Whatever we call it, it is argumentative suicide.
What is the substantial difference between what she did and what a flipping coin does? You're not explaining it, you're just asserting it. Tell us what free will is without using the word "will" or any of its synonyms (like "autonomy").
And this is another fallacy called the appeal to consequences. You're saying that a proposition must be true because if it were false, that would lead to undesirable things. This is fallacious because sometimes things actually are undesirable. What you're doing here is a precise formal equivalent to this argument: "If we do not have a cure for cancer, then people will suffer and die of the disease. But it's undesirable for people to suffer and die. Therefore, we must have a cure for cancer."
That's the first problem with this argument. The second is that it's not at all clear that a denial of free will implies a denial of accountability. There are a number of determinist arguments that it doesn't. But even if it does, well, maybe it's just the unfortunate truth that we don't have accountability. We can't disregard that possibility simply because we don't like it.
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Basically, god is supposed to be omnipotent and can therefore do ANYTHING and EVERYTHING.
My premise is that a maximally great being that can create the universe and everything in it from a state of non-existence is more powerful than a god who merely exists and does it. Because, you know, this particular god doesn’t exist, and yet it still created the universe! That makes it more powerful than a god that exists.
Therefore god does not exist.
Within logic, yes.
I don't see how that makes any sense.
We can also reject " 'ought' implies 'can' ", or modify how we interpret it. Determinists say that all actions flow from a causal process, but words and ideas may be part of that causal process. Thinking about something causes you to think about something else, which causes you to think about something else, and so on. So thinking about what you ought to do may be what causes you to do it, where otherwise you wouldn't. And if you don't do what you ought to - well, how is that a problem, exactly? People don't do what they ought to all the time under just about any theory of morality.
He's not the first person to advance that rebuttal. It makes about as much sense as the ontological argument itself - which is the point.
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Yeah, but same thing applies: if everything is determined already, then what is the point of saying that anyone "should do" anything? If you can't do anything other than what is already set that you will do, then you have no control over what you will do, right? And if you won't do anything other than what you will do, which you cannot control anyway, there is no "should do," because no other course is physically possible. It is only "will do" or "won't do," but there is no "choose to do," and therefore there is no "should do," because no one has any actual influence over his or her actions.
Gotcha.
Define "point". Why does it matter whether there is a "point" or not?
That may be an overly aggressive reading of determinism. "Already set" is loaded and potentially misleading terminology - determinism is not the same thing as predetermination. And the causal entities directly controlling what you do are, well, parts of you. (Hence "define 'you' " above.)
A tautology which is true no matter one's stance on free will, and which like any tautology should not be overinterpreted.
You're begging the question again here. You're invoking "ought implies can" in order to argue for "ought implies can".
Furthermore, define "should", "choose", and (again) "influence".
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
This is absurd. If I bodyjack someone like in a science fiction movie, is that person morally responsible for everything I force them to do? Of course not, because they are not choosing to act the way they are. They have no choice in their actions. They have no control in what they are doing, and therefore they cannot be morally responsible for their actions.
The same principle applies here. If a random number generator/dice/some other form of chance controls what it is we do, then we are not in control of what we do. Therefore, we cannot be said to have choice in anything. Therefore, we cannot be held morally accountable for our actions.
In what way?
You know, the capacity to have an effect on.
*Sigh* Is this really necessary?
What possible meaning could any ethical statement have in a world where no group of people has control over their actions? If one cannot choose an action, then what results is out of one's control, right? So if what results is out of one's control, how can any person be held morally accountable for one's actions?
Ok, I guess we have different definitions of determinism, because I have heard determinism defined by its contrast to free will, that the outcome of a situation is controlled by factors that do not include choice, and that all things are action and reaction based on external factors.
Are you defining determinism to be otherwise?
Alright, I'll reword: "If you cannot do anything other than what has been set that you will do..." Although, you called that into question above.
I guess "obligated to."
To select from a number of possibilities.
See above.
If that's the definition, then even a falling rock has influence.
If we're going to be debating internal vs. external causes for action, then yes, figuring out what is internal to you is very necessary.
Depends how you read ethical statements. Under utilitarianism, for instance, an ethical statement read as a statement of the net utility of a given action is perfectly coherent.
The same way they're held accountable if the results are under their control. It's not like we physically can't send people to jail or whatever if they're automata. The jail's still there; it still works just fine. In order to make your case, you need to elucidate the problem with doing this.
Well, we've already touched on "external factors" above. And what do we mean by "choice"? Couldn't choice be "action and reaction" of an internal sort? Scientifically speaking, the brain certainly doesn't magically produce impulses out of nowhere; the neural network fires in patterns that are predictable (in principle, although vastly complex and chaotic). Does this mean that we don't have "choice", or does it mean that "choice" isn't what we thought it was? What did we think it was? What would be different about us if we had it?
"Already set" implies that a decision has been made, in the past, by somebody else. That's much more than determinism commits to.
It doesn't seem implausible prima facie that one might have impossible obligations. Indeed, quite a bit of classical literature is based on this premise.
"Select" is just a synonym for "choose".
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
You know what peruse them at your own leisure here.
Lecture notes. Wonderful.
"What is the explanation of the correlation between physical and psychical properties? Presumably there is an explanation of it; but also it will have to be, as Adams and Swinburne say, a personal, nonscientific explanation. The most plausible suggestion would involve our being created that way by God."
That is not an argument.
"Lewis speaks of the nostalgia that often engulfs us upon beholding a splendid land or seascape; these somehow speak to us of their maker. Not sure just what the argument is; but suspect there is one there."
What the actual **** am I supposed to do with that?
...Bakgat, I'll tell you what: why don't you select some of the arguments that you think are most convincing, and post them here in your own words so you can defend them to the best of your ability. It'd be a hell of a lot more productive than me trying to make sense of what Plantinga wrote for his own use (or, for that matter, what Craig wrote just to be a dick to Dawkins).
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
A falling rock has influence over a great many things. The outcome of a Gorn fight. One's position in a race on Choco Mountain. Whether or not a coyote can catch a roadrunner.
However, what a falling rock does not have influence over is whether or not it is falling. A falling rock cannot, by conscious action, be or not be a falling rock. Like just about everything else, once gravity takes hold, it falls.
Indeed, a falling rock cannot take conscious actions. It's not conscious, and even if it were, it has no means of action.
Ok, I don't know.
The issue is not the ethical statement's coherency. Yes, utilitarian statements, like any other ethical statement, would have coherency, we could read it and understand what it, but that's not the point. If no one has control over their actions, they have no control over what they will do. If they have no control over what they will do, then saying that they "should do" something has no value. Ethics has a very cypher of a purpose if no one actually can control what they can do.
"Rock is morally incorrect for choosing to fall" is coherent. We can understand what it's saying. It is, however, completely absurd.
That doesn't make any sense. If they perform a morally incorrect action by their own free will, we are justified to hold them accountable. If they perform an action dubbed morally incorrect when they are not in control of their own actions, we are not justified to hold them accountable because they are not accountable. They are not in control of what they do.
Now, granted, we could still hold them accountable without caring whether or not we're morally justified in doing so, but that sort of proves what I've been saying: no free will = **** ETHICS.
That's a stretch.
I mean, unless you believe that choice can only exist in a dualistic universe and not a materialistic one, I don't see a problem with that.
It is inherently absurd for you to say that the rock is morally wrong for falling. The rock has no power over whether or not it falls. It cannot choose to fall. Therefore, to say the rock has performed a wrongful action by falling is inherently absurd.
If we're banning synonyms to define something, we might as well throw out dictionaries.
Why, do you have a definition for choose that uses no synonyms for choose?
Correct. However, you said nothing of consciousness in your definition.
Arguing that something has no value or purpose is very different than arguing that the thing is impossible. It's very possible for something to exist with no value; tons of things do.
And how are you evaluating "value", anyway?
Why? If there's a difference between absurdity and incoherence, I don't know what it is. And what I was saying is that it's not absurd under a certain utilitarian reading. You can compare how much good the rock caused and how much harm the rock caused, concluding that the fall of the rock created negative utility - was morally wrong, under a utilitarian understanding of "morally wrong".
Your reasoning here is completely circular. You're using the proposition that we can't be held accountable if we don't have free will to justify the proposition that we can't be held accountable if we don't have free will.
In fact, if we don't have free will, we don't have any choice in the matter.
It's how the brain actually works.
It's absolutely standard philosophical practice. Otherwise, we'd have such illuminating conversations as, "What is a god?" "A deity." "Okay, so what is a deity?" "A god."
If I don't, that's precisely the problem. In order for the notion of "choice" to be coherent, we have to be able to analyze it - break it down into the properties or components that define it, so we can recognize it more rigorously than just "I know it when I see it".
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Yes. The brain is essentially a computer, you're only going to get out what's programmed in. The mistake people always seem to make is that they think somehow a lack of free will undermine morality or ethics, but morality and ethics are a vital part of both the decision making process and the function of society. Society only exists because we've evolved these traits. They're essentially what puts a check on base instincts (our firmware, so to speak) when we make decisions. That morality is defined partially by our environment and partially by our brain's chemistry. When we punish our children for stealing, for instance, we're essentially training the way their brain thinks about their actions.
Part of the problem with 'free will' is that it tends to ignore or gloss over the outliers. Psychopaths have an altered morality because their brains are physically different from the average person's. Psychopaths can be 'trained' to respect social norms, but they don't 'feel' their morality in the same way the rest of us do. So do they actually have free will any more than a dog who has been trained not to poop on the carpet does?
When we assign 'blame' for an action to an individual, it's not because there is an invisible slate tallying our good and bad. We're 'morally' justified in holding people accountable for their actions because the entire point of morality is to perpetuate positive social norms. Holding people accountable for their actions serves to mold their future behavior and reinforce acceptable behaviors in others.
TerribleBad at Magic since 1998.A Vorthos Guide to Magic Story | Twitter | Tumblr
[Primer] Krenko | Azor | Kess | Zacama | Kumena | Sram | The Ur-Dragon | Edgar Markov | Daretti | Marath
I think BS did a good job of responding to your points, but I just want to add that saying "people don't have free will" is not equivalent to saying "people can't make choices."
For example, let's look at a little bacterium or other single-celled organism. This organism doesn't have a brain or consciousness, and clearly it doesn't have free will. But it's still a complex little biological machine that will respond to stimuli and exhibit "behaviors" we can study.
If you have a single-celled organism in a dish, and you want it to go right instead of left, you can make it do that. You can put some kind of food source to the right, for instance, and it will tend to go toward the food. Alternatively, you can put some kind of irritating or caustic chemical to the left, and it will go right to get away from the chemical.
You can coherently read moral statements as accomplishing the same goals as our incentives for the little organism. If we want people to not lie, for example, we as a society can decide "lying is morally wrong" and teach this fact to people. Since humans are social animals, the mere fact that society condemns lying will act like that caustic chemical in the petri dish. People will choose to lie less because society has deemed it a condemnable behavior, just like the simple little organism "chose" to go right to get away from the bad chemical. If you really want to deter a behavior, you can add extra punishments, like a prison sentence for murder. This creates an even stronger incentive for people to avoid those behaviors.
I think you're reading determinism as a denial of choice. It's clearly not.
Actually, I think the dog displays a canine psychological relative of human morality. We don't want to anthropomorphize, so we need to be careful what we attribute to them, but they clearly respond to social cues in morality-like ways: they get sad when you scold them, and seem capable of feeling shame. (Well, most dogs. Mine is utterly shameless.) Which shouldn't really be surprising, given their kinship to us and their own society-based survival strategy.
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
I think that's fair. I don't mean to oversimplify, the brain is definitely a chaotic system. My point was only that humans are going to make decisions largely based on the influence of nature and nurture. Being an organic system, it won't always be consistent. But I also don't think there is some kind of magic other factor that affects someone's thinking.
That said, when we say the brain is 'unpredictable', I think what we mean is 'unpredictable by human beings right now'. It's reasonable to assume with sufficiently advanced technology we could map a brain pretty accurately and create a model that would mimic thought patterns. Our understanding of neuroscience is advancing at a pretty rapid pace.
Actually, I think the dog displays a canine psychological relative of human morality. We don't want to anthropomorphize, so we need to be careful what we attribute to them, but they clearly respond to social cues in morality-like ways: they get sad when you scold them, and seem capable of feeling shame. (Well, most dogs. Mine is utterly shameless.) Which shouldn't really be surprising, given their kinship to us and their own society-based survival strategy.[/quote]
I'm glad you brought that up, because dogs are a product of human cohabitation, and they definitely show moral-like behavior. The difference is that the trait is, perhaps, artificially selected. We kept the wolves that seemed more 'human' to us, and selected the traits we preferred.
Many animals do show signs of moral behavior, especially other social omnivores like higher primates or elephants (or even Dolphins, but they're kind of sociopaths). While I wouldn't say as full blown as human morality (as we've gotten REALLY complex), basic empathy is a huge boon for social animals.
I think the issue with 'free will' here is that free will is the definition. I had always thought it was only meant to imply freedom from outside interference, specifically that God would let us make our own choices. I think being able to predict my choices doesn't affect my free will, being able to manipulate those choices does.
TerribleBad at Magic since 1998.A Vorthos Guide to Magic Story | Twitter | Tumblr
[Primer] Krenko | Azor | Kess | Zacama | Kumena | Sram | The Ur-Dragon | Edgar Markov | Daretti | Marath
And just in case there was any confusion about whether or not God really did promote free will, that was cleared up with comments about how he 'hardened the heart' of the pharaoh and others to influence their decisions.
My G Yisan, the Bard of Death G deck.
My BUGWR Hermit druid BUGWR deck.