You think an infant without a brain is dead(if we're gonna go into random suppositions, assume a mechanical heart and lung here, if you don't believe something can live without a brain).
No. An infant without a brain is dead. The cells are no longer alive.
You think a fetus without a brain is alive.
A fetus has a brain. An embryo does not, but its cells are still alive.
You think a zygote with the potential to become a human life deserves to be saved.
Yes.
You think a gamete with the potential to become a human life deserves to be destroyed.
A gamete in and of itself has absolutely no potential to become a human. A zygote has every chance of becoming a human being. I don't see why this is so hard to understand.
- That's basically the largest flaw I see in your argument. My argument has flaws as well, I just wanted to point that out.
You pointed out no flaws in my arguments. My argument is consistent. You just cannot seem to grasp these relatively simple concepts.
I will admit that potential is more important than no potential at all. But something with potential is not the same as something with that potential expressed.
Genetically, biologically, it is. You like to believe that something other than biology matters, but you've yet to provide any logic or empirical evidence to substantiate this claim.
The simple thing is, our arguments really come down to whether we think that that potential is worth enough to make it's possable expression good in all cases. And, since there is simply no argument that can sway opinion, I will bow out of this discussion.
I like that previous post of Doubtless One talking with himself. I just may take that outside to keep my crops safe from any crows that may want to eat at it. After all, it is a very effective strawman!!!
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Originally Posted by Green Arrow Yes I did, I wouldn't fully disagree with chronoplasam. Perhaps I do deserve toture. But who amongst us besides myself has what it takes to toture me?
Originally Posted by Highroller
Compared to what? I think compared to chocolate ice cream, women, unicorns, and kung fu, the state pretty much sucks.
No. An infant without a brain is dead. The cells are no longer alive.
Oh, just thought I'd point this out: since you have no problem agreeing that someone can 'live' in a coma without brainwaves, then obviously, you don't need a brain to 'live', because the heart and lungs wouldn't get signals either way.
Quote from T2 »
Cute.
'm not joking... we're talking about three states, here:
1. Nothing
2. Potential
3. Human
You're saying that, since it's not one, it's three. Admittedly, saying since it's not three, so it's one is equally flawed.
- Oh, and insulting me doesn't especially make me want to act nice to you, but whatever.
I contend that abortion can be either immoral or moral, depending on the stage of life at which the fetus is at.
In this situation, I define moral as having compassion, being the awareness of the suffering of another with the desire to end that suffering.
The main argument for abortion states that a fetus is not a living human. But I find it very hard to differentiate a baby that is one-minute away from being born and one that is one-minute old. All the parts of the body are at the same stage of development, the only difference is the environment from which it receives its food and oxygen. It has a functional brain, heart, as well as every other internal organ needed to live and be considered a living human. It can certainly feel and giving it an acid bath or drilling a hole in its head will certainly cause it pain. Moral people do not condone that. So, killing a fetus one minute before birth is immoral.
On the other hand, I've seen fertilized eggs. They are one cell. No brain, no heart, no developed organs. It does not feel or think. It can't move on its own of react to its environment any more than an amoeba. If this fetus happens to be located in the belly of a woman who does not have the means or desire to care for it, it is moral to kill it now and save it the inevitable suffering it will go through later in life. Therefore, killing a fetus one minute after conception can be moral.
The argument, IMO, lies everywhere in between. When does the abortion go from being moral to being immoral. By my definition, this takes place at the moment the fetus develops the ability to feel pain. Even if its cognitive functions are not completely developed, it still suffers when you kill it and causing suffering is not something that moral and compassionate people do.
Solace, you are a very frustrating person to talk with. Mainly, you don't respond specifically to difficult challenges, and you quote parts of other people's posts and then respond with responses that have nothing to do with the context of those quotes.
For instance, a couple pages back, I provided a lengthy response to one of your posts. In it, I asked specific questions that I wanted answered from you. At the top of my post, I also said "Please see T2's response." Your reply to that post? You quoted me saying "Please see T2's response," and then said simply, "'k." That was the entirety of your response to me.
Then you quote T2 saying "Cute," and respond with "I'm not joking" and lay out an argument. But he wasn't saying you were joking. He said "Cute" in response to you saying that you didn't think any opinions would change, and so you might as well quit being part of the debate.
You continue to insist that a brain is necessary for a human to be considered living because, if you remove an adult's brain, the adult will die. It's hard to pick, among the millions of illustrations that completely ruin that logic, like gradual dependency or artificial lungs or somesuch, the one in which you'll take the time to understand without misunderstanding or strawmanning it.
Earlier, I asked if you believed an infant was a human or a potential human. You responded with, "it's a potential adult." Do you realize why that's not an answer at all?
You imply that people need to treat you well in order for you to "act nice" to them, as if anyone's in debt to you for enduring wisdom, understanding, and politeness in this thread. All that I've seen is a repetitive and arrogant nonparticipation in reasonable discussion. Can you empathize with us how infuriating it is when you deceive and consciously evade?
Oh, just thought I'd point this out: since you have no problem agreeing that someone can 'live' in a coma without brainwaves, then obviously, you don't need a brain to 'live', because the heart and lungs wouldn't get signals either way.
Wow. No.
You need a brain to live precisely because it keeps your body running. A brain is necessary to be considered alive only insofar as your cells would die without one. But your rank of human being is not dependant upon the existence of gray matter.
'm not joking... we're talking about three states, here:
1. Nothing
2. Potential
3. Human
You're saying that, since it's not one, it's three. Admittedly, saying since it's not three, so it's one is equally flawed.
That is not what I'm saying at all. Thanks for playing.
- Oh, and insulting me doesn't especially make me want to act nice to you, but whatever.
I don't care if you act nice to me, I care if you read my goddam posts and actually respond to what I'm saying.
Quote from turgy22 »
On the other hand, I've seen fertilized eggs. They are one cell.
One human cell.
No brain, no heart, no developed organs.
A species is not defined by its organs.
It does not feel or think.
Are these part of the definition for human?
It can't move on its own of react to its environment any more than an amoeba.
An amoeba, too, is alive.
If this fetus happens to be located in the belly of a woman who does not have the means or desire to care for it, it is moral to kill it now and save it the inevitable suffering it will go through later in life.
First of all Mamelon, I didn't read your post in detail at all, and I'm sorry about that. I was at my local library, and only had 15 minutes to make the post. In the event I hoped the rest of your post followed that thrust, which it didn't.
Ah, I understand.
Quote from turnip_song »
I also misread what you said about murder, so I'm sorry. I do disagree with your definition, though.
I disagree with it too, since, as I've said, it'd evidently incomplete.
Quote from turnip_song »
Not as drastic. But drastic enough for them to matter, as they imply that more than one baby can result from a single zygote, which forms the thrust of my argument.
Honestly, I do see the point of you argument. However, it's not wholly relevant to mine (nor mine wholly relevant to yours) since my point had more to do with the moral objection against terminating a life cycle.
Quote from turnip_song »
You've misunderstood me here. What I meant was something similar to what you thought I meant in my previous post- the external influences on a fetus (by which I don't exclusively mean nurture, but rather the huge number of chemical factors within the womb that are inherent in fetal development) are going to alter what the fetus is, and what it becomes, in a profound way, and that a baby cannot be considered the product of its DNA alone. I do agree that a fetus is distinct from its mother, but not that the fetus at the stage of abortion is the sole determinant of a person.
Okay, I agree. However, I think it needs to be noted that the changes a fetus undergoes are maturational and logically inevitable, rather than spontaneous and transformative like the changes a gamete goes through.
Quote from turnip_song »
Well, if gametes can be said to have life cycles, them failing to unite in any circumstance where they could would result in their ending.
That's not correct, actually. A cell does have a certain life cycle, and it is a cellular life cycle - for instance, most normal cells die after about seven years or so. The life cycle of a sperm cell does not include maturing into a fetus. A sperm or an ovum is not the beginning of a human life cycle - a zygote is. That is the whole thrust of my argument. Some say that a gamete is "intended" to become a zygote, but I contend with that because:
1) The "intent" is constructed abstractly - there is no actual "intent," nor anyone to intend it.
2) "Intent" does not constitute logical, maturational inevitability - by inevitability, I do not mean that all fetuses (or all organisms) inevitably mature into infants unless we stop them, since disease or some other problem could arise to halt the maturational process. What I mean is that is that the maturation is a logical, natural, inherent, and eventual part of the development process of a zygote, and that development is self-maintained.
I want to make sure that this is cleared up: my argument doesn't have anything to do with degree of "help required." My claim was that the "help" needed to create a zygote out of two gametes, and the "help" required to simply not terminate the zygote, are being illogically conflated in the first place. The difference isn't one of degrees.
Quote from turnip_song »
I think that distinguishing between persons and humans has a critical bearing on this matter.
Quote from turnip_song »
I think that the fact a human will exist is irrelevant to that idea, and, for the record, profoundly disagree that morality is determined by life cycles.
Understandable, since we are most probably using slightly different moral systems.
My point was that one of the reasons we find it undesirable (a tragedy) for a human's life to be ended is because that person's chance at life is now gone, and that the person he or she might have been now will never be allowed to live. If a zygote is a part of the natural development cycle of a human being (which it is), then terminating the zygote has those same consequences.
I'll make three distinctions between types of "people" - in this example we have theoretical people, determined people, and defined people. A defined person is a person who exists and who has observable and definable qualities - that is, she is here, now, and can be met, spoken to, etc. A determined person is someone who we may not have any details about, someone whose qualities may not be observable, and whose actual form has yet to be defined - but the person's existence has been determined, he or she is "real," so to speak. In this example, the person has not been defined, but their existence is determined - imminent. A theoretical person is one who could feasibly exist, but they're not determined. They're not "coming" and there is no particular reason to think that they will be coming any time soon, if at all.
I am saying that defined people and determined people have a development, they are currently developing. A theoretical person (such as a gamete) is not currently in development. I am saying that if terminating a current development is undesirable (I've already explained why I think that), then that extends to the development of people who aren't necessairly defined yet. However, since a theoretical person isn't even developing, then there is no way of terminating the development anyway.
So, I'm saying that in the case of a zygote, even if a person hasn't been defined, as person has been determined, and in the case of a gamete, a person has been neither defined nor determined, only theorized (as a possibility).
I'll make an attempt at an analogy:
Let us say that if I call my friend and ask him over to my house for a party, he must must change all of his plans for the day to come over. Now, if, once he arrives, I tell him to leave, then his schedule is ruined - he changed all his plans to come, and now his day is completely upset because (let's say) he can't change his plans back, and he changed them for nothing. So the consequence is that his plans for the day have all been ruined.
If I call my friend and invite him over, and he changes his plans for the day to accomodate the party (in this example we presume he can't change them back), then call again in five minutes before he has left, and tell him not to come, we face the same consequence - his plans have been ruined. He's not coming to the party, and he changed his plans for nothing. In essence, the consequence is the same, even though he didn't actually show up at my house yet.
Now, if I never call my friend and invite him, and he never changes his plans because of the party, then the consequence isn't the same. I just failed to invite him - his day wasn't ruined.
The argument I'm seeing (put into terms of the analogy) is that the fact that there needs to be a oustide force to change the situation in the first place (by my inviting him at all) and the fact that he needs help from an outside force to get there after being invited (a ride, a vehicle of his own, etc.), that somehow the consequences of his being asked not to come after already being invited are the same as if he had never been invited.
My point is that if we are to find it desirable/moral in the first place to allow my friend to stay at the party once he arrives so to prevent ruining his day, that it should also be so desirable to allow him to continue coming toward my house should he already have changed his plans to do so. Whether or not it is desirable or moral to invite him in the first place is not the same question as whether or not I should consider trying not to ruin his day, not at all.
A note on the analogy to preempt confusion - I realize that having your active development terminated is not the same as having your "plans ruined", and I realize that a mother is not a vehicle. Analogies usually aren't totally analogous in every respect.
Quote from turnip_song »
I think that laws have to protect persons and not humans, and as such I'm going to be looking at this in a different manner than you have here.
I understand that, but my entire position was a challenge of this moral system.
Quote from turnip_song »
You have persuaded me to compromise my view a little, though- I'd now view a fetus as an entity capable of assuming a vast number of personhoods which nevertheless will assume one, as opposed to a position that lacked that latter clause. Convincing me that an entity such as this should be granted rights remotely comprable to those of an actual person, though, would take some doing.
My position was merely that terminating such an entity is relevant to the same moral concern that is relevant to terminating an already-born human life, because it deals with the same values (according to my moral system and projections, of course).
I do think I see your point, however. It seems that you are saying a theoretically defined person, a "soul" (we can call this soul "Jim"), isn't necessarily missing out on development if the development of a zygote that coudl be tied to it is terminated. In other words, if a zygote hasn't been defined as getting ready to become Jim, then Jim isn't affected by the termination of the zygote. And, if the zygote is preparing to become Jim, and is terminated, Jim may very well get another chance at being born by being tied to some other zygote that is being formed somewhere else in the world two minutes later, thus giving him another chance at living. Does that sound about right?
Quote from turgy22 »
In this situation, I define moral as having compassion, being the awareness of the suffering of another with the desire to end that suffering.
I disagree that compassion should be defined in terms of suffering and ending of suffering.
My moral point was that denying a zygote (which is inevitably preparing to become a maturized human) a chance to develop, when lack of such denial would allow it to develop unmolested, is discompassionate.
All that I yearn for, for richer or poorer, is to be the light that you see. All that I yearn for, for richer or poorer, is to be the peace that you feel. All that I yearn for, for richer or poorer, is to fill your heart on my own.
But the rainbow is an image of hope for many reasons, as it is a brilliant sight coming out of oftimes dismal weather.
T2:
I don't disagree with any of the claims you make. Killing a one-celled human is, indeed killing a human. But I don't think that killing a one-celled human (incapable of feeling is the important point here) is immoral, which was the original point of this debate.
My other point, that allowing an unwanted fetus to live to the point where it can feel is immoral, stems from my original objective, which is to end suffering. I'll concede that it is a big assumption on my part, but I believe that if a mother does not have the desire or means to care for her child, that child will suffer and probably die anyway. No statistics can prove what a mother is thinking at the time of her child's birth, but I've read plenty of stories about neglected babies dying prematurely. It would have been moral to terminate them immediately after conception and prevent the suffering they went through.
Quote from mamelon »
I disagree that compassion should be defined in terms of suffering and ending of suffering.
My moral point was that denying a zygote (which is inevitably preparing to become a maturized human) a chance to develop, when lack of such denial would allow it to develop unmolested, is discompassionate.
My definition of compassion was taken from dictionary.com.
You can argue that morals have nothing to do with compassion, but not that compassion has nothing to do with the prevention of suffering.
T2:
I don't disagree with any of the claims you make. Killing a one-celled human is, indeed killing a human. But I don't think that killing a one-celled human (incapable of feeling is the important point here) is immoral, which was the original point of this debate.
My other point, that allowing an unwanted fetus to live to the point where it can feel is immoral, stems from my original objective, which is to end suffering.
First, feeling pain is simply how organisms that have grown a nervous system react to negative stimuli. In earlier stages, even without a complete nervous system, they are still capable of reacting to negative stimuli. That reaction is still suffering, even if it isn't a nervous suffering. Suffering just means dwelling under the yoke of stress or violence. Every living thing, from tree to ant to human, is capable of suffering by the general definition. If you want to limit the scope of "important enough" suffering only to organisms with functional nervous systems, I have to ask what fundamental distinction exists that can justify that limitation.
Second, if I wanted to, I could take an orphaned infant and kill it instantly. It wouldn't suffer at all. Is this moral, since it avoids suffering?
Quote from turgy22 »
I'll concede that it is a big assumption on my part, but I believe that if a mother does not have the desire or means to care for her child, that child will suffer and probably die anyway.
It's a big load of hogwash on your part. There is a shortage of babies up for adoption.
I think you're just arguing semantics, and semantics that aren't against his point. (Again)
"
Molecules in the body are usually inert (nonreactive) unless something, usually a kinase, phosphorylates them (attaches a high-energy phosphate bond). The negative high-energy phosphate bond is taken from its supply carrier adenosine (a kind of delivery boy), and placed on the molecule that needs to be energized. The catalysts that accomplish this battery attachment are called kinases. Research by Ru-Rong Ji and Clifford Woolf indicates that mitogen-activated protein kinase is the master switch in Central Pain. MAPK initiates a process that begins to place high-energy phosphate bonds, or batteries, on all kinds of pain neurotransmitters, making pain nerves fire out of control. Such activity could explain why pain perceptions lose their normal characteristics and fire out of control together to create the unusual pain sensations in Central Pain."
He's saying that the organism doesn't feel pain (which is what you are arguing), but that it still suffers. The feeling of pain is not the only way to suffer.
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Hey, you! Yeah, you behind the computer screen! You're unconstitutional.
He's saying that the organism doesn't feel pain (which is what you are arguing), but that it still suffers. The feeling of pain is not the only way to suffer.
Again, I'm trusting the dictionary for my definitions, but under the entry for "suffer", every appropriate entry relates to pain. I can not think of an example in which something lacking the ability to feel can be proven to suffer. If that's what you believe, then mowing the lawn is immoral because it causes the grass to suffer and taking antibiotics is immoral because it causes the virus to suffer.
Quote from extremestan »
It's a big load of hogwash on your part. There is a shortage of babies up for adoption.
Now we get into a slightly different area of the argument. Asking an unfit mother to give up a child for adoption will certainly benefit the child. But now you are asking a woman (who can be proven as a feeling sentient being) to suffer so that the fetus (which can not be proven as a feeling, sentient being - still assuming that this is moments after conception, of course) can continue to grow. If you don't think that pregnant women suffer, you've probably never been around one. The extra disproportionate weight gained can cause back and foot problems, in addition to the pain of morning sickness and the childbirth process itself.
Keeping with my definitions of moral, compassion and suffer: it is immoral to cause suffering when it can be prevented.
Is suffering really a just cause to kill someone though?
I mean, if some psycho wanted to stretch your genitals wide open and stuff a watermelon into your body through your urethra, but has no intention of killing you, would you have the right to kill this psycho in order to avoid excruciating amounts of pain?
If someone was going to cut off your fingers and stick razor blades in your anus, would it be reasonable to kill that person first?
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GENERATION 3.78: The first time you see this, add it into your sig and add 1 to the number after generation
But that presupposes the organism is capable of feeling, or at least has being. To argue a non-being can suffer seems utterly absurd. This isn't semantics.
Of course it's semantics. You're saying that a zygote is not a "being?" What is a "being?" I believe a zygote is a being. Why wouldn't it be a being?
Quote from turnip_song »
I feel a lot of posters in this thread are ignoring the difference between a biological reaction and the qualia it produces, but this particular argument about redefining suffering in a biologically materialist way is frankly taking it to ludicrous levels. Suffering can not be defined as a stress response to the environment without completely changing the common definition of the word such that it doesn't resemble it at all.
That's not true at all. "Suffering" has wide meaning, and is often applied not only to living things, but also non-living things (the economy suffered after the stock market plunge, the people suffered under the tyrant, the car suffered slight fender damage, the mechanism suffered extreme torsion, etc.). I'm arguing that "the zygote suffered" is much closer to "the infant suffered" than it is to "the car suffered," because the former two are both a case of an environmental violator inflicting injury or harm, and the affected agent biologically reacting accordingly.
Quote from turgy22 »
Again, I'm trusting the dictionary for my definitions, but under the entry for "suffer", every appropriate entry relates to pain. I can not think of an example in which something lacking the ability to feel can be proven to suffer. If that's what you believe, then mowing the lawn is immoral because it causes the grass to suffer and taking antibiotics is immoral because it causes the virus to suffer.
No. They aren't immoral because we don't consider it wrong to cause plants or virii to suffer.
And you're being deceptive with your analysis of the dictionary's entry. In almost every context, it says pain OR something else, like injury or stress.
Quote from turgy22 »
Now we get into a slightly different area of the argument. Asking an unfit mother to give up a child for adoption will certainly benefit the child. But now you are asking a woman (who can be proven as a feeling sentient being) to suffer so that the fetus (which can not be proven as a feeling, sentient being - still assuming that this is moments after conception, of course) can continue to grow. ... Keeping with my definitions of moral, compassion and suffer: it is immoral to cause suffering when it can be prevented.
I'm not keeping with your definitions of "suffer" -- that's the whole point. Let's not talk about weighing levels of suffering until we resolve that.
Besides, you have yet to respond to this:
"Second, if I wanted to, I could take an orphaned infant and kill it instantly. It wouldn't suffer [pain] at all. Is this moral, since it avoids suffering?"
suf·fer ( P ) Pronunciation Key (sfr) v.suf·fered,suf·fer·ing,suf·fers v.intr.
To feel pain or distress; sustain loss, injury, harm, or punishment.
To tolerate or endure evil, injury, pain, or death. See Synonyms at bear1.
To appear at a disadvantage: “He suffers by comparison with his greater contemporary” (Albert C. Baugh).
v.tr.
To undergo or sustain (something painful, injurious, or unpleasant): “Ordinary men have always had to suffer the history their leaders were making” (Herbert J. Muller).
To experience; undergo: suffer a change in staff.
To endure or bear; stand: would not suffer fools.
To permit; allow: “They were not suffered to aspire to so exalted a position as that of streetcar conductor” (Edmund S. Morgan).
I like the first number 2.
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Hey, you! Yeah, you behind the computer screen! You're unconstitutional.
For a more detailed answer: Generally when people look at definitions, it's not "just this one" or "just that one", it's all of them. In this case, number 2 can be applied perfectly to the fetus.
Also, I don't think that you are able to determine which one is used most often, since people talk about non-living things suffering all the time.
Also, just your attitude that the definition contradicts extremestan, even though it doesn't, really boils my blood.
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Hey, you! Yeah, you behind the computer screen! You're unconstitutional.
As in something with awareness and identity, a bit like Heideigger's Daesin. Something that has a something to do the sensing. What I'm talking about doesn't have a clearly defined word, which frustrates me. Nevertheless, it clearly exists, and suggesting it doesn't seems wrong to me.
What about a "sentience?" I would agree that a zygote is not have a sentience. But, of course, I wouldn't say that being too underdeveloped to have a sentience yet nullifies the moral value of a human being.
Quote from turnip_song »
The word "suffering" means something different when applied to people and things, though- one is more or less metaphorical, the other is not, they have different senses and mean different things. You're conflating the two concepts to a horrifying degree, frankly, and getting away with it because they happen to share a uniting word. You might as well argue that magnets are attracted to each other, so they should be considered to be in a relationship.
No, that would be equivocation by using two different contexts of the word "attractive." I'm using a single context: suffering is sustaining pain, injury, stress, punishment, loss or death. The "or" means that it doesn't have to be all of those at once. Now, it's true that when many people think of suffering, they think of pain. But I'm pointing out that pain is simply a certain kind, among many kinds of biological reactive mechanisms in the face of suffering.
But I don't think an entity without sentinence can be said to suffer in the same way an entity with sentinence does- I think the word "suffering" means something rather different in each circumstance, in one relating to an experience of a sentinent being, in the other something more metaphorical. I did a (not very representative) test on this by asking my family if they thought suffering could be construed in the same way for a sentinent and a non-sentinent being: They stared at me in horror. I really think there is a distinction here, and your changing the definition of what it means by ignoring that distinction (which is massive) boils my blood, although you weren't the user using that description.
What is the meaningful, moral distinction between the two? Your family stared at you in horror, emotionally offended at the very notion, but unable to give you the words which you can, in turn, give to me, to explain why, fundamentally, if "A" is an organism undergoing biological injury or loss without the function to process that stimulus as conscious pain, and "B" is an organism undergoing biological injury or loss with the function to process that stimulus as conscious pain, A's predicament is morally dismissable and B's predicament is morally abhorrent.
Quote from turnip_song »
your argument implies only one sentinent being can result from a zygote.
I've explicitly said, earlier in this thread, perhaps even more than once, that more than one Dasein can arise from what was once a single Dasein. If we're defining Dasein to be the physical faculties of environmental perception, then it, to me, is synonymous with sentience. Perhaps that's where the confusion comes from (although I still believe that Heidegger's Dasein is the contents of the metaphysical zone that is not the environment, and that it's not a physical system that develops).
What's the moral difference between something sentient experiencing something hideous and something which has no capacity to experience not experiencing anything at all, because it can't?
Let's use the term "undergo" instead of "experience." I was careful to avoid the word "experience," since I figured that your definition of it necessitated sentience, while mine is more broad.
Quote from turnip_song »
...Are you insane? The whole foundation of morality surely rests on us acting towards beings, towards entities, not towards things (by which I'd define as things that aren't aware of anything at even the most basic possible level, which you said you thought zygotes are, I think.)
"Basic" awareness doesn't need a nervous system. On a basic level, anything that responds to stimuli is aware of that stimuli. On "the most basic possible level" of awareness a tree, for instance, indicates its awareness of some kind of problem (like invading insects) by reacting to certain stimuli with the appropriate reaction (sap). A non-biological example would be visual pattern recognition software being aware of an intruder through storing and processing its given input.
This isn't "figurative" awareness. This isn't some metaphor. This is what awareness is on its most basic level, without poetic "humancentric" imputations.
My definition of compassion was taken from dictionary.com.
Yeah, denotates transcribed for the purpose of reference really aren't going to be sufficient for an argument in which the relevancy of such terms is going to be so closely examined.
Quote from turgy22 »
You can argue that morals have nothing to do with compassion, but not that compassion has nothing to do with the prevention of suffering.
I am seriously wondering what it is with this thread and the irrelevant, off-beat responses. For one, I did not claim, imply, or otherwise contend that morals have nothing to do with compassion, and in fact, I made clear when I was defining my moral system earlier that compassion does have to do with morality. Secondly, I did not say (imply, or othewise contend) that compassion has nothing to do with suffering of the prevention of suffering - I said compassion should not be defined in terms of suffering. Suffering and its prevention are not enough to adequately define compassion.
Quote from turnip_song »
The whole foundation of morality surely rests on us acting towards beings, towards entities, not towards things (by which I'd define as things that aren't aware of anything at even the most basic possible level, which you said you thought zygotes are, I think.) Can you really not make the distinction between a process that occurs to matter and it's sensing by a being that inhabits that matter, however that may ultimately work?
In context of the moral system you proposed, I can see your point, since you defined morality as specifically having to do with states of experience (such as "hurt" and "help"), and as I've already stated and explained, I don't think that moral system is sufficient.
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All that I yearn for, for richer or poorer, is to be the light that you see. All that I yearn for, for richer or poorer, is to be the peace that you feel. All that I yearn for, for richer or poorer, is to fill your heart on my own.
But the rainbow is an image of hope for many reasons, as it is a brilliant sight coming out of oftimes dismal weather.
I assert that this medium restricts my communication to what may be called language, and that this particular communication is expressed in the English language.
I assert that the English language uses certain patterns which structure a "subject" and an "object" and place them in relation to one another.
I assert that the list of human endeavors includes such things as science, religion, metaphysics, ethics and philosophy.
I assert that each of these, seek "truth" in some form.
I assert that there are epistemological problems, problems of meta-ethics, and problems of ethics assumed in the very framework of any question of morals. What I mean to say, is the the semantics of the word "moral" varies radically based on the approach to knowing, the role of reason in ethical judgments, and the meaning of ethical terms themselves.
I assert that without first establishing what it means to be moral, one simply cannot affirm or deny the morality of any given act.
I believe that any attempt to answer this question presupposes moral realism. To affirm or deny that something is moral is to assume the existence of objective moral truths, a discussion of the objective morality of an action has no meaning in moral arealism.
Unless there can be shown to exist an a priori foundation of knowledge, from which a comprehensive system of testable theories can describe what is called "moral" then I will assert that any question of morals is not and cannot be transformed into a question of science.
To clarify the above, I am saying I personally believe that questions of morals are not fundamentally scientific questions, that one cannot gain moral knowledge by the same means as one gains scientific knowledge. This is a rejection of logical positivism.
Even more simply, what ought to be done cannot simply be derived by what is.
Additionally I am saying that I personally answer this question from a perspective of ethical intuitionism and that I reject the following approaches to ethics:
ethical egoism
hedonistic utilitarianism
ideal utilitarianism
In summary, I have to this point concluded that the meaning of the question "is a given act moral" means to me "does a given act, after cogent and deliberate reflection on the situation, accord with the most significant duties proscribed by the moral convictions held by the actor?"
Examples of such duties which may come to bear in such a situation as abortion are the moral duties of beneficence and nonmaleficence. This list is by no means exhaustive of the duties that come to bear, however it represents what I believe are the more significant duties.
I acknowledge that by definition, the duty of nonmaleficence perceived by the actor may be diminished by their understanding of meaning of the term "other".
While it is a significant question, "How are we to know the other?" I assert that this particular problem, while embedded in the scope of the question, is ultimately not one which has a single objective answer.
I affirm that abortion is moral exactly and precisely to the degree which the mother perceives it to be congruent with her moral duty, after careful and reasoned reflection.
I really must disagree, though. I don't think you can define awareness as simply a process that occurs as a response to a stressor- I suppose you could say that awareness emerges from each response to a stressor and builds on that, but I don't see how that could be more than an assumption, and, if we have to extend the definition of awareness such that visual pattern recognition is able to suffer a way that's remotely similar on all levels as a woman who loses a child,
But we weren't saying "on all levels," we were talking about the "most basic possible level" of awareness. I'm sure that my basic uses of the terms "awareness" and "suffering" make you, and probably many people, uneasy. That's because our common usage of the terms are nearly always in the context of a mature human. We take the basic meanings and poeticize them.
The system is aware of an intruder. Dave attained a higher awareness.
The forest suffered heavy logging. Jill suffered under her cancer.
A zygote is a human organism. Ryan accepted his failings, because he felt that's what made him human.
The living bacteria multiplied startlingly. Now, Theresa felt, she was living!
Intuitive definitions change over time, but in semantic debate, you have to ask yourself why you'd apply the term "suffering" to an organism that reacts to duress nervously, and wouldn't apply the term "suffering" to an organism that reacts to duress in a different way. "Why? Because I asked my family and they were offended at the very thought of it!" is not a rational answer to the question. Neither is "Why? Because I think most people don't feel that way." I'm asking why the pain reaction is morally significant and other forms of reaction to duress are morally insignificant. I'm asking why you and your family think that way, rationally. Give me reasons why a difference in how an organism processes input really matters, without answering, "because me and my kin have intuitively trumped up the definition of suffering to exclude anything other than nervous processes."
Quote from turnip_song »
You can define awareness as what you've defined it as, but I'm utterly positive that isn't what almost anyone would define as it. Awareness isn't a process, because it can't be. It must emerge from process because it is in some sense apart from it. To define it merely as something that reacts seems to miss the point of it, to me.
Is the "point" of the term "awareness" to only apply to humans after birth? If so, then I suppose awareness truly doesn't apply to a fetus or zygote or computer. Likewise, if the "point" of the term "suffering" is only to qualify circumstances a nervous organism undergoes, then there's not much I can do about it, is there?
A fetus has a brain. An embryo does not, but its cells are still alive.
Yes.
A gamete in and of itself has absolutely no potential to become a human. A zygote has every chance of becoming a human being. I don't see why this is so hard to understand.
You pointed out no flaws in my arguments. My argument is consistent. You just cannot seem to grasp these relatively simple concepts.
Genetically, biologically, it is. You like to believe that something other than biology matters, but you've yet to provide any logic or empirical evidence to substantiate this claim.
Cute.
-No.
What kind of organism is it?
-Not any kind of organism.
No that is imposible.
-A human organism then?
Yes.
-So a separate human organism?
Yes.
What is murder?
-Killing someone.
What kind of someone?
-A human.
So killing a fetus that is at any stage a human organism is murder?
-I guess so.
now begins the thousand years of REIGN OF BLOOD!
Oh, just thought I'd point this out: since you have no problem agreeing that someone can 'live' in a coma without brainwaves, then obviously, you don't need a brain to 'live', because the heart and lungs wouldn't get signals either way.
'm not joking... we're talking about three states, here:
1. Nothing
2. Potential
3. Human
You're saying that, since it's not one, it's three. Admittedly, saying since it's not three, so it's one is equally flawed.
- Oh, and insulting me doesn't especially make me want to act nice to you, but whatever.
Possibly the last remaining member of the Banana Clan (+1)
Banana of the Month Feb '05
Cool stuff here.
In this situation, I define moral as having compassion, being the awareness of the suffering of another with the desire to end that suffering.
The main argument for abortion states that a fetus is not a living human. But I find it very hard to differentiate a baby that is one-minute away from being born and one that is one-minute old. All the parts of the body are at the same stage of development, the only difference is the environment from which it receives its food and oxygen. It has a functional brain, heart, as well as every other internal organ needed to live and be considered a living human. It can certainly feel and giving it an acid bath or drilling a hole in its head will certainly cause it pain. Moral people do not condone that. So, killing a fetus one minute before birth is immoral.
On the other hand, I've seen fertilized eggs. They are one cell. No brain, no heart, no developed organs. It does not feel or think. It can't move on its own of react to its environment any more than an amoeba. If this fetus happens to be located in the belly of a woman who does not have the means or desire to care for it, it is moral to kill it now and save it the inevitable suffering it will go through later in life. Therefore, killing a fetus one minute after conception can be moral.
The argument, IMO, lies everywhere in between. When does the abortion go from being moral to being immoral. By my definition, this takes place at the moment the fetus develops the ability to feel pain. Even if its cognitive functions are not completely developed, it still suffers when you kill it and causing suffering is not something that moral and compassionate people do.
For instance, a couple pages back, I provided a lengthy response to one of your posts. In it, I asked specific questions that I wanted answered from you. At the top of my post, I also said "Please see T2's response." Your reply to that post? You quoted me saying "Please see T2's response," and then said simply, "'k." That was the entirety of your response to me.
Then you quote T2 saying "Cute," and respond with "I'm not joking" and lay out an argument. But he wasn't saying you were joking. He said "Cute" in response to you saying that you didn't think any opinions would change, and so you might as well quit being part of the debate.
You continue to insist that a brain is necessary for a human to be considered living because, if you remove an adult's brain, the adult will die. It's hard to pick, among the millions of illustrations that completely ruin that logic, like gradual dependency or artificial lungs or somesuch, the one in which you'll take the time to understand without misunderstanding or strawmanning it.
Earlier, I asked if you believed an infant was a human or a potential human. You responded with, "it's a potential adult." Do you realize why that's not an answer at all?
You imply that people need to treat you well in order for you to "act nice" to them, as if anyone's in debt to you for enduring wisdom, understanding, and politeness in this thread. All that I've seen is a repetitive and arrogant nonparticipation in reasonable discussion. Can you empathize with us how infuriating it is when you deceive and consciously evade?
Wow. No.
You need a brain to live precisely because it keeps your body running. A brain is necessary to be considered alive only insofar as your cells would die without one. But your rank of human being is not dependant upon the existence of gray matter.
That is not what I'm saying at all. Thanks for playing.
I don't care if you act nice to me, I care if you read my goddam posts and actually respond to what I'm saying.
One human cell.
A species is not defined by its organs.
Are these part of the definition for human?
An amoeba, too, is alive.
You say "happens to be" as if it was an accident.
Also, in what way is its suffering inevitable?
Ah, I understand.
I disagree with it too, since, as I've said, it'd evidently incomplete.
Honestly, I do see the point of you argument. However, it's not wholly relevant to mine (nor mine wholly relevant to yours) since my point had more to do with the moral objection against terminating a life cycle.
Okay, I agree. However, I think it needs to be noted that the changes a fetus undergoes are maturational and logically inevitable, rather than spontaneous and transformative like the changes a gamete goes through.
That's not correct, actually. A cell does have a certain life cycle, and it is a cellular life cycle - for instance, most normal cells die after about seven years or so. The life cycle of a sperm cell does not include maturing into a fetus. A sperm or an ovum is not the beginning of a human life cycle - a zygote is. That is the whole thrust of my argument. Some say that a gamete is "intended" to become a zygote, but I contend with that because:
1) The "intent" is constructed abstractly - there is no actual "intent," nor anyone to intend it.
2) "Intent" does not constitute logical, maturational inevitability - by inevitability, I do not mean that all fetuses (or all organisms) inevitably mature into infants unless we stop them, since disease or some other problem could arise to halt the maturational process. What I mean is that is that the maturation is a logical, natural, inherent, and eventual part of the development process of a zygote, and that development is self-maintained.
I want to make sure that this is cleared up: my argument doesn't have anything to do with degree of "help required." My claim was that the "help" needed to create a zygote out of two gametes, and the "help" required to simply not terminate the zygote, are being illogically conflated in the first place. The difference isn't one of degrees.
Understandable, since we are most probably using slightly different moral systems.
My point was that one of the reasons we find it undesirable (a tragedy) for a human's life to be ended is because that person's chance at life is now gone, and that the person he or she might have been now will never be allowed to live. If a zygote is a part of the natural development cycle of a human being (which it is), then terminating the zygote has those same consequences.
I'll make three distinctions between types of "people" - in this example we have theoretical people, determined people, and defined people. A defined person is a person who exists and who has observable and definable qualities - that is, she is here, now, and can be met, spoken to, etc. A determined person is someone who we may not have any details about, someone whose qualities may not be observable, and whose actual form has yet to be defined - but the person's existence has been determined, he or she is "real," so to speak. In this example, the person has not been defined, but their existence is determined - imminent. A theoretical person is one who could feasibly exist, but they're not determined. They're not "coming" and there is no particular reason to think that they will be coming any time soon, if at all.
I am saying that defined people and determined people have a development, they are currently developing. A theoretical person (such as a gamete) is not currently in development. I am saying that if terminating a current development is undesirable (I've already explained why I think that), then that extends to the development of people who aren't necessairly defined yet. However, since a theoretical person isn't even developing, then there is no way of terminating the development anyway.
So, I'm saying that in the case of a zygote, even if a person hasn't been defined, as person has been determined, and in the case of a gamete, a person has been neither defined nor determined, only theorized (as a possibility).
I'll make an attempt at an analogy:
Let us say that if I call my friend and ask him over to my house for a party, he must must change all of his plans for the day to come over. Now, if, once he arrives, I tell him to leave, then his schedule is ruined - he changed all his plans to come, and now his day is completely upset because (let's say) he can't change his plans back, and he changed them for nothing. So the consequence is that his plans for the day have all been ruined.
If I call my friend and invite him over, and he changes his plans for the day to accomodate the party (in this example we presume he can't change them back), then call again in five minutes before he has left, and tell him not to come, we face the same consequence - his plans have been ruined. He's not coming to the party, and he changed his plans for nothing. In essence, the consequence is the same, even though he didn't actually show up at my house yet.
Now, if I never call my friend and invite him, and he never changes his plans because of the party, then the consequence isn't the same. I just failed to invite him - his day wasn't ruined.
The argument I'm seeing (put into terms of the analogy) is that the fact that there needs to be a oustide force to change the situation in the first place (by my inviting him at all) and the fact that he needs help from an outside force to get there after being invited (a ride, a vehicle of his own, etc.), that somehow the consequences of his being asked not to come after already being invited are the same as if he had never been invited.
My point is that if we are to find it desirable/moral in the first place to allow my friend to stay at the party once he arrives so to prevent ruining his day, that it should also be so desirable to allow him to continue coming toward my house should he already have changed his plans to do so. Whether or not it is desirable or moral to invite him in the first place is not the same question as whether or not I should consider trying not to ruin his day, not at all.
A note on the analogy to preempt confusion - I realize that having your active development terminated is not the same as having your "plans ruined", and I realize that a mother is not a vehicle. Analogies usually aren't totally analogous in every respect.
I understand that, but my entire position was a challenge of this moral system.
My position was merely that terminating such an entity is relevant to the same moral concern that is relevant to terminating an already-born human life, because it deals with the same values (according to my moral system and projections, of course).
I do think I see your point, however. It seems that you are saying a theoretically defined person, a "soul" (we can call this soul "Jim"), isn't necessarily missing out on development if the development of a zygote that coudl be tied to it is terminated. In other words, if a zygote hasn't been defined as getting ready to become Jim, then Jim isn't affected by the termination of the zygote. And, if the zygote is preparing to become Jim, and is terminated, Jim may very well get another chance at being born by being tied to some other zygote that is being formed somewhere else in the world two minutes later, thus giving him another chance at living. Does that sound about right?
I disagree that compassion should be defined in terms of suffering and ending of suffering.
My moral point was that denying a zygote (which is inevitably preparing to become a maturized human) a chance to develop, when lack of such denial would allow it to develop unmolested, is discompassionate.
All that I yearn for, for richer or poorer, is to be the peace that you feel.
All that I yearn for, for richer or poorer, is to fill your heart on my own.
Gaymers | Magic Coffeehouse | Little Jar of Mamelon | Natural 20
I don't disagree with any of the claims you make. Killing a one-celled human is, indeed killing a human. But I don't think that killing a one-celled human (incapable of feeling is the important point here) is immoral, which was the original point of this debate.
My other point, that allowing an unwanted fetus to live to the point where it can feel is immoral, stems from my original objective, which is to end suffering. I'll concede that it is a big assumption on my part, but I believe that if a mother does not have the desire or means to care for her child, that child will suffer and probably die anyway. No statistics can prove what a mother is thinking at the time of her child's birth, but I've read plenty of stories about neglected babies dying prematurely. It would have been moral to terminate them immediately after conception and prevent the suffering they went through.
My definition of compassion was taken from dictionary.com.
You can argue that morals have nothing to do with compassion, but not that compassion has nothing to do with the prevention of suffering.
First, feeling pain is simply how organisms that have grown a nervous system react to negative stimuli. In earlier stages, even without a complete nervous system, they are still capable of reacting to negative stimuli. That reaction is still suffering, even if it isn't a nervous suffering. Suffering just means dwelling under the yoke of stress or violence. Every living thing, from tree to ant to human, is capable of suffering by the general definition. If you want to limit the scope of "important enough" suffering only to organisms with functional nervous systems, I have to ask what fundamental distinction exists that can justify that limitation.
Second, if I wanted to, I could take an orphaned infant and kill it instantly. It wouldn't suffer at all. Is this moral, since it avoids suffering?
It's a big load of hogwash on your part. There is a shortage of babies up for adoption.
"
Molecules in the body are usually inert (nonreactive) unless something, usually a kinase, phosphorylates them (attaches a high-energy phosphate bond). The negative high-energy phosphate bond is taken from its supply carrier adenosine (a kind of delivery boy), and placed on the molecule that needs to be energized. The catalysts that accomplish this battery attachment are called kinases. Research by Ru-Rong Ji and Clifford Woolf indicates that mitogen-activated protein kinase is the master switch in Central Pain. MAPK initiates a process that begins to place high-energy phosphate bonds, or batteries, on all kinds of pain neurotransmitters, making pain nerves fire out of control. Such activity could explain why pain perceptions lose their normal characteristics and fire out of control together to create the unusual pain sensations in Central Pain."
He's saying that the organism doesn't feel pain (which is what you are arguing), but that it still suffers. The feeling of pain is not the only way to suffer.
Hey, you! Yeah, you behind the computer screen! You're unconstitutional.
America == Velociraptor
Play IRC mafia. (/join #mafia)
I was about to post these exact words, thank you.
Now we get into a slightly different area of the argument. Asking an unfit mother to give up a child for adoption will certainly benefit the child. But now you are asking a woman (who can be proven as a feeling sentient being) to suffer so that the fetus (which can not be proven as a feeling, sentient being - still assuming that this is moments after conception, of course) can continue to grow. If you don't think that pregnant women suffer, you've probably never been around one. The extra disproportionate weight gained can cause back and foot problems, in addition to the pain of morning sickness and the childbirth process itself.
Keeping with my definitions of moral, compassion and suffer: it is immoral to cause suffering when it can be prevented.
I mean, if some psycho wanted to stretch your genitals wide open and stuff a watermelon into your body through your urethra, but has no intention of killing you, would you have the right to kill this psycho in order to avoid excruciating amounts of pain?
If someone was going to cut off your fingers and stick razor blades in your anus, would it be reasonable to kill that person first?
There is an imposter among us...
Of course it's semantics. You're saying that a zygote is not a "being?" What is a "being?" I believe a zygote is a being. Why wouldn't it be a being?
That's not true at all. "Suffering" has wide meaning, and is often applied not only to living things, but also non-living things (the economy suffered after the stock market plunge, the people suffered under the tyrant, the car suffered slight fender damage, the mechanism suffered extreme torsion, etc.). I'm arguing that "the zygote suffered" is much closer to "the infant suffered" than it is to "the car suffered," because the former two are both a case of an environmental violator inflicting injury or harm, and the affected agent biologically reacting accordingly.
No. They aren't immoral because we don't consider it wrong to cause plants or virii to suffer.
And you're being deceptive with your analysis of the dictionary's entry. In almost every context, it says pain OR something else, like injury or stress.
I'm not keeping with your definitions of "suffer" -- that's the whole point. Let's not talk about weighing levels of suffering until we resolve that.
Besides, you have yet to respond to this:
"Second, if I wanted to, I could take an orphaned infant and kill it instantly. It wouldn't suffer [pain] at all. Is this moral, since it avoids suffering?"
Hey, you! Yeah, you behind the computer screen! You're unconstitutional.
America == Velociraptor
Play IRC mafia. (/join #mafia)
For a more detailed answer: Generally when people look at definitions, it's not "just this one" or "just that one", it's all of them. In this case, number 2 can be applied perfectly to the fetus.
Also, I don't think that you are able to determine which one is used most often, since people talk about non-living things suffering all the time.
Also, just your attitude that the definition contradicts extremestan, even though it doesn't, really boils my blood.
Hey, you! Yeah, you behind the computer screen! You're unconstitutional.
America == Velociraptor
Play IRC mafia. (/join #mafia)
What about a "sentience?" I would agree that a zygote is not have a sentience. But, of course, I wouldn't say that being too underdeveloped to have a sentience yet nullifies the moral value of a human being.
No, that would be equivocation by using two different contexts of the word "attractive." I'm using a single context: suffering is sustaining pain, injury, stress, punishment, loss or death. The "or" means that it doesn't have to be all of those at once. Now, it's true that when many people think of suffering, they think of pain. But I'm pointing out that pain is simply a certain kind, among many kinds of biological reactive mechanisms in the face of suffering.
What is the meaningful, moral distinction between the two? Your family stared at you in horror, emotionally offended at the very notion, but unable to give you the words which you can, in turn, give to me, to explain why, fundamentally, if "A" is an organism undergoing biological injury or loss without the function to process that stimulus as conscious pain, and "B" is an organism undergoing biological injury or loss with the function to process that stimulus as conscious pain, A's predicament is morally dismissable and B's predicament is morally abhorrent.
I've explicitly said, earlier in this thread, perhaps even more than once, that more than one Dasein can arise from what was once a single Dasein. If we're defining Dasein to be the physical faculties of environmental perception, then it, to me, is synonymous with sentience. Perhaps that's where the confusion comes from (although I still believe that Heidegger's Dasein is the contents of the metaphysical zone that is not the environment, and that it's not a physical system that develops).
Let's use the term "undergo" instead of "experience." I was careful to avoid the word "experience," since I figured that your definition of it necessitated sentience, while mine is more broad.
"Basic" awareness doesn't need a nervous system. On a basic level, anything that responds to stimuli is aware of that stimuli. On "the most basic possible level" of awareness a tree, for instance, indicates its awareness of some kind of problem (like invading insects) by reacting to certain stimuli with the appropriate reaction (sap). A non-biological example would be visual pattern recognition software being aware of an intruder through storing and processing its given input.
This isn't "figurative" awareness. This isn't some metaphor. This is what awareness is on its most basic level, without poetic "humancentric" imputations.
Yeah, denotates transcribed for the purpose of reference really aren't going to be sufficient for an argument in which the relevancy of such terms is going to be so closely examined.
I am seriously wondering what it is with this thread and the irrelevant, off-beat responses. For one, I did not claim, imply, or otherwise contend that morals have nothing to do with compassion, and in fact, I made clear when I was defining my moral system earlier that compassion does have to do with morality. Secondly, I did not say (imply, or othewise contend) that compassion has nothing to do with suffering of the prevention of suffering - I said compassion should not be defined in terms of suffering. Suffering and its prevention are not enough to adequately define compassion.
In context of the moral system you proposed, I can see your point, since you defined morality as specifically having to do with states of experience (such as "hurt" and "help"), and as I've already stated and explained, I don't think that moral system is sufficient.
All that I yearn for, for richer or poorer, is to be the peace that you feel.
All that I yearn for, for richer or poorer, is to fill your heart on my own.
Gaymers | Magic Coffeehouse | Little Jar of Mamelon | Natural 20
I assert that the English language uses certain patterns which structure a "subject" and an "object" and place them in relation to one another.
I assert that the list of human endeavors includes such things as science, religion, metaphysics, ethics and philosophy.
I assert that each of these, seek "truth" in some form.
I assert that there are epistemological problems, problems of meta-ethics, and problems of ethics assumed in the very framework of any question of morals. What I mean to say, is the the semantics of the word "moral" varies radically based on the approach to knowing, the role of reason in ethical judgments, and the meaning of ethical terms themselves.
I assert that without first establishing what it means to be moral, one simply cannot affirm or deny the morality of any given act.
I believe that any attempt to answer this question presupposes moral realism. To affirm or deny that something is moral is to assume the existence of objective moral truths, a discussion of the objective morality of an action has no meaning in moral arealism.
Unless there can be shown to exist an a priori foundation of knowledge, from which a comprehensive system of testable theories can describe what is called "moral" then I will assert that any question of morals is not and cannot be transformed into a question of science.
To clarify the above, I am saying I personally believe that questions of morals are not fundamentally scientific questions, that one cannot gain moral knowledge by the same means as one gains scientific knowledge. This is a rejection of logical positivism.
Even more simply, what ought to be done cannot simply be derived by what is.
Additionally I am saying that I personally answer this question from a perspective of ethical intuitionism and that I reject the following approaches to ethics:
ethical egoism
hedonistic utilitarianism
ideal utilitarianism
In summary, I have to this point concluded that the meaning of the question "is a given act moral" means to me "does a given act, after cogent and deliberate reflection on the situation, accord with the most significant duties proscribed by the moral convictions held by the actor?"
Examples of such duties which may come to bear in such a situation as abortion are the moral duties of beneficence and nonmaleficence. This list is by no means exhaustive of the duties that come to bear, however it represents what I believe are the more significant duties.
I acknowledge that by definition, the duty of nonmaleficence perceived by the actor may be diminished by their understanding of meaning of the term "other".
While it is a significant question, "How are we to know the other?" I assert that this particular problem, while embedded in the scope of the question, is ultimately not one which has a single objective answer.
I affirm that abortion is moral exactly and precisely to the degree which the mother perceives it to be congruent with her moral duty, after careful and reasoned reflection.
But we weren't saying "on all levels," we were talking about the "most basic possible level" of awareness. I'm sure that my basic uses of the terms "awareness" and "suffering" make you, and probably many people, uneasy. That's because our common usage of the terms are nearly always in the context of a mature human. We take the basic meanings and poeticize them.
The system is aware of an intruder. Dave attained a higher awareness.
The forest suffered heavy logging. Jill suffered under her cancer.
A zygote is a human organism. Ryan accepted his failings, because he felt that's what made him human.
The living bacteria multiplied startlingly. Now, Theresa felt, she was living!
Intuitive definitions change over time, but in semantic debate, you have to ask yourself why you'd apply the term "suffering" to an organism that reacts to duress nervously, and wouldn't apply the term "suffering" to an organism that reacts to duress in a different way. "Why? Because I asked my family and they were offended at the very thought of it!" is not a rational answer to the question. Neither is "Why? Because I think most people don't feel that way." I'm asking why the pain reaction is morally significant and other forms of reaction to duress are morally insignificant. I'm asking why you and your family think that way, rationally. Give me reasons why a difference in how an organism processes input really matters, without answering, "because me and my kin have intuitively trumped up the definition of suffering to exclude anything other than nervous processes."
Is the "point" of the term "awareness" to only apply to humans after birth? If so, then I suppose awareness truly doesn't apply to a fetus or zygote or computer. Likewise, if the "point" of the term "suffering" is only to qualify circumstances a nervous organism undergoes, then there's not much I can do about it, is there?