In the Republic, one of Socrates' first interlocutors makes the following argument about the nature of justice:
[You] fancy that the shepherd or cowherd fattens or tends the sheep or oxen with a view to their own good and not to the good of himself or his master; and you further imagine that the rulers of States, if they are true rulers, never think of their subjects as sheep, and that they are not studying to their own advantage day and night. Oh, no; and so entirely astray are you in your ideas about the just and unjust as not even to know that justice and the just are in reality another's good; that is to say, the interest of the ruler and the stronger. [...] For the unjust is lord over the truly simple and just: he is stronger , and his subjects do what is for his interest, and minister to his happiness, which is very far from being their own.
In short; he is arguing that justice is a tool of the strong to subdue the weak, and that the just are simple, charming folk who do the bidding of the unjust. This, argues Thrasymachus, is how it ought to be.
Socrates attempts to refute this, but fails to logically do so. (Perhaps intentionally; he could be a bit of an ass.) Thrasymachus nevertheless concedes the point. But is he wrong?
Yes. And I will argue based on a number of really bold claims.
1) Justice exists, and it is some set of standards that humans can discover, yet it is independent of human opinion.
2) If it transcends opinion, and if it is central to a universal ethic, then it must apply to all people equally.
3) If justice is a tool of the strong to subdue the weak, then it fails to apply to all people equally.
4) This contradicts (2), meaning this is an erroneous concept of justice.
Help has come in the form of a bit of basic algebra. I feel that it'll shed some light on your problem here.
Basically:
S + T = W
...S in this case stands for 'spam' and the T stands for 'light trolling'. And the W? That stands for 'Warning'. I love math. -- {mikeyG}
1) Justice exists, and it is some set of standards that humans can discover, yet it is independent of human opinion.
This is the only claim that I reject; admittedly this is to my advantage, because if it is accurate than the logic follows nicely. That said, I reject it on the grounds that, Plato aside, concepts cannot be said to exist in any fundamental, independent manner. They are human creations, and are therefore subject to human interpretation and (in some cases) degradation.
That said, I reject it on the grounds that, Plato aside, concepts cannot be said to exist in any fundamental, independent manner.
Is justice a "concept", in the strict mental construct sense of the word? Could it be, rather, some sort of regular category into which various forms of behavior fall? If I say, "This behavior is destructive", you're likely to know what I mean; destructiveness is an objective category of behavior that would exist whether or not humans are around to observe it. Justice, under this formulation, is much the same, albeit rather more complex (and philosophically contentious) in its definition.
Private Mod Note
():
Rollback Post to RevisionRollBack
Vive, vale. Siquid novisti rectius istis,
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
In short; he is arguing that justice is a tool of the strong to subdue the weak, and that the just are simple, charming folk who do the bidding of the unjust.
There are lots of problems I see in this argument.
1.) It argues about the nature of justice based on the way it is applied. To me those are very different things. Individuals may use the mechanisms of justice to futher their own unjust agendas, but that does affect what justice really is.
2.) It implies or even presupposes that the strong behave unjustly. I would argue that many strong people do believe in and follow the precepts of justice, therefore the conclusion does not hold valid.
3.) It formulates propositions based on qualities that can change. A strong, unjust individual may oppress a group of just weaklings. But oppressed groups have a knack for finding a way to turn the tables on their oppressor. By his reasoning the oppressed weaklings are now the strong oppressors and their actions are now unjust by very definition. That's nonsense.
Private Mod Note
():
Rollback Post to RevisionRollBack
The Golden Rule of forums: If you're going to be rude, be right. If you might be wrong, be polite.
But this argument says that Justice is both subjective(used as a tool, and defined by others) and objective(universally true), which is self contradictory.
A better constructed argument would be one that showed people in power to be hypocritical or enacting a double standard.
It could be said that justice is an ethical state, a type of conditions which affairs can possess with respect to ethics, and thus is an entity relative to the ethos that contains it. I argue, instead, that justice is more like an ethics-based description of a state that isn't itself a purely ethical one. There are disagreements as to what contributes to or detracts from the attainment of the state of justice, predicated on disagreeing moral systems, but it's still an objective state.
Quote from Blinking Spirit »
Is justice a "concept", in the strict mental construct sense of the word? Could it be, rather, some sort of regular category into which various forms of behavior fall? If I say, "This behavior is destructive", you're likely to know what I mean; destructiveness is an objective category of behavior that would exist whether or not humans are around to observe it. Justice, under this formulation, is much the same, albeit rather more complex (and philosophically contentious) in its definition.
Yes, that's what I think, too.
In fact, I'm starting to think it may be sensible to think of general morality in such a way, although it's sure to be more subtle . . .
Anyway, Thrasymachus is talking about justice in the sense of an institution established by a social contract, yes? I say that if justice is a type of objective quality, then his scenario creates a split in meaning: "justice" as in a system that is thought of as just by those who observe it, and states of justness themselves. If the unjust can use "justice" to denigrate the just, then by the nature of that scenario the "justice" isn't justice.
If we accept the meaning of justice to be a homeostasis or equilibrium in the affairs and actions that ethics are concerned with, then a system used by the powerful to oppress the less-powerful is inherently unjust.
Private Mod Note
():
Rollback Post to RevisionRollBack
All that I yearn for, for richer or poorer, is to be the light that you see. All that I yearn for, for richer or poorer, is to be the peace that you feel. All that I yearn for, for richer or poorer, is to fill your heart on my own.
But the rainbow is an image of hope for many reasons, as it is a brilliant sight coming out of oftimes dismal weather.
This is the only claim that I reject; admittedly this is to my advantage, because if it is accurate than the logic follows nicely.
Yay. I win. Sort of. (Well, to be fair, I think you disagree with Thrasymachus, too, but you are trying to figure out why.)
EDIT: Wait, are you disagreeing with me for the sake of disagreeing? Because if so I'd say that's pretty rude. If you're not interested in other people's answer to the question "why is Thrasymachus wrong?" then it seems silly for you to have posted a thread about it.
That said, I reject it on the grounds that, Plato aside,
Do you mean that there is a Platonic objection to my claim? Have not read a single word Plato has every written outside of what is posted on BrainyQuotes, so you will have to enlighten me.
concepts cannot be said to exist in any fundamental, independent manner. They are human creations, and are therefore subject to human interpretation and (in some cases) degradation.
Okay, this will seem verbose, but I hope clear enough of an argument.
I take a concept (like justice) to mean "A mental construct seen as mediating between a word and whatever it denotes or is used to refer to. Thus a concept ‘dog’ would be seen as mediating between dog and the set of animals denoted by it; this concept might be seen as common to both dog and e.g. chien in French; and so on" (Concise Oxford Dictionary of Linguistics).
When I talk about justice, I am simply using the word to refer to the claims people can legitimately make against others.
The implication of my account is that while the description of justice is conceived of by humans, the legitimacy of such a description is independent of our opinions.
Thus if someone makes a moral claim "X is just," and if someone else makes the moral claim "X is unjust," somebody has to be wrong. And the reason one person is right is not because he believes it, nor even because he is justified in believing it. X simply has the property of being just or unjust.
Please tell me if I am being unclear. What I want to turn to is what I feel about your claim. I strongly believe that if the truth of justice is subject to human interpretation, then the whole concept kind of falls apart and loses its value.
It is, I think, essential to an anti-authoritarian outlook (which I know we both share) that we view claims about justice to come from objective standards. And if these standards are objective, I would argue that they can't be made up. If it turned out that justice was defined by the most powerful, "enlightened" person, then that would really suck for the average Jane, whose common sense tells her better. Even if she's not very good at philosophy, she can still make right claims despite lacking an intellectually satisfying story about said claim.
Is justice a "concept", in the strict mental construct sense of the word? Could it be, rather, some sort of regular category into which various forms of behavior fall? If I say, "This behavior is destructive", you're likely to know what I mean; destructiveness is an objective category of behavior that would exist whether or not humans are around to observe it. Justice, under this formulation, is much the same, albeit rather more complex (and philosophically contentious) in its definition.
If it were to turn out that I'm wrong (as opposed to unjustified) in claiming justice is a concept, I think that Blinking Spirit's reasoning would also vindicate my claim about justice.
Help has come in the form of a bit of basic algebra. I feel that it'll shed some light on your problem here.
Basically:
S + T = W
...S in this case stands for 'spam' and the T stands for 'light trolling'. And the W? That stands for 'Warning'. I love math. -- {mikeyG}
In fact, I'm starting to think it may be sensible to think of general morality in such a way, although it's sure to be more subtle . . .
Note on the scholarship: Many ancient philosophy specialists believe that when Plato or Aristotle or whoever is talking about "justice", that's his word for what you call "general morality". Then again, some claim that their "justice" is something totally different from any modern notion of morality, and we really shouldn't read these as ethical arguments at all.
Anyway, Thrasymachus is talking about justice in the sense of an institution established by a social contract, yes?
The status of ethics may be contentious, but the notion of the social contract definitely didn't exist at the time. (Though, yet again, there's at least one philosopher who finds a sort of crypto-Hobbesianism in Aristotle - describing his theory that way does it no justice at all, but you get the idea.)
I say that if justice is a type of objective quality, then his scenario creates a split in meaning: "justice" as in a system that is thought of as just by those who observe it, and states of justness themselves. If the unjust can use "justice" to denigrate the just, then by the nature of that scenario the "justice" isn't justice.
Spot on. In fact, it's true that the "justice" of a tyrant isn't justice even if there actually isn't any objective justice. We know what the word "unicorn" means, even though no such animal exists. If I glue a narwhal horn onto a grey horse's forehead, I haven't made a unicorn; I've just made something that can be mistaken for one. I submit that when we speak of "justice", we are inherently referring to some sort of universal and objective standard. We may not know what it is, or even if it exists, but we can certainly tell what isn't it.
Private Mod Note
():
Rollback Post to RevisionRollBack
Vive, vale. Siquid novisti rectius istis,
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Note on the scholarship: Many ancient philosophy specialists believe that when Plato or Aristotle or whoever is talking about "justice", that's his word for what you call "general morality". Then again, some claim that their "justice" is something totally different from any modern notion of morality, and we really shouldn't read these as ethical arguments at all.
The status of ethics may be contentious, but the notion of the social contract definitely didn't exist at the time. (Though, yet again, there's at least one philosopher who finds a sort of crypto-Hobbesianism in Aristotle - describing his theory that way does it no justice at all, but you get the idea.)
Spot on. In fact, it's true that the "justice" of a tyrant isn't justice even if there actually isn't any objective justice. We know what the word "unicorn" means, even though no such animal exists. If I glue a narwhal horn onto a grey horse's forehead, I haven't made a unicorn; I've just made something that can be mistaken for one. I submit that when we speak of "justice", we are inherently referring to some sort of universal and objective standard. We may not know what it is, or even if it exists, but we can certainly tell what isn't it.
This is true, when you read Plato, what is the exact word he uses for Justice? Is it diké? Because if it is, this had more the connotation of "restitution", "penalties" or "punishment for wrongdoing" as imposed by a court of law, etc. than it did for the broader sense of inherent equality and dignity we use for that word today.
And in the very limited sense, Thrasymachus was right; it is possible that unequal or inappropriate use of restitution penalties was a tool by which tyrants could benefit their cronies and ruin their opposition, and the threat of dispossession for minor transgressions could be used as a fear tactic to keep the lesser ranks of society in line.
This is true, when you read Plato, what is the exact word he uses for Justice? Is it diké? Because if it is, this had more the connotation of "restitution", "penalties" or "punishment for wrongdoing" as imposed by a court of law, etc. than it did for the broader sense of inherent equality and dignity we use for that word today.
'S all Greek to me. I'm a Latin man, myself. I'd look it up at the Perseus Project, but that's the slowest website on Earth.
And in the very limited sense, Thrasymachus was right; it is possible that unequal or inappropriate use of restitution penalties was a tool by which tyrants could benefit their cronies and ruin their opposition, and the threat of dispossession for minor transgressions could be used as a fear tactic to keep the lesser ranks of society in line.
I see your point, but I also find it revealing that your choice of English words - "restitution", "wrongdoing" - still appeals to some notion of morality.
Private Mod Note
():
Rollback Post to RevisionRollBack
Vive, vale. Siquid novisti rectius istis,
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Help has come in the form of a bit of basic algebra. I feel that it'll shed some light on your problem here.
Basically:
S + T = W
...S in this case stands for 'spam' and the T stands for 'light trolling'. And the W? That stands for 'Warning'. I love math. -- {mikeyG}
To post a comment, please login or register a new account.
In short; he is arguing that justice is a tool of the strong to subdue the weak, and that the just are simple, charming folk who do the bidding of the unjust. This, argues Thrasymachus, is how it ought to be.
Socrates attempts to refute this, but fails to logically do so. (Perhaps intentionally; he could be a bit of an ass.) Thrasymachus nevertheless concedes the point. But is he wrong?
1) Justice exists, and it is some set of standards that humans can discover, yet it is independent of human opinion.
2) If it transcends opinion, and if it is central to a universal ethic, then it must apply to all people equally.
3) If justice is a tool of the strong to subdue the weak, then it fails to apply to all people equally.
4) This contradicts (2), meaning this is an erroneous concept of justice.
Help has come in the form of a bit of basic algebra. I feel that it'll shed some light on your problem here.
Basically:
S + T = W
...S in this case stands for 'spam' and the T stands for 'light trolling'. And the W? That stands for 'Warning'. I love math. -- {mikeyG}
This is the only claim that I reject; admittedly this is to my advantage, because if it is accurate than the logic follows nicely. That said, I reject it on the grounds that, Plato aside, concepts cannot be said to exist in any fundamental, independent manner. They are human creations, and are therefore subject to human interpretation and (in some cases) degradation.
Is justice a "concept", in the strict mental construct sense of the word? Could it be, rather, some sort of regular category into which various forms of behavior fall? If I say, "This behavior is destructive", you're likely to know what I mean; destructiveness is an objective category of behavior that would exist whether or not humans are around to observe it. Justice, under this formulation, is much the same, albeit rather more complex (and philosophically contentious) in its definition.
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
There are lots of problems I see in this argument.
1.) It argues about the nature of justice based on the way it is applied. To me those are very different things. Individuals may use the mechanisms of justice to futher their own unjust agendas, but that does affect what justice really is.
2.) It implies or even presupposes that the strong behave unjustly. I would argue that many strong people do believe in and follow the precepts of justice, therefore the conclusion does not hold valid.
3.) It formulates propositions based on qualities that can change. A strong, unjust individual may oppress a group of just weaklings. But oppressed groups have a knack for finding a way to turn the tables on their oppressor. By his reasoning the oppressed weaklings are now the strong oppressors and their actions are now unjust by very definition. That's nonsense.
Current New Favorite Person™: Mallory Archer
She knows why.
A better constructed argument would be one that showed people in power to be hypocritical or enacting a double standard.
Yes, that's what I think, too.
In fact, I'm starting to think it may be sensible to think of general morality in such a way, although it's sure to be more subtle . . .
Anyway, Thrasymachus is talking about justice in the sense of an institution established by a social contract, yes? I say that if justice is a type of objective quality, then his scenario creates a split in meaning: "justice" as in a system that is thought of as just by those who observe it, and states of justness themselves. If the unjust can use "justice" to denigrate the just, then by the nature of that scenario the "justice" isn't justice.
If we accept the meaning of justice to be a homeostasis or equilibrium in the affairs and actions that ethics are concerned with, then a system used by the powerful to oppress the less-powerful is inherently unjust.
All that I yearn for, for richer or poorer, is to be the peace that you feel.
All that I yearn for, for richer or poorer, is to fill your heart on my own.
Gaymers | Magic Coffeehouse | Little Jar of Mamelon | Natural 20
Yay. I win. Sort of. (Well, to be fair, I think you disagree with Thrasymachus, too, but you are trying to figure out why.)
EDIT: Wait, are you disagreeing with me for the sake of disagreeing? Because if so I'd say that's pretty rude. If you're not interested in other people's answer to the question "why is Thrasymachus wrong?" then it seems silly for you to have posted a thread about it.
Do you mean that there is a Platonic objection to my claim? Have not read a single word Plato has every written outside of what is posted on BrainyQuotes, so you will have to enlighten me.
Okay, this will seem verbose, but I hope clear enough of an argument.
I take a concept (like justice) to mean "A mental construct seen as mediating between a word and whatever it denotes or is used to refer to. Thus a concept ‘dog’ would be seen as mediating between dog and the set of animals denoted by it; this concept might be seen as common to both dog and e.g. chien in French; and so on" (Concise Oxford Dictionary of Linguistics).
When I talk about justice, I am simply using the word to refer to the claims people can legitimately make against others.
The implication of my account is that while the description of justice is conceived of by humans, the legitimacy of such a description is independent of our opinions.
Thus if someone makes a moral claim "X is just," and if someone else makes the moral claim "X is unjust," somebody has to be wrong. And the reason one person is right is not because he believes it, nor even because he is justified in believing it. X simply has the property of being just or unjust.
Please tell me if I am being unclear. What I want to turn to is what I feel about your claim. I strongly believe that if the truth of justice is subject to human interpretation, then the whole concept kind of falls apart and loses its value.
It is, I think, essential to an anti-authoritarian outlook (which I know we both share) that we view claims about justice to come from objective standards. And if these standards are objective, I would argue that they can't be made up. If it turned out that justice was defined by the most powerful, "enlightened" person, then that would really suck for the average Jane, whose common sense tells her better. Even if she's not very good at philosophy, she can still make right claims despite lacking an intellectually satisfying story about said claim.
I take justice to mean fidelity to and concern for each person's rights motivated by a respect for the intrinsic value of each person.
If it were to turn out that I'm wrong (as opposed to unjustified) in claiming justice is a concept, I think that Blinking Spirit's reasoning would also vindicate my claim about justice.
Help has come in the form of a bit of basic algebra. I feel that it'll shed some light on your problem here.
Basically:
S + T = W
...S in this case stands for 'spam' and the T stands for 'light trolling'. And the W? That stands for 'Warning'. I love math. -- {mikeyG}
Note on the scholarship: Many ancient philosophy specialists believe that when Plato or Aristotle or whoever is talking about "justice", that's his word for what you call "general morality". Then again, some claim that their "justice" is something totally different from any modern notion of morality, and we really shouldn't read these as ethical arguments at all.
The status of ethics may be contentious, but the notion of the social contract definitely didn't exist at the time. (Though, yet again, there's at least one philosopher who finds a sort of crypto-Hobbesianism in Aristotle - describing his theory that way does it no justice at all, but you get the idea.)
Spot on. In fact, it's true that the "justice" of a tyrant isn't justice even if there actually isn't any objective justice. We know what the word "unicorn" means, even though no such animal exists. If I glue a narwhal horn onto a grey horse's forehead, I haven't made a unicorn; I've just made something that can be mistaken for one. I submit that when we speak of "justice", we are inherently referring to some sort of universal and objective standard. We may not know what it is, or even if it exists, but we can certainly tell what isn't it.
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
This is true, when you read Plato, what is the exact word he uses for Justice? Is it diké? Because if it is, this had more the connotation of "restitution", "penalties" or "punishment for wrongdoing" as imposed by a court of law, etc. than it did for the broader sense of inherent equality and dignity we use for that word today.
And in the very limited sense, Thrasymachus was right; it is possible that unequal or inappropriate use of restitution penalties was a tool by which tyrants could benefit their cronies and ruin their opposition, and the threat of dispossession for minor transgressions could be used as a fear tactic to keep the lesser ranks of society in line.
'S all Greek to me. I'm a Latin man, myself. I'd look it up at the Perseus Project, but that's the slowest website on Earth.
I see your point, but I also find it revealing that your choice of English words - "restitution", "wrongdoing" - still appeals to some notion of morality.
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Help has come in the form of a bit of basic algebra. I feel that it'll shed some light on your problem here.
Basically:
S + T = W
...S in this case stands for 'spam' and the T stands for 'light trolling'. And the W? That stands for 'Warning'. I love math. -- {mikeyG}