If you mean instead that the laws of physics count as physical then that is inconsistent with the definition your provided of physicalism. Laws that define the behavior of things are neither made of matter/energy or an emergent property of matter/energy. To make such behavior purely physical you have to abandon the notion of the laws of physics and propose that the universe just to happens to act as though there are such laws.
The pattern exists as Physical laws, which are also--as the name implies--physical.
Yes, I do mean to imply that physical laws are part of physicalism. If you read the wiki page where the quote comes from that I first used to define the physicalist's definition of 'the physical,' you will see it also defines physical laws as such.
But, maybe wiki isn't your cup of tea: "Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical... The general idea is that the nature of the actual world (i.e. the universe and everything in it) conforms to a certain condition, the condition of being physical. Of course, physicalists don't deny that the world might contain many items that at first glance don't seem physical — items of a biological, or psychological, or moral, or social nature. But they insist nevertheless that at the end of the day such items are either physical or supervene on the physical." http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/
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Reading through that I stand by my objection. The idea that physical laws are physical things seems to simply be assumed even though it is inconsistent with the rest of physicalism. Much is made of demonstrating that physical properties are physical but nothing suggests that the rules themselves are physical.
Physical laws are not made of matter and energy.
Physical laws cannot be an emergent property of matter and energy and they can only supervene on matter and energy if they are coincidental.
This places physical laws outside of physicalism as defined in both of your quotes, despite the use of the world physical in the name.
(Although I note with some distress that the author performs the philosophical two-step and never actually says what it means for something to be physical.)
Ummmm.... are you sure about that?
"Thus, a gravitational field is used to explain gravitational phenomena, and is measured in newtons per kilogram (N/kg). "[1]
The whole premise of field theory is that all of nature is made of matter and energy. Those fields--and the rules that govern them--"supervenes on, or [are] necessitated by, the physical."
Or, are you going Chenjesu's route and are saying that our symbology of these phenomenon somehow--necessarily--'transcends' the physical?
Ummmm.... are you sure about that?
"Thus, a gravitational field is used to explain gravitational phenomena, and is measured in newtons per kilogram (N/kg). "[1]
The whole premise of field theory is that all of nature is made of matter and energy. Those fields--and the rules that govern them--"supervenes on, or [are] necessitated by, the physical."
Or, are you going Chenjesu's route and are saying that our symbology of these phenomenon somehow--necessarily--'transcends' the physical?
A gravitational field is not a physical law it is a physical phenomenon created by the rules. What defines the behavior of the field? The rules. Again this feels like a retreat toward an unmoved mover.
In Magic, for instance, when you cast a spell it goes on the stack. This is only possible because the rules exist outside of the cards (no card tells you to put itself on the stack) so the game state supervenes on the rules not the other way around. I'd agree with the statement that the rules of magic transcend the cards and yes, I think I'd agree that the laws of physics transcend the physical world.
Certainly if they are "physical" then they are a very alien sort of physical. They can affect us but we cannot affect them which is not true of anything else physical. The gravitational constant helps define how I fall but I cannot take any action to adjust that constant.
I guess the question becomes: Does "the Law of Gravity" exist in some objective metaphysical sense?
Is it part of some nonphysical meta-system, is it part of some higher order physical system, OR is it simply some words and symbols us humans use to describe an observed physical phenomena?
Now, I'm not going to sit here and tell you I have the definitive answer to that question. I'm sure Crashing00 can probably explain there is some ontological rule saying I CAN'T know the answer to that question. However, I will reiterate what I said before:
The nonphysical cannot--by definition--interact with the physical.
If YOU are going to claim that "the Law of Gravity" DOES exist in some objective nonphysical sense, then I will be skeptical until you also explain how something purely intangible can affect the tangible.
The nonphysical cannot--by definition--interact with the physical.
If YOU are going to claim that "the Law of Gravity" DOES exist in some objective nonphysical sense, then I will be skeptical until you also explain how something purely intangible can affect the tangible.
I think there is a subtle leap here that I brought up earlier, and perhaps I missed or forgot you covering this topic, but have we agreed to a definition on word "existence"? I personally can't claim anything exists until I know what existence means.
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Vive, vale. Siquid novisti rectius istis,
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
~~~~~
No, I haven't defined "existence."
One of the reasons being that if I did it I'm pretty sure that definition would be irreverently tainted by my physicalist perspective to the point of being a question beg.
I guess the question becomes: Does "the Law of Gravity" exist in some objective metaphysical sense?
The notion does not, that's symbology as you say, but I would say that if there is a rule it must exist in some metaphysical way.
My argument for why the Law of Gravity cannot supervene on physical things is this:
Imagine a configuration of objects affected only by "gravity". We cannot tell from where they are what the law of gravity is.
If we move forward by dt we still can't tell what the law of gravity is because there are countless laws that will give equivalent results.
The rule cannot be a consequence of the objects because the behavior of the objects can never define a specific rule, all of those potential rules supervene equally on the objects. If there is a particular rule they must supervene on it.
As an instrumentalist I'm actually fine with accepting a coincidental world I just have no intention of treating it as such. Perhaps you're trying to hard to map the language of science onto physicalism. It is not a failure on the part of physicalism to deny that gravity exists in a deepmetaphysical sense, it's not like you're a Humean who's going to jump off a bridge or something.
If YOU are going to claim that "the Law of Gravity" DOES exist in some objective nonphysical sense, then I will be skeptical until you also explain how something purely intangible can affect the tangible.
I'd argue that it doesn't have affect to affect tangible if it defines it instead. I am totally willing to be convinced that I'm fooling myself with semantic trickery, though.
No, I haven't defined "existence."
One of the reasons being that if I did it I'm pretty sure that definition would be irreverently tainted by my physicalist perspective to the point of being a question beg.
I think that's why philosophers developed different forms/types/levels of existence.
Wonder Woman does not exist in the same way that Angela Merkel exists and neither exists in the same way that the Platonic Forms are said to exist.
No, I haven't defined "existence."
One of the reasons being that if I did it I'm pretty sure that definition would be irreverently tainted by my physicalist perspective to the point of being a question beg.
Us working out a definition of existence is important because definitions are not universal. Let's take Chenjesu's example of the purple unicorn, but this time before we can claim what it is or is not, let's talk about what makes a purple unicorn a purple unicorn. A lot of people have an idea of what a purple unicorn is. But there is a slight problem that I found when I did a google search on purple unicorns: I found all this.
The range of purple unicorn representations is massive. Even ignoring the things that Google caught by mistake, I'd say the variation is so great. The common elements seem to be is purple (somewhere), has a horn, and is a mammal stands on four legs. But that definition at least appears to be broad enough to include this as a purple unicorn, and the way to exclude this is by making the definition more specific. But if we're both talking about a "purple (somewhere), has a horn, and is a mammal stands on four legs" and do not get a better idea of what the picture we're imagining is, even if we're using two of the same images from my Google Search of Purple Unicorns, we could lose each other when I talk with this in mind, and you talk with this in mind.
Coming back around, I'd say that the same thing goes for existence. The most efficient way to exclude the immaterial is to define not just existence, but the material and the immaterial as well. Then flesh out a definition of existence that makes a relevant distinction between the two, and in terms of physicalism, what makes the exclusion of the immaterial relevant. *Granted you've done some of this already, but defining existence might alter the view a little*
Typically science does not inquire about what is immaterial. It domain of authority is strictly to the physical world. This does not make such an inquiry unimportant or preclude the possibility of having knowledge about it. It is just not what the discipline strives to explain.
It is a rather recent phenomena that atheism is being portrayed in the market place of ideas as the world view of the scientist by its self appointed spokespeople. A lot of scientist of the past where happy to admit the limits of science but alas it seem the logical positivist has discard the magnanimous approach and plunged head long into the view that science is the sole arbiter of knowledge (As truly arrogant as that may be).
It is a pity though. If there is a continued crusade to purge the natural sciences of any religious thought then science can be assured that eventually you will have a great segment of society who will completely remove them from such disciplines. Thus bringing with a depression in the progress of science that may very easily take a century to recover from.
If you think a Christian 18 year old cannot see Richard Dawkins proclaiming that real scientist are atheist and think to him / her self. He is an ex Oxford professor telling me this maybe I should study and become something else and there by loosing another potential Noble laureate in the process I think you would be wrong.
But unfortunately he and many in of the new crop of atheism is not so much interested in advancement of science as they are of using science to promote an ideological agenda.
The notion does not, that's symbology as you say, but I would say that if there is a rule it must exist in some metaphysical way.
My argument for why the Law of Gravity cannot supervene on physical things is this:
Imagine a configuration of objects affected only by "gravity". We cannot tell from where they are what the law of gravity is.
If we move forward by dt we still can't tell what the law of gravity is because there are countless laws that will give equivalent results.
The rule cannot be a consequence of the objects because the behavior of the objects can never define a specific rule, all of those potential rules supervene equally on the objects. If there is a particular rule they must supervene on it.
Can we say that the Law of Gravity is the Ockham-shaven abstraction of all these possible rules? Whatever else is in a rule, it must include this bit about how massive objects behave around each other.
The notion does not, that's symbology as you say, but I would say that if there is a rule it must exist in some metaphysical way.
Why can't the rule be a causa sui property of the universe itself? The following two formulations:
1) The (extant) universe has the property "constrains things in it to behave gravitationally," the property itself having no metaphysical existence independent of the universe.
2) The (extant) law of gravity is a distinct metaphysical entity so construed as to constrain the (also extant) universe to have the property "constrains things in it to behave gravitationally."
-- are physically and mathematically isomorphic. For you to say that the rule must exist metaphysically is for you to say that (1) is wrong in some way -- makes mispredictions, produces mathematical invalidities, something.
My argument for why the Law of Gravity cannot supervene on physical things is this:
Imagine a configuration of objects affected only by "gravity". We cannot tell from where they are what the law of gravity is.
If we move forward by dt we still can't tell what the law of gravity is because there are countless laws that will give equivalent results.
The rule cannot be a consequence of the objects because the behavior of the objects can never define a specific rule, all of those potential rules supervene equally on the objects. If there is a particular rule they must supervene on it.
The last sentence simply does not follow. You've argued correctly that the set of potentially-viable laws of gravity supervenes on the gravitational behavior of particles, but that doesn't entail anything at all about the supervenience of the actual law of gravity.
In fact, from a mathematical perspective, the law of gravity and the gravitational behavior of particles are "equivenient": any change in the law of gravity entails the existence of a physical model where the gravitational behavior of particles qualitatively differs from the models under the previous law. This is because, mathematically speaking, the law of gravity is just the thing that tells you what kinds of gravitational behaviors can be actualized. Likewise, any change in physical model that yields qualitatively different gravitational behavior necessitates a change in the law of gravity to account for it. So there isn't a strict supervenience or subvenience relation.
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A limit of time is fixed for thee
Which if thou dost not use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind
It will go and thou wilt go, never to return.
I'm not going to articulate this as elegantly or accurately as Crashing00 did. But, I do want to throw my two cents in anyway, because I really think this is the heart of the disagreement:
I'd argue that it doesn't have affect to affect tangible if it defines it instead. I am totally willing to be convinced that I'm fooling myself with semantic trickery, though.
But, what is a "definition." When we define "blue," what are we doing?
We are saying photons of ~450–495 nm in wavelength are to be represented by these four characters: b, l, u, and e in that order. We do this because its easier than actually having the thing in question whenever we want to refer to it.
But, does that definition--itself--then have some objective metaphysical life of its own? Does the "blueness" of those photons exist in some Substance theory way, apart from the physicality of the energy band? I would emphatically disagree with anyone claiming "yes" was somehow a necessarily answer. But--in saying that--I certainly can't prove it does or doesn't. Yet--from a scientific stance--that's exactly the point:
The claim is unfalsifiable, and--thus--a scientifically useless one.
I don't think it's right to relegate the physical laws to the status of supervening on the physical. I think they are physical properties, just like the masses and waves themselves. My account of reality is that there is mass in such-and-such a configuration about, and part and parcel of what we understand by mass is that it is gravitational. Likewise, all the particles known of participate in a handful of force laws (or fields, or whatever the QM craze is going on about nowadays). Those laws, as properties of matter, elucidate the statement of the existence of any material thing.
I know that "force" is a bit of a backwater term, so I'm hobbled to proceed in detail here, but why not agree to make the so-called "laws" first-class members of the physics lexicon and get out of the trouble of debating their 'reality'?
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So electrons are moved about on little strings? What defines the motion of the strings then? I assume you're not comfortable with a primum mobil.
With the intention of playing along, why not something finite but cyclical? A loop is finite in size yet has no beginning or end, and is a linear object in the respect of having the ability to travel "along its length". If the universe has a destructive force that can double as a creative force of equal power and neither energy nor matter within the universe truly are consumed but instead merely change forms, then the universe can be a single finite functional object that is self contained and self sustaining with laws within it governing all actions and concepts demonstrated within without the need for an external instigating force.
If you want to argue against the concept of physicalism then I would like to pose you a question.
"Can you imagine something that is non-physical not in the respect that it _does not exist_, but rather in the respect that it _can not exist_, as it is non-physical"?
I ask that you propose some sort of "thing"(using a nebulous term here for the sake of not limiting you) that the physical universe does not contain the necessary materials to have exist somewhere at some time somehow in the physical sense, even if it does not do so at this place at this time?
Because every single "Non-physical" thing I've seen mentioned in this threat so far is a physical object that just so happens to not exist right here right now to our current knowledge. A hippo with wings doesn't exist, but it could exist as a physical object, it's just highly unlikely to due to evolution not favoring wings developing on creatures of that body type.
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Reading through that I stand by my objection. The idea that physical laws are physical things seems to simply be assumed even though it is inconsistent with the rest of physicalism. Much is made of demonstrating that physical properties are physical but nothing suggests that the rules themselves are physical.
Physical laws are not made of matter and energy.
Physical laws cannot be an emergent property of matter and energy and they can only supervene on matter and energy if they are coincidental.
This places physical laws outside of physicalism as defined in both of your quotes, despite the use of the world physical in the name.
(Although I note with some distress that the author performs the philosophical two-step and never actually says what it means for something to be physical.)
No one is implying that all physical laws are physical "things."
The implication is that they are "physical" because those laws "supervenes on, or [are] necessitated by, the physical."
Ummmm.... are you sure about that?
"Thus, a gravitational field is used to explain gravitational phenomena, and is measured in newtons per kilogram (N/kg). "[1]
The whole premise of field theory is that all of nature is made of matter and energy. Those fields--and the rules that govern them--"supervenes on, or [are] necessitated by, the physical."
Or, are you going Chenjesu's route and are saying that our symbology of these phenomenon somehow--necessarily--'transcends' the physical?
I disagree with that claim.
A gravitational field is not a physical law it is a physical phenomenon created by the rules. What defines the behavior of the field? The rules. Again this feels like a retreat toward an unmoved mover.
In Magic, for instance, when you cast a spell it goes on the stack. This is only possible because the rules exist outside of the cards (no card tells you to put itself on the stack) so the game state supervenes on the rules not the other way around. I'd agree with the statement that the rules of magic transcend the cards and yes, I think I'd agree that the laws of physics transcend the physical world.
Certainly if they are "physical" then they are a very alien sort of physical. They can affect us but we cannot affect them which is not true of anything else physical. The gravitational constant helps define how I fall but I cannot take any action to adjust that constant.
Is it part of some nonphysical meta-system, is it part of some higher order physical system, OR is it simply some words and symbols us humans use to describe an observed physical phenomena?
Now, I'm not going to sit here and tell you I have the definitive answer to that question. I'm sure Crashing00 can probably explain there is some ontological rule saying I CAN'T know the answer to that question. However, I will reiterate what I said before:
The nonphysical cannot--by definition--interact with the physical.
If YOU are going to claim that "the Law of Gravity" DOES exist in some objective nonphysical sense, then I will be skeptical until you also explain how something purely intangible can affect the tangible.
I think there is a subtle leap here that I brought up earlier, and perhaps I missed or forgot you covering this topic, but have we agreed to a definition on word "existence"? I personally can't claim anything exists until I know what existence means.
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
~~~~~
One of the reasons being that if I did it I'm pretty sure that definition would be irreverently tainted by my physicalist perspective to the point of being a question beg.
The notion does not, that's symbology as you say, but I would say that if there is a rule it must exist in some metaphysical way.
My argument for why the Law of Gravity cannot supervene on physical things is this:
Imagine a configuration of objects affected only by "gravity". We cannot tell from where they are what the law of gravity is.
If we move forward by dt we still can't tell what the law of gravity is because there are countless laws that will give equivalent results.
The rule cannot be a consequence of the objects because the behavior of the objects can never define a specific rule, all of those potential rules supervene equally on the objects. If there is a particular rule they must supervene on it.
As an instrumentalist I'm actually fine with accepting a coincidental world I just have no intention of treating it as such. Perhaps you're trying to hard to map the language of science onto physicalism. It is not a failure on the part of physicalism to deny that gravity exists in a deepmetaphysical sense, it's not like you're a Humean who's going to jump off a bridge or something.
I'd argue that it doesn't have affect to affect tangible if it defines it instead. I am totally willing to be convinced that I'm fooling myself with semantic trickery, though.
I think that's why philosophers developed different forms/types/levels of existence.
Wonder Woman does not exist in the same way that Angela Merkel exists and neither exists in the same way that the Platonic Forms are said to exist.
Us working out a definition of existence is important because definitions are not universal. Let's take Chenjesu's example of the purple unicorn, but this time before we can claim what it is or is not, let's talk about what makes a purple unicorn a purple unicorn. A lot of people have an idea of what a purple unicorn is. But there is a slight problem that I found when I did a google search on purple unicorns: I found all this.
The range of purple unicorn representations is massive. Even ignoring the things that Google caught by mistake, I'd say the variation is so great. The common elements seem to be is purple (somewhere), has a horn, and is a mammal stands on four legs. But that definition at least appears to be broad enough to include this as a purple unicorn, and the way to exclude this is by making the definition more specific. But if we're both talking about a "purple (somewhere), has a horn, and is a mammal stands on four legs" and do not get a better idea of what the picture we're imagining is, even if we're using two of the same images from my Google Search of Purple Unicorns, we could lose each other when I talk with this in mind, and you talk with this in mind.
Coming back around, I'd say that the same thing goes for existence. The most efficient way to exclude the immaterial is to define not just existence, but the material and the immaterial as well. Then flesh out a definition of existence that makes a relevant distinction between the two, and in terms of physicalism, what makes the exclusion of the immaterial relevant. *Granted you've done some of this already, but defining existence might alter the view a little*
P.S. I don't know how to define existence myself.
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
~~~~~
It is a rather recent phenomena that atheism is being portrayed in the market place of ideas as the world view of the scientist by its self appointed spokespeople. A lot of scientist of the past where happy to admit the limits of science but alas it seem the logical positivist has discard the magnanimous approach and plunged head long into the view that science is the sole arbiter of knowledge (As truly arrogant as that may be).
It is a pity though. If there is a continued crusade to purge the natural sciences of any religious thought then science can be assured that eventually you will have a great segment of society who will completely remove them from such disciplines. Thus bringing with a depression in the progress of science that may very easily take a century to recover from.
If you think a Christian 18 year old cannot see Richard Dawkins proclaiming that real scientist are atheist and think to him / her self. He is an ex Oxford professor telling me this maybe I should study and become something else and there by loosing another potential Noble laureate in the process I think you would be wrong.
But unfortunately he and many in of the new crop of atheism is not so much interested in advancement of science as they are of using science to promote an ideological agenda.
END OF RANT///
Most constructive part of the post.
Returning to topic...
Can we say that the Law of Gravity is the Ockham-shaven abstraction of all these possible rules? Whatever else is in a rule, it must include this bit about how massive objects behave around each other.
Have you ever seen them together in the same room?
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Why can't the rule be a causa sui property of the universe itself? The following two formulations:
1) The (extant) universe has the property "constrains things in it to behave gravitationally," the property itself having no metaphysical existence independent of the universe.
2) The (extant) law of gravity is a distinct metaphysical entity so construed as to constrain the (also extant) universe to have the property "constrains things in it to behave gravitationally."
-- are physically and mathematically isomorphic. For you to say that the rule must exist metaphysically is for you to say that (1) is wrong in some way -- makes mispredictions, produces mathematical invalidities, something.
The last sentence simply does not follow. You've argued correctly that the set of potentially-viable laws of gravity supervenes on the gravitational behavior of particles, but that doesn't entail anything at all about the supervenience of the actual law of gravity.
In fact, from a mathematical perspective, the law of gravity and the gravitational behavior of particles are "equivenient": any change in the law of gravity entails the existence of a physical model where the gravitational behavior of particles qualitatively differs from the models under the previous law. This is because, mathematically speaking, the law of gravity is just the thing that tells you what kinds of gravitational behaviors can be actualized. Likewise, any change in physical model that yields qualitatively different gravitational behavior necessitates a change in the law of gravity to account for it. So there isn't a strict supervenience or subvenience relation.
Which if thou dost not use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind
It will go and thou wilt go, never to return.
But, what is a "definition." When we define "blue," what are we doing?
We are saying photons of ~450–495 nm in wavelength are to be represented by these four characters: b, l, u, and e in that order. We do this because its easier than actually having the thing in question whenever we want to refer to it.
But, does that definition--itself--then have some objective metaphysical life of its own? Does the "blueness" of those photons exist in some Substance theory way, apart from the physicality of the energy band? I would emphatically disagree with anyone claiming "yes" was somehow a necessarily answer. But--in saying that--I certainly can't prove it does or doesn't. Yet--from a scientific stance--that's exactly the point:
The claim is unfalsifiable, and--thus--a scientifically useless one.
I know that "force" is a bit of a backwater term, so I'm hobbled to proceed in detail here, but why not agree to make the so-called "laws" first-class members of the physics lexicon and get out of the trouble of debating their 'reality'?
Awesome avatar provided by Krashbot @ [Epic Graphics].
With the intention of playing along, why not something finite but cyclical? A loop is finite in size yet has no beginning or end, and is a linear object in the respect of having the ability to travel "along its length". If the universe has a destructive force that can double as a creative force of equal power and neither energy nor matter within the universe truly are consumed but instead merely change forms, then the universe can be a single finite functional object that is self contained and self sustaining with laws within it governing all actions and concepts demonstrated within without the need for an external instigating force.
If you want to argue against the concept of physicalism then I would like to pose you a question.
"Can you imagine something that is non-physical not in the respect that it _does not exist_, but rather in the respect that it _can not exist_, as it is non-physical"?
I ask that you propose some sort of "thing"(using a nebulous term here for the sake of not limiting you) that the physical universe does not contain the necessary materials to have exist somewhere at some time somehow in the physical sense, even if it does not do so at this place at this time?
Because every single "Non-physical" thing I've seen mentioned in this threat so far is a physical object that just so happens to not exist right here right now to our current knowledge. A hippo with wings doesn't exist, but it could exist as a physical object, it's just highly unlikely to due to evolution not favoring wings developing on creatures of that body type.