For example, what would I do personally if I heard God tell me to tie my son to an altar and sacrifice him? I would seek psychiatric counseling for hearing voices that told me to commit horrible acts against my own child. I would do so specifically because I would know those voices definitely weren't coming from God. It could not be God, because God would not command such a thing.
Suppose that one of your beliefs about the nature of God is incorrect (you're certainly not infallible, so we should agree this is possible), and God decides one day that he wants to set you straight on that point. Is there any form of evidence he could present you with to do so, or would you simply assume that any message or evidence which does not precisely match your belief about the nature of God must not be coming from God?
I'm not a believer, but that a "loving" God would ask for a human sacrifice doesn't make sense to me either. Just curious where does your understanding of God come from?
Suppose that one of your beliefs about the nature of God is incorrect (you're certainly not infallible, so we should agree this is possible), and God decides one day that he wants to set you straight on that point. Is there any form of evidence he could present you with to do so, or would you simply assume that any message or evidence which does not precisely match your belief about the nature of God must not be coming from God?
For God to demonstrate that he's not omnipotent, not omnibenevolent, not omniscient, or not any of the three? Yeah, he certainly could.
So then you don't believe God is the arbiter of morality but instead is held to some external standard?
I suppose so. I mean, I don't believe in Divine Command Theory.
But I guess my problem with this dichotomy has always been that if we then say, "Well then God must be held to some external standard," my question becomes, "Well what is that standard, exactly? From whence does it come?" And I'm not saying God is the only possible source of morality, I'm asking from whence does morality come?
Suppose that one of your beliefs about the nature of God is incorrect (you're certainly not infallible, so we should agree this is possible), and God decides one day that he wants to set you straight on that point. Is there any form of evidence he could present you with to do so, or would you simply assume that any message or evidence which does not precisely match your belief about the nature of God must not be coming from God?
For God to demonstrate that he's not omnipotent, not omnibenevolent, not omniscient, or not any of the three? Yeah, he certainly could.
So then suppose God does so, convinces you he's down with child sacrifice, and then asks you to do it. Do you decide that God is no longer worth obeying, or do you decide that child sacrifice is maybe okay if God is so gung-ho about it?
So then suppose God does so, convinces you he's down with child sacrifice, and then asks you to do it. Do you decide that God is no longer worth obeying
So then suppose God does so, convinces you he's down with child sacrifice, and then asks you to do it. Do you decide that God is no longer worth obeying
Yes.
No chance that God knows right from wrong better than you since he's all-knowing?
So then you don't believe God is the arbiter of morality but instead is held to some external standard?
I suppose so. I mean, I don't believe in Divine Command Theory.
But I guess my problem with this dichotomy has always been that if we then say, "Well then God must be held to some external standard," my question becomes, "Well what is that standard, exactly? From whence does it come?" And I'm not saying God is the only possible source of morality, I'm asking from whence does morality come?
This sort of reminds me of the paradox "if God made the universe, in where did God exist before that?" The only logical answer to that I believe is "within himself" which would mean that God isn't just an awareness but a place also.
So using this logic, God doesn't have to adhere to some external morality to himself if he is himself morality also.
To me, this seems to be the only logically consistent solution to the paradox you presented.
Ok, justify to me how straight up murdering my own kid is right.
I'm not God.
I know. That's rather the point, though, isn't it? This situation came from you, not God. And notice how you can't justify how me murdering my own progeny is the right thing.
This sort of reminds me of the paradox "if God made the universe, in where did God exist before that?" The only logical answer to that I believe is "within himself" which would mean that God isn't just an awareness but a place also.
So using this logic, God doesn't have to adhere to some external morality to himself if he is himself morality also.
To me, this seems to be the only logically consistent solution to the paradox you presented.
I wouldn't say I presented a paradox. I just asked a question: from whence does morality come?
And again, I don't mean this to mean that there must be a God or else there is no morality. I'm just asking from whence it comes.
Ok, justify to me how straight up murdering my own kid is right.
I'm not God.
I know. That's rather the point, though, isn't it? This situation came from you, not God. And notice how you can't justify how me murdering my own progeny is the right thing.
Right, so what I'm suggesting is that if God is much more intelligent than us, even omniscient, we shouldn't be that surprised if he has an understanding of morality that none of us can justify or understand. However, if we believe he's much more intelligent than us, then shouldn't we trust him on it?
Right, so what I'm suggesting is that if God is much more intelligent than us, even omniscient, we shouldn't be that surprised if he has an understanding of morality that none of us can justify or understand. However, if we believe he's much more intelligent than us, then shouldn't we trust him on it?
Assuming it is actually God who is speaking and not Tiax? Also, assuming God is omnibenevolent, which would immediately come under question if God were to command murder of a child?
Then God should have no problem justifying to a human being why one should follow a command that appears so blatantly wrong, so contradictory to God's previous commands, and so out of character for God to ask.
I'm also going to stress the fact that God is talking in this scenario. Literally speaking. With a voice. While this is surely not impossible for an omnipotent being, it's not something I've ever known God to do. I've heard as much from other Christians, that they've gone their whole lives never hearing God literally talk with a voice.
So, no, I'm defaulting on serious-ass skepticism about this whole deal until extraordinary evidence is provided otherwise.
Assuming it is actually God who is speaking and not Tiax? Also, assuming God is omnibenevolent, which would immediately come under question if God were to command murder of a child?
Then God should have no problem justifying to a human being why one should follow a command that appears so blatantly wrong, so contradictory to God's previous commands, and so out of character for God to ask.
I'm also going to stress the fact that God is talking in this scenario. Literally speaking. With a voice. While this is surely not impossible for an omnipotent being, it's not something I've ever known God to do. I've heard as much from other Christians, that they've gone their whole lives never hearing God literally talk with a voice.
So, no, I'm defaulting on serious-ass skepticism about this whole deal until extraordinary evidence is provided otherwise.
In the story (which I know you don't think is literal, but bear with me), God seems to actually speak to Abraham and even show him where to do the sacrifice. Certainly this would go pretty far towards avoiding the "maybe I'm just hearing things" concern. God does not, however, seem to give any sort of moral or ethical argument. Rather, Abraham goes along with it because he trusts that God knows what is best. If we accept that God is all-knowing, doesn't his proclamation that sacrificing your child is the thing to do make for as rock-solid of a justification as one could imagine?
[quote]In the story (which I know you don't think is literal, but bear with me),
Actually I do believe it's literal. However, I don't believe it's true. Likewise, I believe that Genesis 1 is a story about God literally creating the universe in six days. I believe the story is literal. I don't believe the story is true.
Now, as to what you posted, I see a problem here:
Quote from Tiax »
Suppose that one of your beliefs about the nature of God is incorrect (you're certainly not infallible, so we should agree this is possible), and God decides one day that he wants to set you straight on that point. Is there any form of evidence he could present you with to do so, or would you simply assume that any message or evidence which does not precisely match your belief about the nature of God must not be coming from God?
In the story (which I know you don't think is literal, but bear with me), God seems to actually speak to Abraham and even show him where to do the sacrifice. Certainly this would go pretty far towards avoiding the "maybe I'm just hearing things" concern. God does not, however, seem to give any sort of moral or ethical argument. Rather, Abraham goes along with it because he trusts that God knows what is best. If we accept that God is all-knowing, doesn't his proclamation that sacrificing your child is the thing to do make for as rock-solid of a justification as one could imagine?
First, you asked me to assume that one of my beliefs about the nature of God may be incorrect because I am clearly not infallible.
Now you are saying that I am simply to accept that God is all-knowing and is acting benevolently in his command for me to slaughter my own child without questioning?
How can I question my beliefs about the nature of God and yet follow a belief about the nature of God unquestioningly, Tiax? I'm confused.
First, you asked me to assume that one of my beliefs about the nature of God may be incorrect because I am clearly not infallible.
Now you are saying that I am simply to accept that God is all-knowing and is acting benevolently in his command for me to slaughter my own child without questioning?
How can I question my beliefs about the nature of God and yet follow a belief about the nature of God unquestioningly, Tiax? I'm confused.
Sure, so the thing being questioned is not necessarily whether God is omni-whatever. Instead, you're re-evaluating whether you understand precisely what he wants, and therefore what exactly omni-benevolence entails. In other words, if you're mistaken about whether a particular act is moral or immoral, God and you will disagree about that act, but he would still be omni-benevolent. So, the belief about the nature of God being questioned is what you believe God thinks about child sacrifice.
Assuming it is actually God who is speaking and not Tiax? Also, assuming God is omnibenevolent, which would immediately come under question if God were to command murder of a child?
Then God should have no problem justifying to a human being why one should follow a command that appears so blatantly wrong, so contradictory to God's previous commands, and so out of character for God to ask.
The "devil's advocate" answer would be:
God works in mysterious ways. God's logic for demanding this act is clearly beyond your human comprehension. And while you as a man cannot coneceive of any reason to slaughter your own child, perhaps there are reasons fathomable by God to order this. And since I'm not God either I can't give you a reason to commit this heinous act either./playing devil's advocate
Just curious Roller, what do you believe the nature of God to be as far as omniscience/omnipotence/infallibility/etc is?
Although it looks like we're all in agreement that there is no human conceivable reason to murder your own kid, yay@
Sure, so the thing being questioned is not necessarily whether God is omni-whatever. Instead, you're re-evaluating whether you understand precisely what he wants, and therefore what exactly omni-benevolence entails. In other words, if you're mistaken about whether a particular act is moral or immoral, God and you will disagree about that act, but he would still be omni-benevolent. So, the belief about the nature of God being questioned is what you believe God thinks about child sacrifice.
As I said before, God is more than welcome to make a compelling argument that killing my kid is something I should do.
Do you know where the idea that God wouldn't ask someone to do this again comes from?
Haven't seen anyone really address this question, so here's the standard answer from Christain theology:
The Jewish faith included the regular sacrifice of animals as tribute to God. Christians interpret the death of Jesus as an "ultimate" or "final" sacrifice that obviated the need for any further sacrifices to God. Therefore, post-Jesus, God would never command anyone to sacrifice anything (human or animal) because to do so would repudiate the sacrifice of Christ. It would be like God saying "go tell everyone the Bible is BS and they should sin as much as possible"; this would be antithetical to the nature of the Christian god.
As I said before, God is more than welcome to make a compelling argument that killing my kid is something I should do.
Barring that, not murdering my kid.
Isn't the argument that goes "I'm God and I'm omnibenevolent and omniscient and I say that killing your kid is something you should do" about as compelling as one can get? If you accept that God really is omnibenevolent and omniscient, then he can't be wrong about what you should do.
Do you know where the idea that God wouldn't ask someone to do this again comes from?
Haven't seen anyone really address this question, so here's the standard answer from Christain theology:
The Jewish faith included the regular sacrifice of animals as tribute to God. Christians interpret the death of Jesus as an "ultimate" or "final" sacrifice that obviated the need for any further sacrifices to God. Therefore, post-Jesus, God would never command anyone to sacrifice anything (human or animal) because to do so would repudiate the sacrifice of Christ. It would be like God saying "go tell everyone the Bible is BS and they should sin as much as possible"; this would be antithetical to the nature of the Christian god.
Isn't the argument that goes "I'm God and I'm omnibenevolent and omniscient and I say that killing your kid is something you should do" about as compelling as one can get? If you accept that God really is omnibenevolent and omniscient, then he can't be wrong about what you should do.
Suppose an omniscient bachelor honestly claims to be married. Is he married? Then he's not a bachelor. Is he unmarried? Then he's either not omniscient or not honest.
This is not a reductio of omniscience, honesty, or bachelorhood; it's a reductio of the notion that an honest, omniscient bachelor could ever make that claim. So if your argument shows anything, it's that God literally cannot ask for a child sacrifice. It's logically impossible.
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A limit of time is fixed for thee
Which if thou dost not use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind
It will go and thou wilt go, never to return.
Suppose an omniscient bachelor honestly claims to be married. Is he married? Then he's not a bachelor. Is he unmarried? Then he's either not omniscient or not honest.
This is not a reductio of omniscience, honesty, or bachelorhood; it's a reductio of the notion that an honest, omniscient bachelor could ever make that claim. So if your argument shows anything, it's that God literally cannot ask for a child sacrifice. It's logically impossible.
Only if we start with the premise that child sacrifice is unquestionably immoral. If we are willing to entertain the notion that it might not be, then God's say so seems to constitute a pretty compelling argument that it is not immoral.
Only if we start with the premise that child sacrifice is unquestionably immoral. If we are willing to entertain the notion that it might not be, then God's say so seems to constitute a pretty compelling argument that it is not immoral.
First, why should we be willing to entertain that notion? I'd no more entertain that notion than I would the notion that 2+2=5 in Peano arithmetic, or there exists a married bachelor.
Second, this looks like a standard argumentum ad verecundiam to me. If we're ultimately going to ground morality in logic, then everyone has to justify their moral claims, even God. "Because I said so" is not a formally sound argumentative technique.
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A limit of time is fixed for thee
Which if thou dost not use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind
It will go and thou wilt go, never to return.
First, why should we be willing to entertain that notion? I'd no more entertain that notion than I would the notion that 2+2=5 in Peano arithmetic, or there exists a married bachelor.
Really? You think "not child sacrifice" is the basic-level definition of morality? I tend to think the proposition "Don't sacrifice children", while still absolutely true, is a little more derived than that. It's the Pythagorean Theorem, not the Parallel Postulate.
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Vive, vale. Siquid novisti rectius istis,
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Really? You think "not child sacrifice" is the basic-level definition of morality? I tend to think the proposition "Don't sacrifice children", while still absolutely true, is a little more derived than that. It's the Pythagorean Theorem, not the Parallel Postulate.
Sure, I'll grant that it's more likely that "don't sacrifice children" is a (non-axiomatic) theorem than an axiom -- but that doesn't seem to change the argument. 2+2=4 is not an axiom of Peano arithmetic, yet I wouldn't accept "2+2=5 because I said so," even from someone who was ostensibly God. Omniscience is an impressive quality, but it doesn't serve to falsify the things that we non-omniscient folks do know.
Suppose that one of your beliefs about the nature of God is incorrect (you're certainly not infallible, so we should agree this is possible), and God decides one day that he wants to set you straight on that point. Is there any form of evidence he could present you with to do so, or would you simply assume that any message or evidence which does not precisely match your belief about the nature of God must not be coming from God?
For God to demonstrate that he's not omnipotent, not omnibenevolent, not omniscient, or not any of the three? Yeah, he certainly could.
I suppose so. I mean, I don't believe in Divine Command Theory.
But I guess my problem with this dichotomy has always been that if we then say, "Well then God must be held to some external standard," my question becomes, "Well what is that standard, exactly? From whence does it come?" And I'm not saying God is the only possible source of morality, I'm asking from whence does morality come?
So then suppose God does so, convinces you he's down with child sacrifice, and then asks you to do it. Do you decide that God is no longer worth obeying, or do you decide that child sacrifice is maybe okay if God is so gung-ho about it?
No chance that God knows right from wrong better than you since he's all-knowing?
I'm not God.
This sort of reminds me of the paradox "if God made the universe, in where did God exist before that?" The only logical answer to that I believe is "within himself" which would mean that God isn't just an awareness but a place also.
So using this logic, God doesn't have to adhere to some external morality to himself if he is himself morality also.
To me, this seems to be the only logically consistent solution to the paradox you presented.
I wouldn't say I presented a paradox. I just asked a question: from whence does morality come?
And again, I don't mean this to mean that there must be a God or else there is no morality. I'm just asking from whence it comes.
Right, so what I'm suggesting is that if God is much more intelligent than us, even omniscient, we shouldn't be that surprised if he has an understanding of morality that none of us can justify or understand. However, if we believe he's much more intelligent than us, then shouldn't we trust him on it?
Then God should have no problem justifying to a human being why one should follow a command that appears so blatantly wrong, so contradictory to God's previous commands, and so out of character for God to ask.
I'm also going to stress the fact that God is talking in this scenario. Literally speaking. With a voice. While this is surely not impossible for an omnipotent being, it's not something I've ever known God to do. I've heard as much from other Christians, that they've gone their whole lives never hearing God literally talk with a voice.
So, no, I'm defaulting on serious-ass skepticism about this whole deal until extraordinary evidence is provided otherwise.
In the story (which I know you don't think is literal, but bear with me), God seems to actually speak to Abraham and even show him where to do the sacrifice. Certainly this would go pretty far towards avoiding the "maybe I'm just hearing things" concern. God does not, however, seem to give any sort of moral or ethical argument. Rather, Abraham goes along with it because he trusts that God knows what is best. If we accept that God is all-knowing, doesn't his proclamation that sacrificing your child is the thing to do make for as rock-solid of a justification as one could imagine?
Actually I do believe it's literal. However, I don't believe it's true. Likewise, I believe that Genesis 1 is a story about God literally creating the universe in six days. I believe the story is literal. I don't believe the story is true.
Now, as to what you posted, I see a problem here:
First, you asked me to assume that one of my beliefs about the nature of God may be incorrect because I am clearly not infallible.
Now you are saying that I am simply to accept that God is all-knowing and is acting benevolently in his command for me to slaughter my own child without questioning?
How can I question my beliefs about the nature of God and yet follow a belief about the nature of God unquestioningly, Tiax? I'm confused.
Sure, so the thing being questioned is not necessarily whether God is omni-whatever. Instead, you're re-evaluating whether you understand precisely what he wants, and therefore what exactly omni-benevolence entails. In other words, if you're mistaken about whether a particular act is moral or immoral, God and you will disagree about that act, but he would still be omni-benevolent. So, the belief about the nature of God being questioned is what you believe God thinks about child sacrifice.
The "devil's advocate" answer would be:
God works in mysterious ways. God's logic for demanding this act is clearly beyond your human comprehension. And while you as a man cannot coneceive of any reason to slaughter your own child, perhaps there are reasons fathomable by God to order this. And since I'm not God either I can't give you a reason to commit this heinous act either./playing devil's advocate
Just curious Roller, what do you believe the nature of God to be as far as omniscience/omnipotence/infallibility/etc is?
Although it looks like we're all in agreement that there is no human conceivable reason to murder your own kid, yay@
Barring that, not murdering my kid.
Haven't seen anyone really address this question, so here's the standard answer from Christain theology:
The Jewish faith included the regular sacrifice of animals as tribute to God. Christians interpret the death of Jesus as an "ultimate" or "final" sacrifice that obviated the need for any further sacrifices to God. Therefore, post-Jesus, God would never command anyone to sacrifice anything (human or animal) because to do so would repudiate the sacrifice of Christ. It would be like God saying "go tell everyone the Bible is BS and they should sin as much as possible"; this would be antithetical to the nature of the Christian god.
Isn't the argument that goes "I'm God and I'm omnibenevolent and omniscient and I say that killing your kid is something you should do" about as compelling as one can get? If you accept that God really is omnibenevolent and omniscient, then he can't be wrong about what you should do.
Is there a biblical basis for this idea?
Suppose an omniscient bachelor honestly claims to be married. Is he married? Then he's not a bachelor. Is he unmarried? Then he's either not omniscient or not honest.
This is not a reductio of omniscience, honesty, or bachelorhood; it's a reductio of the notion that an honest, omniscient bachelor could ever make that claim. So if your argument shows anything, it's that God literally cannot ask for a child sacrifice. It's logically impossible.
Which if thou dost not use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind
It will go and thou wilt go, never to return.
Only if we start with the premise that child sacrifice is unquestionably immoral. If we are willing to entertain the notion that it might not be, then God's say so seems to constitute a pretty compelling argument that it is not immoral.
First, why should we be willing to entertain that notion? I'd no more entertain that notion than I would the notion that 2+2=5 in Peano arithmetic, or there exists a married bachelor.
Second, this looks like a standard argumentum ad verecundiam to me. If we're ultimately going to ground morality in logic, then everyone has to justify their moral claims, even God. "Because I said so" is not a formally sound argumentative technique.
Which if thou dost not use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind
It will go and thou wilt go, never to return.
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Sure, I'll grant that it's more likely that "don't sacrifice children" is a (non-axiomatic) theorem than an axiom -- but that doesn't seem to change the argument. 2+2=4 is not an axiom of Peano arithmetic, yet I wouldn't accept "2+2=5 because I said so," even from someone who was ostensibly God. Omniscience is an impressive quality, but it doesn't serve to falsify the things that we non-omniscient folks do know.
Which if thou dost not use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind
It will go and thou wilt go, never to return.