"We have apparent choice" =/= "We have free will"
"We have free will" could be false.
No it can't. You agreed to (and in fact, posted) the definition of free will as: "the apparent human ability to make choices that are not externally determined."
"We have apparent choice" is precisely "we have free will" by that definition.
No, because I also said that God creating U#581 would be "external determination" for the purposes of that definition.
Don't forget the last part of that definition.
Even if we have "apparent choice", it isn't free will if God made U#581.
If you're trying to catch me being inconsistent, you're not going to.
I have been very careful about what I say here.
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Thanks to Xenphire @ Inkfox for the amazing new sig
“Thus strangely are our souls constructed, and by slight ligaments
are we bound to prosperity and ruin.”
― Mary Shelley, Frankenstein
"We have apparent choice" =/= "We have free will"
"We have free will" could be false.
No it can't. You agreed to (and in fact, posted) the definition of free will as: "the apparent human ability to make choices that are not externally determined."
"We have apparent choice" is precisely "we have free will" by that definition.
No, because I also said that God creating U#581 would be "external determination" for the purposes of that definition.
Don't forget the last part of that definition.
Even if we have "apparent choice", it isn't free will if God made U#581.
If you're trying to catch me being inconsistent, you're not going to.
I have been very careful about what I say here.
Oh, then you misinterpreted the definition. Allow me to help adding math parentheses (it's how I'd view this).
"the apparent (human ability to make (choices that are not externally determined))."
The word apparent applies to the whole sentence. It is apparent that humans have the ability to make choices that are not externally determined.
The definition should not be read like this:
"(the apparent (human ability to make choices)) that are not externally determined."
EDIT: It's like "that are not externally determined" is just a modifier for the word "choices." Since the word "apparent" is at the beginning, it considers everything after it. I'm not sure if I'm explaining this well enough.
EDIT2: Again with math language:
It appears as though humans can do X.
X = make choices that are not externally determined.
That's not how I read it, but then, I could be wrong and maybe I have misinterpreted that definition. Which, would of course lead to some confusion.
If I have it wrong I'm sorry. I hope you understand what I actually mean when I say it though.
I always meant it in a way that put the parenthesis around the last half, and not the first.
The apparent human ability to make choices (that are not externally determined).
So I agreed that we have an apparent human ability to make choices, it certainly appears that way, but that because it would fail the second part (they are externally determined), it would not be free will.
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Thanks to Xenphire @ Inkfox for the amazing new sig
“Thus strangely are our souls constructed, and by slight ligaments
are we bound to prosperity and ruin.”
― Mary Shelley, Frankenstein
For the record, I agree with you on philosophy. It's not free will if our "choices" are determined by something else, regardless of whether it appears like we have a choice. I just read that definition far differently than you did.
I think I'd have worded it like this:
"the apparent human ability to make choices, unless those choices were determined externally."
Actually, I don't know what the word "apparent" does in that sentence anymore.
But basically: Foreknowledge at creation, or as Crashing said, any infallible predictability of future decisions invalidates free will.
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"[Screw] you and the green you ramped in on." - My EDH battle cry. If I had one. Which I don't.
I did NOT say that God created a Jim with free will.
Please, whatever you do, do NOT put words in my mouth.
I have been extremely careful choosing my words here.
Well then no, of course Jim doesn't have free will. I mean, obviously. How could a person made without free will have free will?
That's not what we're discussing. The entire point of the thread is regarding a person who has free will. That was stated in the OP.
Crafting a scenario in which a person doesn't have free will and saying that person does not have free will... I mean, yes, correct, that person does not. That doesn't say anything about the scenario InfinityAlarm is discussing, which involves a person with free will.
This is pretty much how free will coexists with determinism too. From your arguments, I get the idea that you think determinism somehow takes away choice. That's not the case. It 'sees' what will happen in the same way God does; it observes what will be chosen.
No, determinism does take away choice.
Maybe we're dealing with two definitions of the word "determinism," so let me clarify what I mean when I say it:
Determinism means only one outcome was ever possible. I don't mean only one outcome results. I mean only one outcome was ever possible in the first place. Thus, when someone is presented with a red ball and a blue ball, and takes the blue ball, it is because it is impossible for them to do otherwise. There is no choice involved, because there was never another possible option. That red ball is extraneous information, the blue ball was the only possible course.
All human actions become as an aspirin dissolving in water, or as an apple influenced by gravity. They proceed as they do because there is no other possible outcome.
It's like if we're driving on a perfectly straight, one-way road. Would you call that road a fork? No, you wouldn't, because a fork is when the road diverges into two paths. Would you call that road an intersection? No, because an intersection is when multiple paths cross. This is just a straight road. There's no choice involved, because there's only one possible direction to go (well, you can stop or reverse, but I'm trying to make a point here).
A universe with choice is entirely different. In a universe with choice, there are multiple possible outcomes, and the one a person goes with is based on a decision that person makes amongst multiple options. When a person is presented with a red and a blue ball, and takes the blue ball, it's because the person chose to take the blue ball. That person had the option of taking one or the other, but the decision came from him to choose the blue ball. People proceed as they do because they have agency, which allows them to select what will result.
The other options are randomness (there is no "why" to things, nothing is dependent on the state before, causality doesn't exist), and the many-worlds scenario (all possible states are actualized).
To me, it seems like you're complaining that a weather forecaster (assuming weather forecasters had perfect predictive capabilities, which, you know)
Haha, yeah...
controls the weather, when instead they're making a prediction about coming weather based on the current state.
No, see, that's the thing. Determinism is the state in which the person is being controlled. See above.
Highroller, what has been confusing me about your posts concerns the scenario of U#581 and Jim choosing Q.
Suppose that God creates U#581 in which Jim chooses Q. Do you think it is possible for Jim to choose "not Q"?
This seems definitionally impossible. Jim seems to literally have as much choice as a robot in whether or to do Q. What's the important distinction between God creating U#581 in which Jim cannot choose "not Q", and IcecreamMan installing program #581 on a robot named Jim-bot in which Jim-bot cannot choose "not Q".
Is the difference that Jim's "will" determines Q, but Jim-bot's doesn't? You told me on page 3 that "will" is something along the lines of "processes of decision-making internal to the individual in question". I have difficulty seeing how the two scenarios are significantly different. Either both decision-making processes are inside the individuals (Jim's brain, Jim-bot's cpu), or they are external to the individuals (God crafted the universe in such a way that Jim will choose Q, IcecreamMan writes the programming in such a way that Jim-bot will choose Q).
I take it you feel these situations are different? Could you explain what the significant difference is between them?
I don't even know what IcecreamMan is trying to accomplish with his Jim scenario. If he's arguing that if God made a person without free will, that person would not have free will.
But that's not what this thread was made to discuss at all. You're discussing a person with free will. That was one of the assumptions we were supposed to make as detailed in the OP. The question was whether or not God's will could be reconciled with a person who has free will. So I have no idea why he's going on about scenarios in which people don't have free will.
For free will to exist, there must be the following components:
1. The person must have an identity
2. The person must have agency, or will
If these exist, if InfinityAlarm is a person with an independent identity, and has agency, then InfinityAlarm is capable of making choices.
So no, if Jim doesn't have any of the above, then of course he's not capable of making choices. Nothing that he does is coming from, or could possibly come from, him. He's just a puppet God's controlling.
This is not analogous to the above InfinityAlarm scenario.
I do not understand what is vague about "Either everything was prewritten, or it wasn't".
This isn't what's vague. I am not questioning your construction of a universe with a fixed spacetime. The vague bit is this: If "apparent choice" is a shroud of deception over something that's not true, what is that something? If it is meant to stand in contrast to "apparent choice" then let's call it "real choice" -- what is it that distinguishes an apparent choice from a real one?
What property of the universe you ask: The property of being designed-in-completeness. That's the best way I can put it. From beginning to end it's already made. Possibilities, choices, the do not exist. Everything is going as planned.
No, I meant what property distinguishes the different kinds of choice. "the difference between an apparent choice and one that is not merely apparent would be _________________" <-- fill in this blank
I always meant it in a way that put the parenthesis around the last half, and not the first.
The apparent human ability to make choices (that are not externally determined).
English grammar actually yields only one unique way of parsing the phrase "the apparent human ability to make choices that are not externally determined." The adjective clause "that are not externally determined" can only modify "choices" because of the plural verb form "are." So it's the choices that are not externally determined, and the ability to make those undetermined choices that is apparent.
So once again, even if we're in U#528 with a fixed spacetime, as long as Jim's mind gives him the sensation of making undetermined choices, he has free will under this definition. The actual interesting questions are still being skirted.
-------------------------------------
Let me try to introduce a new Socratic line of inquiry that might aid in understanding. Suppose we observe Jim approaching a left/right fork in the road, and when he gets to the fork he takes the left path. Suppose you're allowed to run any tests you want to on Jim or the universe.
- How could you test whether or not Jim made a choice (apparent or otherwise)?
- If you determined he made a choice, how would you distinguish between a merely-apparent choice and whatever you think it is that constitutes a choice that is not merely apparent?
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A limit of time is fixed for thee
Which if thou dost not use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind
It will go and thou wilt go, never to return.
This is pretty much how free will coexists with determinism too. From your arguments, I get the idea that you think determinism somehow takes away choice. That's not the case. It 'sees' what will happen in the same way God does; it observes what will be chosen.
No, determinism does take away choice.
Maybe we're dealing with two definitions of the word "determinism," so let me clarify what I mean when I say it:
Determinism means only one outcome was ever possible. I don't mean only one outcome results. I mean only one outcome was ever possible in the first place. Thus, when someone is presented with a red ball and a blue ball, and takes the blue ball, it is because it is impossible for them to do otherwise. There is no choice involved, because there was never another possible option. That red ball is extraneous information, the blue ball was the only possible course.
All human actions become as an aspirin dissolving in water, or as an apple influenced by gravity. They proceed as they do because there is no other possible outcome.
I understand your definition, but I disagree with the idea that it precludes free will. I perceive determinism as more akin to perfect forecasting, able to predict free-willed decisions. Given perfect knowledge of the past and current state of the universe, it can be predicted what will happen next.
The reason I don't see this as removing human agency is that these predictions are based on the state of mind of the humans involved. Determinism to me is descriptive, not prescriptive. Being able to predict the outcome of a choice is not the same thing as dictating that outcome.
I think that there's something in your use of the word 'possible' that bothers me too, but I can't put my finger on it at the moment.
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Quote from MD »
I am willing to bet my collection that Frozen and Solid are not on the same card. For example, Frozen Tomb and Solid Wall.
If Frozen Solid is not reprinted, you are aware that I'm quoting you in my sig for eternity?
I did NOT say that God created a Jim with free will.
Please, whatever you do, do NOT put words in my mouth.
I have been extremely careful choosing my words here.
Well then no, of course Jim doesn't have free will. I mean, obviously. How could a person made without free will have free will?
I also did NOT say that God made a Jim without free will.
I ONLY say that God made U#581 where Jim does Q.
Then, I compare that to the definition of free will that I posted.
Is the scenario compatible with free will?
Conclusion: No.
So either Jim has free will, and #1 (omniscient infallible foreknowledge) is false.
Or #1 is true, and Jim has no free will.
That's not what we're discussing. The entire point of the thread is regarding a person who has free will. That was stated in the OP.
I already answered the OP adequately, go back to page 1 and two.
Crafting a scenario in which a person doesn't have free will and saying that person does not have free will... I mean, yes, correct, that person does not. That doesn't say anything about the scenario InfinityAlarm is discussing, which involves a person with free will.
I only crafted a scenario, then checked to see if it was compatible with free will, it wasn't.
I already answered IA's questions back on page one.
YOU'RE the one who came in here with your erroneous compatibilism.
I came back to stop you from spreading your bad reasoning to others.
This is pretty much how free will coexists with determinism too. From your arguments, I get the idea that you think determinism somehow takes away choice. That's not the case. It 'sees' what will happen in the same way God does; it observes what will be chosen.
No, determinism does take away choice.
Maybe we're dealing with two definitions of the word "determinism," so let me clarify what I mean when I say it:
Determinism means only one outcome was ever possible. I don't mean only one outcome results. I mean only one outcome was ever possible in the first place. Thus, when someone is presented with a red ball and a blue ball, and takes the blue ball, it is because it is impossible for them to do otherwise. There is no choice involved, because there was never another possible option. That red ball is extraneous information, the blue ball was the only possible course.
All human actions become as an aspirin dissolving in water, or as an apple influenced by gravity. They proceed as they do because there is no other possible outcome.
It's like if we're driving on a perfectly straight, one-way road. Would you call that road a fork? No, you wouldn't, because a fork is when the road diverges into two paths. Would you call that road an intersection? No, because an intersection is when multiple paths cross. This is just a straight road. There's no choice involved, because there's only one possible direction to go (well, you can stop or reverse, but I'm trying to make a point here).
A universe with choice is entirely different. In a universe with choice, there are multiple possible outcomes, and the one a person goes with is based on a decision that person makes amongst multiple options. When a person is presented with a red and a blue ball, and takes the blue ball, it's because the person chose to take the blue ball. That person had the option of taking one or the other, but the decision came from him to choose the blue ball. People proceed as they do because they have agency, which allows them to select what will result.
The other options are randomness (there is no "why" to things, nothing is dependent on the state before, causality doesn't exist), and the many-worlds scenario (all possible states are actualized).
To me, it seems like you're complaining that a weather forecaster (assuming weather forecasters had perfect predictive capabilities, which, you know)
Haha, yeah...
controls the weather, when instead they're making a prediction about coming weather based on the current state.
No, see, that's the thing. Determinism is the state in which the person is being controlled. See above.
Highroller, what has been confusing me about your posts concerns the scenario of U#581 and Jim choosing Q.
Suppose that God creates U#581 in which Jim chooses Q. Do you think it is possible for Jim to choose "not Q"?
This seems definitionally impossible. Jim seems to literally have as much choice as a robot in whether or to do Q. What's the important distinction between God creating U#581 in which Jim cannot choose "not Q", and IcecreamMan installing program #581 on a robot named Jim-bot in which Jim-bot cannot choose "not Q".
Is the difference that Jim's "will" determines Q, but Jim-bot's doesn't? You told me on page 3 that "will" is something along the lines of "processes of decision-making internal to the individual in question". I have difficulty seeing how the two scenarios are significantly different. Either both decision-making processes are inside the individuals (Jim's brain, Jim-bot's cpu), or they are external to the individuals (God crafted the universe in such a way that Jim will choose Q, IcecreamMan writes the programming in such a way that Jim-bot will choose Q).
I take it you feel these situations are different? Could you explain what the significant difference is between them?
I don't even know what IcecreamMan is trying to accomplish with his Jim scenario. If he's arguing that if God made a person without free will, that person would not have free will.
see above.
But that's not what this thread was made to discuss at all. You're discussing a person with free will. That was one of the assumptions we were supposed to make as detailed in the OP. The question was whether or not God's will could be reconciled with a person who has free will. So I have no idea why he's going on about scenarios in which people don't have free will.
I'm trying to make you see your compatibilism is wrong.
For free will to exist, there must be the following components:
1. The person must have an identity
This is not a requirement of free will.
2. The person must have agency, or will
This is.
If these exist, if InfinityAlarm is a person with an independent identity, and has agency, then InfinityAlarm is capable of making choices.
IA can have identity, and still not have free will.
A robot with a unique identity is still a robot.
So no, if Jim doesn't have any of the above, then of course he's not capable of making choices. Nothing that he does is coming from, or could possibly come from, him. He's just a puppet God's controlling.
Jim has identity, just no choice. he is doing only what he was created to do.
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Thanks to Xenphire @ Inkfox for the amazing new sig
“Thus strangely are our souls constructed, and by slight ligaments
are we bound to prosperity and ruin.”
― Mary Shelley, Frankenstein
This is pretty much how free will coexists with determinism too. From your arguments, I get the idea that you think determinism somehow takes away choice. That's not the case. It 'sees' what will happen in the same way God does; it observes what will be chosen.
No, determinism does take away choice.
Maybe we're dealing with two definitions of the word "determinism," so let me clarify what I mean when I say it:
Determinism means only one outcome was ever possible. I don't mean only one outcome results. I mean only one outcome was ever possible in the first place. Thus, when someone is presented with a red ball and a blue ball, and takes the blue ball, it is because it is impossible for them to do otherwise. There is no choice involved, because there was never another possible option. That red ball is extraneous information, the blue ball was the only possible course.
All human actions become as an aspirin dissolving in water, or as an apple influenced by gravity. They proceed as they do because there is no other possible outcome.
I understand your definition, but I disagree with the idea that it precludes free will. I perceive determinism as more akin to perfect forecasting, able to predict free-willed decisions. Given perfect knowledge of the past and current state of the universe, it can be predicted what will happen next.
The reason I don't see this as removing human agency is that these predictions are based on the state of mind of the humans involved. Determinism to me is descriptive, not prescriptive. Being able to predict the outcome of a choice is not the same thing as dictating that outcome.
I think that there's something in your use of the word 'possible' that bothers me too, but I can't put my finger on it at the moment.
Perhaps I've not made myself clear: I've never stated that the ability to predict removes human agency.
I'm saying that what defines determinism is that humans don't have agency, as opposed to a scenario in which human beings do, that scenario being the free will scenario.
Ability to predict has absolutely no bearing on free will. It's extraneous information.
In fact, I feel that free will in fact requires the ability to predict it, as knowledge of a person enables one to anticipate what that person will do — indeed, we witness this in day-to-day life — and in free will, a person's actions stem from choices, which come from that person. Thus, with perfect knowledge of a person, one should be able to predict that person's actions given perfect knowledge of the scenario that person is in.
I also did NOT say that God made a Jim without free will.
... You said that God did not make Jim with free will. You also said one has free will or one does not, there's no "games with the excluded middle."
Quote from IcecreamMan80 »
I do not enjoy playing games in the excluded middle. We either have free will or we don't.
So which is it then? Does Jim have free will, or doesn't he?
I ONLY say that God made U#581 where Jim does Q.
And I will repeat the question I've been asking: Does Jim do Q because he chooses to, or does Jim do Q because God's making him do Q and he has no agency of his own?
You're trying to conflate the two. They cannot be conflated. As you say, one either has free will or he doesn't.
Then, I compare that to the definition of free will that I posted.
Is the scenario compatible with free will?
Conclusion: No.
Correct, if God creates a person without free will, that person does not have free will.
Notice how that totally ignores the purpose of the thread.
InfinityAlarm's intent with this thread was to assume two premises to be true:
A. Human beings have free will
B. God has a divine plan
And to see whether these are compatible or incompatible.
Saying, "In this scenario in which God has a divine plan and Jim has no free will, Jim has no free will. Therefore, no free will," does not address the intent of this thread, because you ignored Premise A.
Imagine two cooks arguing whether a recipe would produce a loaf of bread or a piece of flatbread, and one cook makes the recipe but omits the yeast that the recipe calls for, then looks at the result and says, "See? Flatbread!" Well yes, of course it's flat, but that's because he omitted the key ingredient: the yeast! The very thing that makes the bread rise in the first place!
So too have you omitted Jim's free will, the very thing we need to see whether free will and God's plan are compatible.
I already answered the OP adequately
No, you haven't. Page 1 is where we go started on this whole Jim thing.
Crafting a scenario in which a person doesn't have free will and saying that person does not have free will... I mean, yes, correct, that person does not. That doesn't say anything about the scenario InfinityAlarm is discussing, which involves a person with free will.
I only crafted a scenario, then checked to see if it was compatible with free will, it wasn't.
Of course it wasn't, because you changed one of the core premises to make it so Jim never had free will to begin with.
Jim has identity, just no choice. he is doing only what he was created to do.
Right, because you changed Premise A, which is one of the core premises of this thread, by making it so Jim does not have free will.
Which is not analogous to what we're talking about.
I also did NOT say that God made a Jim without free will.
... You said that God did not make Jim with free will. You also said one has free will or one does not, there's no "games with the excluded middle."
Right.
You must have skipped the part of my post above where I say
Then, I compare that to the definition of free will that I posted.
Is the scenario compatible with free will?
Conclusion: No. So either Jim has free will, and #1 (omniscient infallible foreknowledge) is false.
Or #1 is true, and Jim has no free will.
Quote from IcecreamMan80 »
I do not enjoy playing games in the excluded middle. We either have free will or we don't.
So which is it then? Does Jim have free will, or doesn't he?
I showed an incompatibility.
I ONLY say that God made U#581 where Jim does Q.
And I will repeat the question I've been asking: Does Jim do Q because he chooses to, or does Jim do Q because God's making him do Q and he has no agency of his own?
If my scenario is all true, than Jim does Q because God made him to.
No free will.
Or, #1 is false, God created U without infallible foreknowledge, and Jim has free will.
You're trying to conflate the two. They cannot be conflated. As you say, one either has free will or he doesn't.
Correct.
I'm not going to allow your misunderstanding of things trip me up.
Then, I compare that to the definition of free will that I posted.
Is the scenario compatible with free will?
Conclusion: No.
Correct, if God creates a person without free will, that person does not have free will.
See the above bold part of what I said which you deliberately skipped over it seems.
Notice how that totally ignores the purpose of the thread.
I didn't ignore the purpose of the thread. I already answered IA's OP.
InfinityAlarm's intent with this thread was to assume two premises to be true:
A. Human beings have free will
B. God has a divine plan
And I answered that adequately.
It is possible for God to have plans for the universe that are not affected by the free choices of people.
And to see whether these are compatible or incompatible.
Saying, "In this scenario in which God has a divine plan and Jim has no free will, Jim has no free will. Therefore, no free will," does not address the intent of this thread, because you ignored Premise A.
No, I didn't.
Go back and read my responses to IA. I addressed the OP.
Imagine two cooks arguing whether a recipe would produce a loaf of bread or a piece of flatbread, and one cook makes the recipe but omits the yeast that the recipe calls for, then looks at the result and says, "See? Flatbread!" Well yes, of course it's flat, but that's because he omitted the key ingredient: the yeast! The very thing that makes the bread rise in the first place!
So too have you omitted Jim's free will, the very thing we need to see whether free will and God's plan are compatible.
Sigh, sure buddy, but you're wrong again.
I already answered the OP adequately
No, you haven't. Page 1 is where we go started on this whole Jim thing.
Then it was page two or whatever, but I still addressed the Op adequately.
You have not, because you have consistently failed to answer the most important question:
Why does Jim perform Q?
Does he do so because he chooses to, or does he do so because God makes him do so?
Because that would change the outcome, just like bread having yeast will be very different from bread not having yeast.
You seem to think you can just leave this question unanswered:
I did NOT say that God created a Jim with free will.
I also did NOT say that God made a Jim without free will.
I ONLY say that God made U#581 where Jim does Q.
But in fact it's the most important detail. You're in a debate about free will here, whether or not Jim has free will is important.
If my scenario is all true, than Jim does Q because God made him to.
No free will.
Right, which means your conclusion is "If Jim has no free will, then he does not have free will."
While this logically functions, it violates Premise A: Human beings have free will, as noted in the OP of this thread.
Do you now see the problem?
InfinityAlarm's intent with this thread was to assume two premises to be true:
A. Human beings have free will
B. God has a divine plan
And I answered that adequately.
It is possible for God to have plans for the universe that are not affected by the free choices of people.
He's not talking about plans for the sun going supernova, IcecreamMan. He's clearly talking about plans for people's actions.
Did you read the OP or just skim it?
I already answered the OP adequately
No, you haven't. Page 1 is where we go started on this whole Jim thing.
Then it was page two or whatever, but I still addressed the Op adequately.
... So you don't know which page it was? Why don't you find this post then?
EDIT: See, page 1 is where you start on this Jim scenario that, as we later see, violates the thread's premise in the first place. You cannot be said to adequately address IA's question when you consistently ignore Premise A.
This is pretty much how free will coexists with determinism too. From your arguments, I get the idea that you think determinism somehow takes away choice. That's not the case. It 'sees' what will happen in the same way God does; it observes what will be chosen.
No, determinism does take away choice.
Maybe we're dealing with two definitions of the word "determinism," so let me clarify what I mean when I say it:
Determinism means only one outcome was ever possible. I don't mean only one outcome results. I mean only one outcome was ever possible in the first place. Thus, when someone is presented with a red ball and a blue ball, and takes the blue ball, it is because it is impossible for them to do otherwise. There is no choice involved, because there was never another possible option. That red ball is extraneous information, the blue ball was the only possible course.
All human actions become as an aspirin dissolving in water, or as an apple influenced by gravity. They proceed as they do because there is no other possible outcome.
I understand your definition, but I disagree with the idea that it precludes free will. I perceive determinism as more akin to perfect forecasting, able to predict free-willed decisions. Given perfect knowledge of the past and current state of the universe, it can be predicted what will happen next.
The reason I don't see this as removing human agency is that these predictions are based on the state of mind of the humans involved. Determinism to me is descriptive, not prescriptive. Being able to predict the outcome of a choice is not the same thing as dictating that outcome.
I think that there's something in your use of the word 'possible' that bothers me too, but I can't put my finger on it at the moment.
Perhaps I've not made myself clear: I've never stated that the ability to predict removes human agency.
I'm saying that what defines determinism is that humans don't have agency, as opposed to a scenario in which human beings do, that scenario being the free will scenario.
Ability to predict has absolutely no bearing on free will. It's extraneous information.
In fact, I feel that free will in fact requires the ability to predict it, as knowledge of a person enables one to anticipate what that person will do — indeed, we witness this in day-to-day life — and in free will, a person's actions stem from choices, which come from that person. Thus, with perfect knowledge of a person, one should be able to predict that person's actions given perfect knowledge of the scenario that person is in.
But that is determinism. All determinism does is make that prediction. It's not taking away the agency, it's describing it.
You say that in determinism there are no other possible choices than the one taken, therefore no free will, but you also say that when an omniscient being knows what you will choose, there are other possible choices. Determinism doesn't force a choice, it just 'knows what you will choose'.
Would you define a free willed choice as affected by the chooser's beliefs, motivations, desires? Under determinism they still are. Can you describe a situation where a particular deterministic choice (for the sake of argument, let's not quibble about whether you think determinism precludes choice; you know what I mean) and a free willed (according to you) choice differ, and that difference isn't due to the observer having less-than-perfect information?
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I am willing to bet my collection that Frozen and Solid are not on the same card. For example, Frozen Tomb and Solid Wall.
If Frozen Solid is not reprinted, you are aware that I'm quoting you in my sig for eternity?
Perhaps I missed the post, but Icecream Man, each post I've read from you dismisses the OP's given statement. Is there a post where you have argued from the vantage that free will and God both exist?
I can appreciate your view, but even if you did adequately answer the OP somewhere, the debate has become irrelevant to the OP and it retreads discussion found in numerous other threads. I'd rather read discussion regarding the OP. I am curious to see what people who actually believe the OP's given think.
Perhaps I missed the post, but Icecream Man, each post I've read from you dismisses the OP's given statement. Is there a post where you have argued from the vantage that free will and God both exist?
I can appreciate your view, but even if you did adequately answer the OP somewhere, the debate has become irrelevant to the OP and it retreads discussion found in numerous other threads. I'd rather read discussion regarding the OP. I am curious to see what people who actually believe the OP's given think.
Well, thread drift does happen (and at one point the OP gave their blessing to the tangent, I seem to recall).
However, since you ask: I'm an atheist, so I'm speaking theoretically, but whether a divine plan and free will are compatible rather hinges on your definition of free will (and to an extent, divine plan).
- For example, if God creates a universe in which his plan plays out as per earlier discussion in this thread, as the free willed actions of its inhabitants are along the lines he intended, then sits back and watches, He has no need to influence the world beyond its starting conditions. Divine plan + free will: compatible.
- If God creates a universe and then messes with the minds of people in it (such as Pharaohs) to achieve his divine plan, then he's impinging on free will. Divine plan + free will: incompatible.
- If God creates a universe and doesn't mess with the minds of people in it, but feels free to drop natural disasters, or send the Angel of Death around for firstborns, to stop people deviating from his plan, I'd call that duress. Whether that interferes with the letter of free will, I'm not sure, but I think it does violence to the spirit.
But that is determinism. All determinism does is make that prediction. It's not taking away the agency, it's describing it.
You say that in determinism there are no other possible choices than the one taken, therefore no free will,
No other possible options. To call them choices is misleading. But I know what you mean.
but you also say that when an omniscient being knows what you will choose, there are other possible choices. Determinism doesn't force a choice, it just 'knows what you will choose'.
So you call both those scenarios — let's call them Free Will Scenario and BLOGGLEFLOGGLE Scenario for now — "determinism"? How then do you define "determinism?"
And what is your name for BLOGGLEFLOGGLE? Because BLOGGLEFLOGGLE needs to be distinguishable from Free Will. And I strongly think you're trying to conflate BLOGGLEFLOGGLE with Free Will by saying they're the same thing. They aren't.
Would you define a free willed choice as affected by the chooser's beliefs, motivations, desires?
Yes, because a person's beliefs, motivations, and desires are part of what makes that person that person.
Under determinism they still are. Can you describe a situation where a particular deterministic choice (for the sake of argument, let's not quibble about whether you think determinism precludes choice; you know what I mean) and a free willed (according to you) choice differ, and that difference isn't due to the observer having less-than-perfect information?
Take the ice cream scenario.
If Highroller walks into the ice cream store and gets flavor X because Highroller has agency and input and the selection comes from Highroller, then it is free will.
If Highroller walks into the ice cream store and gets flavor X for reasons other than Highroller's own agency, if Highroller is being controlled to do so, then it is determinism. Or BLOGGLEFLOGGLE.
The key component is whether or not the selection comes from Highroller, whether who Highroller is has any bearing.
Now, for better illustration, let's see what would happen if God decides his divine plan will involve Highroller getting flavor Y.
In the deterministic/BLOGGLEFLOGGLE scenario, God could simply change "Highroller gets X" to "Highroller gets Y," because Highroller isn't actually the one in control anyway. Highroller does not actually have any say as to which ice cream flavor he walks out with, so a simple rewrite is easy. Nothing else needs to change.
In the free will scenario, it's not so simple. If Highroller is presented with exactly the same set of circumstances, he's just going to make the same choice. For Highroller to choose differently, Highroller himself needs to be different. Something needs to be different in order to promote a change in Highroller so that he makes a different choice.
Imagine the deterministic scenario like a video game. In Final Fantasy 1, the Black Mage isn't the one in control, I am, so I can make the Black Mage buy a sword, go back, and change it to the Black Mage buying a staff or whatever.
Actually Final Fantasy 1 is a great example. I don't know if you've played it, but the characters are blank slates. They have no actual characterization beyond some numbers indicating how hard they can hit or take hits or whatever. So no choice is out of character for them.
Whereas imagine we're writing a story with fully fleshed-out, three-dimensional characters who have distinct and developed personalities. These characters do things because we write that they do. They don't have an independent will from us. But they do have identities and personalities that feel human. And so we can't just write them as doing whatever. We CAN, but something feels wrong.
Have you ever watched a movie or TV show where a character does something totally out of character and you react negatively? You criticize the writer and you say, "Come on, there's no way the character would do that." Same deal. The character doesn't have independent will, it does things based on a writer doing it, and as such we can make Batman give up his life as a vigilante and join the mob as easily as we can make Batman never give up fighting crime. But the former feels totally wrong, doesn't it?
Why? Because the action is not consistent with who the character is. It doesn't come from his personality or identity. And if Batman had independent will or agency, he wouldn't choose the same thing.
- For example, if God creates a universe in which his plan plays out as per earlier discussion in this thread, as the free willed actions of its inhabitants are along the lines he intended, then sits back and watches, He has no need to influence the world beyond its starting conditions. Divine plan + free will: compatible.
- If God creates a universe and then messes with the minds of people in it (such as Pharaohs) to achieve his divine plan, then he's impinging on free will. Divine plan + free will: incompatible.
- If God creates a universe and doesn't mess with the minds of people in it, but feels free to drop natural disasters, or send the Angel of Death around for firstborns, to stop people deviating from his plan, I'd call that duress. Whether that interferes with the letter of free will, I'm not sure, but I think it does violence to the spirit.
I'm pretty sure I agree with this. However, I think it's perfectly fine for God to alter the conditions and actively participate in creation and for there to still be free will.
The relevant issue is whether he's seizing control of someone's mind directly, thus denying them agency, like Pharaoh, or not.
In the free will scenario, it's not so simple. If Highroller is presented with exactly the same set of circumstances, he's just going to make the same choice. For Highroller to choose differently, Highroller himself needs to be different. Something needs to be different in order to promote a change in Highroller so that he makes a different choice.
I agree with a lot of what you said, so I've snipped it.
But the above is pretty much definitionally determinism as I understand it. Under determinism, the same situation will produce the same result; to produce a change, something in the scenario needs to change.
Nondeterminism is where the same scenario can result in different outputs.
Now I'm not sure if we've just agreed on the same thing but with different names, or if we've disagreed. (The wikipedia page on determinism lists several varieties of determinism; I think what you are describing as determinism treads close to fatalism (as they define it) whereas I'm proposing adequate determinism, if that helps.)
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I am willing to bet my collection that Frozen and Solid are not on the same card. For example, Frozen Tomb and Solid Wall.
If Frozen Solid is not reprinted, you are aware that I'm quoting you in my sig for eternity?
In the free will scenario, it's not so simple. If Highroller is presented with exactly the same set of circumstances, he's just going to make the same choice. For Highroller to choose differently, Highroller himself needs to be different. Something needs to be different in order to promote a change in Highroller so that he makes a different choice.
I agree with a lot of what you said, so I've snipped it.
But the above is pretty much definitionally determinism as I understand it. Under determinism, the same situation will produce the same result; to produce a change, something in the scenario needs to change.
Nondeterminism is where the same scenario can result in different outputs.
So are using "determinism" to describe both Free Will and BLOGGLEFLOGGLE?
I don't mind that, provided that you agree that we need to distinguish free will from BLOGGLEFLOGGLE, and if we can find a better word for BLOGGLEFLOGGLE other than BLOGGLEFLOGGLE.
Now I'm not sure if we've just agreed on the same thing but with different names, or if we've disagreed.
I'm not sure about that either to be honest.
(The wikipedia page on determinism lists several varieties of determinism; I think what you are describing as determinism treads close to fatalism (as they define it) whereas I'm proposing adequate determinism, if that helps.)
Jesus tapdancing Christ...
I hate doing it, but I'll repeat myself, again, for everyone, and address the OP yet again as well.
I'll also make it very simple, so HR can stop misrepresenting my arguments.
I believe there is an important difference between "having plans" and "having planned".
The difference between I plan to get married, and my wedding has been planned. The difference between I plan to go to the store, and I went to the store as planned.
It is possible for God to have an uncountable number of plans.
Some of those plans might be affected by human choice, and some might not be.
I plan for people to suffer pain and torture.
Free will would be virtually irrelevant.
No free will - they can still suffer pain and torture. Yay nervous and cardiovascular system!
Free will - they can still suffer pain and torture. Yay nervous and cardiovascular system!
I plan for Adolf Hitler to exterminate Jews, gypsies, and others between 1937 and 1944.
Free will is relevant.
No free will - it happens as planned.
Free will - Momma Hitler has an abortion, or Adolf moves to Fiji at 23 and becomes an opium addict, it doesn't happen according to plan.
Now to the OP.
God can have the kind of plans that allow for free will, and still be an interventionist.
However, I'd add that God intervening adds a level of manipulation. He is pushing choice in a direction, but not making the choice for you. He is adding incentive to make the choices he wishes to see you make.
Would they make the same choice if he had not? Does he answer prayers, or does he only intervene when he feels like it? How much manipulation does it take before you were no longer acting freely?
Etc.
Now, about compatibility.
I do not believe that an omniscient God with infallible foreknowledge creating the Universe knowing everything that would happen, "the end before the beginning" is compatible with free will.
1. God has infallible omniscient foreknowledge
2. The Universe does not yet exist
3. God envisions U#581 where Jim does Q
4. God then creates precisely U#581
5. Because of 1 and 3, Jim doing Q is now necessary, it would
not be U#581 otherwise
According to the definition of free will that I adhere to http://www.thefreedictionary.com/free+will
"The power of making free choices that are unconstrained by external circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will."
The above scenario is not compatible with free will.
My argument is that the above form of Fatalism is not compatible with Free Will.
If 1 and 3 are true, Jim doesn't have free will. Jim does exactly what God created Jim to do. There is no choice, possibilities don't exist. OR
1 and 3 are false, Jim has free will, and he chooses to do Q.
Fatalism is the thesis that human acts occur by necessity and hence are unfree. Theological fatalism is the thesis that infallible foreknowledge of a human act makes the act necessary and hence unfree. If there is a being who knows the entire future infallibly, then no human act is free.
"For any future act you will perform, if some being infallibly believed in the past that the act would occur, there is nothing you can do now about the fact that he believed what he believed since nobody has any control over past events; nor can you make him mistaken in his belief, given that he is infallible. Therefore, there is nothing you can do now about the fact that he believed in a way that cannot be mistaken that you would do what you will do. But if so, you cannot do otherwise than what he believed you would do. And if you cannot do otherwise, you will not perform the act freely."
I have read the "solutions" and I do not believe any of them actually work against (that particular) God's level of Fatalism.
I plan for Adolf Hitler to exterminate Jews, gypsies, and others between 1937 and 1944.
Free will is relevant.
No free will - it happens as planned.
Free will - Momma Hitler has an abortion, or Adolf moves to Fiji at 23 and becomes an opium addict, it doesn't happen according to plan.
No. Free will does not require something not go according to plan. It could go exactly according to plan.
All that's required is that the person acting does so of his volition.
Example: Grant's plan is that he throws a ball at me and I catch it. He yells, "Highroller, catch!" and throws the ball. Highroller catches.
By your logic, Highroller does not have free will. Except this is an invalid conclusion, because just because Highroller acted according to Grant's plan doesn't mean that Highroller wasn't in control of his actions.
Grant's plan not only had no bearing on Highroller having free will, but indeed, free will requires someone with knowledge of Highroller be able to anticipate his actions. So as someone approaches 100% total knowledge of Highroller, his ability to predict Highroller's choices in a given situation should approach 100%.
Now to the OP.
God can have the kind of plans that allow for free will, and still be an interventionist.
We agree here.
However, I'd add that God intervening adds a level of manipulation. He is pushing choice in a direction, but not making the choice for you. He is adding incentive to make the choices he wishes to see you make.
Yes.
Although manipulated choices are still choices. See also: the cereal aisle. No one's forcing you to choose a cereal, but they damn sure are manipulating you by putting certain things at eye level, making boxes bright colors, putting certain numbers in really large font, etc.
Really, this could be said about marketing as a whole.
Now, about compatibility.
I do not believe that an omniscient God with infallible foreknowledge creating the Universe knowing everything that would happen, "the end before the beginning" is compatible with free will.
Whereas I disagree.
It doesn't matter whether or not God knows beforehand what happens. The only thing that matters is whether God gives people free will or whether God is directly controlling them.
In your Jim does Q scenario, since God directly controls Jim into taking Q, then Jim has no free will.
However, the alternative would be Jim does Q because Jim of his own will freely chooses Q.
Now if God sees this beforehand, it still doesn't change the fact that Jim's choosing to do Q, because the reason God sees this beforehand is because Jim chose to do Q. God's vision takes Jim's ability to choose, and his choice, into account.
1. God has infallible omniscient foreknowledge
2. The Universe does not yet exist
3. God envisions U#581 where Jim does Q
4. God then creates precisely U#581
5. Because of 1 and 3, Jim doing Q is now necessary, it would
not be U#581 otherwise
No, that's where you veer off-course.
Once again, if Jim has free will and chooses Q of his own volition, God foreseeing Jim choosing Q does not negate Jim choosing Q. In this scenario, Jim choosing Q is why God foresees Jim choosing Q.
This is completely different from Jim doing Q because God makes Jim do Q. This scenario involves Jim having no free will of his own. He's not doing Q of his own choosing, but instead is doing Q because God said so.
So when you say, "Jim doing Q is now necessary," that does not follow. It would be in the second scenario where Jim has no free will.
However, it's not necessary that Jim do Q in the first scenario. Jim could do anything. He chooses to do Q, and God foreseeing that Jim would choose to do Q of does not mean God made Jim do Q, because, as already stated, it is instead Jim's choice to do Q.
And once again, the second scenario is where God does not give man free will, which violates Premise A of the thread.
"For any future act you will perform, if some being infallibly believed in the past that the act would occur, there is nothing you can do now about the fact that he believed what he believed since nobody has any control over past events; nor can you make him mistaken in his belief, given that he is infallible.
God being correct because he foresaw you choosing to do something is not the same thing as God being correct because you never had a choice and it was his will that made you perform the action. Those are completely different things. Again, in the Grant throwing a ball at Highroller scenario, things going exactly according to Grant's plan with Highroller catching the ball does not mean Highroller never had a choice.
Likewise, Highroller catching the ball because Grant throws the ball and he caught it is not the same thing as Highroller catching the ball because Grant mindjacked him using Grant's ESP powers.
The problem with your argument is while you think you are displaying a logical inconsistency in the idea of Premise A and Premise B both being true, what you are actually doing is going against Premise A.
This is akin to forgetting the yeast in a recipe for bread, and claiming it is a recipe for flatbread.
I plan for Adolf Hitler to exterminate Jews, gypsies, and others between 1937 and 1944.
Free will is relevant.
No free will - it happens as planned.
Free will - Momma Hitler has an abortion, or Adolf moves to Fiji at 23 and becomes an opium addict, it doesn't happen according to plan.
No. Free will does not require something not go according to plan. It could go exactly according to plan.
All that's required is that the person acting does so of his volition.
Example: Grant's plan is that he throws a ball at me and I catch it. He yells, "Highroller, catch!" and throws the ball. Highroller catches.
By your logic, Highroller does not have free will. Except this is an invalid conclusion, because just because Highroller acted according to Grant's plan doesn't mean that Highroller wasn't in control of his actions.
Grant's plan not only had no bearing on Highroller having free will, but indeed, free will requires someone with knowledge of Highroller be able to anticipate his actions. So as someone approaches 100% total knowledge of Highroller, his ability to predict Highroller's choices in a given situation should approach 100%.
Grant didn't create you, or the football, or time, or space...
God did.
To me, this is important.
Now to the OP.
God can have the kind of plans that allow for free will, and still be an interventionist.
We agree here.
However, I'd add that God intervening adds a level of manipulation. He is pushing choice in a direction, but not making the choice for you. He is adding incentive to make the choices he wishes to see you make.
Yes.
Although manipulated choices are still choices. See also: the cereal aisle. No one's forcing you to choose a cereal, but they damn sure are manipulating you by putting certain things at eye level, making boxes bright colors, putting certain numbers in really large font, etc.
Really, this could be said about marketing as a whole.
I agree with you here.
Now, about compatibility.
I do not believe that an omniscient God with infallible foreknowledge creating the Universe knowing everything that would happen, "the end before the beginning" is compatible with free will.
Whereas I disagree.
It doesn't matter whether or not God knows beforehand what happens. The only thing that matters is whether God gives people free will or whether God is directly controlling them.
In your Jim does Q scenario, since God directly controls Jim into taking Q, then Jim has no free will.
However, the alternative would be Jim does Q because Jim of his own will freely chooses Q.
Now if God sees this beforehand, it still doesn't change the fact that Jim's choosing to do Q, because the reason God sees this beforehand is because Jim chose to do Q. God's vision takes Jim's ability to choose, and his choice, into account.
I guess we have to agree to disagree then.
I believe God making U#581 makes Jim does Q necessary.
Because it is now necessary for Jim to do Q, and there is zero possibility Jim does not, Jim has no choice.
1. God has infallible omniscient foreknowledge
2. The Universe does not yet exist
3. God envisions U#581 where Jim does Q
4. God then creates precisely U#581
5. Because of 1 and 3, Jim doing Q is now necessary, it would
not be U#581 otherwise
No, that's where you veer off-course.
Once again, if Jim has free will and chooses Q of his own volition, God foreseeing Jim choosing Q does not negate Jim choosing Q. In this scenario, Jim choosing Q is why God foresees Jim choosing Q.
I argue he doesn't have choice in the scenario.
I'm arguing from a form of Strict Fatalism.
This is completely different from Jim doing Q because God makes Jim do Q. This scenario involves Jim having no free will of his own. He's not doing Q of his own choosing, but instead is doing Q because God said so.
So when you say, "Jim doing Q is now necessary," that does not follow. It would be in the second scenario where Jim has no free will.
It would not be U#581 if Jim does not do Q.
God made U#581. Jim has no choice.
However, it's not necessary that Jim do Q in the first scenario. Jim could do anything. That he does Q is of his own volition, and God foreseeing that Jim would do Q does not mean God made Jim do Q, it is instead Jim's choice to do Q.
"For any future act you will perform, if some being infallibly believed in the past that the act would occur, there is nothing you can do now about the fact that he believed what he believed since nobody has any control over past events; nor can you make him mistaken in his belief, given that he is infallible.
God being correct because he foresaw you choosing to do something is not the same thing as God being correct because you never had a choice and it was his will that made you perform the action. Those are completely different things.Again, in the Grant throwing a ball at Highroller scenario, things going exactly according to Grant's plan with Highroller catching the ball does not mean Highroller never had a choice.
Likewise, Highroller catching the ball because Grant throws the ball and he caught it is not the same thing as Highroller catching the ball because Grant mindjacked him using Grant's ESP powers.
The problem with your argument is while you think you are displaying a logical inconsistency in the idea of Premise A and Premise B both being true, what you are actually doing is going against Premise A.
Again, this is akin to forgetting the yeast in a recipe for bread, and claiming it is a recipe for flatbread.
I'm not going through this over and over again. You're not getting it.
Read the link to the Stanford philosophy discussion, read about Fatalism and the responses to Fatalism.
I'm tired of trying to explain this to you, I made it as easy as I could.
Regarding "the plan", IMO God did not plan for evil to happen. He did plan to make a creation that freely would reject evil, and that plan will come to fruition. But in the meantime He has given much authority to us.
@ Grant: I think the truth of God and free will is somewhere in the middle. Sometimes He forces things to happen, other times He doesn't. The more one seeks Him, the more freedom and responsibility one is granted. I think it is possible for a person to seek God without realizing that is what they in fact are doing. (See the parable of the two sons where one tells the father he will do what he asks but doesn't, while the other does the converse.)
Whether OT references are correct regarding the amount of intervention God exercises is certainly debatable. Were the writers merely trying to assert His sovereignty and explain theology to the best of their ability? Or was God in fact imposing His will?
BTW, I do not subscribe to traditional teachings on Job that state God told Him He had no right to question Him. I believe God answered Him profoundly.
Grant didn't create you, or the football, or time, or space...
God did.
To me, this is important.
But that's the thing. Let's look at this example:
Now, about compatibility.
I do not believe that an omniscient God with infallible foreknowledge creating the Universe knowing everything that would happen, "the end before the beginning" is compatible with free will.
Whereas I disagree.
It doesn't matter whether or not God knows beforehand what happens. The only thing that matters is whether God gives people free will or whether God is directly controlling them.
In your Jim does Q scenario, since God directly controls Jim into taking Q, then Jim has no free will.
However, the alternative would be Jim does Q because Jim of his own will freely chooses Q.
Now if God sees this beforehand, it still doesn't change the fact that Jim's choosing to do Q, because the reason God sees this beforehand is because Jim chose to do Q. God's vision takes Jim's ability to choose, and his choice, into account.
I guess we have to agree to disagree then.
I believe God making U#581 makes Jim does Q necessary.
Because it is now necessary for Jim to do Q, and there is zero possibility Jim does not, Jim has no choice.
But in the free will scenario I outlined, Jim has free will, and in turn the ability to choose. As such, the reason why Jim does Q in the free will scenario is because he has free will. Right?
So, how then could God making that universe negate Jim having free will, if the whole reason he does Q in the first place is because he chooses it?
Does that make sense?
What I'm saying is that the real question here is why Jim does Q. Saying God made the universe inside which Jim does Q doesn't address why Jim does Q. It doesn't tell us whether God took control of Jim directly, or if Jim is choosing with his independent will to do Q and God just took Jim's choice into account when he foresaw how the universe was going to end up.
That's the question we need to answer.
I argue he doesn't have choice in the scenario.
I'm arguing from a form of Strict Fatalism.
Yeah, I figured that would be the case. The thing is, as I outlined before, InfinityAlarm's scenario involves assuming that everyone has free will, which is what I've been calling Premise A. The goal of the thread is to see whether this can be reconciled with Premise B, that God has a divine plan.
It really seems like what you've done is you've started out with the assumption that Jim doesn't have free will. So naturally, your conclusion will be that Jim doesn't have free will. But that's not the set of premises InfinityAlarm asked us to start with.
This is completely different from Jim doing Q because God makes Jim do Q. This scenario involves Jim having no free will of his own. He's not doing Q of his own choosing, but instead is doing Q because God said so.
So when you say, "Jim doing Q is now necessary," that does not follow. It would be in the second scenario where Jim has no free will.
It would not be U#581 if Jim does not do Q.
God made U#581. Jim has no choice.
But just because God made the universe doesn't mean we can't choose things.
God being correct because he foresaw you choosing to do something is not the same thing as God being correct because you never had a choice and it was his will that made you perform the action. Those are completely different things.Again, in the Grant throwing a ball at Highroller scenario, things going exactly according to Grant's plan with Highroller catching the ball does not mean Highroller never had a choice.
Likewise, Highroller catching the ball because Grant throws the ball and he caught it is not the same thing as Highroller catching the ball because Grant mindjacked him using Grant's ESP powers.
The problem with your argument is while you think you are displaying a logical inconsistency in the idea of Premise A and Premise B both being true, what you are actually doing is going against Premise A.
Again, this is akin to forgetting the yeast in a recipe for bread, and claiming it is a recipe for flatbread.
I'm not going through this over and over again. You're not getting it.
Read the link to the Stanford philosophy discussion, read about Fatalism and the responses to Fatalism.
I'm tired of trying to explain this to you, I made it as easy as I could.
Yes, in a fatalistic scenario, there is no free will. That's pretty much part-and-parcel with fatalism.
We're not in a fatalistic scenario. The whole point of this thread is the assumption that we have choice. Premise A explicitly states he have the ability to choose. Read the OP:
Quote from InfinityAlarm »
So God doesn't like robots. He wants people to make their own choices freely and not control what anyone decides. This is important enough to Him that He does not intervene in human decisions.
(^ let's just take that as a given for the sake of this thread)
The OP explicitly states we are not in a fatalistic scenario. The whole point of this thread is asking whether God can have a divine plan that is not-fatalism.
The premise the OP proposes is inconsistent or insufficiently explained or both; reasoning from an inconsistent premise will lead to faulty conclusions.
The thing to do is back up and define terms: What is a choice? What does it mean to be a "free" choice?
People have written books on what exactly a choice is, and many free will camps define it differently.
Grant didn't create you, or the football, or time, or space...
God did.
To me, this is important.
But that's the thing. Let's look at this example:
Now, about compatibility.
I do not believe that an omniscient God with infallible foreknowledge creating the Universe knowing everything that would happen, "the end before the beginning" is compatible with free will.
Whereas I disagree.
It doesn't matter whether or not God knows beforehand what happens. The only thing that matters is whether God gives people free will or whether God is directly controlling them.
In your Jim does Q scenario, since God directly controls Jim into taking Q, then Jim has no free will.
However, the alternative would be Jim does Q because Jim of his own will freely chooses Q.
Now if God sees this beforehand, it still doesn't change the fact that Jim's choosing to do Q, because the reason God sees this beforehand is because Jim chose to do Q. God's vision takes Jim's ability to choose, and his choice, into account.
I guess we have to agree to disagree then.
I believe God making U#581 makes Jim does Q necessary.
Because it is now necessary for Jim to do Q, and there is zero possibility Jim does not, Jim has no choice.
But in the free will scenario I outlined, Jim has free will, and in turn the ability to choose. As such, the reason why Jim does Q in the free will scenario is because he has free will. Right?
So, how then could God making that universe negate Jim having free will, if the whole reason he does Q in the first place is because he chooses it?
I do not accept that, the whole reason Jim does Q in the first place, is because that's precisely what God made Jim to do.
Does that make sense?
It has ALWAYS made sense to me, I just disagree with your reasoning, I do not believe they are compatible. I believe that the fatalism and predetermination involved invalidates the claim of free will.
Jim had no choice.
What I'm saying is that the real question here is why Jim does Q. Saying God made the universe inside which Jim does Q doesn't address why Jim does Q. It doesn't tell us whether God took control of Jim directly, or if Jim is choosing with his independent will to do Q and God just took Jim's choice into account when he foresaw how the universe was going to end up.
Jim is following the Jim does Q program.
This really isn't that hard to grasp.
That's the question we need to answer.
Asked and answered.
Jim does Q because God made U#581.
Jim is simply following the Jim does Q program.
I argue he doesn't have choice in the scenario.
I'm arguing from a form of Strict Fatalism.
Yeah, I figured that would be the case. The thing is, as I outlined before, InfinityAlarm's scenario involves assuming that everyone has free will, which is what I've been calling Premise A. The goal of the thread is to see whether this can be reconciled with Premise B, that God has a divine plan.
I ALREADY ANSWERED THIS THREE TIMES NOW.
Yes, God can have plans that do or do not triffle with Free Will. Do you just skip over huge sections of my posts for fun? Or to troll me?
It really seems like what you've done is you've started out with the assumption that Jim doesn't have free will. So naturally, your conclusion will be that Jim doesn't have free will. But that's not the set of premises InfinityAlarm asked us to start with.
No my scenario doesn't.
It posits a premise (1. God has infallible omniscient foreknowledge)
Then, it provides a gamestate (2. The universe doesn't exist)
Then, an action takes place (3. God envisions U#581, where Jim does Q)
After that, another action takes place (4. God Creates U#581, where Jim does Q)
Then, based on the premise, has a result (5. Because of 1 and 3, Jim does Q is necessary for it to be U#581)
Now - I take the definition of Free Will that I believe in <The ability to make choices that are not constrained by external circumstances such as fate or divine will>, and ask whether the above scenario is compatible with it.
The answer is, no.
Because it is incompatible - then either the premise is true and Jim does not have free will. Or the premise is false and Jim has free will.
The rest of your post, and what you have been doing for the last few pages is just NOT GETTING IT.
This is completely different from Jim doing Q because God makes Jim do Q. This scenario involves Jim having no free will of his own. He's not doing Q of his own choosing, but instead is doing Q because God said so.
So when you say, "Jim doing Q is now necessary," that does not follow. It would be in the second scenario where Jim has no free will.
It would not be U#581 if Jim does not do Q.
God made U#581. Jim has no choice.
But just because God made the universe doesn't mean we can't choose things.
Correct.
It's possible for the Universe to be created by a God and we still have free will.
Not the God with infallible omniscient foreknowledge prior to creation, but some sort of God, sure.
We're not in a fatalistic scenario. The whole point of this thread is the assumption that we have choice. Premise A explicitly states he have the ability to choose. Read the OP:
Quote from InfinityAlarm »
So God doesn't like robots. He wants people to make their own choices freely and not control what anyone decides. This is important enough to Him that He does not intervene in human decisions.
(^ let's just take that as a given for the sake of this thread)
The OP explicitly states we are not in a fatalistic scenario. The whole point of this thread is asking whether God can have a divine plan that is not-fatalism.
I read the OP, and I adequately answered IA's issues, in post #2, and post #11, and my post #94
THEN, after I addressed IA's OP, the conversation was allowed to drift into other aspects of the problem.
No, because I also said that God creating U#581 would be "external determination" for the purposes of that definition.
Don't forget the last part of that definition.
Even if we have "apparent choice", it isn't free will if God made U#581.
If you're trying to catch me being inconsistent, you're not going to.
I have been very careful about what I say here.
Thanks to Xenphire @ Inkfox for the amazing new sig
“Thus strangely are our souls constructed, and by slight ligaments
are we bound to prosperity and ruin.”
― Mary Shelley, Frankenstein
Oh, then you misinterpreted the definition. Allow me to help adding math parentheses (it's how I'd view this).
"the apparent (human ability to make (choices that are not externally determined))."
The word apparent applies to the whole sentence. It is apparent that humans have the ability to make choices that are not externally determined.
The definition should not be read like this:
"(the apparent (human ability to make choices)) that are not externally determined."
EDIT: It's like "that are not externally determined" is just a modifier for the word "choices." Since the word "apparent" is at the beginning, it considers everything after it. I'm not sure if I'm explaining this well enough.
EDIT2: Again with math language:
It appears as though humans can do X.
X = make choices that are not externally determined.
Pristaxcontrombmodruu!
If I have it wrong I'm sorry. I hope you understand what I actually mean when I say it though.
I always meant it in a way that put the parenthesis around the last half, and not the first.
The apparent human ability to make choices (that are not externally determined).
So I agreed that we have an apparent human ability to make choices, it certainly appears that way, but that because it would fail the second part (they are externally determined), it would not be free will.
Thanks to Xenphire @ Inkfox for the amazing new sig
“Thus strangely are our souls constructed, and by slight ligaments
are we bound to prosperity and ruin.”
― Mary Shelley, Frankenstein
I think I'd have worded it like this:
"the apparent human ability to make choices, unless those choices were determined externally."
Actually, I don't know what the word "apparent" does in that sentence anymore.
But basically: Foreknowledge at creation, or as Crashing said, any infallible predictability of future decisions invalidates free will.
Pristaxcontrombmodruu!
Well then no, of course Jim doesn't have free will. I mean, obviously. How could a person made without free will have free will?
That's not what we're discussing. The entire point of the thread is regarding a person who has free will. That was stated in the OP.
Crafting a scenario in which a person doesn't have free will and saying that person does not have free will... I mean, yes, correct, that person does not. That doesn't say anything about the scenario InfinityAlarm is discussing, which involves a person with free will.
No, determinism does take away choice.
Maybe we're dealing with two definitions of the word "determinism," so let me clarify what I mean when I say it:
Determinism means only one outcome was ever possible. I don't mean only one outcome results. I mean only one outcome was ever possible in the first place. Thus, when someone is presented with a red ball and a blue ball, and takes the blue ball, it is because it is impossible for them to do otherwise. There is no choice involved, because there was never another possible option. That red ball is extraneous information, the blue ball was the only possible course.
All human actions become as an aspirin dissolving in water, or as an apple influenced by gravity. They proceed as they do because there is no other possible outcome.
It's like if we're driving on a perfectly straight, one-way road. Would you call that road a fork? No, you wouldn't, because a fork is when the road diverges into two paths. Would you call that road an intersection? No, because an intersection is when multiple paths cross. This is just a straight road. There's no choice involved, because there's only one possible direction to go (well, you can stop or reverse, but I'm trying to make a point here).
A universe with choice is entirely different. In a universe with choice, there are multiple possible outcomes, and the one a person goes with is based on a decision that person makes amongst multiple options. When a person is presented with a red and a blue ball, and takes the blue ball, it's because the person chose to take the blue ball. That person had the option of taking one or the other, but the decision came from him to choose the blue ball. People proceed as they do because they have agency, which allows them to select what will result.
The other options are randomness (there is no "why" to things, nothing is dependent on the state before, causality doesn't exist), and the many-worlds scenario (all possible states are actualized).
Haha, yeah...
No, see, that's the thing. Determinism is the state in which the person is being controlled. See above.
I don't even know what IcecreamMan is trying to accomplish with his Jim scenario. If he's arguing that if God made a person without free will, that person would not have free will.
But that's not what this thread was made to discuss at all. You're discussing a person with free will. That was one of the assumptions we were supposed to make as detailed in the OP. The question was whether or not God's will could be reconciled with a person who has free will. So I have no idea why he's going on about scenarios in which people don't have free will.
For free will to exist, there must be the following components:
1. The person must have an identity
2. The person must have agency, or will
If these exist, if InfinityAlarm is a person with an independent identity, and has agency, then InfinityAlarm is capable of making choices.
So no, if Jim doesn't have any of the above, then of course he's not capable of making choices. Nothing that he does is coming from, or could possibly come from, him. He's just a puppet God's controlling.
This is not analogous to the above InfinityAlarm scenario.
Have I clarified where I stand?
This isn't what's vague. I am not questioning your construction of a universe with a fixed spacetime. The vague bit is this: If "apparent choice" is a shroud of deception over something that's not true, what is that something? If it is meant to stand in contrast to "apparent choice" then let's call it "real choice" -- what is it that distinguishes an apparent choice from a real one?
No, I meant what property distinguishes the different kinds of choice. "the difference between an apparent choice and one that is not merely apparent would be _________________" <-- fill in this blank
English grammar actually yields only one unique way of parsing the phrase "the apparent human ability to make choices that are not externally determined." The adjective clause "that are not externally determined" can only modify "choices" because of the plural verb form "are." So it's the choices that are not externally determined, and the ability to make those undetermined choices that is apparent.
So once again, even if we're in U#528 with a fixed spacetime, as long as Jim's mind gives him the sensation of making undetermined choices, he has free will under this definition. The actual interesting questions are still being skirted.
-------------------------------------
Let me try to introduce a new Socratic line of inquiry that might aid in understanding. Suppose we observe Jim approaching a left/right fork in the road, and when he gets to the fork he takes the left path. Suppose you're allowed to run any tests you want to on Jim or the universe.
- How could you test whether or not Jim made a choice (apparent or otherwise)?
- If you determined he made a choice, how would you distinguish between a merely-apparent choice and whatever you think it is that constitutes a choice that is not merely apparent?
Which if thou dost not use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind
It will go and thou wilt go, never to return.
I understand your definition, but I disagree with the idea that it precludes free will. I perceive determinism as more akin to perfect forecasting, able to predict free-willed decisions. Given perfect knowledge of the past and current state of the universe, it can be predicted what will happen next.
The reason I don't see this as removing human agency is that these predictions are based on the state of mind of the humans involved. Determinism to me is descriptive, not prescriptive. Being able to predict the outcome of a choice is not the same thing as dictating that outcome.
I think that there's something in your use of the word 'possible' that bothers me too, but I can't put my finger on it at the moment.
I also did NOT say that God made a Jim without free will.
I ONLY say that God made U#581 where Jim does Q.
Then, I compare that to the definition of free will that I posted.
Is the scenario compatible with free will?
Conclusion: No.
So either Jim has free will, and #1 (omniscient infallible foreknowledge) is false.
Or #1 is true, and Jim has no free will.
I already answered the OP adequately, go back to page 1 and two.
I only crafted a scenario, then checked to see if it was compatible with free will, it wasn't.
I already answered IA's questions back on page one.
YOU'RE the one who came in here with your erroneous compatibilism.
I came back to stop you from spreading your bad reasoning to others.
see above.
I'm trying to make you see your compatibilism is wrong.
This is not a requirement of free will.
This is.
IA can have identity, and still not have free will.
A robot with a unique identity is still a robot.
Jim has identity, just no choice. he is doing only what he was created to do.
Thanks to Xenphire @ Inkfox for the amazing new sig
“Thus strangely are our souls constructed, and by slight ligaments
are we bound to prosperity and ruin.”
― Mary Shelley, Frankenstein
Perhaps I've not made myself clear: I've never stated that the ability to predict removes human agency.
I'm saying that what defines determinism is that humans don't have agency, as opposed to a scenario in which human beings do, that scenario being the free will scenario.
Ability to predict has absolutely no bearing on free will. It's extraneous information.
In fact, I feel that free will in fact requires the ability to predict it, as knowledge of a person enables one to anticipate what that person will do — indeed, we witness this in day-to-day life — and in free will, a person's actions stem from choices, which come from that person. Thus, with perfect knowledge of a person, one should be able to predict that person's actions given perfect knowledge of the scenario that person is in.
... You said that God did not make Jim with free will. You also said one has free will or one does not, there's no "games with the excluded middle."
So which is it then? Does Jim have free will, or doesn't he?
And I will repeat the question I've been asking: Does Jim do Q because he chooses to, or does Jim do Q because God's making him do Q and he has no agency of his own?
You're trying to conflate the two. They cannot be conflated. As you say, one either has free will or he doesn't.
Correct, if God creates a person without free will, that person does not have free will.
Notice how that totally ignores the purpose of the thread.
InfinityAlarm's intent with this thread was to assume two premises to be true:
A. Human beings have free will
B. God has a divine plan
And to see whether these are compatible or incompatible.
Saying, "In this scenario in which God has a divine plan and Jim has no free will, Jim has no free will. Therefore, no free will," does not address the intent of this thread, because you ignored Premise A.
Imagine two cooks arguing whether a recipe would produce a loaf of bread or a piece of flatbread, and one cook makes the recipe but omits the yeast that the recipe calls for, then looks at the result and says, "See? Flatbread!" Well yes, of course it's flat, but that's because he omitted the key ingredient: the yeast! The very thing that makes the bread rise in the first place!
So too have you omitted Jim's free will, the very thing we need to see whether free will and God's plan are compatible.
No, you haven't. Page 1 is where we go started on this whole Jim thing.
Of course it wasn't, because you changed one of the core premises to make it so Jim never had free will to begin with.
Right, because you changed Premise A, which is one of the core premises of this thread, by making it so Jim does not have free will.
Which is not analogous to what we're talking about.
Right.
You must have skipped the part of my post above where I say
I showed an incompatibility.
If my scenario is all true, than Jim does Q because God made him to.
No free will.
Or, #1 is false, God created U without infallible foreknowledge, and Jim has free will.
Correct.
I'm not going to allow your misunderstanding of things trip me up.
See the above bold part of what I said which you deliberately skipped over it seems.
I didn't ignore the purpose of the thread. I already answered IA's OP.
And I answered that adequately.
It is possible for God to have plans for the universe that are not affected by the free choices of people.
No, I didn't.
Go back and read my responses to IA. I addressed the OP.
Sigh, sure buddy, but you're wrong again.
Then it was page two or whatever, but I still addressed the Op adequately.
FROM PAGE 1:
http://forums.mtgsalvation.com/showpost.php?p=11171841&postcount=2
http://forums.mtgsalvation.com/showpost.php?p=11185660&postcount=11
I adequately address IA's concerns.
Thanks to Xenphire @ Inkfox for the amazing new sig
“Thus strangely are our souls constructed, and by slight ligaments
are we bound to prosperity and ruin.”
― Mary Shelley, Frankenstein
You have not, because you have consistently failed to answer the most important question:
Why does Jim perform Q?
Does he do so because he chooses to, or does he do so because God makes him do so?
Because that would change the outcome, just like bread having yeast will be very different from bread not having yeast.
You seem to think you can just leave this question unanswered:
But in fact it's the most important detail. You're in a debate about free will here, whether or not Jim has free will is important.
Right, which means your conclusion is "If Jim has no free will, then he does not have free will."
While this logically functions, it violates Premise A: Human beings have free will, as noted in the OP of this thread.
Do you now see the problem?
He's not talking about plans for the sun going supernova, IcecreamMan. He's clearly talking about plans for people's actions.
Did you read the OP or just skim it?
... So you don't know which page it was? Why don't you find this post then?
EDIT: See, page 1 is where you start on this Jim scenario that, as we later see, violates the thread's premise in the first place. You cannot be said to adequately address IA's question when you consistently ignore Premise A.
But that is determinism. All determinism does is make that prediction. It's not taking away the agency, it's describing it.
You say that in determinism there are no other possible choices than the one taken, therefore no free will, but you also say that when an omniscient being knows what you will choose, there are other possible choices. Determinism doesn't force a choice, it just 'knows what you will choose'.
Would you define a free willed choice as affected by the chooser's beliefs, motivations, desires? Under determinism they still are. Can you describe a situation where a particular deterministic choice (for the sake of argument, let's not quibble about whether you think determinism precludes choice; you know what I mean) and a free willed (according to you) choice differ, and that difference isn't due to the observer having less-than-perfect information?
I can appreciate your view, but even if you did adequately answer the OP somewhere, the debate has become irrelevant to the OP and it retreads discussion found in numerous other threads. I'd rather read discussion regarding the OP. I am curious to see what people who actually believe the OP's given think.
Well, thread drift does happen (and at one point the OP gave their blessing to the tangent, I seem to recall).
However, since you ask: I'm an atheist, so I'm speaking theoretically, but whether a divine plan and free will are compatible rather hinges on your definition of free will (and to an extent, divine plan).
- For example, if God creates a universe in which his plan plays out as per earlier discussion in this thread, as the free willed actions of its inhabitants are along the lines he intended, then sits back and watches, He has no need to influence the world beyond its starting conditions. Divine plan + free will: compatible.
- If God creates a universe and then messes with the minds of people in it (such as Pharaohs) to achieve his divine plan, then he's impinging on free will. Divine plan + free will: incompatible.
- If God creates a universe and doesn't mess with the minds of people in it, but feels free to drop natural disasters, or send the Angel of Death around for firstborns, to stop people deviating from his plan, I'd call that duress. Whether that interferes with the letter of free will, I'm not sure, but I think it does violence to the spirit.
If the question is 'Are A and B compatible?', then 'B precludes A' is a perfectly reasonable answer.
No other possible options. To call them choices is misleading. But I know what you mean.
So you call both those scenarios — let's call them Free Will Scenario and BLOGGLEFLOGGLE Scenario for now — "determinism"? How then do you define "determinism?"
And what is your name for BLOGGLEFLOGGLE? Because BLOGGLEFLOGGLE needs to be distinguishable from Free Will. And I strongly think you're trying to conflate BLOGGLEFLOGGLE with Free Will by saying they're the same thing. They aren't.
Yes, because a person's beliefs, motivations, and desires are part of what makes that person that person.
Take the ice cream scenario.
If Highroller walks into the ice cream store and gets flavor X because Highroller has agency and input and the selection comes from Highroller, then it is free will.
If Highroller walks into the ice cream store and gets flavor X for reasons other than Highroller's own agency, if Highroller is being controlled to do so, then it is determinism. Or BLOGGLEFLOGGLE.
The key component is whether or not the selection comes from Highroller, whether who Highroller is has any bearing.
Now, for better illustration, let's see what would happen if God decides his divine plan will involve Highroller getting flavor Y.
In the deterministic/BLOGGLEFLOGGLE scenario, God could simply change "Highroller gets X" to "Highroller gets Y," because Highroller isn't actually the one in control anyway. Highroller does not actually have any say as to which ice cream flavor he walks out with, so a simple rewrite is easy. Nothing else needs to change.
In the free will scenario, it's not so simple. If Highroller is presented with exactly the same set of circumstances, he's just going to make the same choice. For Highroller to choose differently, Highroller himself needs to be different. Something needs to be different in order to promote a change in Highroller so that he makes a different choice.
Imagine the deterministic scenario like a video game. In Final Fantasy 1, the Black Mage isn't the one in control, I am, so I can make the Black Mage buy a sword, go back, and change it to the Black Mage buying a staff or whatever.
Actually Final Fantasy 1 is a great example. I don't know if you've played it, but the characters are blank slates. They have no actual characterization beyond some numbers indicating how hard they can hit or take hits or whatever. So no choice is out of character for them.
Whereas imagine we're writing a story with fully fleshed-out, three-dimensional characters who have distinct and developed personalities. These characters do things because we write that they do. They don't have an independent will from us. But they do have identities and personalities that feel human. And so we can't just write them as doing whatever. We CAN, but something feels wrong.
Have you ever watched a movie or TV show where a character does something totally out of character and you react negatively? You criticize the writer and you say, "Come on, there's no way the character would do that." Same deal. The character doesn't have independent will, it does things based on a writer doing it, and as such we can make Batman give up his life as a vigilante and join the mob as easily as we can make Batman never give up fighting crime. But the former feels totally wrong, doesn't it?
Why? Because the action is not consistent with who the character is. It doesn't come from his personality or identity. And if Batman had independent will or agency, he wouldn't choose the same thing.
I'm pretty sure I agree with this. However, I think it's perfectly fine for God to alter the conditions and actively participate in creation and for there to still be free will.
The relevant issue is whether he's seizing control of someone's mind directly, thus denying them agency, like Pharaoh, or not.
It would be a perfectly reasonable answer if it were demonstrated using perfect reasoning.
IcecreamMan isn't doing that. He thinks he is, but what he's really doing is ignoring Premise A entirely.
Again, it's very easy to say the recipe makes flatbread if you ignore where it says to add yeast.
But the above is pretty much definitionally determinism as I understand it. Under determinism, the same situation will produce the same result; to produce a change, something in the scenario needs to change.
Nondeterminism is where the same scenario can result in different outputs.
Now I'm not sure if we've just agreed on the same thing but with different names, or if we've disagreed. (The wikipedia page on determinism lists several varieties of determinism; I think what you are describing as determinism treads close to fatalism (as they define it) whereas I'm proposing adequate determinism, if that helps.)
So are using "determinism" to describe both Free Will and BLOGGLEFLOGGLE?
I don't mind that, provided that you agree that we need to distinguish free will from BLOGGLEFLOGGLE, and if we can find a better word for BLOGGLEFLOGGLE other than BLOGGLEFLOGGLE.
I'm not sure about that either to be honest.
Let me look that up and get back to you.
I hate doing it, but I'll repeat myself, again, for everyone, and address the OP yet again as well.
I'll also make it very simple, so HR can stop misrepresenting my arguments.
I believe there is an important difference between "having plans" and "having planned".
The difference between I plan to get married, and my wedding has been planned. The difference between I plan to go to the store, and I went to the store as planned.
It is possible for God to have an uncountable number of plans.
Some of those plans might be affected by human choice, and some might not be.
I plan for people to suffer pain and torture.
Free will would be virtually irrelevant.
No free will - they can still suffer pain and torture. Yay nervous and cardiovascular system!
Free will - they can still suffer pain and torture. Yay nervous and cardiovascular system!
I plan for Adolf Hitler to exterminate Jews, gypsies, and others between 1937 and 1944.
Free will is relevant.
No free will - it happens as planned.
Free will - Momma Hitler has an abortion, or Adolf moves to Fiji at 23 and becomes an opium addict, it doesn't happen according to plan.
Now to the OP.
God can have the kind of plans that allow for free will, and still be an interventionist.
However, I'd add that God intervening adds a level of manipulation. He is pushing choice in a direction, but not making the choice for you. He is adding incentive to make the choices he wishes to see you make.
Would they make the same choice if he had not? Does he answer prayers, or does he only intervene when he feels like it? How much manipulation does it take before you were no longer acting freely?
Etc.
Now, about compatibility.
I do not believe that an omniscient God with infallible foreknowledge creating the Universe knowing everything that would happen, "the end before the beginning" is compatible with free will.
1. God has infallible omniscient foreknowledge
2. The Universe does not yet exist
3. God envisions U#581 where Jim does Q
4. God then creates precisely U#581
5. Because of 1 and 3, Jim doing Q is now necessary, it would
not be U#581 otherwise
According to the definition of free will that I adhere to
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/free+will
"The power of making free choices that are unconstrained by external circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will."
The above scenario is not compatible with free will.
My argument is that the above form of Fatalism is not compatible with Free Will.
If 1 and 3 are true, Jim doesn't have free will. Jim does exactly what God created Jim to do. There is no choice, possibilities don't exist.
OR
1 and 3 are false, Jim has free will, and he chooses to do Q.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/
I have read the "solutions" and I do not believe any of them actually work against (that particular) God's level of Fatalism.
Thanks to Xenphire @ Inkfox for the amazing new sig
“Thus strangely are our souls constructed, and by slight ligaments
are we bound to prosperity and ruin.”
― Mary Shelley, Frankenstein
No. Free will does not require something not go according to plan. It could go exactly according to plan.
All that's required is that the person acting does so of his volition.
Example: Grant's plan is that he throws a ball at me and I catch it. He yells, "Highroller, catch!" and throws the ball. Highroller catches.
By your logic, Highroller does not have free will. Except this is an invalid conclusion, because just because Highroller acted according to Grant's plan doesn't mean that Highroller wasn't in control of his actions.
Grant's plan not only had no bearing on Highroller having free will, but indeed, free will requires someone with knowledge of Highroller be able to anticipate his actions. So as someone approaches 100% total knowledge of Highroller, his ability to predict Highroller's choices in a given situation should approach 100%.
We agree here.
Yes.
Although manipulated choices are still choices. See also: the cereal aisle. No one's forcing you to choose a cereal, but they damn sure are manipulating you by putting certain things at eye level, making boxes bright colors, putting certain numbers in really large font, etc.
Really, this could be said about marketing as a whole.
Whereas I disagree.
It doesn't matter whether or not God knows beforehand what happens. The only thing that matters is whether God gives people free will or whether God is directly controlling them.
In your Jim does Q scenario, since God directly controls Jim into taking Q, then Jim has no free will.
However, the alternative would be Jim does Q because Jim of his own will freely chooses Q.
Now if God sees this beforehand, it still doesn't change the fact that Jim's choosing to do Q, because the reason God sees this beforehand is because Jim chose to do Q. God's vision takes Jim's ability to choose, and his choice, into account.
No, that's where you veer off-course.
Once again, if Jim has free will and chooses Q of his own volition, God foreseeing Jim choosing Q does not negate Jim choosing Q. In this scenario, Jim choosing Q is why God foresees Jim choosing Q.
This is completely different from Jim doing Q because God makes Jim do Q. This scenario involves Jim having no free will of his own. He's not doing Q of his own choosing, but instead is doing Q because God said so.
So when you say, "Jim doing Q is now necessary," that does not follow. It would be in the second scenario where Jim has no free will.
However, it's not necessary that Jim do Q in the first scenario. Jim could do anything. He chooses to do Q, and God foreseeing that Jim would choose to do Q of does not mean God made Jim do Q, because, as already stated, it is instead Jim's choice to do Q.
And once again, the second scenario is where God does not give man free will, which violates Premise A of the thread.
God being correct because he foresaw you choosing to do something is not the same thing as God being correct because you never had a choice and it was his will that made you perform the action. Those are completely different things. Again, in the Grant throwing a ball at Highroller scenario, things going exactly according to Grant's plan with Highroller catching the ball does not mean Highroller never had a choice.
Likewise, Highroller catching the ball because Grant throws the ball and he caught it is not the same thing as Highroller catching the ball because Grant mindjacked him using Grant's ESP powers.
The problem with your argument is while you think you are displaying a logical inconsistency in the idea of Premise A and Premise B both being true, what you are actually doing is going against Premise A.
This is akin to forgetting the yeast in a recipe for bread, and claiming it is a recipe for flatbread.
UW Ephara Hatebears [Primer], GB Gitrog Lands, BRU Inalla Combo-Control, URG Maelstrom Wanderer Landfall
Grant didn't create you, or the football, or time, or space...
God did.
To me, this is important.
I agree with you here.
I guess we have to agree to disagree then.
I believe God making U#581 makes Jim does Q necessary.
Because it is now necessary for Jim to do Q, and there is zero possibility Jim does not, Jim has no choice.
I argue he doesn't have choice in the scenario.
I'm arguing from a form of Strict Fatalism.
It would not be U#581 if Jim does not do Q.
God made U#581. Jim has no choice.
I'm not going through this over and over again. You're not getting it.
Read the link to the Stanford philosophy discussion, read about Fatalism and the responses to Fatalism.
I'm tired of trying to explain this to you, I made it as easy as I could.
Edit 1:
My argument against compatibilism is basically that Fatalism + Pre-determination = No free will.
http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/pre-determinism.html
Edit 2:
A great paper, and one in which many of these ideas are discussed.
http://web.mit.edu/holton/www/pubs/determinism&fatalism.pdf
Thanks to Xenphire @ Inkfox for the amazing new sig
“Thus strangely are our souls constructed, and by slight ligaments
are we bound to prosperity and ruin.”
― Mary Shelley, Frankenstein
@ Grant: I think the truth of God and free will is somewhere in the middle. Sometimes He forces things to happen, other times He doesn't. The more one seeks Him, the more freedom and responsibility one is granted. I think it is possible for a person to seek God without realizing that is what they in fact are doing. (See the parable of the two sons where one tells the father he will do what he asks but doesn't, while the other does the converse.)
Whether OT references are correct regarding the amount of intervention God exercises is certainly debatable. Were the writers merely trying to assert His sovereignty and explain theology to the best of their ability? Or was God in fact imposing His will?
BTW, I do not subscribe to traditional teachings on Job that state God told Him He had no right to question Him. I believe God answered Him profoundly.
But that's the thing. Let's look at this example:
But in the free will scenario I outlined, Jim has free will, and in turn the ability to choose. As such, the reason why Jim does Q in the free will scenario is because he has free will. Right?
So, how then could God making that universe negate Jim having free will, if the whole reason he does Q in the first place is because he chooses it?
Does that make sense?
What I'm saying is that the real question here is why Jim does Q. Saying God made the universe inside which Jim does Q doesn't address why Jim does Q. It doesn't tell us whether God took control of Jim directly, or if Jim is choosing with his independent will to do Q and God just took Jim's choice into account when he foresaw how the universe was going to end up.
That's the question we need to answer.
Yeah, I figured that would be the case. The thing is, as I outlined before, InfinityAlarm's scenario involves assuming that everyone has free will, which is what I've been calling Premise A. The goal of the thread is to see whether this can be reconciled with Premise B, that God has a divine plan.
It really seems like what you've done is you've started out with the assumption that Jim doesn't have free will. So naturally, your conclusion will be that Jim doesn't have free will. But that's not the set of premises InfinityAlarm asked us to start with.
But just because God made the universe doesn't mean we can't choose things.
Yes, in a fatalistic scenario, there is no free will. That's pretty much part-and-parcel with fatalism.
We're not in a fatalistic scenario. The whole point of this thread is the assumption that we have choice. Premise A explicitly states he have the ability to choose. Read the OP:
The OP explicitly states we are not in a fatalistic scenario. The whole point of this thread is asking whether God can have a divine plan that is not-fatalism.
The thing to do is back up and define terms: What is a choice? What does it mean to be a "free" choice?
People have written books on what exactly a choice is, and many free will camps define it differently.
UW Ephara Hatebears [Primer], GB Gitrog Lands, BRU Inalla Combo-Control, URG Maelstrom Wanderer Landfall
I do not accept that, the whole reason Jim does Q in the first place, is because that's precisely what God made Jim to do.
It has ALWAYS made sense to me, I just disagree with your reasoning, I do not believe they are compatible. I believe that the fatalism and predetermination involved invalidates the claim of free will.
Jim had no choice.
Jim is following the Jim does Q program.
This really isn't that hard to grasp.
Asked and answered.
Jim does Q because God made U#581.
Jim is simply following the Jim does Q program.
I ALREADY ANSWERED THIS THREE TIMES NOW.
Yes, God can have plans that do or do not triffle with Free Will. Do you just skip over huge sections of my posts for fun? Or to troll me?
No my scenario doesn't.
It posits a premise (1. God has infallible omniscient foreknowledge)
Then, it provides a gamestate (2. The universe doesn't exist)
Then, an action takes place (3. God envisions U#581, where Jim does Q)
After that, another action takes place (4. God Creates U#581, where Jim does Q)
Then, based on the premise, has a result (5. Because of 1 and 3, Jim does Q is necessary for it to be U#581)
Now - I take the definition of Free Will that I believe in <The ability to make choices that are not constrained by external circumstances such as fate or divine will>, and ask whether the above scenario is compatible with it.
The answer is, no.
Because it is incompatible - then either the premise is true and Jim does not have free will. Or the premise is false and Jim has free will.
The rest of your post, and what you have been doing for the last few pages is just NOT GETTING IT.
Correct.
It's possible for the Universe to be created by a God and we still have free will.
Not the God with infallible omniscient foreknowledge prior to creation, but some sort of God, sure.
I read the OP, and I adequately answered IA's issues, in post #2, and post #11, and my post #94
THEN, after I addressed IA's OP, the conversation was allowed to drift into other aspects of the problem.
Thanks to Xenphire @ Inkfox for the amazing new sig
“Thus strangely are our souls constructed, and by slight ligaments
are we bound to prosperity and ruin.”
― Mary Shelley, Frankenstein