I think you are misunderstanding what I am saying.
Like you and your rubber tennis balls, I am not saying the conclusion is silly because all puppies have mothers. I am saying it is silly because changing the genesis of the object -puppies or otherwise- normally changes the classification of an object. If something is created differently, it normally IS different. This general truth was what I was trying to illustrate with my specific example.
But that's just not the case. "All cars on this lot were made in Detroit, therefore all cars are made in Detroit." The heuristic "properties related to the 'genesis' of an object are more inductible" doesn't seem to be a very good heuristic. It's trivial to think of properties related to the creation or genesis of objects that don't hold across an entire class of specimens.
However, -even more general- it would be better if we looked at properties that are normally shared by a collection of objects to draw our conclusions. This way, material makeup -like rubber and DNA- falls into the same category of properties as "has a mother."
What properties are normally shared by a collection of objects? If you are just proposing a list, then your list is vulnerable to attack. For instance, if "properties relating to genesis" is on your list, then I can easily throw out any number of counterexamples showing that such properties aren't shared by large collections of objects.
If you are proposing some metamethod for finding these collections of properties, then you had better make sure, as Hume pointed out, that your method does not rely on induction from similar properties -- otherwise it would be circular.
I object to this for the same reason you would object to me changing your example from "made of rubber" to "made of this exact number of rubber molecules in this exact configuration."
You should object to it. That's kind of the point. Hume showed that the kind of naive induction we're discussing here is incoherent. These are the reasons why. There's no basis for agreement to be had here.
That you're negating the universe you're assuming you're in?
You'd have the problem even if you changed P to "we live in a teleological universe where the Higgs Boson causes gravity."
No, no, no. I thought this would be immediately obvious, but I guess not.
The question before me is whether or not to regard your series of observations of physics simulations (E) as evidence for the hypothesis that the universe is similarly simulated and teleological (P). As a Bayesian, I regard something as evidence only if it is more likely under the hypothesis than its negation.
Well, in this case, I can actually figure out the numbers and see that your observations do not constitute evidence. It turns out we can unconditionally calculate P(E). Regardless of any fact about the universe, every physics simulation is going to be simulated and teleological, because that's just what a physics simulation is. So P(E) = 1.
Thus P(E|P) = P(E|~P) = 1. In other words, you would have seen the same data E regardless of whether or not your hypothesis P was true. And therefore, E is not evidence for P, from a Bayesian perspective.
Because I find a lack of a counterexample more important than the difference between there being 100 or 10,000 examples. If you'd like me to make a rough estimate of the number of numerical simulations which have the same fundamental laws as our universe, I probably could, but I don't feel such an exercise would strengthen my argument. I am currently trying to make an purely inductive argument.
Actually, it's funny that you feel that way about the absence of counterexamples, because I've given you counterexamples to some of your induction heuristics and it seems to roll off your back like water.
That being said, I can see that you feel strongly about that method, even though you don't apply it consistently -- but you should be a great deal more suspicious of conclusions springing from naive induction than you currently are. It's a method with some very well-known problems. Not, mind you, that there is any entirely uncontroversial way of doing inductive reasoning, but out of a series of more or less unpalatable options you've chosen the actual worst one.
But that's just not the case. "All cars on this lot were made in Detroit, therefore all cars are made in Detroit."
What does that have to do with what I'm saying?
Either you're completely misreading me or you are being dishonest in your representation of my point. I am saying "Cars made in Detroit are different from cars made in Japan," not the formal fallacy you've made my point to be. It would be like me saying your argument is akin to "all tennis balls are made of rubber, therefore all rubber things are tennis balls."
Based on our past interactions, I know you really dislike when people ineptly characterize your argument. So, please don't do it to me.
If you are just proposing a list, then your list is vulnerable to attack. For instance, if "properties relating to genesis" is on your list, then I can easily throw out any number of counterexamples showing that such properties aren't shared by large collections of objects.
I am proposing a list using the same logic you used to make your "exogenous vs endogenous," only I'm making it more general. A practice -if I recall- you approve of.
"Made the same way" being something just as often shared by a clarification of objects as "has the same stuff in it."
You should object to it. That's kind of the point. Hume showed that the kind of naive induction we're discussing here is incoherent. These are the reasons why. There's no basis for agreement to be had here.
Maybe I'm being glib in asking, but are you saying both my point and your objection to my point are both incoherent? If that is your (or Hume's) claim, maybe we should be discussing about weather or not our "naive induction" is incoherent instead of continuing down the "exogenous vs endogenous" vain.
Honestly, I'm not even sure why you brought up "exogenous vs endogenous." Even if I were to agree that "exogenous vs endogenous" is the only way to classify classifications, and that exogenism is fundamentally a weaker corollary then endogenism, my next response would be "so?" Even if my exogenous proposal would be "weaker" then a endogenous one, there is no endogenous counterclaim. "Not created for a reason" is just as exogenous as "created for a reason," and "not created for a reason" has no teleological examples.
The question before me is whether or not to regard your series of observations of physics simulations (E) as evidence for the hypothesis that the universe is similarly simulated and teleological (P).
Except I'm not claiming something as specific as "the universe is simulated," nor am I saying only simulated universes can be given as evidence, but go on.
Well, in this case, I can actually figure out the numbers and see that your observations do not constitute evidence. It turns out we can unconditionally calculate P(E). Regardless of any fact about the universe, every physics simulation is going to be simulated and teleological, because that's just what a physics simulation is. So P(E) = 1.
While it is true that every simulated universe is simulated, I am not claiming only simulated universes can be presented as evidence; any universe can. It just so happens all universes with known origins are simulated, but this isn't some kind of requirement I am imposing.
Thus P(E|P) = P(E|~P) = 1. In other words, you would have seen the same data E regardless of whether or not your hypothesis P was true. And therefore, E is not evidence for P, from a Bayesian perspective.
Not all known teleological universes have known origins. This one is an example.
I would also like to just say I am confused by what you mean by "~P." I went back to check to see if you defined it. If the universe we live in is 'P' then it would seem to me '~P' would be a negation of our universe, which doesn't make any sense. It would seem to me you would want to define the theory we are discussing as 'T' or something and then talk about "P(E|T)" and "P(E|~T)." "P(E|~P)" looks super weird to me.
However, I also understand you have a better formal understanding of these kinds of things then I do. So, maybe I just need a more detailed explanation of what you mean.
Actually, it's funny that you feel that way about the absence of counterexamples, because I've given you counterexamples to some of your induction heuristics and it seems to roll off your back like water.
Probably because, as far as I can tell, they've all been strawmen. A true counterclaim would be a teleological universe that was known to be created without reason. Unless I really did gloss over something, you didn't provide one of those (and to my knowledge none exist).
I'm also trying to ignore emotionally provocative statements like:
What does that have to do with what I'm saying?
Either you're completely misreading me or you are being dishonest in your representation of my point. I am saying "Cars made in Detroit are different from cars made in Japan," not the formal fallacy you've made my point to be. It would be like me saying your argument is akin to "all tennis balls are made of rubber, therefore all rubber things are tennis balls."
Based on our past interactions, I know you really dislike when people ineptly characterize your argument. So, please don't do it to me.
What? This has no relation to what I said, no relation to the subargument in question, no relation to anything. I never accused you of affirming the consequent.
Your response to this subargument makes no sense whatsoever, which makes me think that if anyone's ineptly characterizing an argument here it's you. And frankly, if you want to bring past interactions into this, well, let's do a little naive induction on those and judge on that basis who's more likely to be inept in this instance. I'm thrilled to let the record speak for itself on that matter.
However, before this turns into a flame war, I'm going to try to move the conversation forward to the following point, which I think is more interesting:
Maybe I'm being glib in asking, but are you saying both my point and your objection to my point are both incoherent? If that is your (or Hume's) claim, maybe we should be discussing about weather or not our "naive induction" is incoherent instead of continuing down the "exogenous vs endogenous" vain.
Honestly, I'm not even sure why you brought up "exogenous vs endogenous."
In a sense, yes, they are both incoherent. Debating different heuristics for doing naive induction is like rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.
I brought it up because I wasn't quite sure at the time where the conversation would end up going, and obviously it's boarded the midnight express to loonytown, so now I regret bringing it up. I'm going to stop wasting my time rearranging the deck chairs.
Thus, the position I am now defending is the following: the collection of observations of teleological, simulated universes that we have obtained thus far from physics simulations is not Bayesian evidence that the physical universe is itself teleological or simulated. I'm dropping all other claims except that one.
Except I'm not claiming something as specific as "the universe is simulated," nor am I saying only simulated universes can be given as evidence, but go on.
You say things as if they are answers to points or claims I've made, and I read them, and they just read back as complete non sequiturs.
First, if your claim does not arise from naively inducting teleology or simulation from physics simulations up to the physical universe, then what have we been talking about? That is what I understand your claim to be and that's what I've been debating against. If I'm wrong, state your claim clearly, completely, and unambiguously in your reply and I'll be happy to address it.
If you're not specifically claiming the universe is simulated, then fine, modify the argument dropping "simulated" and leaving "teleological." It doesn't matter to the reasoning. (Incidentally, though, why wouldn't you claim it was simulated? All universes you've observed have been simulated, so by naive induction...)
Second, I never accused you of restricting or doctoring the evidence. The data you presented is the data you have, and I take it at face value. Your pointing out that you have not doctored the data is completely irrelevant to the notion that that bundle of data, however it arose, does not constitute Bayesian evidence for the conclusion.
While it is true that every simulated universe is simulated, I am not claiming only simulated universes can be presented as evidence; any universe can. It just so happens all universes with known origins are simulated, but this isn't some kind of requirement I am imposing.
Why do you think it matters whether it is a requirement you impose or not?
Data that does not change when the hypothesis changes is not evidence. It doesn't matter whether you doctored the data or not. Of course, if you had doctored the data, that would be an additional reason why it turned out not to be good evidence, but ultimately, all that matters is that the data does not share Shannon mutual information with the hypothesis.
Regardless of whether or not the universe is teleological, any bundle of data coming from physics simulations will be teleological, so there is no Shannon mutual information between the hypothesis and the data.
I would also like to just say I am confused by what you mean by "~P."
...
However, I also understand you have a better formal understanding of these kinds of things then I do. So, maybe I just need a more detailed explanation of what you mean.
P is your hypothesis, which I originally took to be "the universe is simulated and teleological." Thus by DeMorgan's laws, ~P would be "the universe is either not simulated or not teleological."
We could also take P to be either one of those things separately, like "the universe is teleological." Then ~P would be "the universe is not teleological."
I thought this would be immediately obvious, but I guess not.
Good idea, because I'm not here to coddle anyone's feelings and I don't buy into postmodern leftist triggering bullcrap. If for whatever you can't handle something I say, just skip past it -- and if that specific example is too much for you, then I don't know what to say, besides pointing out that you're going to be triggered a lot by me, so strap in.
Thus, the position I am now defending is the following: the collection of observations of teleological, simulated universes that we have obtained thus far from physics simulations is not Bayesian evidence that the physical universe is itself teleological or simulated. I'm dropping all other claims except that one.
Alright, well since -as I said before- I'm not attempting to make a "Bayesian argument," only a pure inductive one (naive or otherwise), I guess that's it for this discussion.
Good idea, because I'm not here to coddle anyone's feelings and I don't buy into postmodern leftist triggering bullcrap. If for whatever you can't handle something I say, just skip past it -- and if that specific example is too much for you, then I don't know what to say, besides pointing out that you're going to be triggered a lot by me, so strap in.
Actually, no.
While you might not buy into "postmodern leftist triggering bullcrap" or "coddling," I -personally- have reached the point in my life were I don't see a reason to interact with other adults who don't value mutual respect. While I do -very much- respect your knowledge and understanding, it's clear you feel a deep-seated need to forever treat me as an irredeemable pariah based on a series of interactions between us ~4 years ago. If you don't feel there should be mutual respect between us, then I don't see the value in continuing to interact with you. I'll just continue to enjoy reading your posts.
So, I will not be "strapping in." I will be "walking away."
Thus, the position I am now defending is the following: the collection of observations of teleological, simulated universes that we have obtained thus far from physics simulations is not Bayesian evidence that the physical universe is itself teleological or simulated. I'm dropping all other claims except that one.
Alright, well since -as I said before- I'm not attempting to make a "Bayesian argument," only a pure inductive one (naive or otherwise), I guess that's it for this discussion.
The point is that Bayesian methods are the only way to make any sense out of induction. But let's cut the jargon and just look at a straightforward example, which will illustrate the basic point I think Crashing is trying to make:
Imagine two hypothetical universes: universe A and universe B. Universe A is exactly like our universe, except we know for a fact that it was created by a god. Universe B is exactly like our universe, except we know for a fact it was not created by a god.
Now let's imagine that some humans in universe A decide to do an induction experiment to see if their universe was created by a god. They look at every simulated universe ever created, just like you're advocating we do, and they conclude that all these simulated universes had a creator, therefore their universe must have one too. In universe A, they're right.
Now let's go to universe B, where some humans run the same experiment and likewise determine their universe must have a creator. In universe B, they're wrong.
Both of these scenarios, A and B, are equally reasonable. There is simply nothing to suggest that one is more possible or more likely than the other. So we can conclude that the observation of simulated universes doesn't tell us anything helpful about the universe we live in. They are Bayesian independent as it were. This illustrates an inherent flaw in your inductive argument.
Both of these scenarios, A and B, are equally reasonable. There is simply nothing to suggest that one is more possible or more likely than the other. So we can conclude that the observation of simulated universes doesn't tell us anything helpful about the universe we live in. They are Bayesian independent as it were. This illustrates an inherent flaw in your inductive argument.
You mean to say this shows the inherent flaw in induction itself. This example of yours would still be the same if we replaced "created by a god" with "the Higgs boson causes gravity" or any other scientific postulate. It's the well known "Problem of induction." If you think I'm somehow trying to get around this flaw, you're wrong. I know I can't (and you can't get around it with "Bayesian evidence" either).
All inductive arguments share this problem, yet induction is the tool we use to obtain scientific "knowledge."
While I'm not going to claim perfect knowledge of Crushing00's argument (I don't know why he felt "our universe isn't teleological"/"our universe doesn't exist" was even on the table, for example; but, at this point I'm too tired of his "Soron is intellectually dishonest" bit to try and unpack his argument fully) I'm going to go ahead and assume this isn't what Crushing00 was arguing (unless he says otherwise). I respect him too much to assume he was naively trying to say "Problem of Inductiontherefore induction/science doesn't lead to real knowledge." I also expect he knows that Bayesian statistics don't fix this problem. They can only be used to tell us how wrong we are, not that we're right. I will add, I'm certainly not trying to say I'm '100% right' because that would be silly. If there are more created universes then uncreated universes, then chances are we're in one of the created ones. The question is about reasonability based on current observations, not about obtaining Ultimate Truth.
If simulations had nothing to tell us about the universe, scientists wouldn't use them.
All inductive arguments share this problem, yet induction is the tool we use to obtain scientific "knowledge."
No, what I'm describing goes beyond the problem of induction. I think this is where you're getting confused.
If I observe the sun rise and set 1,000 days in a row, I can feel pretty confident saying "the sun will rise and set tomorrow." The nature of this observation rationally suggests something about future observations. It implies that there is likely some kind of structure or predictability to the behavior of the sun, and I can try to leverage my past observations to make predictions about future facts.
Now I could still be wrong about my prediction, either because I don't have enough data points (the sun always rises and sets 1000 days in a row and then takes a day off for vacation) or because some other process is at work that I have not accounted for in my observation (the sun is getting ready to blow up before it can rise tomorrow). This is the problem of induction, that past observations cannot give us guaranteed information about the future.
But that's not what I'm criticizing here. I'm saying there's a further problem with your reasoning, which is that there is no logical connection between the observation you're making and the conclusion that you're drawing. It's like saying, "I observe that whenever I throw a ball up in the air it comes back down, therefore the sun must always set after it rises. What goes up must come down." But there is no meaningful inductive connection here. A ball would rise and fall when thrown up in the air regardless of whether the earth was rotating or not. A simulated universe would always have the property of being created regardless of whether the real universe was created or not. You're taking two things that seem analogous in some abstract way, but have no functional connection to one another, and trying to derive inductive information about one from your observation of the other. This is a completely different issue than the problem of induction.
If simulations had nothing to tell us about the universe, scientists wouldn't use them.
Of course simulations have value. But you have to ask the right questions of the simulation.
What if I want to run a simulation to determine whether climate change is taking place, and I set as one of the parameters of my simulation that global temperatures must increase exactly one degree every year. Would this tell me anything useful about climate change?
What if I want to run a simulation to determine whether a sentient being created the universe, and I set as one of the parameters of my simulation that I, a sentient being, created the simulated universe. Would this tell me anything useful about who or what created our universe?
But that's not what I'm criticizing here. I'm saying there's a further problem with your reasoning, which is that there is no logical connection between the observation you're making and the conclusion that you're drawing. It's like saying, "I observe that whenever I throw a ball up in the air it comes back down, therefore the sun must always set after it rises. What goes up must come down." But there is no meaningful inductive connection here. A ball would rise and fall when thrown up in the air regardless of whether the earth was rotating or not. A simulated universe would always have the property of being created regardless of whether the real universe was created or not. You're taking two things that seem analogous in some abstract way, but have no functional connection to one another, and trying to derive inductive information about one from your observation of the other. This is a completely different issue than the problem of induction.
If the simulations in question are meant to have the same physical laws as our universe (and could -in principle- have simulated 'life' in them), then I disagree with this assessment.
Using those kinds of simulations as "example universes" is fundamental to my argument. If you outright deny this, then we are using different axioms. So -trivially- no agreement can be reached. If that's what Crushing00 was doing, then -certainly- we were "rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic."
But that's not what I'm criticizing here. I'm saying there's a further problem with your reasoning, which is that there is no logical connection between the observation you're making and the conclusion that you're drawing. It's like saying, "I observe that whenever I throw a ball up in the air it comes back down, therefore the sun must always set after it rises. What goes up must come down." But there is no meaningful inductive connection here. A ball would rise and fall when thrown up in the air regardless of whether the earth was rotating or not. A simulated universe would always have the property of being created regardless of whether the real universe was created or not. You're taking two things that seem analogous in some abstract way, but have no functional connection to one another, and trying to derive inductive information about one from your observation of the other. This is a completely different issue than the problem of induction.
If the simulations in question are meant to have the same physical laws as our universe (and could -in principle- have simulated 'life' in them), then I disagree with this assessment.
Using those kinds of simulations as "example universes" is fundamental to my argument. If you outright deny this, then we are using different axioms. So -trivially- no agreement can be reached. If that's what Crushing00 was doing, then -certainly- we were "rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic."
1. There are no simulated universes with "the same physical laws as our universe" in existence. All simulations of this kind are using highly simplified assumptions and approximations. Just to accurately simulate the turbulent flow of milk around your spoon in your morning bowl of cereal is an absurdly complex task that no computer is currently capable of doing with any high degree of accuracy. Simulating our entire universe in any kind of realistic way is not close to possible with current technology.
2. But ultimately that's irrelevant. The point is that the simulation, no matter how realistic, cannot possibly tell us anything meaningful about who or what created the universe we live in. Why? Because that's a fixed parameter of the simulation. In other words, the identity of the creator of the simulation is never a result or an output. If you run a weather simulation, but you set as a parameter of the simulation that the weather on Tuesday is fixed at 70 degrees Fahrenheit, then the simulation cannot give you a meaningful prediction of Tuesday's weather because you've already told the simulation what it must be. If you're doing a simulation of a cannon firing a cannonball, and you set as a parameter of the simulation that the ball must leave the cannon at 30 meters per second, then you can't use that simulation to predict how fast a real ball would leave a real cannon. You fixed that parameter.
1. There are no simulated universes with "the same physical laws as our universe" in existence. All simulations of this kind are using highly simplified assumptions and approximations. Just to accurately simulate the turbulent flow of milk around your spoon in your morning bowl of cereal is an absurdly complex task that no computer is currently capable of doing with any high degree of accuracy. Simulating our entire universe in any kind of realistic way is not close to possible with current technology.
Who said anything about having a simulation of the entire universe? The "same physical laws as our universe" quote is also out of context, clearly. You missed the "meant to have the same physical laws as our universe." I'm not saying someone has a perfect simulation of our universe on a computer somewhere...
You might want to go back and relook at the paper I linked: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1210.1847v2.pdf
2. But ultimately that's irrelevant. The point is that the simulation, no matter how realistic, cannot possibly tell us anything meaningful about who or what created the universe we live in. Why? Because that's a fixed parameter of the simulation. In other words, the identity of the creator of the simulation is never a result or an output. If you run a weather simulation, but you set as a parameter of the simulation that the weather on Tuesday is fixed at 70 degrees Fahrenheit, then the simulation cannot give you a meaningful prediction of Tuesday's weather because you've already told the simulation what it must be. If you're doing a simulation of a cannon firing a cannonball, and you set as a parameter of the simulation that the ball must leave the cannon at 30 meters per second, then you can't use that simulation to predict how fast a real ball would leave a real cannon. You fixed that parameter.
You seem to be misunderstanding what I'm doing. I am not using the simulations to simulate my data-set, I am using simulations as example universes in my "example universe" data-set. As I said a few posts ago "I am not claiming only simulated universes can be presented as evidence; any universe can. It just so happens all universes with known origins are simulated, but this isn't some kind of requirement I am imposing."
Each new "example universe" is allowed to have whatever "created or not created" parameter it has. Just like each swan you might observe could be any color; it just is whatever color it is. Each example could be created or not created, but is what it is.
The "created or not created" parameter IS allowed to vary across examples, but it doesn't. So, what conclusions should we draw from this fact?
(Certainly, one conclusion should always be to find more [and better] data, since no one should settle for thinking they've found the Ultimate Truth or something silly like that. Each experiment -a thought experiment or otherwise- needs to lead to the next one. That's why I brought up the 'natural' universes that might be inside black holes[1] as other potential 'example universes.')
The "created or not created" parameter IS allowed to vary across examples, but it doesn't. So, what conclusions should we draw from this fact?
First of all, this is not correct. You're not making a set of observations where the "created" parameter is allowed to take any value, and just happens to take the value "true" repeatedly. You're observing human-simulated universes, and so you know a priori that the value of "created" will necessarily be "true" for all your observations. I understand that, in principle, you are willing to include universes that do not have a creator in your "sample," but your willingness to do so does not change the problematic nature of your current data set.
But again, this isn't the problem I'm talking about, which you seem to be ignoring, so let me spell it out clearly: there is no reason to think that the value of the "created" parameter for simulated universes has any relationship whatsoever to the value of the "created" parameter for our universe. A hypothesis of a mechanism connecting your observations with your conclusion is a necessary component of rational induction.
In the case of black & white swans, we hypothesize that animals tend to look similar to other members of their species due to their genes. So the more white swans we observe, the more confidently we can say there are no black swans. Of course, this would still be an incorrect statement due to the limits of induction, but it would be a logically justifiable conclusion. Here, it's reasonable to believe that there is some mechanism (genetics) that connects our repeated observations (lots of white swans) to our inductive conclusion (all swans are white). Our conclusion is wrong because our dataset is not large enough, but our conclusion is based on sound inductive reasoning.
Likewise, we hypothesize that there is a mechanism that causes the sun to appear to rise and set at regular intervals (depending on the era, the hypothesis might be: rotation of earth, orbit of sun around the earth, the music of the spheres, etc.). Thus it is reasonable to conclude that a mechanism connects our repeated observations (the sun rises and sets) with our inductive conclusion (the sun will rise tomorrow).
In your example, there is no hypothesis that connects your observations (all simulated universes are created by humans) with your conclusion (our universe was created). In fact, all simulated universes would necessarily be created by humans regardless of who or what created the universe we live in, so there is no possible mechanism that could connect these two phenomena. This is my criticism. It's definitely not the same as the problem of induction, and it's substantively quite similar to the more formal Bayesian criticism that Crashing00 has raised.
First of all, this is not correct. You're not making a set of observations where the "created" parameter is allowed to take any value, and just happens to take the value "true" repeatedly.
No, I'm not. Please take what I'm saying at face value.
You're observing human-simulated universes, and so you know a priori that the value of "created" will necessarily be "true" for all your observations. I understand that, in principle, you are willing to include universes that do not have a creator in your "sample," but your willingness to do so does not change the problematic nature of your current data set.
My criteria is: "Any universe to which could -in principle- have 'life' in it, and its origin is known."
I understand that you object to this criteria. However, that doesn't mean that I'm somehow fixing the parameter in question. That parameter isn't in my criteria. It is not fixed. That you find the criteria unreasonable is another matter -one I disagree with- but your disagreement doesn't mean I'm a priori fixing the parameter in question. I'm not.
But again, this isn't the problem I'm talking about, which you seem to be ignoring, so let me spell it out clearly: there is no reason to think that the value of the "created" parameter for simulated universes has any relationship whatsoever to the value of the "created" parameter for our universe. A hypothesis of a mechanism connecting your observations with your conclusion is a necessary component of rational induction.
"There is no reason to think that the value of the "Higgs Boson" parameter for simulated universes has any relationship whatsoever to the value of the "Higgs Boson" parameter for our universe."
The simulations that scientists do -for things like the origin of gravity- aren't actually our universe. Yet, they are meant to represent our universe (or part of it). So, while these simulations don't directly have any bearing on our universe (and the simulated Higgs Bosons -and their behaviors- aren't 'real') they still can provide insight.
Anyway -to more directly address your point- it is my assertion that IF these simulations in question can -in principle- recreate universes similar to ours, they are able to provide insight into the origins of ours. I agree that these simulated universes aren't directly related to ours, but they can represent it.
And, again, that you disagree with that assertion is understood. I just disagree with your disagreement.
In your example, there is no hypothesis that connects your observations (all simulated universes are created by humans) with your conclusion (our universe was created). In fact, all simulated universes would necessarily be created by humans regardless of who or what created the universe we live in, so there is no possible mechanism that could connect these two phenomena. This is my criticism. It's definitely not the same as the problem of induction, and it's substantively quite similar to the more formal Bayesian criticism that Crashing00 has raised.
If each universe can spawn countless 'created' universes, then it is my assertion this fact can be used to make a reasonable guess about which kind we're in.
Again, that you disagree with this assertion is understood.
If each universe can spawn countless 'created' universes, then it is my assertion this fact can be used to make a reasonable guess about which kind we're in.
If your assertion is that we are in a simulated universe created by humans or sentient aliens, and the simulated universe itself exists within a larger meta-universe, then perhaps you can make a colorable argument that your inductive observations are relevant.
But that's not what people are asking when they ask whether you are a theist or atheist. They're asking whether you think the ultimate "real" universe was created by god. So at best you've just kicked the can one step down the road, but you eventually have to contend with the whether the ultimate "real" universe was created by a god or not. And I'm saying that simulated universes have no possible relevance or relationship to that question.
"There is no reason to think that the value of the "Higgs Boson" parameter for simulated universes has any relationship whatsoever to the value of the "Higgs Boson" parameter for our universe."
The simulations that scientists do -for things like the origin of gravity- aren't actually our universe. Yet, they are meant to represent our universe (or part of it). So, while these simulations don't directly have any bearing on our universe (and the simulated Higgs Bosons -and their behaviors- aren't 'real') they still can provide insight.
I'm glad you brought this up, because there are at least two critical differences between a Higgs Boson simulation and the simulations you're talking about.
First, the thing we're studying (the behavior and properties of the Higgs Boson) is an output of the simulation, it is not a parameter. That is a very important difference. The parameters are the things that are pre-set beforehand, like the laws of quantum mechanics and the attraction law of the strong force. We then run the simulation and it spits out approximate values for various Higgs Boson properties. It would be totally silly to argue that the simulation proves the existence of the strong force; the existence and nature of the strong force was one of the input parameters that we fixed at the start of the simulation. Likewise, it's silly to argue that a simulated universe suggests that the real universe was created, because the "created" parameter was fixed at the start, it is not an output of the simulation.
Second, we know that the Higgs Boson simulation is likely to have predictive value in the real world because we know something about the laws of physics in the real world and we try to make the simulation match those laws as closely as we can. In other words, like I was saying in my last post, we have a hypothesis about why our observations (the simulation) are connected our conclusion (how things are in the real world). In the case of universe simulations, we have absolutely no clue about the conditions "before" and "during" our universe's creation, so we have absolutely no reason to think that the conditions of the simulated universe's creation has any relationship to our universe's creation. We have no rational hypothesis about why they should be related or similar.
If your assertion is that we are in a simulated universe created by humans or sentient aliens, and the simulated universe itself exists within a larger meta-universe, then perhaps you can make a colorable argument that your inductive observations are relevant.
But that's not what people are asking when they ask whether you are a theist or atheist. They're asking whether you think the ultimate "real" universe was created by god. So at best you've just kicked the can one step down the road, but you eventually have to contend with the whether the ultimate "real" universe was created by a god or not. And I'm saying that simulated universes have no possible relevance or relationship to that question.
These next quotes are probably more exacerbated then they strictly should be -and aren't directed at you- but I think they get my point across:
Something that fulfills the definition of a god is a god. I've looked at definitions of 'god' and I see no reason why "intelligent creator of the universe" isn't a good enough definition. What about that definition do you object to? No white flowing beard?
Honestly, if you think a programmer isn't the god of his program, then I don't think you have the correct definition of the term. What could be more godlike to a program then its programmer?
It seems to me you're still looking at this problem as if the very idea of any god is simply ridiculous. I'm under the impression you feel all deific proposals are convoluted, contradictory, or not "really" gods. If you're associating the definition of "divine" with "impossible," then you're a strong-atheist. Not that it's uncommon, I've know plenty of people that feel "miracle=magic=impossible" or "god=supernatural=impossible," yet -for some reason- claim to be an "agnostic-atheist."
But, the take-home part is:
"Honestly, if you think a programmer isn't the god of his program, then I don't think you have the correct definition of the term. What could be more godlike to a program then its programmer?"
"Honestly, if you think a programmer isn't the god of his program, then I don't think you have the correct definition of the term. What could be more godlike to a program then its programmer?"
I have no interest in arguing semantics about what "god" means. I'm just saying that when people talk about atheism, theism, and agnosticism, they're talking about some ultimate "God" that exists outside of the last onion layer. They're not talking about an engineer running a simulation. Many atheists would acknowledge the possibility that we're living in a simulated universe while still considering themselves hard atheists.
But I actually still think your argument is relatively weak even if it boils down to a claim that we're living in a simulated universe. The fact that we can simulate universes within our own in no way suggests that there exists a meta-universe in which our own universe could be simulated. Again, there is just no rational connection between the observation and the inductive conclusion. Simulated universes are equally likely to exist in a "real" universe versus a "simulated" universe, just like they're equally likely to exist in "created" and "un-created" universes. See my edit about the Higgs Boson simulations above for more detail on this point.
Is it fair to say that the recent Blood Moon Tetrad that falls on the Jewish Feast Days is logical proof of God? I'd say it is. Sure there won't be another Tetrad like it in the next 600 years but it can't be a coincidence If it's occurring right now in our lifetime. Of course NASA will try to back up claims to disprove the religious context of it just like how religion tries to disprove the science behind it which shows the never ending struggle between religion and science.
To assume that a computer programmer has the ability to control the Sun, the Moon, and the constellations of the stars in outer space just seems too far fetched to believe but it does bring forth the idea that we might be living inside a simulated universe like the Matrix where humans are unable to plug themselves out of it. I still believe it's all just science fiction but one of the things that fascinated me about the Matrix trilogy is how it questions our own existence and how we got where we are today.
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America Bless Christ Jesus
"Restriction breeds creativity." - Sheldon Menery on EDH / Commander in Magic: The Gathering
"Cancel Culture is the real reason why everyone's not allowed to have nice things anymore." - Anonymous
"For what will it profit a man if he gains the whole world, and loses his own soul?" - Mark 8:36
"Most men and women will grow up to love their servitude and will never dream of revolution." - Aldous Huxley, Brave New World
"Every life decision is always a risk / reward proposition." - Sanjay Gupta
I'm just saying that when people talk about atheism, theism, and agnosticism, they're talking about some ultimate "God" that exists outside of the last onion layer. They're not talking about an engineer running a simulation. Many atheists would acknowledge the possibility that we're living in a simulated universe while still considering themselves hard atheists.
If the criteria you're using for "a god" would cause the ancient Egyptians, Greeks, Babylons, etc. to be considered atheists -as it seems this one your using does- then I guess this will have to be one more thing we disagree about.
I would also like to say that if the criteria you're using has a hidden clause that makes it axiomatically impossible for "a god" to exist, then I'm not the one with an a priori problem. But, I want it to be clear with that statement that I'm not saying you are doing this. I don't know if you are, but based on past experiences I find many do.
See my edit about the Higgs Boson simulations above for more detail on this point.
I'm fairly certain I've already addressed the issues you raised in that edit in post #219. But, if you feel that explanation is insufficient I can try to elaborate further.
We've found many more universes we know to be simulated then ones we know not to be. In fact, to my knowledge we've found exactly none we know not to be (Even if we count this one as real, we still would have no others known to be 'real' based on that assumption).
Is it fair to say that the recent Blood Moon Tetrad that falls on the Jewish Feast Days is logical proof of God?
No. It's a coincidence. Were all the times that there wasn't a blood moon on a Jewish Holiday proof that god doesn't exist?
Sure there won't be another Tetrad like it in the next 600 years
That's 600 years without one and 1 year with one. Sounds like the *proof* against god here weighs 600 to 1, if you consider the blood-moon-barometer to be accurate.
But it can't be a coincidence If it's occurring right now in our lifetime.
Why not? If it had happened 200 years ago and we were alive 200 years ago, would you be saying the same thing? Or did someone predict that it would happen during this lifetime? Were those people Nasa, because they apparently are able to do that. It doesn't make them god.
Of course NASA will try to back up claims to disprove the religious context of it just like how religion tries to disprove the science behind it which shows the never ending struggle between religion and science.
The difference is that science has evidence and religion has warm and fuzzy feelings. It goes like this.
Science: "That's checkmate."
Religion: "No it isn't."
Science: "Uh, yes it is. My bishop is attacking your king from H-7 and your king has no spaces to move, considering that my knight and pawn are threatening his escape squares."
But that's just not the case. "All cars on this lot were made in Detroit, therefore all cars are made in Detroit." The heuristic "properties related to the 'genesis' of an object are more inductible" doesn't seem to be a very good heuristic. It's trivial to think of properties related to the creation or genesis of objects that don't hold across an entire class of specimens.
Well, it's always possible for you to play the game where you simply decline to apply the word to the object. I'm not going to.
How do you classify an object as a puppy when you encounter it? Do you demand to see its mother?
What properties are normally shared by a collection of objects? If you are just proposing a list, then your list is vulnerable to attack. For instance, if "properties relating to genesis" is on your list, then I can easily throw out any number of counterexamples showing that such properties aren't shared by large collections of objects.
If you are proposing some metamethod for finding these collections of properties, then you had better make sure, as Hume pointed out, that your method does not rely on induction from similar properties -- otherwise it would be circular.
You should object to it. That's kind of the point. Hume showed that the kind of naive induction we're discussing here is incoherent. These are the reasons why. There's no basis for agreement to be had here.
No, no, no. I thought this would be immediately obvious, but I guess not.
The question before me is whether or not to regard your series of observations of physics simulations (E) as evidence for the hypothesis that the universe is similarly simulated and teleological (P). As a Bayesian, I regard something as evidence only if it is more likely under the hypothesis than its negation.
Well, in this case, I can actually figure out the numbers and see that your observations do not constitute evidence. It turns out we can unconditionally calculate P(E). Regardless of any fact about the universe, every physics simulation is going to be simulated and teleological, because that's just what a physics simulation is. So P(E) = 1.
Thus P(E|P) = P(E|~P) = 1. In other words, you would have seen the same data E regardless of whether or not your hypothesis P was true. And therefore, E is not evidence for P, from a Bayesian perspective.
Actually, it's funny that you feel that way about the absence of counterexamples, because I've given you counterexamples to some of your induction heuristics and it seems to roll off your back like water.
That being said, I can see that you feel strongly about that method, even though you don't apply it consistently -- but you should be a great deal more suspicious of conclusions springing from naive induction than you currently are. It's a method with some very well-known problems. Not, mind you, that there is any entirely uncontroversial way of doing inductive reasoning, but out of a series of more or less unpalatable options you've chosen the actual worst one.
Which if thou dost not use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind
It will go and thou wilt go, never to return.
Either you're completely misreading me or you are being dishonest in your representation of my point. I am saying "Cars made in Detroit are different from cars made in Japan," not the formal fallacy you've made my point to be. It would be like me saying your argument is akin to "all tennis balls are made of rubber, therefore all rubber things are tennis balls."
Based on our past interactions, I know you really dislike when people ineptly characterize your argument. So, please don't do it to me. How a thing is made, for starters.
I am proposing a list using the same logic you used to make your "exogenous vs endogenous," only I'm making it more general. A practice -if I recall- you approve of.
"Made the same way" being something just as often shared by a clarification of objects as "has the same stuff in it."
Maybe I'm being glib in asking, but are you saying both my point and your objection to my point are both incoherent? If that is your (or Hume's) claim, maybe we should be discussing about weather or not our "naive induction" is incoherent instead of continuing down the "exogenous vs endogenous" vain.
Honestly, I'm not even sure why you brought up "exogenous vs endogenous." Even if I were to agree that "exogenous vs endogenous" is the only way to classify classifications, and that exogenism is fundamentally a weaker corollary then endogenism, my next response would be "so?" Even if my exogenous proposal would be "weaker" then a endogenous one, there is no endogenous counterclaim. "Not created for a reason" is just as exogenous as "created for a reason," and "not created for a reason" has no teleological examples.
Except I'm not claiming something as specific as "the universe is simulated," nor am I saying only simulated universes can be given as evidence, but go on. While it is true that every simulated universe is simulated, I am not claiming only simulated universes can be presented as evidence; any universe can. It just so happens all universes with known origins are simulated, but this isn't some kind of requirement I am imposing.
Not all known teleological universes have known origins. This one is an example.
I would also like to just say I am confused by what you mean by "~P." I went back to check to see if you defined it. If the universe we live in is 'P' then it would seem to me '~P' would be a negation of our universe, which doesn't make any sense. It would seem to me you would want to define the theory we are discussing as 'T' or something and then talk about "P(E|T)" and "P(E|~T)." "P(E|~P)" looks super weird to me.
However, I also understand you have a better formal understanding of these kinds of things then I do. So, maybe I just need a more detailed explanation of what you mean.
Probably because, as far as I can tell, they've all been strawmen. A true counterclaim would be a teleological universe that was known to be created without reason. Unless I really did gloss over something, you didn't provide one of those (and to my knowledge none exist).
I'm also trying to ignore emotionally provocative statements like:
What? This has no relation to what I said, no relation to the subargument in question, no relation to anything. I never accused you of affirming the consequent.
Your response to this subargument makes no sense whatsoever, which makes me think that if anyone's ineptly characterizing an argument here it's you. And frankly, if you want to bring past interactions into this, well, let's do a little naive induction on those and judge on that basis who's more likely to be inept in this instance. I'm thrilled to let the record speak for itself on that matter.
However, before this turns into a flame war, I'm going to try to move the conversation forward to the following point, which I think is more interesting:
In a sense, yes, they are both incoherent. Debating different heuristics for doing naive induction is like rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.
I brought it up because I wasn't quite sure at the time where the conversation would end up going, and obviously it's boarded the midnight express to loonytown, so now I regret bringing it up. I'm going to stop wasting my time rearranging the deck chairs.
Thus, the position I am now defending is the following: the collection of observations of teleological, simulated universes that we have obtained thus far from physics simulations is not Bayesian evidence that the physical universe is itself teleological or simulated. I'm dropping all other claims except that one.
You say things as if they are answers to points or claims I've made, and I read them, and they just read back as complete non sequiturs.
First, if your claim does not arise from naively inducting teleology or simulation from physics simulations up to the physical universe, then what have we been talking about? That is what I understand your claim to be and that's what I've been debating against. If I'm wrong, state your claim clearly, completely, and unambiguously in your reply and I'll be happy to address it.
If you're not specifically claiming the universe is simulated, then fine, modify the argument dropping "simulated" and leaving "teleological." It doesn't matter to the reasoning. (Incidentally, though, why wouldn't you claim it was simulated? All universes you've observed have been simulated, so by naive induction...)
Second, I never accused you of restricting or doctoring the evidence. The data you presented is the data you have, and I take it at face value. Your pointing out that you have not doctored the data is completely irrelevant to the notion that that bundle of data, however it arose, does not constitute Bayesian evidence for the conclusion.
Why do you think it matters whether it is a requirement you impose or not?
Data that does not change when the hypothesis changes is not evidence. It doesn't matter whether you doctored the data or not. Of course, if you had doctored the data, that would be an additional reason why it turned out not to be good evidence, but ultimately, all that matters is that the data does not share Shannon mutual information with the hypothesis.
Regardless of whether or not the universe is teleological, any bundle of data coming from physics simulations will be teleological, so there is no Shannon mutual information between the hypothesis and the data.
P is your hypothesis, which I originally took to be "the universe is simulated and teleological." Thus by DeMorgan's laws, ~P would be "the universe is either not simulated or not teleological."
We could also take P to be either one of those things separately, like "the universe is teleological." Then ~P would be "the universe is not teleological."
The argument works just the same in either case.
Good idea, because I'm not here to coddle anyone's feelings and I don't buy into postmodern leftist triggering bullcrap. If for whatever you can't handle something I say, just skip past it -- and if that specific example is too much for you, then I don't know what to say, besides pointing out that you're going to be triggered a lot by me, so strap in.
Which if thou dost not use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind
It will go and thou wilt go, never to return.
Actually, no.
While you might not buy into "postmodern leftist triggering bullcrap" or "coddling," I -personally- have reached the point in my life were I don't see a reason to interact with other adults who don't value mutual respect. While I do -very much- respect your knowledge and understanding, it's clear you feel a deep-seated need to forever treat me as an irredeemable pariah based on a series of interactions between us ~4 years ago. If you don't feel there should be mutual respect between us, then I don't see the value in continuing to interact with you. I'll just continue to enjoy reading your posts.
So, I will not be "strapping in." I will be "walking away."
The point is that Bayesian methods are the only way to make any sense out of induction. But let's cut the jargon and just look at a straightforward example, which will illustrate the basic point I think Crashing is trying to make:
Imagine two hypothetical universes: universe A and universe B. Universe A is exactly like our universe, except we know for a fact that it was created by a god. Universe B is exactly like our universe, except we know for a fact it was not created by a god.
Now let's imagine that some humans in universe A decide to do an induction experiment to see if their universe was created by a god. They look at every simulated universe ever created, just like you're advocating we do, and they conclude that all these simulated universes had a creator, therefore their universe must have one too. In universe A, they're right.
Now let's go to universe B, where some humans run the same experiment and likewise determine their universe must have a creator. In universe B, they're wrong.
Both of these scenarios, A and B, are equally reasonable. There is simply nothing to suggest that one is more possible or more likely than the other. So we can conclude that the observation of simulated universes doesn't tell us anything helpful about the universe we live in. They are Bayesian independent as it were. This illustrates an inherent flaw in your inductive argument.
All inductive arguments share this problem, yet induction is the tool we use to obtain scientific "knowledge."
While I'm not going to claim perfect knowledge of Crushing00's argument (I don't know why he felt "our universe isn't teleological"/"our universe doesn't exist" was even on the table, for example; but, at this point I'm too tired of his "Soron is intellectually dishonest" bit to try and unpack his argument fully) I'm going to go ahead and assume this isn't what Crushing00 was arguing (unless he says otherwise). I respect him too much to assume he was naively trying to say "Problem of Induction therefore induction/science doesn't lead to real knowledge." I also expect he knows that Bayesian statistics don't fix this problem. They can only be used to tell us how wrong we are, not that we're right. I will add, I'm certainly not trying to say I'm '100% right' because that would be silly. If there are more created universes then uncreated universes, then chances are we're in one of the created ones. The question is about reasonability based on current observations, not about obtaining Ultimate Truth.
If simulations had nothing to tell us about the universe, scientists wouldn't use them.
No, what I'm describing goes beyond the problem of induction. I think this is where you're getting confused.
If I observe the sun rise and set 1,000 days in a row, I can feel pretty confident saying "the sun will rise and set tomorrow." The nature of this observation rationally suggests something about future observations. It implies that there is likely some kind of structure or predictability to the behavior of the sun, and I can try to leverage my past observations to make predictions about future facts.
Now I could still be wrong about my prediction, either because I don't have enough data points (the sun always rises and sets 1000 days in a row and then takes a day off for vacation) or because some other process is at work that I have not accounted for in my observation (the sun is getting ready to blow up before it can rise tomorrow). This is the problem of induction, that past observations cannot give us guaranteed information about the future.
But that's not what I'm criticizing here. I'm saying there's a further problem with your reasoning, which is that there is no logical connection between the observation you're making and the conclusion that you're drawing. It's like saying, "I observe that whenever I throw a ball up in the air it comes back down, therefore the sun must always set after it rises. What goes up must come down." But there is no meaningful inductive connection here. A ball would rise and fall when thrown up in the air regardless of whether the earth was rotating or not. A simulated universe would always have the property of being created regardless of whether the real universe was created or not. You're taking two things that seem analogous in some abstract way, but have no functional connection to one another, and trying to derive inductive information about one from your observation of the other. This is a completely different issue than the problem of induction.
Of course simulations have value. But you have to ask the right questions of the simulation.
What if I want to run a simulation to determine whether climate change is taking place, and I set as one of the parameters of my simulation that global temperatures must increase exactly one degree every year. Would this tell me anything useful about climate change?
What if I want to run a simulation to determine whether a sentient being created the universe, and I set as one of the parameters of my simulation that I, a sentient being, created the simulated universe. Would this tell me anything useful about who or what created our universe?
Using those kinds of simulations as "example universes" is fundamental to my argument. If you outright deny this, then we are using different axioms. So -trivially- no agreement can be reached. If that's what Crushing00 was doing, then -certainly- we were "rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic."
1. There are no simulated universes with "the same physical laws as our universe" in existence. All simulations of this kind are using highly simplified assumptions and approximations. Just to accurately simulate the turbulent flow of milk around your spoon in your morning bowl of cereal is an absurdly complex task that no computer is currently capable of doing with any high degree of accuracy. Simulating our entire universe in any kind of realistic way is not close to possible with current technology.
2. But ultimately that's irrelevant. The point is that the simulation, no matter how realistic, cannot possibly tell us anything meaningful about who or what created the universe we live in. Why? Because that's a fixed parameter of the simulation. In other words, the identity of the creator of the simulation is never a result or an output. If you run a weather simulation, but you set as a parameter of the simulation that the weather on Tuesday is fixed at 70 degrees Fahrenheit, then the simulation cannot give you a meaningful prediction of Tuesday's weather because you've already told the simulation what it must be. If you're doing a simulation of a cannon firing a cannonball, and you set as a parameter of the simulation that the ball must leave the cannon at 30 meters per second, then you can't use that simulation to predict how fast a real ball would leave a real cannon. You fixed that parameter.
You might want to go back and relook at the paper I linked:
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1210.1847v2.pdf
You seem to be misunderstanding what I'm doing. I am not using the simulations to simulate my data-set, I am using simulations as example universes in my "example universe" data-set. As I said a few posts ago "I am not claiming only simulated universes can be presented as evidence; any universe can. It just so happens all universes with known origins are simulated, but this isn't some kind of requirement I am imposing."
Each new "example universe" is allowed to have whatever "created or not created" parameter it has. Just like each swan you might observe could be any color; it just is whatever color it is. Each example could be created or not created, but is what it is.
The "created or not created" parameter IS allowed to vary across examples, but it doesn't. So, what conclusions should we draw from this fact?
(Certainly, one conclusion should always be to find more [and better] data, since no one should settle for thinking they've found the Ultimate Truth or something silly like that. Each experiment -a thought experiment or otherwise- needs to lead to the next one. That's why I brought up the 'natural' universes that might be inside black holes[1] as other potential 'example universes.')
First of all, this is not correct. You're not making a set of observations where the "created" parameter is allowed to take any value, and just happens to take the value "true" repeatedly. You're observing human-simulated universes, and so you know a priori that the value of "created" will necessarily be "true" for all your observations. I understand that, in principle, you are willing to include universes that do not have a creator in your "sample," but your willingness to do so does not change the problematic nature of your current data set.
But again, this isn't the problem I'm talking about, which you seem to be ignoring, so let me spell it out clearly: there is no reason to think that the value of the "created" parameter for simulated universes has any relationship whatsoever to the value of the "created" parameter for our universe. A hypothesis of a mechanism connecting your observations with your conclusion is a necessary component of rational induction.
In the case of black & white swans, we hypothesize that animals tend to look similar to other members of their species due to their genes. So the more white swans we observe, the more confidently we can say there are no black swans. Of course, this would still be an incorrect statement due to the limits of induction, but it would be a logically justifiable conclusion. Here, it's reasonable to believe that there is some mechanism (genetics) that connects our repeated observations (lots of white swans) to our inductive conclusion (all swans are white). Our conclusion is wrong because our dataset is not large enough, but our conclusion is based on sound inductive reasoning.
Likewise, we hypothesize that there is a mechanism that causes the sun to appear to rise and set at regular intervals (depending on the era, the hypothesis might be: rotation of earth, orbit of sun around the earth, the music of the spheres, etc.). Thus it is reasonable to conclude that a mechanism connects our repeated observations (the sun rises and sets) with our inductive conclusion (the sun will rise tomorrow).
In your example, there is no hypothesis that connects your observations (all simulated universes are created by humans) with your conclusion (our universe was created). In fact, all simulated universes would necessarily be created by humans regardless of who or what created the universe we live in, so there is no possible mechanism that could connect these two phenomena. This is my criticism. It's definitely not the same as the problem of induction, and it's substantively quite similar to the more formal Bayesian criticism that Crashing00 has raised.
My criteria is: "Any universe to which could -in principle- have 'life' in it, and its origin is known."
I understand that you object to this criteria. However, that doesn't mean that I'm somehow fixing the parameter in question. That parameter isn't in my criteria. It is not fixed. That you find the criteria unreasonable is another matter -one I disagree with- but your disagreement doesn't mean I'm a priori fixing the parameter in question. I'm not.
"There is no reason to think that the value of the "Higgs Boson" parameter for simulated universes has any relationship whatsoever to the value of the "Higgs Boson" parameter for our universe."
The simulations that scientists do -for things like the origin of gravity- aren't actually our universe. Yet, they are meant to represent our universe (or part of it). So, while these simulations don't directly have any bearing on our universe (and the simulated Higgs Bosons -and their behaviors- aren't 'real') they still can provide insight.
Anyway -to more directly address your point- it is my assertion that IF these simulations in question can -in principle- recreate universes similar to ours, they are able to provide insight into the origins of ours. I agree that these simulated universes aren't directly related to ours, but they can represent it.
And, again, that you disagree with that assertion is understood. I just disagree with your disagreement.
If each universe can spawn countless 'created' universes, then it is my assertion this fact can be used to make a reasonable guess about which kind we're in.
Again, that you disagree with this assertion is understood.
If your assertion is that we are in a simulated universe created by humans or sentient aliens, and the simulated universe itself exists within a larger meta-universe, then perhaps you can make a colorable argument that your inductive observations are relevant.
But that's not what people are asking when they ask whether you are a theist or atheist. They're asking whether you think the ultimate "real" universe was created by god. So at best you've just kicked the can one step down the road, but you eventually have to contend with the whether the ultimate "real" universe was created by a god or not. And I'm saying that simulated universes have no possible relevance or relationship to that question.
Edit:
I'm glad you brought this up, because there are at least two critical differences between a Higgs Boson simulation and the simulations you're talking about.
First, the thing we're studying (the behavior and properties of the Higgs Boson) is an output of the simulation, it is not a parameter. That is a very important difference. The parameters are the things that are pre-set beforehand, like the laws of quantum mechanics and the attraction law of the strong force. We then run the simulation and it spits out approximate values for various Higgs Boson properties. It would be totally silly to argue that the simulation proves the existence of the strong force; the existence and nature of the strong force was one of the input parameters that we fixed at the start of the simulation. Likewise, it's silly to argue that a simulated universe suggests that the real universe was created, because the "created" parameter was fixed at the start, it is not an output of the simulation.
Second, we know that the Higgs Boson simulation is likely to have predictive value in the real world because we know something about the laws of physics in the real world and we try to make the simulation match those laws as closely as we can. In other words, like I was saying in my last post, we have a hypothesis about why our observations (the simulation) are connected our conclusion (how things are in the real world). In the case of universe simulations, we have absolutely no clue about the conditions "before" and "during" our universe's creation, so we have absolutely no reason to think that the conditions of the simulated universe's creation has any relationship to our universe's creation. We have no rational hypothesis about why they should be related or similar.
But, the take-home part is:
"Honestly, if you think a programmer isn't the god of his program, then I don't think you have the correct definition of the term. What could be more godlike to a program then its programmer?"
I have no interest in arguing semantics about what "god" means. I'm just saying that when people talk about atheism, theism, and agnosticism, they're talking about some ultimate "God" that exists outside of the last onion layer. They're not talking about an engineer running a simulation. Many atheists would acknowledge the possibility that we're living in a simulated universe while still considering themselves hard atheists.
But I actually still think your argument is relatively weak even if it boils down to a claim that we're living in a simulated universe. The fact that we can simulate universes within our own in no way suggests that there exists a meta-universe in which our own universe could be simulated. Again, there is just no rational connection between the observation and the inductive conclusion. Simulated universes are equally likely to exist in a "real" universe versus a "simulated" universe, just like they're equally likely to exist in "created" and "un-created" universes. See my edit about the Higgs Boson simulations above for more detail on this point.
To assume that a computer programmer has the ability to control the Sun, the Moon, and the constellations of the stars in outer space just seems too far fetched to believe but it does bring forth the idea that we might be living inside a simulated universe like the Matrix where humans are unable to plug themselves out of it. I still believe it's all just science fiction but one of the things that fascinated me about the Matrix trilogy is how it questions our own existence and how we got where we are today.
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If the criteria you're using for "a god" would cause the ancient Egyptians, Greeks, Babylons, etc. to be considered atheists -as it seems this one your using does- then I guess this will have to be one more thing we disagree about.
I would also like to say that if the criteria you're using has a hidden clause that makes it axiomatically impossible for "a god" to exist, then I'm not the one with an a priori problem. But, I want it to be clear with that statement that I'm not saying you are doing this. I don't know if you are, but based on past experiences I find many do.
I'm fairly certain I've already addressed the issues you raised in that edit in post #219. But, if you feel that explanation is insufficient I can try to elaborate further.
We've found many more universes we know to be simulated then ones we know not to be. In fact, to my knowledge we've found exactly none we know not to be (Even if we count this one as real, we still would have no others known to be 'real' based on that assumption).
No. It's a coincidence. Were all the times that there wasn't a blood moon on a Jewish Holiday proof that god doesn't exist?
That's 600 years without one and 1 year with one. Sounds like the *proof* against god here weighs 600 to 1, if you consider the blood-moon-barometer to be accurate.
Why not? If it had happened 200 years ago and we were alive 200 years ago, would you be saying the same thing? Or did someone predict that it would happen during this lifetime? Were those people Nasa, because they apparently are able to do that. It doesn't make them god.
The difference is that science has evidence and religion has warm and fuzzy feelings. It goes like this.
Science: "That's checkmate."
Religion: "No it isn't."
Science: "Uh, yes it is. My bishop is attacking your king from H-7 and your king has no spaces to move, considering that my knight and pawn are threatening his escape squares."
Religion: "I don't believe you."
Science: "The pieces are right there."
Religion: "I have faith that I haven't lost."
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