I was pointing out a perceived flaw in Highroller's judgment; pointing out one reason I believe that it cannot be objective: because we have no way to determine which claim accurately highlights the objective moral value of an action. I wasn't contradicting myself, I was illustrating a perceived contradiction in another's viewpoint.
You're joining a long, long list of people I've said this to: you're conflating metaphysics with epistemology, objective reality with human knowledge. There are many objective facts about the universe that are epistemically inaccessible to us; this does not in any way diminish their objectivity. The existence or nonexistence of God is objective fact; so is the text of Aeschylus' lost play Prometheus Unbound; so is the exact number of E. coli bacteria in my stomach.
And quite independently of all that, your reproduction of an objectivist's argument was a strawman, precisely because it was so blatantly self-contradictory. Like I said, a change in majority does not cause a change in morality under objectivism. Your "contradiction" hinges on a falsehood.
But it (as you said) is abstract, and it has shades of gray because our species (or genetics or whatever you chalk it down to) has not come to a consensus yet.
Of course we haven't all arrived at the peak of the fitness landscape yet. And there exist many differing opinions on where that peak might be. But that's because of that epistemology-metaphysics distinction again: our perceptions are limited and flawed, and therefore our conclusions sometimes don't match objective reality. Assuming there is a fitness landscape (and how could there not be?), some opinions about how to move "upslope" are going to be right, and some are going to be wrong. It's just the nature of human intellectual endeavors.
Now, you bring up the "shades of gray" metaphor, which suits me just fine, because I like to point out that some shades of gray are lighter, and some are darker, and we can usually tell the difference - or at least discuss the difference with a common understanding of what it means to be "light" or "dark". For instance, we may not agree on abortion, but we can probably agree on which aspects of the practice are light (e.g. women's autonomy) and which are dark (e.g. curtailing a life*). We're unlikely to find anyone who'd argue that abortion is a moral gray area because curtailing a life is good and women's autonomy is bad. In short, the disagreement springs not from irreconcilable difference of opinion on what is morally good and bad, but rather different analyses of a complex situation that are nevertheless founded on the same moral principles.
And, of course, it is not necessary that a person believe that a moral decision she makes be lily-white in order for her to make it, merely that it is lighter than the alternative(s). A woman may decide to get an abortion even though she acknowledges that it's wrong to curtail a life - even though she sees abortion as a moral gray area. And Truman decided to bomb Hiroshima even though he knew the "obliterating a city of a civilians" aspect of the action was very bad.
*To expand on this, we may disagree on whether a fetus is a life at the time it's aborted, but we probably agree that if it is a life, it would be bad to end it. Some moral disagreements devolve to factual disagreements like this. To use another example I like, the Aztecs performed human sacrifice because they thought it was necessary to retain their gods' favor and make the crops grow. We of course disagree with their understanding of the causation here (and with good reason), but we can acknowledge that if they were right, then that would be a point in favor of human sacrifice, a consideration that would "lighten" its blackness.
A belief in logic that goes unscrutinized is no different than a belief in --- that goes unscrutinized.
It's a good thing we scrutinize it, then.
Quote from wiki »
The other argument often attributed to Mackie, often called the Argument from Disagreement, maintains that any moral claim (e.g. "Killing babies is wrong") entails a correspondent "reasons claim" ("one has reason not to kill babies"). Put another way, if "killing babies is wrong" is true then everybody has a reason to not kill babies. This includes the psychopath who takes great pleasure from killing babies, and is utterly miserable when he does not have their blood on his hands. But, surely, (if we assume that he will suffer no reprisals) this psychopath has every reason to kill babies, and no reason not to do so. All moral claims are thus false.
A moral claim entails a correspondent moral reasons claim. If one ignores morality utterly, like a psychopath, then one is similarly going to disregard moral reasons. This is identical to the situation with any other normative claim. For instance, consider an economic recommendation like "You should invest your money in this profitable firm." The economic reason for this is, of course, "You will make more money." But if you don't care about money, then this recommendation is going to fall on deaf ears.
A psychopath has a moral reason not to kill babies. He just ignores it.
A moral claim entails a correspondent moral reasons claim. If one ignores morality utterly, like a psychopath, then one is similarly going to disregard moral reasons. This is identical to the situation with any other normative claim. For instance, consider an economic recommendation like "You should invest your money in this profitable firm." The economic reason for this is, of course, "You will make more money." But if you don't care about money, then this recommendation is going to fall on deaf ears.
A psychopath has a moral reason not to kill babies. He just ignores it.
Exactly. I have no qualms saying that if you value minimizing suffering you should or should not do X. However, that is not what most people consider morality. And I have trouble seeing how this would be considered objective. As an agent without that value has no reasons for following the moral claim.
Most people want to say that if X is wrong, then nobody should do X.
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----------------------- Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans Progenitus - 5 Color Control Mangara - MWC Drana - MBC Ashling - 50 Mountain Death Karn - Typical Karn deck Kresh - Sac + Tokens Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank Teeg -30 disenchants
--------------------------- Dismantled Sen Triplets - Boring Control Uril - Enchantment Voltron
Exactly. I have no qualms saying that if you value minimizing suffering you should or should not do X. However, that is not what most people consider morality. And I have trouble seeing how this would be considered objective. As an agent without that value has no reasons for following the moral claim.
That doesn't mean it's not objective, any more than an agent who does not value money makes the science of economics not objective. Whether or not the agent values money, it is nevertheless objectively true that investing in a profitable firm would make him a richer person. Similarly, whether or not the agent values morality, it is nevertheless objectively true (according to moral objectivism) that not killing babies would make him a morally better person.
Following any normative system whatsoever is contingent on an agent accepting the goals of the system, because any reasons the system gives for an action are necessarily going to derive from those goals. As Mackie correctly notes, any imperative "You should do X" is going to be accompanied by a reason clause "...because it will accomplish Y". To this, it is always possible to respond "But I don't want to accomplish Y, so I don't care about doing X". This potential for apathy is not a weakness of moral objectivism; it's simply the nature of normativity in general. And whether or not the agent cares about the reason, it is still true that he has a reason; thus Mackie's conclusion does not follow.
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Vive, vale. Siquid novisti rectius istis,
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Evolutionarily speaking, the behavior pattern we call "moral" is the peak in the fitness landscape of possible behavior patterns for intelligent social animals. A fitness landscape is objective (albeit abstract), therefore morality is objective.
I think one has to be very careful when treading on this ground. Firstly, what does fitness mean in this case? Usually it translates roughly into "observed rate of reproduction," but in the case of the massive geneto-memetic fitness landscape you seem to be talking about here, it is not clear that "memetic rate of reproduction" and "genetic rate of reproduction" can be merged into a single commensurate fitness variable. (i.e. the Cartesian product of genetic and memetic fitness cannot necessarily be totally ordered in a sensible way) Memes replicate in a systematically different way than do genes, of course, and someone with zero genetic fitness can have considerable memetic fitness. It's just not clear that these are necessarily commensurate quantities.
Secondly, while the fitness landscape is unique and objective when regarded as a function from genetomemetic space into whatever unspecified range our fitness is supposed to be quantified over, each organism unto itself has its own set of genes and memes and therefore occupies its own position on the fitness landscape. Thus the local "gradient" (in whatever sense that can be defined) of the fitness landscape, and therefore the direction of genetomemetic evolution of each organism, need not even be consistent across organisms (and certainly not across tribes or species.) Furthermore, each organism occupies its own local optimum which is certainly not a global maximum (which we don't even know exists for such a complicated function) but may not even be a local maximum, but rather a cusp or saddle point. And furthermore, to the extent that we can study this fitness landscape, we can only do so locally, and so it is not possible for someone who is stuck at "low" fitness to actualize that information.
So I think that even this evolutionary description of morality admits of moral relativism, in both the "meta-ethical" and "Descriptive" senses as listed by Wikipedia, but not in the normative sense.
To concretize it a little bit, a human who lives in a tribe whose coming-of-age ritual involves hunting, killing, and eating a human from a nearby tribe occupies a different point on the fitness landscape, and therefore has different local genetomemetic evolutionary tendencies, than does a suburban white male. In his case, the genetomemetic fitness gradient points in the direction of engaging in cannibalism, as passing the coming-of-age ritual is a necessary prerequisite for both genetic and memetic reproduction. And it does not suffice to point out that the cannibal's fitness is objectively "lower," firstly because the ordering on fitness is not necessarily clear, and secondly because the cannibal is only aware of his neighborhood of genetomemetic space and he in fact might be the highest-fitness guy in that neck of the woods. You may say "come join me on my higher plateau of the fitness landscape," but (A) he has no way of knowing from his local viewpoint that your plateau is higher; in fact, he feels like the king of his particular hill -- and (B) there may be a gulf between the two points that he simply cannot cross even if he wished to.
That doesn't mean it's not objective, any more than an agent who does not value money makes the science of economics not objective. Whether or not the agent values money, it is nevertheless objectively true that investing in a profitable firm would make him a richer person. Similarly, whether or not the agent values morality, it is nevertheless objectively true (according to moral objectivism) that not killing babies would make him a morally better person.
Taboo the word morality. What does morality mean when you use it here? We have metrics for wealth. When you say morality are you meaning some kind of utility function?
Following any normative system whatsoever is contingent on an agent accepting the goals of the system because any reasons the system gives for an action are necessarily going to derive from those goals. As Mackie correctly notes, any imperative "You should do X" is going to be accompanied by a reason clause "...because it will accomplish Y". To this, it is always possible to respond "But I don't want to accomplish Y, so I don't care about doing X".
I agree with all this.
This potential for apathy is not a weakness of moral objectivism; it's simply the nature of normativity in general. And whether or not the agent cares about the reason, it is still true that he has a reason; thus Mackie's conclusion does not follow.
This claim seems unsubstantiated to me. After all, it is not that the psychopath is apathetic to the reason, but that he *lacks* the reason for motivation. His brain literally is lacking any reason for the moral action.
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----------------------- Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans Progenitus - 5 Color Control Mangara - MWC Drana - MBC Ashling - 50 Mountain Death Karn - Typical Karn deck Kresh - Sac + Tokens Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank Teeg -30 disenchants
--------------------------- Dismantled Sen Triplets - Boring Control Uril - Enchantment Voltron
Taboo the word morality. What does morality mean when you use it here? We have metrics for wealth. When you say morality are you meaning some kind of utility function?
Different objectivist theories have different metrics. I'm deliberately being as general as I can here. But yes, there is some sort of metric, and I'm using the word "moral" as a placeholder for it.
This claim seems unsubstantiated to me. After all, it is not that the psychopath is apathetic to the reason, but that he *lacks* the reason for motivation. His brain literally is lacking any reason for the moral action.
What, you mean he just instantly forgets it whenever someone tells him why he shouldn't kill babies? No. The reason is before him, he just doesn't care about it.
And why are we looking at his psychology in the first place? Flipping back to the economics analogy, you still have a reason to invest in a profitable firm even if you're not merely apathetic to money, but have been drugged into a stupor such that you literally cannot understand the proposition. Reasons are not psychological states, but rather objective facts about cause and effect; they're there even if you can't see them. Otherwise, it would be nonsensical for me to point out to you a reason to do or not do something - and yet we all do this all the time.
Now, if Mackie wants to say that every moral imperative entails some sort of universal psychological state, as opposed to a mere cause-and-effect proposition, then that's something he's going to have to argue. I suspect he will fail, because it's loco.
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Vive, vale. Siquid novisti rectius istis,
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Different objectivist theories have different metrics. I'm deliberately being as general as I can here. But yes, there is some sort of metric, and I'm using the word "moral" as a placeholder for it.
Fair enough.
What, you mean he just instantly forgets it whenever someone tells him why he shouldn't kill babies? No. The reason is before him, he just doesn't care about it.
Hmm hmm, I think I see what you are saying here. However, I am uncomfortable with divorcing reasons from the individual. The language you seem to be using is problematic to me, can you clarify what you mean when you say the reason is before him?
And why are we looking at his psychology in the first place? Flipping back to the economics analogy, you still have a reason to invest in a profitable firm even if you're not merely apathetic to money, but have been drugged into a stupor such that you literally cannot understand the proposition. Reasons are not psychological states, but rather objective facts about cause and effect; they're there even if you can't see them. Otherwise, it would be nonsensical for me to point out to you a reason to do or not do something - and yet we all do this all the time.
Do you have a reason to invest if you place 0 value on money? I would say no. It seems more accurate to me to say that I can only point out reasons for action X to people if they value some result or consequence of X.
To keep up with the money example:
Instead of saying that the person with 0 value in money has reasons to invest but chooses to ignore them, I believe that it is more accurate to say that they posses no reasons to invest. This seems to fit our usage of the word much better.
I feel like we need to flesh out a definition of reasons at this point.
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----------------------- Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans Progenitus - 5 Color Control Mangara - MWC Drana - MBC Ashling - 50 Mountain Death Karn - Typical Karn deck Kresh - Sac + Tokens Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank Teeg -30 disenchants
--------------------------- Dismantled Sen Triplets - Boring Control Uril - Enchantment Voltron
Hmm hmm, I think I see what you are saying here. However, I am uncomfortable with divorcing reasons from the individual. The language you seem to be using is problematic to me, can you clarify what you mean when you say the reason is before him?
In that case, he is aware of the proposition that not killing babies will make him a morally better person. But as I go on to say, it's not even necessary that he be aware of the proposition at all. Immoral actions can spring from apathy or ignorance.
To keep up with the money example:
Instead of saying that the person with 0 value in money has reasons to invest but chooses to ignore them, I believe that it is more accurate to say that they posses no reasons to invest. This seems to fit our usage of the word much better.
If you define "reason" that way, then it's simply not the case that moral statements entail reasons.
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Vive, vale. Siquid novisti rectius istis,
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Oh I should have clarified. That seems problematic for *objective* moral statements. AKA the kind that would have person-independent normative power.
My question remains unchanged. I understand your modification/clarification of Mackie's thesis as follows: "An objective moral proposition 'Person X should perform action A' entails the psychological proposition 'Person X desires the consequences of action A'." This seems unreasonable to me; in fact, it seems quite silly. If I say "Person X should perform action A", then you can probably infer pragmatically that I desire the consequences. But I'm making no claim about Person X's desires, or anything else in his actual current psychological state. This is true whether "Person X should perform action A" is supposed to be objective or subjective, whether it's supposed to be moral, economic, aesthetic, strategic, or any other form of normativity. The distinction between what ought to be and what is is kind of the point of normativity.
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Vive, vale. Siquid novisti rectius istis,
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
My question remains unchanged. I understand your modification/clarification of Mackie's thesis as follows: "An objective moral proposition 'Person X should perform action A' entails the psychological proposition 'Person X desires the consequences of action A'."
Basically. Person X should perform action A because he has reasons to perform action A; namely his desires for the consequences of action A.
This seems unreasonable to me; in fact, it seems quite silly. If I say "Person X should perform action A", then you can probably infer pragmatically that I desire the consequences. But I'm making no claim about Person X's desires, or anything else in his actual current psychological state.
And that is where I think your claim would fail. When you make your claim, you are providing no reasons for person X to actually perform claim A. You are basically not showing any justification whatsoever for the *ought*.
For example, suppose you ran into a paper-clip maximizer. This creatures sole goal in life is to maximize the amount of paper-clips in the universe. He values paper-clip maximization solely, and above all else.
He says, Person X should perform action A where A maximizes paper-clips.
The both of you are going to proceed to talk past each other about what the other ought to do. Because neither of you has ANY good reason to follow the other's supposed normative claims.
Neither of your assertions are intrinsically motivating. They only hold any power for agents that share a similar value set.
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----------------------- Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans Progenitus - 5 Color Control Mangara - MWC Drana - MBC Ashling - 50 Mountain Death Karn - Typical Karn deck Kresh - Sac + Tokens Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank Teeg -30 disenchants
--------------------------- Dismantled Sen Triplets - Boring Control Uril - Enchantment Voltron
Neither of your assertions are intrinsically motivating. They only hold any power for agents that share a similar value set.
I think this is where the evolutionary account comes in; your shared value set is that you both want your species to survive and thrive, i.e. reproduce at the best possible rate. Although I still think there is a relativity issue there in that different points on the fitness landscape have different fitness gradients, and so you may both (correctly) see different paths of increasing fitness.
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A limit of time is fixed for thee
Which if thou dost not use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind
It will go and thou wilt go, never to return.
Neither of your assertions are intrinsically motivating. They only hold any power for agents that share a similar value set.
Correct. But no assertion whatsoever is intrinsically motivating - even if we somehow found the Kantian categorical imperative that is true a priori because its negation is self-contradictory, even that would not be intrinsically motivating, because human beings are more than capable of behaving illogically. So again my response is: so what?
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Vive, vale. Siquid novisti rectius istis,
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I think this is where the evolutionary account comes in; your shared value set is that you both want your species to survive and thrive, i.e. reproduce at the best possible rate. Although I still think there is a relativity issue there in that different points on the fitness landscape have different fitness gradients, and so you may both (correctly) see different paths of increasing fitness.
Sure, all I am arguing against is an objective morality. Humans share many common values, and you can make normative statements along these shared values. For instance if you want to reduce human suffering, than you should do X.
@BS: I agree, nothing is intrinsically motivating, which is why objective morality doesn't work.
Now, if you think you can have objective morality without intrinsic value, I would be interested in hearing how.
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----------------------- Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans Progenitus - 5 Color Control Mangara - MWC Drana - MBC Ashling - 50 Mountain Death Karn - Typical Karn deck Kresh - Sac + Tokens Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank Teeg -30 disenchants
--------------------------- Dismantled Sen Triplets - Boring Control Uril - Enchantment Voltron
Now, if you think you can have objective morality without intrinsic value, I would be interested in hearing how.
Just because something has intrinsic value doesn't mean that every bonehead on the planet has to recognize it. That's like saying the Earth can't be objectively round because Flat-Earthers exist.
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Vive, vale. Siquid novisti rectius istis,
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Not killing babies makes you a morally better person.
Is that statement one of objective truth or merely desire?
The statement is factual. It doesn't matter whether you believe morality is objective or not, any moral system with any degree of logic will agree to that statement. That's fundamental.
This is not a fair metaphor, and you know it. Hell you have already mentioned the difference between what is and what ought to be.
Why is it not fair? And what makes the is-ought distinction relevant here? Are you saying that "is" statements can be objective, but "ought" statements can't? If so, isn't that rather question-begging?
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Vive, vale. Siquid novisti rectius istis,
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
It seems that I misunderstood you then. I thought that "Correct. But no assertion whatsoever is intrinsically motivating - even if we somehow found the Kantian categorical imperative that is true a priori because its negation is self-contradictory, even that would not be intrinsically motivating, because human beings are more than capable of behaving illogically." meant that you agreed with the lack of intrinsic motivation.
Why is it not fair? And what makes the is-ought distinction relevant here? Are you saying that "is" statements can be objective, but "ought" statements can't? If so, isn't that rather question-begging?
Because there is a fact of the matter on whether the earth is flat or not. There is nothing normative in that statement. You are obviously aware of this difference.
Just because *is* statements are objective has nothing to do with question-begging. I have already pursued a train of thought as to why ought statements fail objectivity.
Maybe it would help if you told me what you mean by objective morality, so that I can be sure where our disagreement lies here.
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----------------------- Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans Progenitus - 5 Color Control Mangara - MWC Drana - MBC Ashling - 50 Mountain Death Karn - Typical Karn deck Kresh - Sac + Tokens Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank Teeg -30 disenchants
--------------------------- Dismantled Sen Triplets - Boring Control Uril - Enchantment Voltron
It seems that I misunderstood you then. I thought that "Correct. But no assertion whatsoever is intrinsically motivating - even if we somehow found the Kantian categorical imperative that is true a priori because its negation is self-contradictory, even that would not be intrinsically motivating, because human beings are more than capable of behaving illogically." meant that you agreed with the lack of intrinsic motivation.
I do. But intrinsic value is a different matter entirely. A motivation is a psychological impulse to perform an action. Value is a property of a thing such that that thing ought to be.
Because there is a fact of the matter on whether the earth is flat or not. There is nothing normative in that statement. You are obviously aware of this difference.
"Normative" does not mean "there is no fact of the matter". The whole point of moral objectivism is that for at least one class of normative statement there is a fact of the matter, just as there is a fact of the matter of the Earth's shape. So when you assume that because a statement is normative, there can be no fact of the matter, you are indeed begging the question. And no, I haven't forgotten that you've given an argument to this effect - but perhaps you have forgotten that it is precisely the premises of that argument that I am questioning here.
Maybe it would help if you told me what you mean by objective morality, so that I can be sure where our disagreement lies here.
Moral objectivism is true if and only if there are moral facts which are objectively true. If a moral fact is objectively true, then its truth value is independent of any observer; a person can think it false, or not know it at all, and it will still be true regardless. When a premise of your argument assumes this claim is false, then the whole argument is a nonstarter.
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Vive, vale. Siquid novisti rectius istis,
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
I do. But intrinsic value is a different matter entirely. A motivation is a psychological impulse to perform an action. Value is a property of a thing such that that thing ought to be.
Oh I see. Intrinsic value does not exist either, or at least I have never seen any evidence of intrinsic value.
"Normative" does not mean "there is no fact of the matter".
Obviously. And I never claimed it did.
The whole point of moral objectivism is that for at least one class of normative statement there is a fact of the matter, just as there is a fact of the matter of the Earth's shape. So when you assume that because a statement is normative, there can be no fact of the matter, you are indeed begging the question.
It is a good thing I do not assume this.
And no, I haven't forgotten that you've given an argument to this effect - but perhaps you have forgotten that it is precisely the premises of that argument that I am questioning here.
This was in response to your claim of question begging.
Moral objectivism is true if and only if there are moral facts which are objectively true. If a moral fact is objectively true, then its truth value is independent of any observer; a person can think it false, or not know it at all, and it will still be true regardless.
Excellent, now we are actually getting somewhere. Please show me an example of such a fact. And tell me how it would be true of the paperclip maximizer.
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----------------------- Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans Progenitus - 5 Color Control Mangara - MWC Drana - MBC Ashling - 50 Mountain Death Karn - Typical Karn deck Kresh - Sac + Tokens Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank Teeg -30 disenchants
--------------------------- Dismantled Sen Triplets - Boring Control Uril - Enchantment Voltron
Then why does your rejection of my analogy seem to be based on the distinction between normativity and descriptivity? It is irrelevant to the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity.
This was in response to your claim of question begging.
Exactly. To beg the question is for an argument to assume its conclusion in its premises.
You: If moral propositions don't motivate people to believe them, then they aren't objective. Me: I reject that premise. Here's an example of another statement that is objective and yet doesn't motivate people to believe it. You: But that statement isn't a moral statement. It's the kind of statement that doesn't have to motivate people in order to be objective; moral statements still do. Me: That's begging the question. I'm in the process of rejecting that premise; you can't defend it by reasserting it. You: Well, see my argument that morality isn't objective. Me: The premise I'm rejecting is from your argument. So that's begging the question too.
Excellent, now we are actually getting somewhere. Please show me an example of such a fact. And tell me how it would be true of the paperclip maximizer.
"It is wrong to have sex with someone without their consent." This is true for the law-abiding citizen who knows it; it is true for the cult leader who falsely believes otherwise; it is true for the common rapist who knows it but doesn't care; and it is true for the young child who doesn't yet know what sex is. It is true for all these people because, no matter what their beliefs, if they were to commit rape the result would be more wrongness in the world (where, again, I'm using "wrongness" as a placeholder).
Now, it makes more sense to me that you meant to ask how this wouldn't be true of the paperclip maximizer. But actually, it both is and isn't true of him. Paperclip maximization is an objective normative code: actions really will lead to more or fewer paperclips in the world regardless of the agent's belief on the matter. The difference is simply that this isn't the moral code. This may seem like a trivial distinction of semantics, or even a capitulation to ultimate subjectivism. But there is in fact nothing trivial or capitulatory about it. It is precisely the same semantics, after all, that prevent me from arguing, "You may say the Earth is the big round rocky thing we're standing on, but I say the Earth is the little flat syrup-covered thing on my breakfast plate. Therefore, whether the Earth is round or flat is subjective."
On analogies and begging questions: I may have been sloppy here, and I apologize. I think that since we are talking about normative statements and about how they may or may not be able to be objective, bringing in a non normative statement as an analogy is ineffective. Normative statements are different in that they jump the is-ought gap. Because my objectivity objection rests firmly in the "ought-ness" of normative statements. A statement with no "ought-ness" is irrelevant. Or at least I think so.
"It is wrong to have sex with someone without their consent." This is true for the law-abiding citizen who knows it; it is true for the cult leader who falsely believes otherwise; it is true for the common rapist who knows it but doesn't care; and it is true for the young child who doesn't yet know what sex is. It is true for all these people because, no matter what their beliefs, if they were to commit rape the result would be more wrongness in the world (where, again, I'm using "wrongness" as a placeholder).
Now, it makes more sense to me that you meant to ask how this wouldn't be true of the paperclip maximizer.
Yeah.
But actually, it both is and isn't true of him. Paperclip maximization is an objective normative code: actions really will lead to more or fewer paperclips in the world regardless of the agent's belief on the matter.
Agreed.
The difference is simply that this isn't the moral code. This may seem like a trivial distinction of semantics, or even a capitulation to ultimate subjectivism.
Yeah it does to me. I think at this point you could jump in and say: WHY!? What makes the moral code, THE moral code?
For further understanding: Would it to be fair to suggest that your usage would mean that there is nothing special about moral ought claims. To clarify: what does it matter whether it is a moral code or a paper-clip maximization code?
But there is in fact nothing trivial or capitulatory about it.
I think this needs support.
It is precisely the same semantics, after all, that prevent me from arguing, "You may say the Earth is the big round rocky thing we're standing on, but I say the Earth is the little flat syrup-covered thing on my breakfast plate. Therefore, whether the Earth is round or flat is subjective."
You lost me here.
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EDH DECKS
EDH Decks -- Updated 9/28
----------------------- Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans Progenitus - 5 Color Control Mangara - MWC Drana - MBC Ashling - 50 Mountain Death Karn - Typical Karn deck Kresh - Sac + Tokens Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank Teeg -30 disenchants
--------------------------- Dismantled Sen Triplets - Boring Control Uril - Enchantment Voltron
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You're joining a long, long list of people I've said this to: you're conflating metaphysics with epistemology, objective reality with human knowledge. There are many objective facts about the universe that are epistemically inaccessible to us; this does not in any way diminish their objectivity. The existence or nonexistence of God is objective fact; so is the text of Aeschylus' lost play Prometheus Unbound; so is the exact number of E. coli bacteria in my stomach.
And quite independently of all that, your reproduction of an objectivist's argument was a strawman, precisely because it was so blatantly self-contradictory. Like I said, a change in majority does not cause a change in morality under objectivism. Your "contradiction" hinges on a falsehood.
Of course we haven't all arrived at the peak of the fitness landscape yet. And there exist many differing opinions on where that peak might be. But that's because of that epistemology-metaphysics distinction again: our perceptions are limited and flawed, and therefore our conclusions sometimes don't match objective reality. Assuming there is a fitness landscape (and how could there not be?), some opinions about how to move "upslope" are going to be right, and some are going to be wrong. It's just the nature of human intellectual endeavors.
Now, you bring up the "shades of gray" metaphor, which suits me just fine, because I like to point out that some shades of gray are lighter, and some are darker, and we can usually tell the difference - or at least discuss the difference with a common understanding of what it means to be "light" or "dark". For instance, we may not agree on abortion, but we can probably agree on which aspects of the practice are light (e.g. women's autonomy) and which are dark (e.g. curtailing a life*). We're unlikely to find anyone who'd argue that abortion is a moral gray area because curtailing a life is good and women's autonomy is bad. In short, the disagreement springs not from irreconcilable difference of opinion on what is morally good and bad, but rather different analyses of a complex situation that are nevertheless founded on the same moral principles.
And, of course, it is not necessary that a person believe that a moral decision she makes be lily-white in order for her to make it, merely that it is lighter than the alternative(s). A woman may decide to get an abortion even though she acknowledges that it's wrong to curtail a life - even though she sees abortion as a moral gray area. And Truman decided to bomb Hiroshima even though he knew the "obliterating a city of a civilians" aspect of the action was very bad.
*To expand on this, we may disagree on whether a fetus is a life at the time it's aborted, but we probably agree that if it is a life, it would be bad to end it. Some moral disagreements devolve to factual disagreements like this. To use another example I like, the Aztecs performed human sacrifice because they thought it was necessary to retain their gods' favor and make the crops grow. We of course disagree with their understanding of the causation here (and with good reason), but we can acknowledge that if they were right, then that would be a point in favor of human sacrifice, a consideration that would "lighten" its blackness.
It's a good thing we scrutinize it, then.
A moral claim entails a correspondent moral reasons claim. If one ignores morality utterly, like a psychopath, then one is similarly going to disregard moral reasons. This is identical to the situation with any other normative claim. For instance, consider an economic recommendation like "You should invest your money in this profitable firm." The economic reason for this is, of course, "You will make more money." But if you don't care about money, then this recommendation is going to fall on deaf ears.
A psychopath has a moral reason not to kill babies. He just ignores it.
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Exactly. I have no qualms saying that if you value minimizing suffering you should or should not do X. However, that is not what most people consider morality. And I have trouble seeing how this would be considered objective. As an agent without that value has no reasons for following the moral claim.
Most people want to say that if X is wrong, then nobody should do X.
-----------------------
Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans
Progenitus - 5 Color Control
Mangara - MWC
Drana - MBC
Ashling - 50 Mountain Death
Karn - Typical Karn deck
Kresh - Sac + Tokens
Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi
Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes
Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank
Teeg -30 disenchants
---------------------------
Dismantled
Sen Triplets - Boring Control
Uril - Enchantment Voltron
That doesn't mean it's not objective, any more than an agent who does not value money makes the science of economics not objective. Whether or not the agent values money, it is nevertheless objectively true that investing in a profitable firm would make him a richer person. Similarly, whether or not the agent values morality, it is nevertheless objectively true (according to moral objectivism) that not killing babies would make him a morally better person.
Following any normative system whatsoever is contingent on an agent accepting the goals of the system, because any reasons the system gives for an action are necessarily going to derive from those goals. As Mackie correctly notes, any imperative "You should do X" is going to be accompanied by a reason clause "...because it will accomplish Y". To this, it is always possible to respond "But I don't want to accomplish Y, so I don't care about doing X". This potential for apathy is not a weakness of moral objectivism; it's simply the nature of normativity in general. And whether or not the agent cares about the reason, it is still true that he has a reason; thus Mackie's conclusion does not follow.
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
I think one has to be very careful when treading on this ground. Firstly, what does fitness mean in this case? Usually it translates roughly into "observed rate of reproduction," but in the case of the massive geneto-memetic fitness landscape you seem to be talking about here, it is not clear that "memetic rate of reproduction" and "genetic rate of reproduction" can be merged into a single commensurate fitness variable. (i.e. the Cartesian product of genetic and memetic fitness cannot necessarily be totally ordered in a sensible way) Memes replicate in a systematically different way than do genes, of course, and someone with zero genetic fitness can have considerable memetic fitness. It's just not clear that these are necessarily commensurate quantities.
Secondly, while the fitness landscape is unique and objective when regarded as a function from genetomemetic space into whatever unspecified range our fitness is supposed to be quantified over, each organism unto itself has its own set of genes and memes and therefore occupies its own position on the fitness landscape. Thus the local "gradient" (in whatever sense that can be defined) of the fitness landscape, and therefore the direction of genetomemetic evolution of each organism, need not even be consistent across organisms (and certainly not across tribes or species.) Furthermore, each organism occupies its own local optimum which is certainly not a global maximum (which we don't even know exists for such a complicated function) but may not even be a local maximum, but rather a cusp or saddle point. And furthermore, to the extent that we can study this fitness landscape, we can only do so locally, and so it is not possible for someone who is stuck at "low" fitness to actualize that information.
So I think that even this evolutionary description of morality admits of moral relativism, in both the "meta-ethical" and "Descriptive" senses as listed by Wikipedia, but not in the normative sense.
To concretize it a little bit, a human who lives in a tribe whose coming-of-age ritual involves hunting, killing, and eating a human from a nearby tribe occupies a different point on the fitness landscape, and therefore has different local genetomemetic evolutionary tendencies, than does a suburban white male. In his case, the genetomemetic fitness gradient points in the direction of engaging in cannibalism, as passing the coming-of-age ritual is a necessary prerequisite for both genetic and memetic reproduction. And it does not suffice to point out that the cannibal's fitness is objectively "lower," firstly because the ordering on fitness is not necessarily clear, and secondly because the cannibal is only aware of his neighborhood of genetomemetic space and he in fact might be the highest-fitness guy in that neck of the woods. You may say "come join me on my higher plateau of the fitness landscape," but (A) he has no way of knowing from his local viewpoint that your plateau is higher; in fact, he feels like the king of his particular hill -- and (B) there may be a gulf between the two points that he simply cannot cross even if he wished to.
Which if thou dost not use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind
It will go and thou wilt go, never to return.
Taboo the word morality. What does morality mean when you use it here? We have metrics for wealth. When you say morality are you meaning some kind of utility function?
I agree with all this.
This claim seems unsubstantiated to me. After all, it is not that the psychopath is apathetic to the reason, but that he *lacks* the reason for motivation. His brain literally is lacking any reason for the moral action.
-----------------------
Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans
Progenitus - 5 Color Control
Mangara - MWC
Drana - MBC
Ashling - 50 Mountain Death
Karn - Typical Karn deck
Kresh - Sac + Tokens
Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi
Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes
Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank
Teeg -30 disenchants
---------------------------
Dismantled
Sen Triplets - Boring Control
Uril - Enchantment Voltron
Different objectivist theories have different metrics. I'm deliberately being as general as I can here. But yes, there is some sort of metric, and I'm using the word "moral" as a placeholder for it.
What, you mean he just instantly forgets it whenever someone tells him why he shouldn't kill babies? No. The reason is before him, he just doesn't care about it.
And why are we looking at his psychology in the first place? Flipping back to the economics analogy, you still have a reason to invest in a profitable firm even if you're not merely apathetic to money, but have been drugged into a stupor such that you literally cannot understand the proposition. Reasons are not psychological states, but rather objective facts about cause and effect; they're there even if you can't see them. Otherwise, it would be nonsensical for me to point out to you a reason to do or not do something - and yet we all do this all the time.
Now, if Mackie wants to say that every moral imperative entails some sort of universal psychological state, as opposed to a mere cause-and-effect proposition, then that's something he's going to have to argue. I suspect he will fail, because it's loco.
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Fair enough.
Hmm hmm, I think I see what you are saying here. However, I am uncomfortable with divorcing reasons from the individual. The language you seem to be using is problematic to me, can you clarify what you mean when you say the reason is before him?
Do you have a reason to invest if you place 0 value on money? I would say no. It seems more accurate to me to say that I can only point out reasons for action X to people if they value some result or consequence of X.
To keep up with the money example:
Instead of saying that the person with 0 value in money has reasons to invest but chooses to ignore them, I believe that it is more accurate to say that they posses no reasons to invest. This seems to fit our usage of the word much better.
I feel like we need to flesh out a definition of reasons at this point.
-----------------------
Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans
Progenitus - 5 Color Control
Mangara - MWC
Drana - MBC
Ashling - 50 Mountain Death
Karn - Typical Karn deck
Kresh - Sac + Tokens
Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi
Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes
Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank
Teeg -30 disenchants
---------------------------
Dismantled
Sen Triplets - Boring Control
Uril - Enchantment Voltron
In that case, he is aware of the proposition that not killing babies will make him a morally better person. But as I go on to say, it's not even necessary that he be aware of the proposition at all. Immoral actions can spring from apathy or ignorance.
If you define "reason" that way, then it's simply not the case that moral statements entail reasons.
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
That seems problematic for moral statements.
-----------------------
Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans
Progenitus - 5 Color Control
Mangara - MWC
Drana - MBC
Ashling - 50 Mountain Death
Karn - Typical Karn deck
Kresh - Sac + Tokens
Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi
Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes
Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank
Teeg -30 disenchants
---------------------------
Dismantled
Sen Triplets - Boring Control
Uril - Enchantment Voltron
Why? It's not problematic for an economic statement that it doesn't entail cupidity in every human being everywhere.
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Oh I should have clarified. That seems problematic for *objective* moral statements. AKA the kind that would have person-independent normative power.
-----------------------
Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans
Progenitus - 5 Color Control
Mangara - MWC
Drana - MBC
Ashling - 50 Mountain Death
Karn - Typical Karn deck
Kresh - Sac + Tokens
Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi
Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes
Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank
Teeg -30 disenchants
---------------------------
Dismantled
Sen Triplets - Boring Control
Uril - Enchantment Voltron
My question remains unchanged. I understand your modification/clarification of Mackie's thesis as follows: "An objective moral proposition 'Person X should perform action A' entails the psychological proposition 'Person X desires the consequences of action A'." This seems unreasonable to me; in fact, it seems quite silly. If I say "Person X should perform action A", then you can probably infer pragmatically that I desire the consequences. But I'm making no claim about Person X's desires, or anything else in his actual current psychological state. This is true whether "Person X should perform action A" is supposed to be objective or subjective, whether it's supposed to be moral, economic, aesthetic, strategic, or any other form of normativity. The distinction between what ought to be and what is is kind of the point of normativity.
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Basically. Person X should perform action A because he has reasons to perform action A; namely his desires for the consequences of action A.
And that is where I think your claim would fail. When you make your claim, you are providing no reasons for person X to actually perform claim A. You are basically not showing any justification whatsoever for the *ought*.
For example, suppose you ran into a paper-clip maximizer. This creatures sole goal in life is to maximize the amount of paper-clips in the universe. He values paper-clip maximization solely, and above all else.
He says, Person X should perform action A where A maximizes paper-clips.
The both of you are going to proceed to talk past each other about what the other ought to do. Because neither of you has ANY good reason to follow the other's supposed normative claims.
Neither of your assertions are intrinsically motivating. They only hold any power for agents that share a similar value set.
-----------------------
Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans
Progenitus - 5 Color Control
Mangara - MWC
Drana - MBC
Ashling - 50 Mountain Death
Karn - Typical Karn deck
Kresh - Sac + Tokens
Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi
Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes
Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank
Teeg -30 disenchants
---------------------------
Dismantled
Sen Triplets - Boring Control
Uril - Enchantment Voltron
I think this is where the evolutionary account comes in; your shared value set is that you both want your species to survive and thrive, i.e. reproduce at the best possible rate. Although I still think there is a relativity issue there in that different points on the fitness landscape have different fitness gradients, and so you may both (correctly) see different paths of increasing fitness.
Which if thou dost not use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind
It will go and thou wilt go, never to return.
Correct. But no assertion whatsoever is intrinsically motivating - even if we somehow found the Kantian categorical imperative that is true a priori because its negation is self-contradictory, even that would not be intrinsically motivating, because human beings are more than capable of behaving illogically. So again my response is: so what?
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Sure, all I am arguing against is an objective morality. Humans share many common values, and you can make normative statements along these shared values. For instance if you want to reduce human suffering, than you should do X.
@BS: I agree, nothing is intrinsically motivating, which is why objective morality doesn't work.
Now, if you think you can have objective morality without intrinsic value, I would be interested in hearing how.
-----------------------
Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans
Progenitus - 5 Color Control
Mangara - MWC
Drana - MBC
Ashling - 50 Mountain Death
Karn - Typical Karn deck
Kresh - Sac + Tokens
Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi
Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes
Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank
Teeg -30 disenchants
---------------------------
Dismantled
Sen Triplets - Boring Control
Uril - Enchantment Voltron
Just because something has intrinsic value doesn't mean that every bonehead on the planet has to recognize it. That's like saying the Earth can't be objectively round because Flat-Earthers exist.
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
I thought you already agreed that intrinsic value does not exist?
This is not a fair metaphor, and you know it. Hell you have already mentioned the difference between what is and what ought to be.
-----------------------
Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans
Progenitus - 5 Color Control
Mangara - MWC
Drana - MBC
Ashling - 50 Mountain Death
Karn - Typical Karn deck
Kresh - Sac + Tokens
Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi
Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes
Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank
Teeg -30 disenchants
---------------------------
Dismantled
Sen Triplets - Boring Control
Uril - Enchantment Voltron
The statement is factual. It doesn't matter whether you believe morality is objective or not, any moral system with any degree of logic will agree to that statement. That's fundamental.
Yes.
Nope.
Why is it not fair? And what makes the is-ought distinction relevant here? Are you saying that "is" statements can be objective, but "ought" statements can't? If so, isn't that rather question-begging?
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
It seems that I misunderstood you then. I thought that "Correct. But no assertion whatsoever is intrinsically motivating - even if we somehow found the Kantian categorical imperative that is true a priori because its negation is self-contradictory, even that would not be intrinsically motivating, because human beings are more than capable of behaving illogically." meant that you agreed with the lack of intrinsic motivation.
Because there is a fact of the matter on whether the earth is flat or not. There is nothing normative in that statement. You are obviously aware of this difference.
Just because *is* statements are objective has nothing to do with question-begging. I have already pursued a train of thought as to why ought statements fail objectivity.
Maybe it would help if you told me what you mean by objective morality, so that I can be sure where our disagreement lies here.
-----------------------
Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans
Progenitus - 5 Color Control
Mangara - MWC
Drana - MBC
Ashling - 50 Mountain Death
Karn - Typical Karn deck
Kresh - Sac + Tokens
Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi
Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes
Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank
Teeg -30 disenchants
---------------------------
Dismantled
Sen Triplets - Boring Control
Uril - Enchantment Voltron
I do. But intrinsic value is a different matter entirely. A motivation is a psychological impulse to perform an action. Value is a property of a thing such that that thing ought to be.
"Normative" does not mean "there is no fact of the matter". The whole point of moral objectivism is that for at least one class of normative statement there is a fact of the matter, just as there is a fact of the matter of the Earth's shape. So when you assume that because a statement is normative, there can be no fact of the matter, you are indeed begging the question. And no, I haven't forgotten that you've given an argument to this effect - but perhaps you have forgotten that it is precisely the premises of that argument that I am questioning here.
Moral objectivism is true if and only if there are moral facts which are objectively true. If a moral fact is objectively true, then its truth value is independent of any observer; a person can think it false, or not know it at all, and it will still be true regardless. When a premise of your argument assumes this claim is false, then the whole argument is a nonstarter.
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Oh I see. Intrinsic value does not exist either, or at least I have never seen any evidence of intrinsic value.
Obviously. And I never claimed it did.
It is a good thing I do not assume this.
This was in response to your claim of question begging.
Excellent, now we are actually getting somewhere. Please show me an example of such a fact. And tell me how it would be true of the paperclip maximizer.
-----------------------
Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans
Progenitus - 5 Color Control
Mangara - MWC
Drana - MBC
Ashling - 50 Mountain Death
Karn - Typical Karn deck
Kresh - Sac + Tokens
Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi
Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes
Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank
Teeg -30 disenchants
---------------------------
Dismantled
Sen Triplets - Boring Control
Uril - Enchantment Voltron
Then why does your rejection of my analogy seem to be based on the distinction between normativity and descriptivity? It is irrelevant to the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity.
Exactly. To beg the question is for an argument to assume its conclusion in its premises.
You: If moral propositions don't motivate people to believe them, then they aren't objective.
Me: I reject that premise. Here's an example of another statement that is objective and yet doesn't motivate people to believe it.
You: But that statement isn't a moral statement. It's the kind of statement that doesn't have to motivate people in order to be objective; moral statements still do.
Me: That's begging the question. I'm in the process of rejecting that premise; you can't defend it by reasserting it.
You: Well, see my argument that morality isn't objective.
Me: The premise I'm rejecting is from your argument. So that's begging the question too.
"It is wrong to have sex with someone without their consent." This is true for the law-abiding citizen who knows it; it is true for the cult leader who falsely believes otherwise; it is true for the common rapist who knows it but doesn't care; and it is true for the young child who doesn't yet know what sex is. It is true for all these people because, no matter what their beliefs, if they were to commit rape the result would be more wrongness in the world (where, again, I'm using "wrongness" as a placeholder).
Now, it makes more sense to me that you meant to ask how this wouldn't be true of the paperclip maximizer. But actually, it both is and isn't true of him. Paperclip maximization is an objective normative code: actions really will lead to more or fewer paperclips in the world regardless of the agent's belief on the matter. The difference is simply that this isn't the moral code. This may seem like a trivial distinction of semantics, or even a capitulation to ultimate subjectivism. But there is in fact nothing trivial or capitulatory about it. It is precisely the same semantics, after all, that prevent me from arguing, "You may say the Earth is the big round rocky thing we're standing on, but I say the Earth is the little flat syrup-covered thing on my breakfast plate. Therefore, whether the Earth is round or flat is subjective."
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Yeah.
Agreed.
Yeah it does to me. I think at this point you could jump in and say: WHY!? What makes the moral code, THE moral code?
For further understanding: Would it to be fair to suggest that your usage would mean that there is nothing special about moral ought claims. To clarify: what does it matter whether it is a moral code or a paper-clip maximization code?
I think this needs support.
You lost me here.
-----------------------
Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans
Progenitus - 5 Color Control
Mangara - MWC
Drana - MBC
Ashling - 50 Mountain Death
Karn - Typical Karn deck
Kresh - Sac + Tokens
Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi
Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes
Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank
Teeg -30 disenchants
---------------------------
Dismantled
Sen Triplets - Boring Control
Uril - Enchantment Voltron