Hmm. That's quite a turn-around. Just be careful, Leilani.
that's what EVERYONE says.
I've always been the careful one, I'm sick of being careful. It's like...all my friends can go out and get drunk, or have sex with each other, but I've always got to be the rational/innocent/whatever one. I don't know WHY, but I'm bored/sick of being the careful one.
This is not to say, though, that i would do something incredibly stupid and dangerous while drunk. I won't do something like go drive the car around. I'd most likely stay the night at whatever friend's house we happened to be at.
I don't mean to snap on you, i'm sorry if it came across that way.:p
Private Mod Note
():
Rollback Post to RevisionRollBack
I know it seems that I don't care, but something in me does I swear.
[gaymers]
founder of the MTGS Forum Pirates
'tar/banner by R&Doom.
I know exactly what you're talking about, Jo. If you feel like cutting loose, I say go for it. Obviously, doing something outrageously stupid is ill-advised; but as far as being careful goes, I'd only be say be careful not to let it become your new norm. Cut loose, go a little wild, be a little uninhibited, face some consequences and learn they're not as bad as you imagine them to be. And then find your center again.
Sorry if I've been silent on your recent difficulties, Mikey. I honestly just haven't had anything useful to say. I have no experience with situations like that (the closest probably being my alcoholic uncle, and I don't think he ever actively tried to kill hemself he just didn't care if he happened to die from drinking) and consequently any words of support or encouragement really just sound trite. I do wish you the best, but you seem to be handling the situation quite well.
Private Mod Note
():
Rollback Post to RevisionRollBack
The Golden Rule of forums: If you're going to be rude, be right. If you might be wrong, be polite.
Oddly enough, I feel much worse for her boyfriend right now. Back in March, when I realized that my friendships with them were thinning out, I gave him some parting advice about watching her for signs of deep depression (I've known almost since day one that she was highly depressed and a probable suicide-case). Advice which he quickly discarded because the two of them talked and she's fine now and they're in love and there's no secrets between them and she'd tell him if things were bad, etc. Cut to now, and he's completely blindsided. And I feel bad for him because he was taken in by her lies so all this came as a huge shock and uprooted everything he thought he knew about her.
Raw deal.
And it's not exactly like you can say you told him so. I'm unfeeling so I'd probably have looked at him with a steel gaze of apathy if he looked at me shocked.
So you think you can dance is on tonight and Pirates comes out. Today's going to be busy after work.
Sorry if I've been silent on your recent difficulties, Mikey. I honestly just haven't had anything useful to say. I have no experience with situations like that (the closest probably being my alcoholic uncle, and I don't think he ever actively tried to kill hemself he just didn't care if he happened to die from drinking) and consequently any words of support or encouragement really just sound trite. I do wish you the best, but you seem to be handling the situation quite well.
I'm like a cat that way. Always landing on my feet. And no worries, support and encouragement are usually lost on me anyway.
Honestly though, I'm holding up as well as I am in no small part due to the fact that I've been preparing for something like this happening for over five years.
Quote from blue »
And it's not exactly like you can say you told him so. I'm unfeeling so I'd probably have looked at him with a steel gaze of apathy if he looked at me shocked.
You think that stopped me? Naw, I don't really get anything out of 'I told ya so', so I didn't bother saying it. It doesn't really matter that I did in fact tell him so. What matters is getting him in a state to be of use to himself and her. Which isn't the case if he's kicking himself over not seeing the signs or blaming himself for not doing more before this.
But deontological morality [I]does[/I] care about consequences. [I]n deontological [terms], even if that if the loss is quit negligible, [...] stealing is still wrong. You are still ignoring someone else's rights and privileges (even if that someone is just Wal-Mart), you are still making it okay for yourself to take freely of others. I argue that these are themselves consequences, even though they are consequences that consequentialism ignores.
I don't think that ignoring someone's rights is a consequence. It is part of your intention. Suppose you didn't know that something you found belonged to anyone, then how could be said to be ignoring their rights if you took it? The consequence is the same even if you knew that it belonged to someone, but the intention is different.
The virtues and norms of deontological moral systems certainly aren't decided at random.
Well, I didn't say anything of the sort. But I'm not at all convinced that deontological ethics rely on consequences. They are called nonconsequentialist ethics for a reason.
My point was this: "good" must be defined by a moral system - yes, even a deontological system - and whatever that definitions entail, whatever it's describing, that could be something that has an independent existence.
I have never contested that it [I]could[/I] be something that has an independent existence. I have only contested that this possibility is relevant to anything.
Yes, categorical imperative does primarily use intention as it's measuring stick, so to speak. Not all deontological systems are strictly concerned with that - some weigh both intent and consequences, and all different ranges of consequences aside from immediately visible ones (some kinds of Christian virtue morality are good examples of this). By such systems, you can still do something bad with good intentions at heart.
It is only necessary for my point that some moral systems only use intention as the criteria for determining the morality of an action. The later system you mention, however, I would not consider to be strictly deontological. Those are hybrid systems.
Virtue ethics are a separate category from deontological or consequentialist ethics.
However, I also think that Ain_Soph has a point in that there can be a "something" that all moral goals can eventually be refined to, and that this something exists even if no one realizes it.
I repeat: I have not contested this. Only its relevance to us.
The consequentialist moral system, in a regard, describes or captures the phenomenon of morality in its manifestation through the consequences of actions - and this is measurable. Intents can't be measured, so why would be adopt a moral system that doesn't really help us in interpreting the moral nature of actions?
This is relevant for judging people. That is certainly a problem, and so a purely deontological ethics would be an impractical basis for a law system. But you will note that it's not completely impractical, as we certainly do judge people on intentions and even judge people in court based on them. It is the distinction between 1st and 2nd degree murder, for example.
However, that is purely a practical consideration. Sure, we can't always [I]perceive[/I] people's intentions, however, not everything exists to pamper to our perceptions.
Whether we always know people's intentions, it could still be the case that their intentions are what determine whether their action is objectively moral. We might have to concede for the practical purpose of creating law that we must make judgments about intentions that may be inaccurate or judgments that disregard intention. But it would have no effect on objective morality.
The measured value is, generally, superior to the intuitive one and so consequentialism will be superior to deontology in that it provides a system in which you are able to make measurements and observations.
The problem here is that you have merely provided a premise. What support is there for that idea? If you ask me, that's a subjective judgment, and so it does not reveal anything about objective morality. You are making subjective judgments and insisting that they are objective.
Measurements can only ever tell us what [I]is[/I], they can't tell us what [I]ought[/I] to be.
Which is why as a moral system it doesn't describe Morality, with a capital M, very well... it's just a moral system. So is consequentialist morality, of course, but at least that system helps us to understand how Morality actually operates.
So quick you are to dismiss one of the giants of philosophy. But as I have already stated, you haven't provided an objective basis for assuming that "Morality" is not deontological. Measurements may be objective, but it is not at all clear that objective morality has anything to do with measurements.
Objectively, there is no way to apply a moral system based on intent except through hindsight, in which case an action has already occurred and it seems pretty useless to know intent in any case.
Again, a merely practical consideration. It has no bearing on whether it is true that intentions are the basis of morality.
Morality necessarily describes whether you are [I]doing[/I] something good or something bad. Intents may be flawed by any manner of things, such as ignorance, false rationalizations, or perceptive bias.
Kantian ethics is not so unsophisticated as you are supposing here.
Kantian ethics might say that ignorance, bias and false rationalizations are the result of immoral actions. Your ignorance may be the result of allowing yourself to remain in ignorance, rather than furthering yourself as a rational, autonomous being. Likewise false rationalizations arise from you having a base desire that is the true intention of your action, which you have deceived yourself about. You would not need a false rationalization if your action was of a good intention from the start. As such, your actions can still be immoral even if at first glance you seem to have proper intentions, because those intentions may be at root improper.
The only change that is occurring is when I physically force myself to get up: this is what makes the universe a different framework than it was one second ago - an action occurred.
Are you saying that you deny that when intentions change, changes in the brain/mind occur?
In the same way, Morality describes how individuals will react to stimuli.
I think you are confusing "Morality" with "Psychology".
If they react negatively, it simply means that to cause that stimuli would be immoral, and vice versa. And with repetition, you will consistently achieve the same results with the same individuals. You will make empirical, objective observations as to how they react.
But you will still need a normative statement that is not based on those observations:
"Causing people to react negatively is immoral."
That is not an objective statement that you can ever find by making empirical observations. I am growing more suspicious that you have never heard of nor examined the [I]is-ought[/I] problem.
Morality is simply whatever it is that corresponds to the objectively observable states that people experience when they are impacted by an action. The word itself, Morality, does not matter, but the phenomena that it describes is quite objective in nature.
A scenario: There are five patients in your hospital: one who needs a heart, two a lung, two a kidney and one a liver. Fortunately, you know someone who has all healthy organs, and not only that but people care less about him than the other people. You kill him, take his organs, and save those six people from dying.
We can objectively observe that the negative consequence was one person dying. The positive consequence was that six people did not die, and their friends and family were also happy. We also know that other people were less negatively affected by his death than other people being positively affected by the six people not dying. It seems that our empirical observations have revealed that there were overall good consequences to the action. So it must be a good action.
Now, I'm going to assume that you do not think that that would be a moral thing to do. On the basis of what empirical observation do you conclude that? On what basis might we conclude that it's immorality is objective?
Let's suppose an action impacts two people equally. One person is benefited, and the other person is harmed. This, disregarding any further impact that the action has on people, would render the action morally neutral.
Eh? This would seem to suggest that when I steal $1 from someone, since I gain $1 and they lose $1, the action is morally neutral.
It's true that there is no truly objective moral [I]system [/I]that we can adapt for our use, as you are correct in our lack of causal omniscience. But the underlying Morality itself is objective. If theoretically we had perfect knowledge, we would easily see how it operates objectively. Which means that it [I]is[/I] objective.
Mmmmmm... nope. You still have the [I]is-ought[/I] problem.
Likewise, I could say that if we had perfect knowledge, we would know what all people's intentions were when they carried out their actions. Which would deflect your criticism of Kantian ethics from above (not that I thought that criticism succeeded). In which case, wouldn't Kantian ethics [I]be[/I] objective?
In a little while I'll be enjoying a trip to the beach for about a week. Potentially, there will be some major amounts of alcohol (not that I really want to get hammered, but I'm sure some people do), and this guy I've been into for a bit now. Everyone loves summer drama, right?
Grr that was a call to action >_< Fine. I GUESS I can find a hot guy somewhere but no one shares my taste in men. W/e
Edit: Screw it. I'm getting rid of my libido from lack of use. Anyone want it cuz there's a lot of energy left in there. Someone else can do the Hot Guy of the Week. I haven't seen a famous person that I've been attracted to in a long time. I could show you all some pictures of my hot friends but that'd be weird O-o. (sort of. I don't actually want to go out with any of them)
Seriously, one libido for sale. Near mint. Comes in a sleeve...
But then again 12 is a lot. I mean, in situations like that you've got to give a fair amount of attention to each person, and that would be difficult...
Private Mod Note
():
Rollback Post to RevisionRollBack
The Golden Rule of forums: If you're going to be rude, be right. If you might be wrong, be polite.
No, especially not when there's going to be ~11 other people in the same house. It would be a very fun night, but then not so much.
Well is he gay? I guess I'm not seeing the problem if he's gay. Interested fine that's cool. Not interested, oh well what's a little ball cupping drunken fun between friends. Gay great. Not gay, flattered and drunken kiss seems fine too.
But then again 12 is a lot. I mean, in situations like that you've got to give a fair amount of attention to each person, and that would be difficult...
you think 12 is a lot? Kraj my image of you is so distorted now. I'm disappointed!
Well is he gay? I guess I'm not seeing the problem if he's gay. Interested fine that's cool. Not interested, oh well what's a little ball cupping drunken fun between friends. Gay great. Not gay, flattered and drunken kiss seems fine too.
There are a number of conservative people who do not feel like this in the house.
This is relevant for judging people. That is certainly a problem, and so a purely deontological ethics would be an impractical basis for a law system. But you will note that it's not completely impractical, as we certainly do judge people on intentions and even judge people in court based on them. It is the distinction between 1st and 2nd degree murder, for example.
However, that is purely a practical consideration. Sure, we can't always perceive people's intentions, however, not everything exists to pamper to our perceptions.
It goes beyond the practical considerations. There are a number of things, beyond intent even, that contribute to why people commit certain actions and we don't necessarily have cause to suggest that these things are the basis of what Morality is. For example, you could be predisposed to committing certain actions because of your emotional state at the time, or because of things that have happened to you, and so forth. None of these things, intention included, actually change the impact that the action has on people.
Whether we always know people's intentions, it could still be the case that their intentions are what determine whether their action is objectively moral. We might have to concede for the practical purpose of creating law that we must make judgments about intentions that may be inaccurate or judgments that disregard intention. But it would have no effect on objective morality.
You could create a moral system based on intents in this manner, and it could feasibly have an objective basis, but it wouldn't be a description of Morality. Perhaps a description of principles. The definition of morality entails conduct, or actions in other words.
The problem here is that you have merely provided a premise. What support is there for that idea? If you ask me, that's a subjective judgment, and so it does not reveal anything about objective morality. You are making subjective judgments and insisting that they are objective.
It's unclear to me what you are supposing is subjective. If what you mean is that how I choose to define Morality according to a certain objective system over potentially another... ok, yes when we define our terms we make subjective value judgments.
Given:
___ is defined as the quality of actions have when they impact others.
I'm choosing to use the word "morality" to fill in the blank "___" because arguably, Morality has connotations that are appropriate for that definition. Whatever word we decide to fill in ___, we can see that ___ describes things that are objective. It may be that I'm subjectively choosing the word Morality for this phenomenon, as opposed to using the word morality for whatever quality intent may impart upon actions, but the choice of word itself matters not insomuch as the definition itself. ___ is objective, and if you wish to argue the semantics of whether "morality" is the right word for ___, that's one thing, but you aren't successfully making the point that ___ is subjective.
In the same way, we subjectively define or qualify things when conducting a scientific experiment. That doesn't mean that the actual scientific procedure was subjectively based.
Measurements can only ever tell us what is, they can't tell us what ought to be.
So you are arguing semantics.
As far as that is concerned, I'm saying Morality ought to be the word used for ___ because Morality often has a connotation for acting in a certain way, while it rarely has a connotation for intention.
So quick you are to dismiss one of the giants of philosophy. But as I have already stated, you haven't provided an objective basis for assuming that "Morality" is not deontological. Measurements may be objective, but it is not at all clear that objective morality has anything to do with measurements.
The preference that we have for which words we use for things will always be subjective even things is objective.
Kantian ethics might say that ignorance, bias and false rationalizations are the result of immoral actions. Your ignorance may be the result of allowing yourself to remain in ignorance, rather than furthering yourself as a rational, autonomous being. Likewise false rationalizations arise from you having a base desire that is the true intention of your action, which you have deceived yourself about. You would not need a false rationalization if your action was of a good intention from the start. As such, your actions can still be immoral even if at first glance you seem to have proper intentions, because those intentions may be at root improper.
In which case you've just reduced the intent to an action, and therefore a consequence.
Are you saying that you deny that when intentions change, changes in the brain/mind occur?
I'm denying that changes in the brain necessarily have a causal impact on other things, and that to some degree we are not responsible for the changes that occur - they are independent of us.
I think you are confusing "Morality" with "Psychology".
No, I'm using psychological terms to describe how an action (stimuli) has an impact (reaction) on individuals which can be observed objectively. Using the definition of morality (or __), we can conclude from our observations that an action has a moral or immoral characteristic based off their impact, discernible from the reaction.
But you will still need a normative statement that is not based on those observations:
"Causing people to react negatively is immoral."
That is not an objective statement that you can ever find by making empirical observations.
Only in the sense that the definition of morality (and immorality) is ambiguous.
My statement is actually that "causing harm to others through actions, observable by their reaction, is ___." My conclusion is that we should avoid ___, which is what leaves me to believe ___ is best articulated as "immoral."
I am growing more suspicious that you have never heard of nor examined the is-ought problem.
Do you deny that when an action has an impact upon a person, the state of that action because of that impact is objectively discernible?
A scenario: There are five patients in your hospital: one who needs a heart, two a lung, two a kidney and one a liver. Fortunately, you know someone who has all healthy organs, and not only that but people care less about him than the other people. You kill him, take his organs, and save those six people from dying.
We can objectively observe that the negative consequence was one person dying. The positive consequence was that six people did not die, and their friends and family were also happy. We also know that other people were less negatively affected by his death than other people being positively affected by the six people not dying. It seems that our empirical observations have revealed that there were overall good consequences to the action. So it must be a good action.
Now, I'm going to assume that you do not think that that would be a moral thing to do. On the basis of what empirical observation do you conclude that? On what basis might we conclude that it's immorality is objective?
This scenario could potentially be moral (or immoral). You did not define whether the person was willing, and infringing upon consent is another impact that an action has on person which would tip the balance.
Also, we don't know the full extent of other possibilities that were available to your patients. Was it possible to obtain other donated organs? Was it possible to treat that person successfully without a transplant? Until these possibilities are exhausted, we can't consider an action which would necessarily cause a higher harm to benefit ratio, even if the benefit outweighs the harm.
Eh? This would seem to suggest that when I steal $1 from someone, since I gain $1 and they lose $1, the action is morally neutral.
Well, I would tend to say that the impact that one's actions have upon oneself is always treated as neutral, so stealing a dollar would still be considered immoral. Giving that dollar to someone else might be considered neutral or moral, depending upon, again, whether or not other possibilities have been exhausted and what the benefit to harm ratio results as (after all, some people need a single dollar more than others). I would say Robin Hood did not necessarily commit immoral acts by stealing money, for example.
Mmmmmm... nope. You still have the is-ought problem.
Likewise, I could say that if we had perfect knowledge, we would know what all people's intentions were when they carried out their actions. Which would deflect your criticism of Kantian ethics from above (not that I thought that criticism succeeded). In which case, wouldn't Kantian ethics be objective?
Kantian ethics potentially has an objective basis, but what it describes is different than what I have been describing. Since I've already adopted the word "Morality" for what I am describing, and these two things are incompatible, I would probably have to select a different word to describe Kantian ethics. The basis of me making my choice is because I believe that Morality has more of a connotation appropriate to actions than intents. As such, the choice of words is subjective... but the thing that I am describing with the word Morality is not, itself, subjective.
I don't think that ignoring someone's rights is a consequence. It is part of your intention. Suppose you didn't know that something you found belonged to anyone, then how could be said to be ignoring their rights if you took it? The consequence is the same even if you knew that it belonged to someone, but the intention is different.
Would you say that if you steal something and you don't know you're strealing, it can't be wrong by any deontological standard?
Good intentions often don't mean anything if you're doing something that ends up terribly.
Just to clarify, I still claim that performing in an intent is a consequence in the long term. But admittedly, only in an abstract sense. If I allow myself to violate someone else's rights, even though that is not a concrete result and may not lead to doing the same in the future, I'd still consider that as a "bad effect" of the action. Or more precisely, not so much a bad effect of the act as a bad effect of my deciding to do it.
I'll explain more below.
Well, I didn't say anything of the sort. But I'm not at all convinced that deontological ethics rely on consequences. They are called nonconsequentialist ethics for a reason.
Well, they don't rely on consequences. But how do you think deontological definitions are made? How do you think certain intentions are judged as good or bad? All moral systems must originate from observations of relationships between actions/beliefs/whatever and what their effects are - even if that eventually stops being the chief criteria for judging goodness or badness. Why is treating someone as a means instead of an end bad? What reasoning is there to support such norms that have absolutely no tie to observation of consequences? Such reasoning doesn't have to completely ignore consequences to be nonconsequential.
Consequential ethics only care about concrete consequences. "Did this hurt somebody?" Doing the same thing in two different situations would be judged differently in each situation if one turned out badly and the other didn't. Deontology isn't really concerned with that - something can still be wrong even if it didn't hurt somebody. But "hurt somebody" is not irrelevent to deontology. What I'm saying is that "hurt somebody" can be, and often is, a valid and meaningful incitation to the formation of deontological ethics. Judging the deontological character of a kind of action or intent by itself arises from seeing what it causes. Deontology simply goes past caring just about that.
Deontology judges actions as good or ill regardless of their consequences. I am not arguing otherwise. I am saying that this is not because consequences are irrelevent to morality, but because observing consequences on their own isn't enough. As such, "benefit" is a not a non-issue to deontologists, it's just that it's not a strong enough criteria to define good.
Conseqences can still be good ways of determining how we should treat actions and intentions.
I have never contested that it could be something that has an independent existence. I have only contested that this possibility is relevant to anything.
The possibility of objective moral truth is very relevent to the possibility of objective moral truth, the existence of which Ain_Soph is arguing. I was under the impression that he was not proposing a moral system that was based on this idea, merely that he believed in this idea.
Ain_Soph and you are very clearly using different definitions about what morality is. I am merely trying to point this out. I'm not defending consequentialist ethics.
It is only necessary for my point that some moral systems only use intention as the criteria for determining the morality of an action. The later system you mention, however, I would not consider to be strictly deontological. Those are hybrid systems.
I disagree with the definition you're using for deontology. You seem to be saying that deontology, by definition, is an ethos that is predicated on intent, and that's it. But that's not necessarily true. Kantian deontology does focus a lot on intent, but that's not universal to deontology. Examine this: I meddle in my sister's life in a serious way against her will. Let's say that it turns out just fine and nothing bad happens, and I did it out of love and care for my sister. But the idea that this action was nonetheless wrong - regardless of the results and regardless of my intentions - is still a deontological judgment. My intent was good, and the consequences were not bad - but it would still be a wrong action in a deontological sense (that is, one not predicated on observing consequences).
Virtue ethics are a separate category from deontological or consequentialist ethics.
Somewhat, yes, though they resemble deontology moreso than consequentialism.
I repeat: I have not contested this. Only its relevance to us.
Ain_Soph didn't appear to be arguing it's relevence to devising moral systems. Correct me if I'm wrong, Ain_Soph.
Erimir, to be honest, I am agreeing with you in that the possibility of an objective morality doesn't help us when it comes to determining which moral systems is the closest to being objective. My tendency is to think that it doesn't matter that there is an objective morality, since whichever moral system we treat as objective (the "best" one, for example) may not be so objective, and that this may not really matter.
In this thread, I was also arguing that point, if you feel like perusing it. This is one of the key posts.
In light of that, though, I will say this. I've beheld some proposals over time about objective views of morality, and I see some merit in it.
All moral systems must have a standard by which to judge morality; a definition of goodness - a "gauge," as extremestan puts it. In broad terms, this "standard" is the same as a goal, though not always a goal in the sense of a sequence of events or kind of event that should be achieved.
Actions and attitudes can be evaluated in relation to this standard, and how well they "fit" the standard. This is just an example, but take part of the categorical imperative: do not treat humans as means rather than ends (value humanity). Actions can be judged as serving that standard, or conflicting with it. That actions do or do not serve that standard, that norm, is not subjective.
The core of moral relativism is that such moral standards do not have any actual merit over others, that adopting or not adopting any standard is purely a matter of preference, that none of them are better than others. But disagreement over how specific attitudes and actions fit with a moral definition is verifiable. It seems that this is what some mean when they say that just because people disagree about what is immoral or moral, it doesn't mean some or all of them can't be wrong.
My answer to moral relativism is that some such standards also end up having observable merit - we have reasons to adopt some standards over others. This is where "caring about consequences" comes into it. A utilitarian standard is one defined by the nature of the consequences of actions being measured - the standard would be "good actions have (more) good results, bad actions have (more) bad results," whatever good and bad results mean in that system of definitions. Deontological standards are not defined thusly, since the focus is one something other than the consequences of actions.
However, the merit of a standard can be analyzed and demonstrated through casuistry, case by case, including the valuation of consequences. For instance, let's say one of my moral imperatives is to value human life, even if failing to value human life would not harm anyone. Even if I never try to kill someone or let someone die, if I fail to value human life, according to that imperative, I'm still behaving immorally. As such, that imperative doesn't depend on consequences.
But what if someone asked me, "Why should we value human life?" My explanation would probably involve discussing consequences. If we as people don't highly value human life, then all human life is endangered because it's not being treated as important. If it's not treated as important, it will be sacrificed to serve other goals which are treated as more important. If this is common enough, then everyone is in danger, because anyone with enough power or just opportunity could take lives - including mine and the person who's asking me the question. This is a basically consequentialist reasoning, showing why we stand to benefit from valuing human life, treating it as intrinsically good. This is why I say all moral systems are based in "caring about consequences." We have reasons to adopt certain values, and that usually starts by wanting a benefit.
However, the key is that the imperative isn't only to value human life when doing otherwise could endanger our own lives. Failing to treat one human life as important may not lead to globe-wide genocide, nor self-endangerment. Lack of such valuation would still contribute, even if only in an abstract way, to the general devaluation of human life. And from a utilitarian point of view, the person would still be harming his own potential to behave morally, even if that "harm" is not apparent.
One of the criticisms of utilitarian ethics is that they are not able to consider all of the possible consequences of a scenario. I agree with that. Even though deontology and virtue ethics aren't specifically aimed to achieve good consequeces, they are often still better suited to leading to good consequences, especially in the long run. As many others have said, it's more utilitarian (that is, practical) to be deontological than to be utilitarian.
When I talk about a "best" morality, I mean that which is predicated on standards that we have the most reasons to adopt. Though I admit there probably does eventually come a "breakdown," where we simply have to adopt a standard even though the merits can be ambiguous.
It seems to me that much of the time, when people talk about an objective morality, it's similar to the way they talk about objective truths - they mean it's objective as far as it's safe to assume. Most people would just say that the notion that the Earth orbits around the Sun is an objective fact. We don't actually know that - we assume that because it fits the standards and definitions we have of what facts are how to determine them. We assume the information we receive through our senses is accurate and we treat it as truthful. That allows us to function. As such, the empirical information we can gain about the Sun and the Earth demonstrate the conclusion that the Earth orbits the Sun. Now, I wouldn't say "I assume the Earth orbits the Sun because believing that allows me to function." That isn't so. No, it's that this conclusion is coherent with the standard "information received through my senses is accurate." And that standard is one which is useful in allowing me to function. That's an important distinction. This means that we don't assume that the Earth orbits the Sun only so long as it allows us to function - as that conclusion itself probably has little impact on our daily functioning.
Morality is very similar. I'm saying that deontological systems are ultimately meant to achieve practicality, just like others - even though deontological norms aren't themselves predicated on having utility.
Just uut of curiosity, Erimir - why do you believe in deontology?
And I think Ain_Soph's explanations about the difference between moral defintions and the truths that those describe are very good.
@Pokémon: My problem with evolving the Espeon was that whenever I came to pick up the DS and want to play it, it was past the daytime interval (after 8 o'clock), and I usually don't play in the mornings before work.
I did finally get it done, as I reminded myself to do it tonight.
I wanted to use vitamins, but I just can't afford many right now. I'm not very far in the game. I'm not that concerned with maximizing statistics, at least not at this point. Though I have been trying to gain effort values by fighting a lot of lower-level Pokémon that give the EV points I want.
All that I yearn for, for richer or poorer, is to be the light that you see. All that I yearn for, for richer or poorer, is to be the peace that you feel. All that I yearn for, for richer or poorer, is to fill your heart on my own.
But the rainbow is an image of hope for many reasons, as it is a brilliant sight coming out of oftimes dismal weather.
@Leilani: I only meant be careful while drinking or getting drunk. I assume you don't want to get into anything dangerous. Remember, sometimes one doesn't realize what one is doing while drunk.
Frankly, I'm not surprised at your feelings, if you don't mind my saying so. You appeared very anxious about the idea of drinking before, and it seems natural for that fear to suddenly change.
May I offer some advice? If you really want to get drunk, ask yourself why you feel that way. You may not have a certain answer, but it can be helpful nonetheless. Just think about it. If you have an idea about what you want to happen, you can at least watch to see in case that thing isn't happening.
All that I yearn for, for richer or poorer, is to be the light that you see. All that I yearn for, for richer or poorer, is to be the peace that you feel. All that I yearn for, for richer or poorer, is to fill your heart on my own.
But the rainbow is an image of hope for many reasons, as it is a brilliant sight coming out of oftimes dismal weather.
@Leilani: I only meant be careful while drinking or getting drunk. I assume you don't want to get into anything dangerous. Remember, sometimes one doesn't realize what one is doing while drunk.
Frankly, I'm not surprised at your feelings, if you don't mind my saying so. You appeared very anxious about the idea of drinking before, and it seems natural for that fear to suddenly change.
May I offer some advice? If you really want to get drunk, ask yourself why you feel that way. You may not have a certain answer, but it can be helpful nonetheless. Just think about it. If you have an idea about what you want to happen, you can at least watch to see in case that thing isn't happening.
Oh, i know. And no, I don't want to do anything dangerous. I'm not stupid enough to drink and drive...i know that when i DO feel like getting trashed [not very often], I'll make someone hide my keys so i'm not tempted.
Why do I want to? Because I realize I can't be this uptight ******* about it forever. I gotta learn to live a little. That, and i'm curious as to how some of it tastes. I know for a fact that beer is disgusting.
I would not be opposed to drunken sex with one of my guy friends. Though that would be only if both persons involved were drunk.
I probably sound like some kind of ****. Ah well. I've stopped caring what people think about me. I'm me, if you don't like it, don't talk to me.
Anyway.
Saw Pirates 3 tonight. Meeehhh. The first one will always be the greatest. This one had funny moments where they didn't...quite fit. After, we went back to my friend Mike's house.
and i had a few shots [well, probably 6, total.] of this stuff called Hot Sex. No, I'm serious, that's what it's called. It's like chocolate milk that's spiked. It's interesting...I haven't decided if i like it or not. Made me giggly and more touchy-feely than normal for a while, but that's about it. Molly said I could've had more, but I knew i had to be sober to drive, so i said no. haha.
I'm not going to Ohio at all. Mikey told me he didn't want me there. Fine. I didn't want to go in the first place.
I smell like my friend Peter. He and I were kind of snuggly for a while tonight...it made me miss the times two years ago when we'd just spend an entire afternoon, snuggled up on his futon. listening to music, dozing off and on, talking about whatever.
I miss being one of his best friends.
Still hooked on "Mad World", haha.
Private Mod Note
():
Rollback Post to RevisionRollBack
I know it seems that I don't care, but something in me does I swear.
[gaymers]
founder of the MTGS Forum Pirates
'tar/banner by R&Doom.
@Pokémon: My problem with evolving the Espeon was that whenever I came to pick up the DS and want to play it, it was past the daytime interval (after 8 o'clock), and I usually don't play in the mornings before work.
I did finally get it done, as I reminded myself to do it tonight.
I wanted to use vitamins, but I just can't afford many right now. I'm not very far in the game. I'm not that concerned with maximizing statistics, at least not at this point. Though I have been trying to gain effort values by fighting a lot of lower-level Pokémon that give the EV points I want.[/quote]
Lol I still don't get EV points but I guess I should read up on that.
Pirates was a fantastic movie. I thought it was okay funny but the story line was great (if at parts predictable.) I tended to laugh when no one else was laughing. It's my twisted sense of humor but it seemed like the people around me thought I was A)weird or B)understood a joke that they didn't get.
Leilani did you laugh at
the part where the guy ripped his toe off cuz it was frozen.
I dunno why I laughed at that but it struck me as funny. Some of the other stuff they meant to be funny wasn't.
But the movie is not wholeheartedly a comedy and we know that Really long though. Got to the 12:40 showing and got out at 3:40. Didn't get to sleep until 5 am -_-. But I'm bright eyed and busy tailed this morning! Dontcha just hate people like that
Pirates was a fantastic movie. I thought it was okay funny but the story line was great (if at parts predictable.) I tended to laugh when no one else was laughing. It's my twisted sense of humor but it seemed like the people around me thought I was A)weird or B)understood a joke that they didn't get.
Leilani did you laugh at
the part where the guy ripped his toe off cuz it was frozen.
I dunno why I laughed at that but it struck me as funny. Some of the other stuff they meant to be funny wasn't.
But the movie is not wholeheartedly a comedy and we know that Really long though. Got to the 12:40 showing and got out at 3:40. Didn't get to sleep until 5 am -_-. But I'm bright eyed and busy tailed this morning! Dontcha just hate people like that
We went to the....8:40? showing. out by 11:30, because we stayed to watch the after-credits. Did you see that?
And yeah, I found that part crazily entertaining. I think it's 'cause I wasn't really paying attention for a while [zoning, i was so tired], and then i refocused on the movie...to find that. ahahaha.
it was pretty good overall, but the first is still the best one.
Private Mod Note
():
Rollback Post to RevisionRollBack
I know it seems that I don't care, but something in me does I swear.
[gaymers]
founder of the MTGS Forum Pirates
'tar/banner by R&Doom.
We went to the....8:40? showing. out by 11:30, because we stayed to watch the after-credits. Did you see that?
And yeah, I found that part crazily entertaining. I think it's 'cause I wasn't really paying attention for a while [zoning, i was so tired], and then i refocused on the movie...to find that. ahahaha.
it was pretty good overall, but the first is still the best one.
I disagree. I'm very much in the corner of the third one being the best now.
I saw the aftercredits it was okay. Everyone moaned that they waited through infinite credits just to see that though.
that's what EVERYONE says.
I've always been the careful one, I'm sick of being careful. It's like...all my friends can go out and get drunk, or have sex with each other, but I've always got to be the rational/innocent/whatever one. I don't know WHY, but I'm bored/sick of being the careful one.
This is not to say, though, that i would do something incredibly stupid and dangerous while drunk. I won't do something like go drive the car around. I'd most likely stay the night at whatever friend's house we happened to be at.
I don't mean to snap on you, i'm sorry if it came across that way.:p
I know it seems that I don't care,
but something in me does I swear.
[gaymers]
founder of the MTGS Forum Pirates
'tar/banner by R&Doom.
Sorry if I've been silent on your recent difficulties, Mikey. I honestly just haven't had anything useful to say. I have no experience with situations like that (the closest probably being my alcoholic uncle, and I don't think he ever actively tried to kill hemself he just didn't care if he happened to die from drinking) and consequently any words of support or encouragement really just sound trite. I do wish you the best, but you seem to be handling the situation quite well.
Current New Favorite Person™: Mallory Archer
She knows why.
And it's not exactly like you can say you told him so. I'm unfeeling so I'd probably have looked at him with a steel gaze of apathy if he looked at me shocked.
So you think you can dance is on tonight and Pirates comes out. Today's going to be busy after work.
I'm like a cat that way. Always landing on my feet. And no worries, support and encouragement are usually lost on me anyway.
Honestly though, I'm holding up as well as I am in no small part due to the fact that I've been preparing for something like this happening for over five years.
You think that stopped me? Naw, I don't really get anything out of 'I told ya so', so I didn't bother saying it. It doesn't really matter that I did in fact tell him so. What matters is getting him in a state to be of use to himself and her. Which isn't the case if he's kicking himself over not seeing the signs or blaming himself for not doing more before this.
Archatmos
Excellion
Fracture: Israfiel (WBR), Wujal (URG), Valedon (GUB), Amduat (BGW), Paladris (RWU)
Collision (Set Two of the Fracture Block)
Quest for the Forsaken (Set Two of the Excellion Block)
Katingal: Plane of Chains
Well, I didn't say anything of the sort. But I'm not at all convinced that deontological ethics rely on consequences. They are called nonconsequentialist ethics for a reason.
I have never contested that it [I]could[/I] be something that has an independent existence. I have only contested that this possibility is relevant to anything.
It is only necessary for my point that some moral systems only use intention as the criteria for determining the morality of an action. The later system you mention, however, I would not consider to be strictly deontological. Those are hybrid systems.
Virtue ethics are a separate category from deontological or consequentialist ethics.
I repeat: I have not contested this. Only its relevance to us.
However, that is purely a practical consideration. Sure, we can't always [I]perceive[/I] people's intentions, however, not everything exists to pamper to our perceptions.
Whether we always know people's intentions, it could still be the case that their intentions are what determine whether their action is objectively moral. We might have to concede for the practical purpose of creating law that we must make judgments about intentions that may be inaccurate or judgments that disregard intention. But it would have no effect on objective morality.
The problem here is that you have merely provided a premise. What support is there for that idea? If you ask me, that's a subjective judgment, and so it does not reveal anything about objective morality. You are making subjective judgments and insisting that they are objective.
Measurements can only ever tell us what [I]is[/I], they can't tell us what [I]ought[/I] to be.
So quick you are to dismiss one of the giants of philosophy. But as I have already stated, you haven't provided an objective basis for assuming that "Morality" is not deontological. Measurements may be objective, but it is not at all clear that objective morality has anything to do with measurements.
Again, a merely practical consideration. It has no bearing on whether it is true that intentions are the basis of morality.
Kantian ethics is not so unsophisticated as you are supposing here.
Kantian ethics might say that ignorance, bias and false rationalizations are the result of immoral actions. Your ignorance may be the result of allowing yourself to remain in ignorance, rather than furthering yourself as a rational, autonomous being. Likewise false rationalizations arise from you having a base desire that is the true intention of your action, which you have deceived yourself about. You would not need a false rationalization if your action was of a good intention from the start. As such, your actions can still be immoral even if at first glance you seem to have proper intentions, because those intentions may be at root improper.
Are you saying that you deny that when intentions change, changes in the brain/mind occur?
I think you are confusing "Morality" with "Psychology".
But you will still need a normative statement that is not based on those observations:
"Causing people to react negatively is immoral."
That is not an objective statement that you can ever find by making empirical observations. I am growing more suspicious that you have never heard of nor examined the [I]is-ought[/I] problem.
A scenario: There are five patients in your hospital: one who needs a heart, two a lung, two a kidney and one a liver. Fortunately, you know someone who has all healthy organs, and not only that but people care less about him than the other people. You kill him, take his organs, and save those six people from dying.
We can objectively observe that the negative consequence was one person dying. The positive consequence was that six people did not die, and their friends and family were also happy. We also know that other people were less negatively affected by his death than other people being positively affected by the six people not dying. It seems that our empirical observations have revealed that there were overall good consequences to the action. So it must be a good action.
Now, I'm going to assume that you do not think that that would be a moral thing to do. On the basis of what empirical observation do you conclude that? On what basis might we conclude that it's immorality is objective?
Eh? This would seem to suggest that when I steal $1 from someone, since I gain $1 and they lose $1, the action is morally neutral.
Mmmmmm... nope. You still have the [I]is-ought[/I] problem.
Likewise, I could say that if we had perfect knowledge, we would know what all people's intentions were when they carried out their actions. Which would deflect your criticism of Kantian ethics from above (not that I thought that criticism succeeded). In which case, wouldn't Kantian ethics [I]be[/I] objective?
You know, erimir, you're a rather smart and articulate guy.
You should post more shirtless pictures.
Current New Favorite Person™: Mallory Archer
She knows why.
hah! my brain just rippled with titilation
Titilation and intrigue *serious face*
I second the motion. Let's open it up to the floor.
BTW we need some hot guy of the week action.
Be my guest...
Current New Favorite Person™: Mallory Archer
She knows why.
Grr that was a call to action >_< Fine. I GUESS I can find a hot guy somewhere but no one shares my taste in men. W/e
Edit: Screw it. I'm getting rid of my libido from lack of use. Anyone want it cuz there's a lot of energy left in there. Someone else can do the Hot Guy of the Week. I haven't seen a famous person that I've been attracted to in a long time. I could show you all some pictures of my hot friends but that'd be weird O-o. (sort of. I don't actually want to go out with any of them)
Seriously, one libido for sale. Near mint. Comes in a sleeve...
Dan: Booze + secret crushes? Fun?
No, especially not when there's going to be ~11 other people in the same house. It would be a very fun night, but then not so much.
But then again 12 is a lot. I mean, in situations like that you've got to give a fair amount of attention to each person, and that would be difficult...
Current New Favorite Person™: Mallory Archer
She knows why.
Well is he gay? I guess I'm not seeing the problem if he's gay. Interested fine that's cool. Not interested, oh well what's a little ball cupping drunken fun between friends. Gay great. Not gay, flattered and drunken kiss seems fine too.
Or whatever.
you think 12 is a lot? Kraj my image of you is so distorted now. I'm disappointed!
There are a number of conservative people who do not feel like this in the house.
ahhhhh....
Is he amongst them?
That's what bathrooms at parties are for.
Drunk people can puke on the couch, bathrooms are for hookups.
It goes beyond the practical considerations. There are a number of things, beyond intent even, that contribute to why people commit certain actions and we don't necessarily have cause to suggest that these things are the basis of what Morality is. For example, you could be predisposed to committing certain actions because of your emotional state at the time, or because of things that have happened to you, and so forth. None of these things, intention included, actually change the impact that the action has on people.
You could create a moral system based on intents in this manner, and it could feasibly have an objective basis, but it wouldn't be a description of Morality. Perhaps a description of principles. The definition of morality entails conduct, or actions in other words.
It's unclear to me what you are supposing is subjective. If what you mean is that how I choose to define Morality according to a certain objective system over potentially another... ok, yes when we define our terms we make subjective value judgments.
Given:
___ is defined as the quality of actions have when they impact others.
I'm choosing to use the word "morality" to fill in the blank "___" because arguably, Morality has connotations that are appropriate for that definition. Whatever word we decide to fill in ___, we can see that ___ describes things that are objective. It may be that I'm subjectively choosing the word Morality for this phenomenon, as opposed to using the word morality for whatever quality intent may impart upon actions, but the choice of word itself matters not insomuch as the definition itself. ___ is objective, and if you wish to argue the semantics of whether "morality" is the right word for ___, that's one thing, but you aren't successfully making the point that ___ is subjective.
In the same way, we subjectively define or qualify things when conducting a scientific experiment. That doesn't mean that the actual scientific procedure was subjectively based.
So you are arguing semantics.
As far as that is concerned, I'm saying Morality ought to be the word used for ___ because Morality often has a connotation for acting in a certain way, while it rarely has a connotation for intention.
The preference that we have for which words we use for things will always be subjective even things is objective.
In which case you've just reduced the intent to an action, and therefore a consequence.
I'm denying that changes in the brain necessarily have a causal impact on other things, and that to some degree we are not responsible for the changes that occur - they are independent of us.
No, I'm using psychological terms to describe how an action (stimuli) has an impact (reaction) on individuals which can be observed objectively. Using the definition of morality (or __), we can conclude from our observations that an action has a moral or immoral characteristic based off their impact, discernible from the reaction.
Only in the sense that the definition of morality (and immorality) is ambiguous.
My statement is actually that "causing harm to others through actions, observable by their reaction, is ___." My conclusion is that we should avoid ___, which is what leaves me to believe ___ is best articulated as "immoral."
Do you deny that when an action has an impact upon a person, the state of that action because of that impact is objectively discernible?
This scenario could potentially be moral (or immoral). You did not define whether the person was willing, and infringing upon consent is another impact that an action has on person which would tip the balance.
Also, we don't know the full extent of other possibilities that were available to your patients. Was it possible to obtain other donated organs? Was it possible to treat that person successfully without a transplant? Until these possibilities are exhausted, we can't consider an action which would necessarily cause a higher harm to benefit ratio, even if the benefit outweighs the harm.
Well, I would tend to say that the impact that one's actions have upon oneself is always treated as neutral, so stealing a dollar would still be considered immoral. Giving that dollar to someone else might be considered neutral or moral, depending upon, again, whether or not other possibilities have been exhausted and what the benefit to harm ratio results as (after all, some people need a single dollar more than others). I would say Robin Hood did not necessarily commit immoral acts by stealing money, for example.
Kantian ethics potentially has an objective basis, but what it describes is different than what I have been describing. Since I've already adopted the word "Morality" for what I am describing, and these two things are incompatible, I would probably have to select a different word to describe Kantian ethics. The basis of me making my choice is because I believe that Morality has more of a connotation appropriate to actions than intents. As such, the choice of words is subjective... but the thing that I am describing with the word Morality is not, itself, subjective.
We'll do Marc, Daniel, and Henry!
...I call week two! >_>
Would you say that if you steal something and you don't know you're strealing, it can't be wrong by any deontological standard?
Good intentions often don't mean anything if you're doing something that ends up terribly.
Just to clarify, I still claim that performing in an intent is a consequence in the long term. But admittedly, only in an abstract sense. If I allow myself to violate someone else's rights, even though that is not a concrete result and may not lead to doing the same in the future, I'd still consider that as a "bad effect" of the action. Or more precisely, not so much a bad effect of the act as a bad effect of my deciding to do it.
I'll explain more below.
Well, they don't rely on consequences. But how do you think deontological definitions are made? How do you think certain intentions are judged as good or bad? All moral systems must originate from observations of relationships between actions/beliefs/whatever and what their effects are - even if that eventually stops being the chief criteria for judging goodness or badness. Why is treating someone as a means instead of an end bad? What reasoning is there to support such norms that have absolutely no tie to observation of consequences? Such reasoning doesn't have to completely ignore consequences to be nonconsequential.
Consequential ethics only care about concrete consequences. "Did this hurt somebody?" Doing the same thing in two different situations would be judged differently in each situation if one turned out badly and the other didn't. Deontology isn't really concerned with that - something can still be wrong even if it didn't hurt somebody. But "hurt somebody" is not irrelevent to deontology. What I'm saying is that "hurt somebody" can be, and often is, a valid and meaningful incitation to the formation of deontological ethics. Judging the deontological character of a kind of action or intent by itself arises from seeing what it causes. Deontology simply goes past caring just about that.
Deontology judges actions as good or ill regardless of their consequences. I am not arguing otherwise. I am saying that this is not because consequences are irrelevent to morality, but because observing consequences on their own isn't enough. As such, "benefit" is a not a non-issue to deontologists, it's just that it's not a strong enough criteria to define good.
Conseqences can still be good ways of determining how we should treat actions and intentions.
The possibility of objective moral truth is very relevent to the possibility of objective moral truth, the existence of which Ain_Soph is arguing. I was under the impression that he was not proposing a moral system that was based on this idea, merely that he believed in this idea.
Ain_Soph and you are very clearly using different definitions about what morality is. I am merely trying to point this out. I'm not defending consequentialist ethics.
I disagree with the definition you're using for deontology. You seem to be saying that deontology, by definition, is an ethos that is predicated on intent, and that's it. But that's not necessarily true. Kantian deontology does focus a lot on intent, but that's not universal to deontology. Examine this: I meddle in my sister's life in a serious way against her will. Let's say that it turns out just fine and nothing bad happens, and I did it out of love and care for my sister. But the idea that this action was nonetheless wrong - regardless of the results and regardless of my intentions - is still a deontological judgment. My intent was good, and the consequences were not bad - but it would still be a wrong action in a deontological sense (that is, one not predicated on observing consequences).
Somewhat, yes, though they resemble deontology moreso than consequentialism.
Ain_Soph didn't appear to be arguing it's relevence to devising moral systems. Correct me if I'm wrong, Ain_Soph.
Erimir, to be honest, I am agreeing with you in that the possibility of an objective morality doesn't help us when it comes to determining which moral systems is the closest to being objective. My tendency is to think that it doesn't matter that there is an objective morality, since whichever moral system we treat as objective (the "best" one, for example) may not be so objective, and that this may not really matter.
In this thread, I was also arguing that point, if you feel like perusing it. This is one of the key posts.
In light of that, though, I will say this. I've beheld some proposals over time about objective views of morality, and I see some merit in it.
All moral systems must have a standard by which to judge morality; a definition of goodness - a "gauge," as extremestan puts it. In broad terms, this "standard" is the same as a goal, though not always a goal in the sense of a sequence of events or kind of event that should be achieved.
Actions and attitudes can be evaluated in relation to this standard, and how well they "fit" the standard. This is just an example, but take part of the categorical imperative: do not treat humans as means rather than ends (value humanity). Actions can be judged as serving that standard, or conflicting with it. That actions do or do not serve that standard, that norm, is not subjective.
The core of moral relativism is that such moral standards do not have any actual merit over others, that adopting or not adopting any standard is purely a matter of preference, that none of them are better than others. But disagreement over how specific attitudes and actions fit with a moral definition is verifiable. It seems that this is what some mean when they say that just because people disagree about what is immoral or moral, it doesn't mean some or all of them can't be wrong.
My answer to moral relativism is that some such standards also end up having observable merit - we have reasons to adopt some standards over others. This is where "caring about consequences" comes into it. A utilitarian standard is one defined by the nature of the consequences of actions being measured - the standard would be "good actions have (more) good results, bad actions have (more) bad results," whatever good and bad results mean in that system of definitions. Deontological standards are not defined thusly, since the focus is one something other than the consequences of actions.
However, the merit of a standard can be analyzed and demonstrated through casuistry, case by case, including the valuation of consequences. For instance, let's say one of my moral imperatives is to value human life, even if failing to value human life would not harm anyone. Even if I never try to kill someone or let someone die, if I fail to value human life, according to that imperative, I'm still behaving immorally. As such, that imperative doesn't depend on consequences.
But what if someone asked me, "Why should we value human life?" My explanation would probably involve discussing consequences. If we as people don't highly value human life, then all human life is endangered because it's not being treated as important. If it's not treated as important, it will be sacrificed to serve other goals which are treated as more important. If this is common enough, then everyone is in danger, because anyone with enough power or just opportunity could take lives - including mine and the person who's asking me the question. This is a basically consequentialist reasoning, showing why we stand to benefit from valuing human life, treating it as intrinsically good. This is why I say all moral systems are based in "caring about consequences." We have reasons to adopt certain values, and that usually starts by wanting a benefit.
However, the key is that the imperative isn't only to value human life when doing otherwise could endanger our own lives. Failing to treat one human life as important may not lead to globe-wide genocide, nor self-endangerment. Lack of such valuation would still contribute, even if only in an abstract way, to the general devaluation of human life. And from a utilitarian point of view, the person would still be harming his own potential to behave morally, even if that "harm" is not apparent.
One of the criticisms of utilitarian ethics is that they are not able to consider all of the possible consequences of a scenario. I agree with that. Even though deontology and virtue ethics aren't specifically aimed to achieve good consequeces, they are often still better suited to leading to good consequences, especially in the long run. As many others have said, it's more utilitarian (that is, practical) to be deontological than to be utilitarian.
When I talk about a "best" morality, I mean that which is predicated on standards that we have the most reasons to adopt. Though I admit there probably does eventually come a "breakdown," where we simply have to adopt a standard even though the merits can be ambiguous.
It seems to me that much of the time, when people talk about an objective morality, it's similar to the way they talk about objective truths - they mean it's objective as far as it's safe to assume. Most people would just say that the notion that the Earth orbits around the Sun is an objective fact. We don't actually know that - we assume that because it fits the standards and definitions we have of what facts are how to determine them. We assume the information we receive through our senses is accurate and we treat it as truthful. That allows us to function. As such, the empirical information we can gain about the Sun and the Earth demonstrate the conclusion that the Earth orbits the Sun. Now, I wouldn't say "I assume the Earth orbits the Sun because believing that allows me to function." That isn't so. No, it's that this conclusion is coherent with the standard "information received through my senses is accurate." And that standard is one which is useful in allowing me to function. That's an important distinction. This means that we don't assume that the Earth orbits the Sun only so long as it allows us to function - as that conclusion itself probably has little impact on our daily functioning.
Morality is very similar. I'm saying that deontological systems are ultimately meant to achieve practicality, just like others - even though deontological norms aren't themselves predicated on having utility.
Just uut of curiosity, Erimir - why do you believe in deontology?
And I think Ain_Soph's explanations about the difference between moral defintions and the truths that those describe are very good.
@Pokémon: My problem with evolving the Espeon was that whenever I came to pick up the DS and want to play it, it was past the daytime interval (after 8 o'clock), and I usually don't play in the mornings before work.
I did finally get it done, as I reminded myself to do it tonight.
I wanted to use vitamins, but I just can't afford many right now. I'm not very far in the game. I'm not that concerned with maximizing statistics, at least not at this point. Though I have been trying to gain effort values by fighting a lot of lower-level Pokémon that give the EV points I want.
All that I yearn for, for richer or poorer, is to be the peace that you feel.
All that I yearn for, for richer or poorer, is to fill your heart on my own.
Gaymers | Magic Coffeehouse | Little Jar of Mamelon | Natural 20
No love for Mr. Depp?
And I SOOOOOO want that week!
She's gone off the radar before, but usually not for this long.
I'm pretty worried. I really really hope she's ok.
@Leilani: I only meant be careful while drinking or getting drunk. I assume you don't want to get into anything dangerous. Remember, sometimes one doesn't realize what one is doing while drunk.
Frankly, I'm not surprised at your feelings, if you don't mind my saying so. You appeared very anxious about the idea of drinking before, and it seems natural for that fear to suddenly change.
May I offer some advice? If you really want to get drunk, ask yourself why you feel that way. You may not have a certain answer, but it can be helpful nonetheless. Just think about it. If you have an idea about what you want to happen, you can at least watch to see in case that thing isn't happening.
All that I yearn for, for richer or poorer, is to be the peace that you feel.
All that I yearn for, for richer or poorer, is to fill your heart on my own.
Gaymers | Magic Coffeehouse | Little Jar of Mamelon | Natural 20
Oh, i know. And no, I don't want to do anything dangerous. I'm not stupid enough to drink and drive...i know that when i DO feel like getting trashed [not very often], I'll make someone hide my keys so i'm not tempted.
Why do I want to? Because I realize I can't be this uptight ******* about it forever. I gotta learn to live a little. That, and i'm curious as to how some of it tastes. I know for a fact that beer is disgusting.
I would not be opposed to drunken sex with one of my guy friends. Though that would be only if both persons involved were drunk.
I probably sound like some kind of ****. Ah well. I've stopped caring what people think about me. I'm me, if you don't like it, don't talk to me.
Anyway.
Saw Pirates 3 tonight. Meeehhh. The first one will always be the greatest. This one had funny moments where they didn't...quite fit. After, we went back to my friend Mike's house.
and i had a few shots [well, probably 6, total.] of this stuff called Hot Sex. No, I'm serious, that's what it's called. It's like chocolate milk that's spiked. It's interesting...I haven't decided if i like it or not. Made me giggly and more touchy-feely than normal for a while, but that's about it. Molly said I could've had more, but I knew i had to be sober to drive, so i said no. haha.
I'm not going to Ohio at all. Mikey told me he didn't want me there. Fine. I didn't want to go in the first place.
I smell like my friend Peter. He and I were kind of snuggly for a while tonight...it made me miss the times two years ago when we'd just spend an entire afternoon, snuggled up on his futon. listening to music, dozing off and on, talking about whatever.
I miss being one of his best friends.
Still hooked on "Mad World", haha.
I know it seems that I don't care,
but something in me does I swear.
[gaymers]
founder of the MTGS Forum Pirates
'tar/banner by R&Doom.
I did finally get it done, as I reminded myself to do it tonight.
I wanted to use vitamins, but I just can't afford many right now. I'm not very far in the game. I'm not that concerned with maximizing statistics, at least not at this point. Though I have been trying to gain effort values by fighting a lot of lower-level Pokémon that give the EV points I want.[/quote]
Lol I still don't get EV points but I guess I should read up on that.
Pirates was a fantastic movie. I thought it was okay funny but the story line was great (if at parts predictable.) I tended to laugh when no one else was laughing. It's my twisted sense of humor but it seemed like the people around me thought I was A)weird or B)understood a joke that they didn't get.
Leilani did you laugh at
But the movie is not wholeheartedly a comedy and we know that Really long though. Got to the 12:40 showing and got out at 3:40. Didn't get to sleep until 5 am -_-. But I'm bright eyed and busy tailed this morning! Dontcha just hate people like that
We went to the....8:40? showing. out by 11:30, because we stayed to watch the after-credits. Did you see that?
And yeah, I found that part crazily entertaining. I think it's 'cause I wasn't really paying attention for a while [zoning, i was so tired], and then i refocused on the movie...to find that. ahahaha.
it was pretty good overall, but the first is still the best one.
I know it seems that I don't care,
but something in me does I swear.
[gaymers]
founder of the MTGS Forum Pirates
'tar/banner by R&Doom.
I disagree. I'm very much in the corner of the third one being the best now.
I saw the aftercredits it was okay. Everyone moaned that they waited through infinite credits just to see that though.