Proximately? The language we speak. The moral code is "the moral code" in the same way that the Earth is "the Earth". Sure, you can always redefine words, declare that "morality" might mean paperclip maximization or that "the Earth" might mean a pancake. But at that point, you are no longer speaking the same language as your interlocutor - and at any rate, you have simply changed the thing you are talking about, not the properties of the thing your interlocutor is talking about. So you're not actually making any metaethical or metaphysical point; you're just playing with the fundamental arbitrariness of language.
Ultimately? We can ask why our language has identified this particular normative code with a special word, and why our culture and psychology give this code special significance. This is where we start talking about social evolution and fitness landscapes, which give us an objective and non-arbitrary* explanation for this behavior. Paperclip maximization - who cares? Certainly not natural selection. But morality actually does something.
*You may note that I both call language "arbitrary" and say there is a "non-arbitrary" explanation for how we use it. This may need a little unpacking. Using the particular word "morality" to refer to the thing morality is arbitrary; the language could use any word to refer to morality, and could use "morality" to refer to anything. But the historical explanation for why we have some word to refer to morality is not arbitrary in the least.
Jumping into this thread for the first time. I picked out this quote out of it because I've spent a lot of time on it in the past.
There is a class of moral statements where calling them part of 'the' Moral Code makes intuitive sense to virtually all speakers of the language - your example of rape is one of them.
There is also a class - quite broad - of moral statements where this won't make sense. If you ask whether abortion is immoral, you'll get a large number of people saying yes and a smaller number of people saying no (this won't line up completely with whether it should be illegal - decent numbers of pro-choice people also believe it's immoral, they just don't think the government should be enforcing that morality).
How do we address that? When one person says - with total conviction - that abortion is immoral, and another says - with equal conviction - that it is not, does that just delineate them as speaking different languages? Without going too far into the philosophy of language, we're talking about people in the same speaking community, here. If differences in moral code is the difference in their languages, it is likely the ONLY difference in their language.
We can say that one of the two groups is wrong; that, say, abortion is immoral, and anyone who says that it isn't is using the wrong word for their code of standards that they live by and believe everyone should be held to, but I don't think that gets us very far. The person who believes abortion is not immoral is going to use exactly the same argument in response - that we're misusing the language when we say abortion is immoral, and that we're committing a naming error. If you've got a good way to decide between the two, I'd love to hear it, because it seems fundamentally arbitrary to me.
How do we address that? When one person says - with total conviction - that abortion is immoral, and another says - with equal conviction - that it is not, does that just delineate them as speaking different languages? Without going too far into the philosophy of language, we're talking about people in the same speaking community, here. If differences in moral code is the difference in their languages, it is likely the ONLY difference in their language.
It is possible in principle that this disagreement is an idiolectic difference (in which case, like I said, it's not actually a matter of metaethics at all). However, my observation is that when people speak of "morality" in general terms, they are almost always talking about the same thing, and it is this thing that is the subject of ethics. Disagreements spring from different interpretations of the nature of the thing, and of whether that nature encompasses the contentious action.
A medieval alchemist and a modern chemist would disagree vehemently on the nature of water, and furthermore would disagree on what counts as water (an alchemist might well claim that diamonds contain water, and that air doesn't). But most of us wouldn't hesitate to say that the alchemist and the chemist are talking about the same thing when they use the word "water", and that what the alchemist says about water is false. They're speaking the same language, but at different levels of scientific understanding.
We can say that one of the two groups is wrong; that, say, abortion is immoral, and anyone who says that it isn't is using the wrong word for their code of standards that they live by and believe everyone should be held to, but I don't think that gets us very far. The person who believes abortion is not immoral is going to use exactly the same argument in response - that we're misusing the language when we say abortion is immoral, and that we're committing a naming error. If you've got a good way to decide between the two, I'd love to hear it, because it seems fundamentally arbitrary to me.
As I said above, I don't think this disagreement springs from an idiolectic difference. But if it is, then because the purpose of language is clear communication of ideas, idiolectic differences can be resolved pragmatically by an appeal to the majority of the speakers of the language. If a minority is using a word in such a way that the majority will misunderstand them, it's reasonable to say that the minority is using the wrong word. For example, even though there's no transcendental reason why we English speakers call dogs "dogs", if you have an idiolect that calls dogs "cats" and you want to talk to other English speakers about pets, you should probably change your idiolect.
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It is possible in principle that this disagreement is an idiolectic difference (in which case, like I said, it's not actually a matter of metaethics at all). However, my observation is that when people speak of "morality" in general terms, they are almost always talking about the same thing, and it is this thing that is the subject of ethics. Disagreements spring from different interpretations of the nature of the thing, and of whether that nature encompasses the contentious action.
A medieval alchemist and a modern chemist would disagree vehemently on the nature of water, and furthermore would disagree on what counts as water (an alchemist might well claim that diamonds contain water, and that air doesn't). But most of us wouldn't hesitate to say that the alchemist and the chemist are talking about the same thing when they use the word "water", and that what the alchemist says about water is false. They're speaking the same language, but at different levels of scientific understanding.
If someone finally comes up with an idea that advances our understanding of ethics in the way that chemists have advanced our understanding of water (that is, in an inarguably correct way), I will have to grant this point... for now, it seems to me that the two examples are disanalogous in the following way: if a neutral observer who has done no study at all of water asks a chemist and an alchemist to explain the nature of water, assuming the observer grasps the arguments of the two, the chemist will always be able to convince her that A) the alchemist is wrong, and B) the chemist is correct. The alchemist won't be able to convince the observer of anything; his arguments will be refuted down the line by the chemist.
If we repeat the example but this time use philosopher proponents of different ethical systems (say, an Aristotelian, a Kantian and a Utilitarian), it is very difficult to predict where the observer will fall. Each philosopher will be able to demonstrate that their ethics match certain intuitions of the observer, provide arguments for their side and arguments against the others. The observer might be convinced, on balance, to follow one of them (I think Utilitarianism does better with a modern observer than the other two), but it will most often not be with the kind of certainty or comfort with which they were convinced that the chemist was correct about water, and if we repeat the example over and over, many observers will likely decide that none of the options are satisfactory and will leave the question open.
If there's some grand unified theory of ethics that almost everyone accepts that I've missed, please enlighten me. The last time I checked, despite millennia of trying, the best objective moral codes people have managed to come up with are all still pretty bad.
As I said above, I don't think this disagreement springs from an idiolectic difference. But if it is, then because the purpose of language is clear communication of ideas, idiolectic differences can be resolved pragmatically by an appeal to the majority of the speakers of the language. If a minority is using a word in such a way that the majority will misunderstand them, it's reasonable to say that the minority is using the wrong word. For example, even though there's no transcendental reason why we English speakers call dogs "dogs", if you have an idiolect that calls dogs "cats" and you want to talk to other English speakers about pets, you should probably change your idiolect.
I understand that you don't think this is an idiolectic problem, but bear with me, I'm going somewhere with this.
To break this down, I'll use the following definitions (wishing I could use subscripts right now, btw):
'moralA' - The objective thing picked out by the majority use of the word 'moral' in our relevant community (according to which abortion is wrong).
'moralB' - The objective thing picked out by the minority use of the word 'moral' (according to which abortion is not wrong, but which is otherwise identical to moralA)
If we apply what you just said, the people who use 'moral' to mean moralB are mistaken in their use of the word. It would be difficult to convince them that they are using the wrong word - even if we convince them that the two groups are using the same word for different concepts, they'll want the other group to change (the word 'moral' is special; it carries weight that few other words carry. If we were talking about two different conceptions of what a 'hot dog' is, we wouldn't run into this kind of difficulty except maybe for nationalistic/regionalistic reasons. And this is where I jump in and say that I agree, the problem isn't idiolectic). They'll want the other group to change because they'll say that their use of the word 'moral' captures what is important about morality, while the other group's use of the word 'moral', while also being an objective code (it's not subjective, it gives the same output for every subject), is not an objective code which should be given special value, any more than the objective code which the Nazis followed and labeled 'moral' should be valued. How do we decide between these codes and pick which one to follow? I propose that there may not be any way to choose between them except to trust your gut.
And that's the major issue, I think. The concept of morality is not ambiguous (despite that lengthy bit about language). We all pretty much know what we're trying to get at when we talk about ethics. The problem is that we usually fail to realize that our individual moral codes flow from our individual basic (in the technical sense) values. These are certainly learned, so that members of a single society will have very similar if not identical basic values, but no argument can be given for them.
In short, barring some revolution in moral philosophy, I think that 'trust your gut' morality is about the best we can do. I don't know of any way to argue for or against basic values, and I don't think people can be convinced of any argument regarding morality except arguments from their own basic values.
Being non-religious but believing in a universal moral & ethical code (even if its super basic no-rape no-murder) is basically a form of informal religion. It's just faith in what's right and wrong.
More detailed codes of conduct or morals are derived from social "negotiation" and are highly culture specific, and I don't believe they can be derived from pure logic without starting with some beliefs.
If someone finally comes up with an idea that advances our understanding of ethics in the way that chemists have advanced our understanding of water (that is, in an inarguably correct way), I will have to grant this point... for now, it seems to me that the two examples are disanalogous in the following way: if a neutral observer who has done no study at all of water asks a chemist and an alchemist to explain the nature of water, assuming the observer grasps the arguments of the two, the chemist will always be able to convince her that A) the alchemist is wrong, and B) the chemist is correct. The alchemist won't be able to convince the observer of anything; his arguments will be refuted down the line by the chemist.
If we repeat the example but this time use philosopher proponents of different ethical systems (say, an Aristotelian, a Kantian and a Utilitarian), it is very difficult to predict where the observer will fall. Each philosopher will be able to demonstrate that their ethics match certain intuitions of the observer, provide arguments for their side and arguments against the others. The observer might be convinced, on balance, to follow one of them (I think Utilitarianism does better with a modern observer than the other two), but it will most often not be with the kind of certainty or comfort with which they were convinced that the chemist was correct about water, and if we repeat the example over and over, many observers will likely decide that none of the options are satisfactory and will leave the question open.
If there's some grand unified theory of ethics that almost everyone accepts that I've missed, please enlighten me. The last time I checked, despite millennia of trying, the best objective moral codes people have managed to come up with are all still pretty bad.
Why does it matter that there is currently no undisputed theory of morality? The truth isn't democratic. Maybe we are still in the Dark Ages of ethics, with Aristotelians, Kantians, and utilitarians playing the parts of competing alchemical traditions. If so, they are still all talking about the same thing; they're simply all wrong about it. There is a truth of the matter, but it is elsewhere, and wise observers may well notice its absence. Like the alchemical traditions, though, these theories contain kernels of the truth, and if better theories are to be constructed it will certainly be on the foundations they have laid.
Whatever the state of contemporary moral philosophy, I think this much is clear (and you seem to agree with me below): if you ask an Aristotelian, a Kantian, and a utilitarian what phenomena they're attempting to explain, they'll all point to the class of clear-cut moral intuitions like the wrongness of rape. The questions they're all trying to answer are "What is the explanation for and nature of this wrongness?" and "What else is wrong?" They all have different answers, and none of the answers are as universally convincing as an electrolysis experiment in chemistry, but nevertheless all the indications are that their disagreements are genuine, not idiolectic.
To break this down, I'll use the following definitions (wishing I could use subscripts right now, btw):
'moralA' - The objective thing picked out by the majority use of the word 'moral' in our relevant community (according to which abortion is wrong).
'moralB' - The objective thing picked out by the minority use of the word 'moral' (according to which abortion is not wrong, but which is otherwise identical to moralA)
And that's the major issue, I think. The concept of morality is not ambiguous (despite that lengthy bit about language). We all pretty much know what we're trying to get at when we talk about ethics. The problem is that we usually fail to realize that our individual moral codes flow from our individual basic (in the technical sense) values. These are certainly learned, so that members of a single society will have very similar if not identical basic values, but no argument can be given for them.
Granted, no normative argument can be given for them; that follows from their being basic. But that's not the end of the story. And I'd argue that basic values are not as learned as you might think. Sure, there are some qualities that societies treat as intrinsic goods, but upon analysis they tend to break down to idiosyncratic interpretations of more basic values that are, as far as anthropologists can discern, common to all of humanity. And we can go further, asking what the explanation is for this common core morality. And the answer, of course, was provided by those revolutionary moral philosophers, Thomas Hobbes and Charles Darwin.
Again, this explanation does not constitute a normative argument for adopting the common core morality, because nothing can. If a psychopath who doesn't acknowledge the basic value of human life decides to commit murder, you're not going to convince him to stop by explaining to him that humans value human life because the behavior that flows from such a trait tends to increase the frequency of the trait in future generations. Nevertheless, the explanation is objective, and it tells us what we're talking about when we talk about morality.
Now, turning back to your example of abortion. At least in the mainstream debate over the issue, the two sides clearly demonstrate the same basic moral values: they both value human life, and they both value human autonomy. The disagreement arises over whether a fetus constitutes "human life" (or, perhaps more accurately, a "person"), and, if it does, whether its right to life trumps the mother's right to autonomy. Now, this may sound bizarre coming from an objectivist, but I am not committed to there being a right answer in all cases of moral dilemma*. My main concern is establishing that there are objective moral values at work on both sides; because the values are "fuzzy", mental desires and sentiments, they may sometimes be difficult to quantify and weigh against each other. Sometimes you just have to hold your nose, take what seems to you to be the least wrong option, and accept the fact that some people are going to blame you for it. At least you and they agree on what was bad about your action.
*Actually I am, but it's an argument that begins with the words "if we were omniscient": quite impractical in the real world, and not relevant to the discussion.
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Vive, vale. Siquid novisti rectius istis,
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So BS, my understanding of your idea of morality is that evolution points us in the direction of a moral code that is universal in the way that it leads to the highest species-wide fitness level and will thus become fixed (present in all members of the population or in this case species) at some point, correct?
Why does it matter that there is currently no undisputed theory of morality? The truth isn't democratic.
Right, but the problem that I and I think overs have with your idea is that it attempts to force a democratic consensus (regardless of its source of natural selection) as a manifestation of an objective truth.
Whatever the state of contemporary moral philosophy, I think this much is clear (and you seem to agree with me below): if you ask an Aristotelian, a Kantian, and a utilitarian what phenomena they're attempting to explain, they'll all point to the class of clear-cut moral intuitions like the wrongness of rape.
I'd say that the visceral response to rape as wrong came originally not from evolution, but from something more like the social contract, and is now passed down through socialization, not genetics.
Granted, no normative argument can be given for them; that follows from their being basic. But that's not the end of the story. And I'd argue that basic values are not as learned as you might think. Sure, there are some qualities that societies treat as intrinsic goods, but upon analysis they tend to break down to idiosyncratic interpretations of more basic values that are, as far as anthropologists can discern, common to all of humanity. And we can go further, asking what the explanation is for this common core morality. And the answer, of course, was provided by those revolutionary moral philosophers, Thomas Hobbes and Charles Darwin.
The answer, or a working model?
This is the heart of my concern with your position. It relies on evolution as a progressive force - but evolution isn't. Natural selection simply leads to the development of things that work, not things that work "the best": this is why we have ecological niches.
If one species of bird may feed on nuts or wood mites, when snow falls and nuts are scarce, those adapted towards cracking nuts may die off while those adapted to probing bark thrive. However it may be the case that nuts are a more efficient source of energy, and that in areas where snow never falls, the birds which feed on nuts are instead selected for.
The interesting thing about it is that once the snow melts, you will see a resurgence in nut-eating members. This is because the nuts, now abundant, are an easy source of food for the few remaining nut feeders, who then thrive - regardless of the fact that next year, another frost will come and this segment of the population will suffer heavy losses.
Basically, variation within a population is typically conserved (as long as each variation works under certain circumstances) while specialization may or may not be favored in the individual.
Evolution does not work towards one definite goal. It is in the favor of the species to be varied and sometimes categorically different. It is only when these categorical differences prevent reproduction that speciation occurs - at which point the divergent resultants often move in totally different directions. Why? Because there is no one right way to go, there are only workable options.
Ethics, from an evolutionary standpoint, are the same way. Even if you say that ethics have no social root or that this root is in turn rooted in evolution... the fact is that having people with different viewpoints is, although frustrating, beneficial to the fitness of the species.
As long as a way of thinking has the potential to build a workable society, it can survive - much in the way that a shape of beak with any potential to find nutrients can allow a bird to survive.
The reason that a philosophy with a positive view on, say, murder, is not in widespread use is the fact that (particularly early on in human history for this one) killing off those who could be of use to your community harms your community's fitness.
Why is the death penalty a more popular view? Because it rests on a systematic determination of those who are detrimental to your community's fitness, and then allows you to excise them.
Again, this explanation does not constitute a normative argument for adopting the common core morality, because nothing can. If a psychopath who doesn't acknowledge the basic value of human life decides to commit murder, you're not going to convince him to stop by explaining to him that humans value human life because the behavior that flows from such a trait tends to increase the frequency of the trait in future generations.
Only if you assume that his children would solely develop their value of human life from his genes, and not what he (if you convince him) or others teach them.
The disagreement arises over whether a fetus constitutes "human life" (or, perhaps more accurately, a "person"), and, if it does, whether its right to life trumps the mother's right to autonomy.
Honestly, this always seems like a dummy argument to me. Are you sure the fact is that everyone values human life as paramount and are only debating the beginning of that life? After all, the facts remain: A fetus has a chance other than100% of becoming a fully fledged human. This chance can, as of yet, only be determined by a broad statistical average. In other words, there is nothing to argue about the humanity of a fetus: It has a relatively fixed chance of becoming a fully fledged human, one which we could even mathematically determine and manipulate towards the goal of reaching a decision on this point.
Do we? No, we prefer to argue about how such things cannot be put into numbers (even though in ways, they can) and how either a potential life or a woman's free will is sanctimonious (a notably emotional word).
It's like the most annoying overuse of reductionism, in my opinion... either black or white. And while that might sound strange coming from a determinist, there's a way that it fits which I won't spend the time going into unless someone specifically asks.
To me, the situation appears me like a dummy argument that hides the real debate that you mentioned afterwards: How does the value of a fetus compare to the value of the mother's will/happiness/etc.
Now, this may sound bizarre coming from an objectivist, but I am not committed to there being a right answer in all cases of moral dilemma*.
That's news to-
*Actually I am, but it's an argument that begins with the words "if we were omniscient": quite impractical in the real world, and not relevant to the discussion.
Right... well... aside from using an argument whose base you do not agree with, lets see what you got here.
My main concern is establishing that there are objective moral values at work on both sides; because the values are "fuzzy", mental desires and sentiments, they may sometimes be difficult to quantify and weigh against each other. Sometimes you just have to hold your nose, take what seems to you to be the least wrong option, and accept the fact that some people are going to blame you for it. At least you and they agree on what was bad about your action.
So I guess what you're saying is that even though you think there are objective morals, right now we don't all know them, and the best we can do is try to figure it out and accept that there will be wrong things about our actions due to our misunderstanding/lack of knowledge of the objective moral code?
I guess I can't really say anything to disprove this since it directly relies on your viewpoint, but I can provide my viewpoint's alternate explanations: First, that morality is an entirely cultural human construct and Second, that natural selection favors variability. Basically, like I said before, there are going to be disagreements and such simply because having different species/individuals doing different things are favorable for the environment's/population's (respectively) fitness.
*Actually I am, but it's an argument that begins with the words "if we were omniscient": quite impractical in the real world, and not relevant to the discussion.
So you concede that your viewpoint, even if it is correct, can never be fully realized - that it's simply an idealist one?
This really puzzles me, because I honestly thought your whole thing was "eventually, we'll all agree b/c of evolution".
So BS, my understanding of your idea of morality is that evolution points us in the direction of a moral code that is universal in the way that it leads to the highest species-wide fitness level and will thus become fixed (present in all members of the population or in this case species) at some point, correct?
Um... no. That could happen, but I'm neither a prophet nor a Marxist, to say that it will. And it's completely unnecessary for my theory. The role of evolution is explanatory, not eschatological. And the future state of human belief has no bearing on the objectivity or subjectivity of a moral code. When I say that the truth isn't democratic, I really mean it.
...reading on, most of what you say is perfectly sound criticism of this position that I do not hold. So I'm going to be doing a lot of skipping.
I'd say that the visceral response to rape as wrong came originally not from evolution, but from something more like the social contract, and is now passed down through socialization, not genetics.
I'd disagree strongly with you that the response to rape is the product of socialization, but that's an issue of psychology; for ethical purposes it doesn't matter. Social evolution is just as Darwinian as genetic evolution.
Only if you assume that his children would solely develop their value of human life from his genes, and not what he (if you convince him) or others teach them.
I think you misparsed what I wrote. You should read it as
...you're not going to convince him to stop [by explaining to him that [humans value human life because the behavior that flows from such a trait [valuing human life] tends to increase the frequency of the trait in future generations]].
not
...you're not going to convince him to stop [by explaining to him that humans value human life] because the behavior that flows from such a trait [psychopathy] tends to increase the frequency of the trait in future generations.
To me, the situation appears me like a dummy argument that hides the real debate that you mentioned afterwards: How does the value of a fetus compare to the value of the mother's will/happiness/etc.
Well, you obviously noticed that I brought up this debate, which just leaves me baffled as to why you think I think people don't have it. In fact, I agree with you that it's the more interesting debate. And, more to the point, it's the more directly ethical debate; the personhood one is more ethico-semantic.
So I guess what you're saying is that even though you think there are objective morals, right now we don't all know them, and the best we can do is try to figure it out and accept that there will be wrong things about our actions due to our misunderstanding/lack of knowledge of the objective moral code?
No, don't say "in fact". "In fact" would imply that what SneakySly was saying had any fact in it, as opposed to Sly being so dense that both Blinking Spirit and I gave up on bothering to try to teach him anything.
Sly was talking about ethical subjectivism. He, however, could not separate the idea that there is a way to believe in no absolute moral code while NOT believing in ethical subjectivism.
In fact, you can believe in 2 and 3 concurrently, since they are talking about two different things.
Yes, you can, because 3 is going several steps further than 2. The point is, however, that you can also believe in 2 but not believe in 3. This is what Sly couldn't understand.
You can easily believe intellectually in moral relativism logically.
No, you can't. Ethical relativism is illogical.
People often have this worldview, but if a person truly reflects on this turns out to be a very bad worldview
Let me explain
If Moral relativism is to be held as true do you realise that morally speaking mother therisa is on par with adolf hitler. Did you not think that Hitler was doing what he thought was morally right
We can take it a step further if Moral relativism is to be held true than person a can murder person b for no other reason than he / she believing it is the right thing to do.
If moral relativism was the norm we would not be living in a fair and just society. We woould have anarchy of the gravest type
Why does it matter that there is currently no undisputed theory of morality? The truth isn't democratic. Maybe we are still in the Dark Ages of ethics, with Aristotelians, Kantians, and utilitarians playing the parts of competing alchemical traditions. If so, they are still all talking about the same thing; they're simply all wrong about it. There is a truth of the matter, but it is elsewhere, and wise observers may well notice its absence. Like the alchemical traditions, though, these theories contain kernels of the truth, and if better theories are to be constructed it will certainly be on the foundations they have laid.
Whatever the state of contemporary moral philosophy, I think this much is clear (and you seem to agree with me below): if you ask an Aristotelian, a Kantian, and a utilitarian what phenomena they're attempting to explain, they'll all point to the class of clear-cut moral intuitions like the wrongness of rape. The questions they're all trying to answer are "What is the explanation for and nature of this wrongness?" and "What else is wrong?" They all have different answers, and none of the answers are as universally convincing as an electrolysis experiment in chemistry, but nevertheless all the indications are that their disagreements are genuine, not idiolectic.
(Left this hanging for longer than I meant to - been sick or taking care of sick lady/sick baby. Posting in brief for now)
I don't agree. I think a lot of moral philosophers are interested in it from a practical standpoint - they're seeking a moral code that can be used to govern behavior, not just seeking to explain their own intuitions.
It is possible that there is a 'fact of the matter' - an objective set of principles which explain intuitions about morality and which is universal to all humans. I don't take it for granted that it is the case, but it is at least possible. I don't think it matters whether this turns out to be the case or not, though, for at least two reasons:
1. It is quite likely to be much too broad to be practically applied. Many people have held that rape in some circumstances is completely ok - that, for instance, when you're invading a nation which doesn't hold to the same religion as you, slaughtering them and raping their women is just fine. Sure, few or no philosophers interested in ethics have argued this, and few people of any type have taken this position in the last few hundred years (though by no means no women - rape of enslaved Africans in America was a pretty normal thing 150 years ago, which a lot of people didn't see anything wrong with), but if we're looking for something universal, it needs to account for these kinds of cases as well. I honestly think that whatever universal morality we happen to find underlying everything may not be anything more than an interesting evolutionary or sociological fact.
2. Being universal to our species would not make it universal, unless we want to define morality as relative to a species. Social insects which became 'sentient' would define it in a radically different manner. More solitary species would again define it radically differently, if they had the concept at all. And there may be species structures we have never even been exposed to, among aliens. This again threatens to reduce such a universal human morality to little more than an interesting sociological point - that we evolved in a social clan-based structure, and thus have certain base intuitions about rightness and wrongness. I am pretty confident that if this turns out to be the best we can do by way of objective facts, it falls well short of what the Kantian wants to explain with moral theory.
1. It is quite likely to be much too broad to be practically applied. Many people have held that rape in some circumstances is completely ok - that, for instance, when you're invading a nation which doesn't hold to the same religion as you, slaughtering them and raping their women is just fine. Sure, few or no philosophers interested in ethics have argued this, and few people of any type have taken this position in the last few hundred years (though by no means no women - rape of enslaved Africans in America was a pretty normal thing 150 years ago, which a lot of people didn't see anything wrong with), but if we're looking for something universal, it needs to account for these kinds of cases as well. I honestly think that whatever universal morality we happen to find underlying everything may not be anything more than an interesting evolutionary or sociological fact.
That last sentence commits the naturalistic fallacy. Deriving a "ought" from a "is". How do you explain the fact that in nature a lion commits murder on a bi weekly scale. We don't condemn the lion as being immoral. We just say that's how it is the lion has to do it for survival.
If naturalism is to be true and atheism in particular than their can be know objective morality. As nowhere in nature is morals even hinted at. Atheist commonly accept the judeo / Christian morals that are taken for granted in western society, yet constantly reject the same God that makes these objective morals possible
Google the moral argument if you want to read more
Ps if you want to try a universal morality why don't you start with Christianity. I promise you if more of the world took to the moral teachings of Jesus than it would be a better place
People often have this worldview, but if a person truly reflects on this turns out to be a very bad worldview
Let me explain
If Moral relativism is to be held as true do you realise that morally speaking mother therisa is on par with adolf hitler. Did you not think that Hitler was doing what he thought was morally right
We can take it a step further if Moral relativism is to be held true than person a can murder person b for no other reason than he / she believing it is the right thing to do.
If moral relativism was the norm we would not be living in a fair and just society. We woould have anarchy of the gravest type
Well I partially agree with you here actually. I think there are no moral absolutes. I am aware of the fact that this leads to the conclusion that the nicest person ever is objectively no better morally than Hitler.
But I have subjective morals, and it does not mean that they are subjectively morally equivalent. Subjectively, Hitler was responsible for terrible things and is morally terrible in my view. There's just no objective position to comment from.
Someone can go out and murder someone even if objective morality existed, so your point is kind of lost on me there. It would be objectively wrong in one case, and almost-universally subjectively wrong in the other case.
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"For small creatures such as we the vastness is bearable only through love." --Carl Sagan
That last sentence commits the naturalistic fallacy. Deriving a "ought" from a "is".
The last sentence can't be a fallacy. It's a statement about what the author THINKS is true, as stated. Unless you're saying he does not know what he is thinking.
A naturalistic fallacy only applies if the person is assuring "is" (necessarily)/(has to) mean(s) "ought." Not when someone asserts "I think we will find out in the future 'is' means 'ought.'" That's simply the person stating their prediction of future knowledge.
How do you explain the fact that in nature a lion commits murder on a bi weekly scale. We don't condemn the lion as being immoral. We just say that's how it is the lion has to do it for survival.
We don't consider killing animals "murder," unless you think that humans "murder" billions of animals a day.
If an lion kills a HUMAN, however, suddenly we do care. We feel that killing humans is "murder," not the killing of any living creature, like a plant.
Disagree.
I agree with Robert Wright in Nonzero. In nature we see that cooperative, "good," actions have better long-term beifits than selfish, "evil," actions.
This is also played out in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma experiments. There is no need for a Robot Jesus to show why the computer programs act as they do.
Atheist commonly accept the judeo / Christian morals that are taken for granted in western society, yet constantly reject the same God that makes these objective morals possible
No, they don't.
Judeo / Christian morals are derived solely from the idea that "good" is "doing God's will." If you don't believe in God's Will you reject the very bases of what a Christian feels is good, thus an atheist CANNOT "accept the judeo / Christian morals," and your statement is self contradictory.
That last sentence commits the naturalistic fallacy. Deriving a "ought" from a "is". How do you explain the fact that in nature a lion commits murder on a bi weekly scale. We don't condemn the lion as being immoral. We just say that's how it is the lion has to do it for survival.
It does not. The proposal I'm responding to roughly amounts to the proposal that moral philosophy is actually description of a special class of 'is' - the set of intuitions which underlie the codes of morality which we actually live by, which is presumably shared across all cultures by most normally functional humans. In that case, the 'is' is really an 'ought' already - it's a description of the basic principles underlying all 'ought' statements. It might (and I stress, might) be fair to object to that viewpoint on the naturalistic fallacy, though I haven't gone there.
My objection #1 is just that even if we derive an 'ought' which is objective by finding the thing underlying all of our actual moral intuitions, that 'ought' might be so broad and vague as to not be worth knowing. It may not be able to help any person resolve an actual moral quandary, or to e.g. condemn someone for engaging in slavery, rape or even murder of a member of an outgroup.
If naturalism is to be true and atheism in particular than their can be know objective morality. As nowhere in nature is morals even hinted at. Atheist commonly accept the judeo / Christian morals that are taken for granted in western society, yet constantly reject the same God that makes these objective morals possible
Lots of objective ethics have been proposed which don't rely on any idea of God. It would be more correct to say that atheists commonly accept many of the specific moral results of the Judeo/Christian moral code, but then, many of those ideas are simply commonly regardless of religion.
Google the moral argument if you want to read more
I've done a lot more ethics than just googling it.
Ps if you want to try a universal morality why don't you start with Christianity. I promise you if more of the world took to the moral teachings of Jesus than it would be a better place
Anyone who is looking for an objective morality is looking for a morality that they not only can live by but which they think everyone should live by. Arbitrarily adopting one is generally not an option, and if I don't believe in Jesus as God, I have no reason to value his moral teachings as the word of God. If I'm just arbitrarily accepting a set of moral principles, I'll use the ones that feel right to me rather than ones that some random other person said.
Lots of objective ethics have been proposed which don't rely on any idea of God. It would be more correct to say that atheists commonly accept many of the specific moral results of the Judeo/Christian moral code, but then, many of those ideas are simply commonly regardless of religion.
Please inform me of any objective moral values that your naturalism teaches because I have done some research in my own pursuits as a Christian and time and again when the best atheist scholars have gone into the realms of morals they have always reverted back to moral relativism
So I'm intrigued to say the least as to what objective moral teachings you can posit on your naturalistic worldview that does not commit the naturalistic fallacy.
Yet again it is the Judeo / Christian religion that makes these morals possible yet you do not want to believe in the God that gives the explanation for these morals. The phrase "Have your cake and eat it too" comes to mind
I honestly think that whatever universal morality we happen to find underlying everything may not be anything more than an interesting evolutionary or sociological fact.
To think that objective morals can be the results of evolution is a classic example of the naturalistic fallacy
Please inform me of any objective moral values that your naturalism teaches because I have done some research in my own pursuits as a Christian and time and again when the best atheist scholars have gone into the realms of morals they have always reverted back to moral relativism
In my pursuits as a philosophy student I've done a little research myself, and I bet I can name more secular objectivist philosophers than you can name secular relativist ones.
To think that objective morals can be the results of evolution is a classic example of the naturalistic fallacy
And yet, intelligent and educated men and women who are perfectly familiar with the naturalistic fallacy do so anyway. Perhaps their understanding of the topic is a little more sophisticated than yours?
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Vive, vale. Siquid novisti rectius istis,
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Please inform me of any objective moral values that your naturalism teaches because I have done some research in my own pursuits as a Christian and time and again when the best atheist scholars have gone into the realms of morals they have always reverted back to moral relativism
I know this thread is rather busy and you might not have time to respond to each and every question put to you. I can understand that. However, I really would like you to take a look at my post if you could, and maybe respond to one or two of my statements if you had time. I was hoping if you could give me some insight to your mindset.
Thank you for your time in advance,
Taylor Pyne Connor
Please inform me of any objective moral values that your naturalism teaches because I have done some research in my own pursuits as a Christian and time and again when the best atheist scholars have gone into the realms of morals they have always reverted back to moral relativism
So I'm intrigued to say the least as to what objective moral teachings you can posit on your naturalistic worldview that does not commit the naturalistic fallacy.
Yet again it is the Judeo / Christian religion that makes these morals possible yet you do not want to believe in the God that gives the explanation for these morals. The phrase "Have your cake and eat it too" comes to mind
To think that objective morals can be the results of evolution is a classic example of the naturalistic fallacy
You've committed a fallacy in your presuppositions, and everything you're saying follows from that fallacy.
The fallacy is assuming that your Christianity and my scientistic naturalism are the same kind of thing. They are qualitatively different.
Christianity as a religion is an authority (or, perhaps more correctly, has authorities). An authority is something or someone that tells you concretely that X is true, Y is false, and so on. Because adhering to Christian values entails accepting a Christian authority (possibly the Bible, possibly your priest or minister, possibly what you experience during certain kinds of trances, depending on your particular denomination) as giving you the correct answer. Christianity as a worldview entails belief in a particular moral authority, and moral behavior is just doing what the authority says is right.
Naturalism is a worldview but not an authority. Someone with a Naturalist worldview would not try to derive objective moral imperatives from it directly; they would try to derive them from something else. Kant tried to derive morality from pure reason (basically but not precisely, the rules of logic), for example. If I understand him correctly, Blinking Spirit has been advocating the idea that a certain class of 'is' statements turn out to be 'ought' statements at a basic level due more or less to the definition of the word 'ought'.
These are not 'the word of Naturalism', they are merely compatible with Naturalism. Both are in fact also compatible with Christianity... to do the theodicies, Kant and Christianity can both be right if God has constructed logic such that someone using pure reason as a moral guide will behave according to the tenets of the Bible, while Blinking Spirit and Christianity can both be right if God has made humans with deep-seated intuitions that will tend to lead them to behave according to the moral tenets of the Bible.
All that said, objective moralities (including Christian morality, by the way) do suffer from a motivational problem. To demonstrate the problem:
I accept that there is a God, that he is all powerful, all-knowing, 'all-loving' (whatever that means), and that he commands a particular framework as being 'moral'. Why do I care?
I might care because he's going to punish me if I don't follow his rules, but I will equally follow his rules in that case whether he's commanding me to stone rape victims to death (Deuteronomy 22: 23-24), worship him, or volunteer my time to charities. Further, I may have my own intuitions about what is 'right' and they may not sync up; for instance, it might seem to me that God is doing wrong when he condemns nonbelievers to burn in hell forever simply for not accepting him as their God in the complete absence of evidence despite living the most virtuous lives they can. I won't have any language to express this, of course, since my religious convictions will have co-opted my moral language for another purpose, but that doesn't make that feeling less real.
This doesn't seem to be different in kind from giving a bully my lunch money so that he won't beat me up; it's just much larger stakes. Yet use of moral language seems to be aimed at designating that there is supposed to be a difference in kind. What's the difference?
Other moral systems have different motivational problems, but still have motivational problems - why should I try to maximize pleasure and minimize pain, as Utilitarianism dictates? You can call this the Naturalistic Fallacy if you like, but Christian morality suffers from it too. You're trying to derive an 'ought' (X is morally right) from an 'is' (God says X is morally right and will punish me for disagreeing). And defining morally right as "doing what God says is morally right" doesn't solve the problem any more than defining morally right as "maximizing utility" solves the problem - it pushes it to one level of regress, with observers who accept your definition of terms asking "Why should I value the morally right?"
EDIT: I call this a motivational problem in the literal sense that it is a problem of getting someone who does not already value acting according to what you've defined as moral to begin valuing acting according to that (i.e. would do it even if you didn't make them). It does arise for some forms of relativism (e.g. cultural relativism; you should act according to what your culture considers right) but it does not arise for other forms of relativism (e.g. personal relativism; you should act according to what you feel is right) - everyone already behaves as though personal relativism is true (even if what they feel is right is a manifestation of their having internalized some other belief system e.g. christianity or utilitarianism), so motivating them to start believing in it is simply not a priority. This objection is, basically, the reason why I think that what I've termed "Follow your gut morality" is the best we'll ever do. Blinking Spirit's moral thesis is actually resistant to this objection, incidentally, but I have other objections to that thesis so I haven't accepted it anyway.
Jumping into this thread for the first time. I picked out this quote out of it because I've spent a lot of time on it in the past.
There is a class of moral statements where calling them part of 'the' Moral Code makes intuitive sense to virtually all speakers of the language - your example of rape is one of them.
There is also a class - quite broad - of moral statements where this won't make sense. If you ask whether abortion is immoral, you'll get a large number of people saying yes and a smaller number of people saying no (this won't line up completely with whether it should be illegal - decent numbers of pro-choice people also believe it's immoral, they just don't think the government should be enforcing that morality).
How do we address that? When one person says - with total conviction - that abortion is immoral, and another says - with equal conviction - that it is not, does that just delineate them as speaking different languages? Without going too far into the philosophy of language, we're talking about people in the same speaking community, here. If differences in moral code is the difference in their languages, it is likely the ONLY difference in their language.
We can say that one of the two groups is wrong; that, say, abortion is immoral, and anyone who says that it isn't is using the wrong word for their code of standards that they live by and believe everyone should be held to, but I don't think that gets us very far. The person who believes abortion is not immoral is going to use exactly the same argument in response - that we're misusing the language when we say abortion is immoral, and that we're committing a naming error. If you've got a good way to decide between the two, I'd love to hear it, because it seems fundamentally arbitrary to me.
It is possible in principle that this disagreement is an idiolectic difference (in which case, like I said, it's not actually a matter of metaethics at all). However, my observation is that when people speak of "morality" in general terms, they are almost always talking about the same thing, and it is this thing that is the subject of ethics. Disagreements spring from different interpretations of the nature of the thing, and of whether that nature encompasses the contentious action.
A medieval alchemist and a modern chemist would disagree vehemently on the nature of water, and furthermore would disagree on what counts as water (an alchemist might well claim that diamonds contain water, and that air doesn't). But most of us wouldn't hesitate to say that the alchemist and the chemist are talking about the same thing when they use the word "water", and that what the alchemist says about water is false. They're speaking the same language, but at different levels of scientific understanding.
As I said above, I don't think this disagreement springs from an idiolectic difference. But if it is, then because the purpose of language is clear communication of ideas, idiolectic differences can be resolved pragmatically by an appeal to the majority of the speakers of the language. If a minority is using a word in such a way that the majority will misunderstand them, it's reasonable to say that the minority is using the wrong word. For example, even though there's no transcendental reason why we English speakers call dogs "dogs", if you have an idiolect that calls dogs "cats" and you want to talk to other English speakers about pets, you should probably change your idiolect.
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
If someone finally comes up with an idea that advances our understanding of ethics in the way that chemists have advanced our understanding of water (that is, in an inarguably correct way), I will have to grant this point... for now, it seems to me that the two examples are disanalogous in the following way: if a neutral observer who has done no study at all of water asks a chemist and an alchemist to explain the nature of water, assuming the observer grasps the arguments of the two, the chemist will always be able to convince her that A) the alchemist is wrong, and B) the chemist is correct. The alchemist won't be able to convince the observer of anything; his arguments will be refuted down the line by the chemist.
If we repeat the example but this time use philosopher proponents of different ethical systems (say, an Aristotelian, a Kantian and a Utilitarian), it is very difficult to predict where the observer will fall. Each philosopher will be able to demonstrate that their ethics match certain intuitions of the observer, provide arguments for their side and arguments against the others. The observer might be convinced, on balance, to follow one of them (I think Utilitarianism does better with a modern observer than the other two), but it will most often not be with the kind of certainty or comfort with which they were convinced that the chemist was correct about water, and if we repeat the example over and over, many observers will likely decide that none of the options are satisfactory and will leave the question open.
If there's some grand unified theory of ethics that almost everyone accepts that I've missed, please enlighten me. The last time I checked, despite millennia of trying, the best objective moral codes people have managed to come up with are all still pretty bad.
I understand that you don't think this is an idiolectic problem, but bear with me, I'm going somewhere with this.
To break this down, I'll use the following definitions (wishing I could use subscripts right now, btw):
'moralA' - The objective thing picked out by the majority use of the word 'moral' in our relevant community (according to which abortion is wrong).
'moralB' - The objective thing picked out by the minority use of the word 'moral' (according to which abortion is not wrong, but which is otherwise identical to moralA)
If we apply what you just said, the people who use 'moral' to mean moralB are mistaken in their use of the word. It would be difficult to convince them that they are using the wrong word - even if we convince them that the two groups are using the same word for different concepts, they'll want the other group to change (the word 'moral' is special; it carries weight that few other words carry. If we were talking about two different conceptions of what a 'hot dog' is, we wouldn't run into this kind of difficulty except maybe for nationalistic/regionalistic reasons. And this is where I jump in and say that I agree, the problem isn't idiolectic). They'll want the other group to change because they'll say that their use of the word 'moral' captures what is important about morality, while the other group's use of the word 'moral', while also being an objective code (it's not subjective, it gives the same output for every subject), is not an objective code which should be given special value, any more than the objective code which the Nazis followed and labeled 'moral' should be valued. How do we decide between these codes and pick which one to follow? I propose that there may not be any way to choose between them except to trust your gut.
And that's the major issue, I think. The concept of morality is not ambiguous (despite that lengthy bit about language). We all pretty much know what we're trying to get at when we talk about ethics. The problem is that we usually fail to realize that our individual moral codes flow from our individual basic (in the technical sense) values. These are certainly learned, so that members of a single society will have very similar if not identical basic values, but no argument can be given for them.
In short, barring some revolution in moral philosophy, I think that 'trust your gut' morality is about the best we can do. I don't know of any way to argue for or against basic values, and I don't think people can be convinced of any argument regarding morality except arguments from their own basic values.
More detailed codes of conduct or morals are derived from social "negotiation" and are highly culture specific, and I don't believe they can be derived from pure logic without starting with some beliefs.
Like trying to build theorems without postulates.
Why does it matter that there is currently no undisputed theory of morality? The truth isn't democratic. Maybe we are still in the Dark Ages of ethics, with Aristotelians, Kantians, and utilitarians playing the parts of competing alchemical traditions. If so, they are still all talking about the same thing; they're simply all wrong about it. There is a truth of the matter, but it is elsewhere, and wise observers may well notice its absence. Like the alchemical traditions, though, these theories contain kernels of the truth, and if better theories are to be constructed it will certainly be on the foundations they have laid.
Whatever the state of contemporary moral philosophy, I think this much is clear (and you seem to agree with me below): if you ask an Aristotelian, a Kantian, and a utilitarian what phenomena they're attempting to explain, they'll all point to the class of clear-cut moral intuitions like the wrongness of rape. The questions they're all trying to answer are "What is the explanation for and nature of this wrongness?" and "What else is wrong?" They all have different answers, and none of the answers are as universally convincing as an electrolysis experiment in chemistry, but nevertheless all the indications are that their disagreements are genuine, not idiolectic.
moral[sub]A[/sub] = moralA
Granted, no normative argument can be given for them; that follows from their being basic. But that's not the end of the story. And I'd argue that basic values are not as learned as you might think. Sure, there are some qualities that societies treat as intrinsic goods, but upon analysis they tend to break down to idiosyncratic interpretations of more basic values that are, as far as anthropologists can discern, common to all of humanity. And we can go further, asking what the explanation is for this common core morality. And the answer, of course, was provided by those revolutionary moral philosophers, Thomas Hobbes and Charles Darwin.
Again, this explanation does not constitute a normative argument for adopting the common core morality, because nothing can. If a psychopath who doesn't acknowledge the basic value of human life decides to commit murder, you're not going to convince him to stop by explaining to him that humans value human life because the behavior that flows from such a trait tends to increase the frequency of the trait in future generations. Nevertheless, the explanation is objective, and it tells us what we're talking about when we talk about morality.
Now, turning back to your example of abortion. At least in the mainstream debate over the issue, the two sides clearly demonstrate the same basic moral values: they both value human life, and they both value human autonomy. The disagreement arises over whether a fetus constitutes "human life" (or, perhaps more accurately, a "person"), and, if it does, whether its right to life trumps the mother's right to autonomy. Now, this may sound bizarre coming from an objectivist, but I am not committed to there being a right answer in all cases of moral dilemma*. My main concern is establishing that there are objective moral values at work on both sides; because the values are "fuzzy", mental desires and sentiments, they may sometimes be difficult to quantify and weigh against each other. Sometimes you just have to hold your nose, take what seems to you to be the least wrong option, and accept the fact that some people are going to blame you for it. At least you and they agree on what was bad about your action.
*Actually I am, but it's an argument that begins with the words "if we were omniscient": quite impractical in the real world, and not relevant to the discussion.
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Right, but the problem that I and I think overs have with your idea is that it attempts to force a democratic consensus (regardless of its source of natural selection) as a manifestation of an objective truth.
I'd say that the visceral response to rape as wrong came originally not from evolution, but from something more like the social contract, and is now passed down through socialization, not genetics.
The answer, or a working model?
This is the heart of my concern with your position. It relies on evolution as a progressive force - but evolution isn't. Natural selection simply leads to the development of things that work, not things that work "the best": this is why we have ecological niches.
If one species of bird may feed on nuts or wood mites, when snow falls and nuts are scarce, those adapted towards cracking nuts may die off while those adapted to probing bark thrive. However it may be the case that nuts are a more efficient source of energy, and that in areas where snow never falls, the birds which feed on nuts are instead selected for.
The interesting thing about it is that once the snow melts, you will see a resurgence in nut-eating members. This is because the nuts, now abundant, are an easy source of food for the few remaining nut feeders, who then thrive - regardless of the fact that next year, another frost will come and this segment of the population will suffer heavy losses.
Basically, variation within a population is typically conserved (as long as each variation works under certain circumstances) while specialization may or may not be favored in the individual.
Evolution does not work towards one definite goal. It is in the favor of the species to be varied and sometimes categorically different. It is only when these categorical differences prevent reproduction that speciation occurs - at which point the divergent resultants often move in totally different directions. Why? Because there is no one right way to go, there are only workable options.
Ethics, from an evolutionary standpoint, are the same way. Even if you say that ethics have no social root or that this root is in turn rooted in evolution... the fact is that having people with different viewpoints is, although frustrating, beneficial to the fitness of the species.
As long as a way of thinking has the potential to build a workable society, it can survive - much in the way that a shape of beak with any potential to find nutrients can allow a bird to survive.
The reason that a philosophy with a positive view on, say, murder, is not in widespread use is the fact that (particularly early on in human history for this one) killing off those who could be of use to your community harms your community's fitness.
Why is the death penalty a more popular view? Because it rests on a systematic determination of those who are detrimental to your community's fitness, and then allows you to excise them.
Only if you assume that his children would solely develop their value of human life from his genes, and not what he (if you convince him) or others teach them.
Honestly, this always seems like a dummy argument to me. Are you sure the fact is that everyone values human life as paramount and are only debating the beginning of that life? After all, the facts remain: A fetus has a chance other than 100% of becoming a fully fledged human. This chance can, as of yet, only be determined by a broad statistical average. In other words, there is nothing to argue about the humanity of a fetus: It has a relatively fixed chance of becoming a fully fledged human, one which we could even mathematically determine and manipulate towards the goal of reaching a decision on this point.
Do we? No, we prefer to argue about how such things cannot be put into numbers (even though in ways, they can) and how either a potential life or a woman's free will is sanctimonious (a notably emotional word).
It's like the most annoying overuse of reductionism, in my opinion... either black or white. And while that might sound strange coming from a determinist, there's a way that it fits which I won't spend the time going into unless someone specifically asks.
To me, the situation appears me like a dummy argument that hides the real debate that you mentioned afterwards: How does the value of a fetus compare to the value of the mother's will/happiness/etc.
That's news to- Right... well... aside from using an argument whose base you do not agree with, lets see what you got here.
So I guess what you're saying is that even though you think there are objective morals, right now we don't all know them, and the best we can do is try to figure it out and accept that there will be wrong things about our actions due to our misunderstanding/lack of knowledge of the objective moral code?
I guess I can't really say anything to disprove this since it directly relies on your viewpoint, but I can provide my viewpoint's alternate explanations: First, that morality is an entirely cultural human construct and Second, that natural selection favors variability. Basically, like I said before, there are going to be disagreements and such simply because having different species/individuals doing different things are favorable for the environment's/population's (respectively) fitness.
So you concede that your viewpoint, even if it is correct, can never be fully realized - that it's simply an idealist one?
This really puzzles me, because I honestly thought your whole thing was "eventually, we'll all agree b/c of evolution".
Um... no. That could happen, but I'm neither a prophet nor a Marxist, to say that it will. And it's completely unnecessary for my theory. The role of evolution is explanatory, not eschatological. And the future state of human belief has no bearing on the objectivity or subjectivity of a moral code. When I say that the truth isn't democratic, I really mean it.
...reading on, most of what you say is perfectly sound criticism of this position that I do not hold. So I'm going to be doing a lot of skipping.
I'd disagree strongly with you that the response to rape is the product of socialization, but that's an issue of psychology; for ethical purposes it doesn't matter. Social evolution is just as Darwinian as genetic evolution.
I think you misparsed what I wrote. You should read it as not
No. And I explicitly said as such. They do, however, all value human life.
Well, you obviously noticed that I brought up this debate, which just leaves me baffled as to why you think I think people don't have it. In fact, I agree with you that it's the more interesting debate. And, more to the point, it's the more directly ethical debate; the personhood one is more ethico-semantic.
Yes. Welcome to the human epistemic condition.
Scientifically demonstrable as false. See Steven Pinker's The Blank Slate, and the extensive bibliography thereof.
But a very special and circumscribed sort of variability. It's emphatically not the case that anything goes.
Short answer: No.
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
No, don't say "in fact". "In fact" would imply that what SneakySly was saying had any fact in it, as opposed to Sly being so dense that both Blinking Spirit and I gave up on bothering to try to teach him anything.
Sly was talking about ethical subjectivism. He, however, could not separate the idea that there is a way to believe in no absolute moral code while NOT believing in ethical subjectivism.
Yes, you can, because 3 is going several steps further than 2. The point is, however, that you can also believe in 2 but not believe in 3. This is what Sly couldn't understand.
People often have this worldview, but if a person truly reflects on this turns out to be a very bad worldview
Let me explain
If Moral relativism is to be held as true do you realise that morally speaking mother therisa is on par with adolf hitler. Did you not think that Hitler was doing what he thought was morally right
We can take it a step further if Moral relativism is to be held true than person a can murder person b for no other reason than he / she believing it is the right thing to do.
If moral relativism was the norm we would not be living in a fair and just society. We woould have anarchy of the gravest type
Insert witty phrase here
(Left this hanging for longer than I meant to - been sick or taking care of sick lady/sick baby. Posting in brief for now)
I don't agree. I think a lot of moral philosophers are interested in it from a practical standpoint - they're seeking a moral code that can be used to govern behavior, not just seeking to explain their own intuitions.
It is possible that there is a 'fact of the matter' - an objective set of principles which explain intuitions about morality and which is universal to all humans. I don't take it for granted that it is the case, but it is at least possible. I don't think it matters whether this turns out to be the case or not, though, for at least two reasons:
1. It is quite likely to be much too broad to be practically applied. Many people have held that rape in some circumstances is completely ok - that, for instance, when you're invading a nation which doesn't hold to the same religion as you, slaughtering them and raping their women is just fine. Sure, few or no philosophers interested in ethics have argued this, and few people of any type have taken this position in the last few hundred years (though by no means no women - rape of enslaved Africans in America was a pretty normal thing 150 years ago, which a lot of people didn't see anything wrong with), but if we're looking for something universal, it needs to account for these kinds of cases as well. I honestly think that whatever universal morality we happen to find underlying everything may not be anything more than an interesting evolutionary or sociological fact.
2. Being universal to our species would not make it universal, unless we want to define morality as relative to a species. Social insects which became 'sentient' would define it in a radically different manner. More solitary species would again define it radically differently, if they had the concept at all. And there may be species structures we have never even been exposed to, among aliens. This again threatens to reduce such a universal human morality to little more than an interesting sociological point - that we evolved in a social clan-based structure, and thus have certain base intuitions about rightness and wrongness. I am pretty confident that if this turns out to be the best we can do by way of objective facts, it falls well short of what the Kantian wants to explain with moral theory.
That last sentence commits the naturalistic fallacy. Deriving a "ought" from a "is". How do you explain the fact that in nature a lion commits murder on a bi weekly scale. We don't condemn the lion as being immoral. We just say that's how it is the lion has to do it for survival.
If naturalism is to be true and atheism in particular than their can be know objective morality. As nowhere in nature is morals even hinted at. Atheist commonly accept the judeo / Christian morals that are taken for granted in western society, yet constantly reject the same God that makes these objective morals possible
Google the moral argument if you want to read more
Ps if you want to try a universal morality why don't you start with Christianity. I promise you if more of the world took to the moral teachings of Jesus than it would be a better place
Insert witty phrase here
Well I partially agree with you here actually. I think there are no moral absolutes. I am aware of the fact that this leads to the conclusion that the nicest person ever is objectively no better morally than Hitler.
But I have subjective morals, and it does not mean that they are subjectively morally equivalent. Subjectively, Hitler was responsible for terrible things and is morally terrible in my view. There's just no objective position to comment from.
Someone can go out and murder someone even if objective morality existed, so your point is kind of lost on me there. It would be objectively wrong in one case, and almost-universally subjectively wrong in the other case.
A naturalistic fallacy only applies if the person is assuring "is" (necessarily)/(has to) mean(s) "ought." Not when someone asserts "I think we will find out in the future 'is' means 'ought.'" That's simply the person stating their prediction of future knowledge.
We don't consider killing animals "murder," unless you think that humans "murder" billions of animals a day.
If an lion kills a HUMAN, however, suddenly we do care. We feel that killing humans is "murder," not the killing of any living creature, like a plant.
No. You just need to derive it from another "objective" source, like physics or something. Disagree.
I agree with Robert Wright in Nonzero. In nature we see that cooperative, "good," actions have better long-term beifits than selfish, "evil," actions.
This is also played out in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma experiments. There is no need for a Robot Jesus to show why the computer programs act as they do.
No, they don't.
Judeo / Christian morals are derived solely from the idea that "good" is "doing God's will." If you don't believe in God's Will you reject the very bases of what a Christian feels is good, thus an atheist CANNOT "accept the judeo / Christian morals," and your statement is self contradictory.
It does not. The proposal I'm responding to roughly amounts to the proposal that moral philosophy is actually description of a special class of 'is' - the set of intuitions which underlie the codes of morality which we actually live by, which is presumably shared across all cultures by most normally functional humans. In that case, the 'is' is really an 'ought' already - it's a description of the basic principles underlying all 'ought' statements. It might (and I stress, might) be fair to object to that viewpoint on the naturalistic fallacy, though I haven't gone there.
My objection #1 is just that even if we derive an 'ought' which is objective by finding the thing underlying all of our actual moral intuitions, that 'ought' might be so broad and vague as to not be worth knowing. It may not be able to help any person resolve an actual moral quandary, or to e.g. condemn someone for engaging in slavery, rape or even murder of a member of an outgroup.
Lots of objective ethics have been proposed which don't rely on any idea of God. It would be more correct to say that atheists commonly accept many of the specific moral results of the Judeo/Christian moral code, but then, many of those ideas are simply commonly regardless of religion.
I've done a lot more ethics than just googling it.
Anyone who is looking for an objective morality is looking for a morality that they not only can live by but which they think everyone should live by. Arbitrarily adopting one is generally not an option, and if I don't believe in Jesus as God, I have no reason to value his moral teachings as the word of God. If I'm just arbitrarily accepting a set of moral principles, I'll use the ones that feel right to me rather than ones that some random other person said.
So I'm intrigued to say the least as to what objective moral teachings you can posit on your naturalistic worldview that does not commit the naturalistic fallacy.
Yet again it is the Judeo / Christian religion that makes these morals possible yet you do not want to believe in the God that gives the explanation for these morals. The phrase "Have your cake and eat it too" comes to mind
To think that objective morals can be the results of evolution is a classic example of the naturalistic fallacy
Insert witty phrase here
And yet, intelligent and educated men and women who are perfectly familiar with the naturalistic fallacy do so anyway. Perhaps their understanding of the topic is a little more sophisticated than yours?
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Dear TheBaron,
You seemed to have overlooked my post:
http://forums.mtgsalvation.com/showpost.php?p=6398644&postcount=90
I know this thread is rather busy and you might not have time to respond to each and every question put to you. I can understand that. However, I really would like you to take a look at my post if you could, and maybe respond to one or two of my statements if you had time. I was hoping if you could give me some insight to your mindset.
Thank you for your time in advance,
Taylor Pyne Connor
You've committed a fallacy in your presuppositions, and everything you're saying follows from that fallacy.
The fallacy is assuming that your Christianity and my scientistic naturalism are the same kind of thing. They are qualitatively different.
Christianity as a religion is an authority (or, perhaps more correctly, has authorities). An authority is something or someone that tells you concretely that X is true, Y is false, and so on. Because adhering to Christian values entails accepting a Christian authority (possibly the Bible, possibly your priest or minister, possibly what you experience during certain kinds of trances, depending on your particular denomination) as giving you the correct answer. Christianity as a worldview entails belief in a particular moral authority, and moral behavior is just doing what the authority says is right.
Naturalism is a worldview but not an authority. Someone with a Naturalist worldview would not try to derive objective moral imperatives from it directly; they would try to derive them from something else. Kant tried to derive morality from pure reason (basically but not precisely, the rules of logic), for example. If I understand him correctly, Blinking Spirit has been advocating the idea that a certain class of 'is' statements turn out to be 'ought' statements at a basic level due more or less to the definition of the word 'ought'.
These are not 'the word of Naturalism', they are merely compatible with Naturalism. Both are in fact also compatible with Christianity... to do the theodicies, Kant and Christianity can both be right if God has constructed logic such that someone using pure reason as a moral guide will behave according to the tenets of the Bible, while Blinking Spirit and Christianity can both be right if God has made humans with deep-seated intuitions that will tend to lead them to behave according to the moral tenets of the Bible.
All that said, objective moralities (including Christian morality, by the way) do suffer from a motivational problem. To demonstrate the problem:
I accept that there is a God, that he is all powerful, all-knowing, 'all-loving' (whatever that means), and that he commands a particular framework as being 'moral'. Why do I care?
I might care because he's going to punish me if I don't follow his rules, but I will equally follow his rules in that case whether he's commanding me to stone rape victims to death (Deuteronomy 22: 23-24), worship him, or volunteer my time to charities. Further, I may have my own intuitions about what is 'right' and they may not sync up; for instance, it might seem to me that God is doing wrong when he condemns nonbelievers to burn in hell forever simply for not accepting him as their God in the complete absence of evidence despite living the most virtuous lives they can. I won't have any language to express this, of course, since my religious convictions will have co-opted my moral language for another purpose, but that doesn't make that feeling less real.
This doesn't seem to be different in kind from giving a bully my lunch money so that he won't beat me up; it's just much larger stakes. Yet use of moral language seems to be aimed at designating that there is supposed to be a difference in kind. What's the difference?
Other moral systems have different motivational problems, but still have motivational problems - why should I try to maximize pleasure and minimize pain, as Utilitarianism dictates? You can call this the Naturalistic Fallacy if you like, but Christian morality suffers from it too. You're trying to derive an 'ought' (X is morally right) from an 'is' (God says X is morally right and will punish me for disagreeing). And defining morally right as "doing what God says is morally right" doesn't solve the problem any more than defining morally right as "maximizing utility" solves the problem - it pushes it to one level of regress, with observers who accept your definition of terms asking "Why should I value the morally right?"
EDIT: I call this a motivational problem in the literal sense that it is a problem of getting someone who does not already value acting according to what you've defined as moral to begin valuing acting according to that (i.e. would do it even if you didn't make them). It does arise for some forms of relativism (e.g. cultural relativism; you should act according to what your culture considers right) but it does not arise for other forms of relativism (e.g. personal relativism; you should act according to what you feel is right) - everyone already behaves as though personal relativism is true (even if what they feel is right is a manifestation of their having internalized some other belief system e.g. christianity or utilitarianism), so motivating them to start believing in it is simply not a priority. This objection is, basically, the reason why I think that what I've termed "Follow your gut morality" is the best we'll ever do. Blinking Spirit's moral thesis is actually resistant to this objection, incidentally, but I have other objections to that thesis so I haven't accepted it anyway.