4. My nihilist may choose to believe either O or ~O. Hey may choose to believe O in order to obtain his goal of living. He may choose to believe ~O because he considers defeating his own goals to be "poetic" (to borrow your example), or for some other reason.
If he believes ~O, then why would he think he's defeating his own goals? If he believes ~O, and does ~O, then by the very definition of ~O he expects to live. If he strangles himself to defeat his own goals, then that means he must believe O, because he expects not living to be the result of strangling himself. The statement that is "governing his behavior" is O. Otherwise he'd attempt to be poetic by breathing expecting to die.
There's an important but subtle distinction between the situation you're describing and the one I'm describing.
My nihilist's goal is to live. That is a constraint of the hypothetical. So he is not permitted to suffocate himself while believing O, because he would no longer be working toward the goal "live." In order to suffocate himself while working toward the goal "live," he must believe ~O. A the same time, he is permitted to understand that this configuration of belief and action will not "cash out" metaphysically, because he has chosen to believe a statement that is not true. His reason for choosing to believe a false statement might be that he finds that statement more "poetic" or something of the sort.
Now you might say that normal people don't think and act this way. You might dislike the way I've used the term "believe." But these are descriptive objections, not prescriptive objections. You're saying "I don't normally observe the universe to work this way." But the crux of the debate here is about moral imperatives. Who/what dictates that a person can't or shouldn't think and act this way.
You might also say that the situation I've formulated is "nonsensical" or some other variation that basically boils down to arguing that what I'm describing is bad/wrong/incorrect. But that's begging the question. Why is is bad, wrong, or incorrect? Where does the moral imperative come from that allows you to make that judgment?
If he does not expect his actions to cash out and result in living, then living is not his goal. In order to escape this, your nihilist must reject more than he rejects. He must entirely reject, whether he admits it or not, the idea that truth cashes out metaphysically.
When we say his goal is living, that's a statement about the future state of reality. He must therefore act in a way that will "cash out" because his goal is a description of a reality in which he has cashed out. Otherwise, one of the following must be the case:
1) It's not actually his goal.
2) He does not believe O.
3) He does not believe that truth "cahses out".
However, you've stated that all three of these are true about your nihilist. So, I assert that your scenario is contradictory. The nihilist is certainly free to act in a contradictory manner, because he's a nihilist. But that doesn't translate into how we should describe the situation from the outside.
I never said he "believed" that truth cashes out. I said he "understands" that truth cashes out (ie he knows that "truth cashes out" is a true statement). But we have defined belief as something like a template or heuristic that guides actions. I assert he is not required to believe that truth cashes out, because he is not required to believe true statements. He may believe or not believe this statement as he chooses.
I believe in Christianity, that Christ is the lord, based on faith. there are not arguments which get me there; no logic. From a nihilistic perspective that is irrational and illogical, but so are a great many other things.
Good for religion it is then that that is not basis of there believes.
OP seems to think that Atheism = Moral Nihilism. Secular Humanist are not nihilist. There is three competing hypotheses here. Seems strangely silent on the third one. Now if you can get a Secular Humanists arguments as to why he / she rejects moral nihilism that would be interesting.
If you ask me why I think Moral Nihilism is abhorrent I would say you need to look at the real life apllications of the philosophy in question. When deciding on what view you should hold the effect that this view would have on yourself and on the community in which it may operates must be important in your reflections. To me this is where Moral Nihilism falls short.
I personally hold to the view that humanity is indeed fallen and if there is to be no adherence to good and evil and furthermore no imprtance to the thought that tries to decern what that would be then it would not be the blind leading the blind it would be the blind murderer leading the blind child molester with no way to say anything they do is wrong.
If he does not believe that truth cashes out, then he does not believe that he is acting to defeat his own goals.
I never said he believed either of those things. I said he understood them. I am drawing a consistent dichotomy here. I "understand" a statement if I am aware of that statement and know its truth value. I "believe" a statement if select that statement to govern my behavior. The two concepts are completely independent. I can believe things I don't understand, I can understand things I don't believe.
If he does not believe that truth cashes out, then he does not believe that he is acting to defeat his own goals.
I never said he believed either of those things. I said he understood them. I am drawing a consistent dichotomy here. I "understand" a statement if I am aware of that statement and know its truth value. I "believe" a statement if select that statement to govern my behavior. The two concepts are completely independent. I can believe things I don't understand, I can understand things I don't believe.
I understand the distinction you've drawn between believe and understand. However, I still think your initial description is one in which he believes that breathing will cause him to live. Specifically, you said:
He may choose to believe ~O because he considers defeating his own goals to be "poetic" (to borrow your example), or for some other reason.
His desire is to defeat his own goals. What principle governs which action he selects in order to do that? Well, he chooses to strangle himself in order to defeat his goals. So he selects strangle with the expected result of death. This is O, and not ~O. Therefore he believes O because O governs his action. A person whose actions were governed by ~O would breathe to defeat their goal of living.
If he does not believe that truth cashes out, then he does not believe that he is acting to defeat his own goals.
I never said he believed either of those things. I said he understood them. I am drawing a consistent dichotomy here. I "understand" a statement if I am aware of that statement and know its truth value. I "believe" a statement if select that statement to govern my behavior. The two concepts are completely independent. I can believe things I don't understand, I can understand things I don't believe.
I understand the distinction you've drawn between believe and understand. However, I still think your initial description is one in which he believes that breathing will cause him to live. Specifically, you said:
He may choose to believe ~O because he considers defeating his own goals to be "poetic" (to borrow your example), or for some other reason.
His desire is to defeat his own goals. What principle governs which action he selects in order to do that? Well, he chooses to strangle himself in order to defeat his goals. So he selects strangle with the expected result of death. This is O, and not ~O. Therefore he believes O because O governs his action. A person whose actions were governed by ~O would breathe to defeat their goal of living.
EDIT: Removed a stray "not"
You are correct that there is a contradiction given the way I phrased this in the post you quote. I corrected/rephrased the statement in a later post.
His reason for choosing to believe a false statement might be that he finds that statement more "poetic" or something of the sort.
To be clear, what I should have said in the original post was:
He may choose to believe ~O because he considers defeating his own goalsbelieving ~O to be "poetic" (to borrow your example), or for some other reason.
I don't think that fixes it. He is still invested in the truth value of whether ~O is poetic. The only "reason" that gets out of this is that he forms his beliefs completely arbitrarily - for no reason at all.
I don't think that fixes it. He is still invested in the truth value of whether ~O is poetic. The only "reason" that gets out of this is that he forms his beliefs completely arbitrarily - for no reason at all.
"Tiax's posts are poetic." - Is that statement true or false? Or, more likely, is it completely subjective and devoid of a truth value?
But regardless, it doesn't matter whether "~O is poetic" is true. It matters whether our nihilist believes "~O is poetic." I continue to assert that his beliefs can be independent of a statement's truth value.
"Tiax's posts are poetic." - Is that statement true or false? Or, more likely, is it completely subjective and devoid of a truth value?
If he is able to structure his actions on it, then it must have a truth value.
But regardless, it doesn't matter whether "~O is poetic" is true. It matters whether our nihilist believes "~O is poetic." I continue to assert that his beliefs can be independent of a statement's truth value.
Well, there are two options for him. One is that it's beliefs regardless of truth all the way down. That every step of reasoning from "~O is poetic" to strangling himself is an arbitrary belief choice. There are any number of false beliefs about the nature of reasoning that he might adopt which would lead him to not strangling himself, and an equal number that would lead him to strangling himself. In this instance, it doesn't matter whether he believes ~O is poetic, because every step from their to action is a coinflip. For example, perhaps he believes that the way to strangle one's self is to instead breathe. Perhaps he believes that the way to attempt to strangle himself is to will his diaphragm to alternatingly expand and contract his lungs. Perhaps he believes that being alive is what constitutes death, and therefore breathes so that ~O will make him living and therefore dead. At this point, he is a total nihilist - every action is completely arbitrary.
Alternatively, he must at some point employ a series of truth-based steps of reasoning and action to decide on his goals and execute them. Once you state that his actions have some reason, you're implying that he is taking this truth-based steps and cares about the truth of the logical rules that get him from the reason to the action. Fundamentally, the concept of a reason is a truth statement: If A is a reason for B, and A is true, do B.
Now, the first nihilist might by completely arbitrary chance act exactly the same as the second one. But we as observes should not say he is doing so for a reason. He does have a concept of a reason.
"Tiax's posts are poetic." - Is that statement true or false? Or, more likely, is it completely subjective and devoid of a truth value?
If he is able to structure his actions on it, then it must have a truth value.
But regardless, it doesn't matter whether "~O is poetic" is true. It matters whether our nihilist believes "~O is poetic." I continue to assert that his beliefs can be independent of a statement's truth value.
Well, there are two options for him. One is that it's beliefs regardless of truth all the way down. That every step of reasoning from "~O is poetic" to strangling himself is an arbitrary belief choice. There are any number of false beliefs about the nature of reasoning that he might adopt which would lead him to not strangling himself, and an equal number that would lead him to strangling himself. In this instance, it doesn't matter whether he believes ~O is poetic, because every step from there to action is a coinflip. For example, perhaps he believes that the way to strangle one's self is to instead breathe. Perhaps he believes that the way to attempt to strangle himself is to will his diaphragm to alternatingly expand and contract his lungs. Perhaps he believes that being alive is what constitutes death, and therefore breathes so that ~O will make him living and therefore dead. At this point, he is a total nihilist - every action is completely arbitrary.
Alternatively, he must at some point employ a series of truth-based steps of reasoning and action to decide on his goals and execute them. Once you state that his actions have some reason, you're implying that he is taking this truth-based steps and cares about the truth of the logical rules that get him from the reason to the action. Fundamentally, the concept of a reason is a truth statement: If A is a reason for B, and A is true, do B.
Now, the first nihilist might by completely arbitrary chance act exactly the same as the second one. But we as observes should not say he is doing so for a reason. He does have a concept of a reason.
4. My nihilist may choose to believe either O or ~O. Hey may choose to believe O in order to obtain his goal of living. He may choose to believe ~O because he considers defeating his own goals to be "poetic" (to borrow your example), or for some other reason.
See, earlier you said you weren't trying to adopt "total nihilism," but that's what this is. I had assumed you were advocating a slightly more interesting position. The problem with total nihilism is that it's an epistemic black hole. Anything that goes in disappears, and what comes out is nothing but white noise, carrying no information and bearing no relation to what has gone in.
I never said he had the propensity to act on true statements. He has the ability to do so. He understands what it means to do so. But no imperative compels him to do so.
But it seems to me that you do say essentially that when it suits you to do so! Observe:
My nihilist's goal is to live. That is a constraint of the hypothetical. So he is not permitted to suffocate himself while believing O, because he would no longer be working toward the goal "live." In order to suffocate himself while working toward the goal "live," he must believe ~O.
Here you assert that a nihilist whose truthful goal is to live and who truthfully believes O(live, not suffocate) is "not permitted" (hint hint, that sounds like an imperative) to suffocate himself. I will disprove this by counterexample. A nihilist could:
1) Assert honestly that living is what he desires, hopes, wants, seeks, et cetera, and that he believes all of those things.
2) Assert honestly that he believes that if he wishes to live, then it is not the case that he ought to suffocate himself.
3) Assert honestly that he disbelieves that the standard inference rule of modus ponens applies to his beliefs, but instead believes a logical inference rule I'll call modus impotens: (P, P->Q) |- ~Q
4) Conclude from 1 and 2, by way of 3, that it is the case he ought to suffocate himself
5) Proceed to suffocate himself.
Thus it is possible for a nihilist to actually believe both of those statements and still proceed to suffocate himself. This contradicts your assertion.
If you want your assertion to be true, you're going to have to assign your nihilist an imperative. This is because your assertion is expressly imperatival in its character; it says that some or another action is impermissible! And of course at that point he'll cease to be a nihilist.
(Preview of coming attractions: the imperative you have to assign him will be functionally if not formally like "My beliefs ought to comport with truth.")
Quote from bitterroot »
For fun, I might spot you that he always tries to act to further his goals. But I don't see why he's even compelled to do that. And he certainly is not compelled to select his goals in any particular way.
The fact that you think your granting this statement is charitable towards my position makes me think you and I are not on the same page. If you assign proper goal-seeking behavior to your nihilist (which I point out that you have in fact done) then, firstly, you contradict yourself because he's no longer a nihilist, and secondly, you make his position more coherent and thus harder for me to argue against.
It is far better for my position, it seems, that you leave your hypothetical character an actual nihilist whose behavior is disconnected from epistemology altogether. In fact, I almost don't have to argue for the irrationality of that position, because it seems to meet the definition of irrationality prima facie.
If, on the other hand, you are arguing from a position of extreme moral skepticism but not actual moral nihilism, that's a horse of a different color -- but in that case we have to agree that your guy is governed by a nonempty set of explicit moral imperatives before we move onward. And of course, once you agree to one moral imperative, it makes it substantially easier for me to get you to agree with others. Which is why I assign enormous dialectical value to us clearing this hurdle.
Where do you get the assumption that truth even has value?
Then you assert it matters not if Moral Nihilism is true or false. That there is no real (objective) difference between being true or being false.
So, I tell you Moral Nihilism is false. How can you rebuttal this without contradicting your premise? How can you assert it's true that truth doesn't matter?
No less irrational than the arbitrary declaration love, hope, honor, and a number of of intangible "values" as real.
The idea that "love", "hope" and so one aren't "real" is ludicrous for all practical purposes.
Love, hope, joy, sadness and similar are self-defining. They're emotions we label and the experiences of those emotions are proof of themselves. You feel them, therefore the feeling is real. In truth, they can be said to be more assuredly real than a lump of sugar in front of you. While you can see, feel and taste the sugar - your senses might be fooled by hallucination or similar. The taste of sweetness itself, however, is evidence for itself. The taste of sweetness cannot be false - because the fact you are having the experience of sweet taste is self-proving that you are indeed having an experience of sweet taste.
The fact you are feeling hope is proof that the feeling of hope exists. The same goes for love (though that word carries wildly different definitions, and any individual definition would need to be agreed on for each discussion) Honor involves more of a value judgment of certain actions, and is also self-defining. If you do something that goes against the code required to maintain honor, as it is defined, you have obviously lost your honor by that definition. Another system might think you have done something honorable by breaking the first code, depending on their definition of what is labeled as an honorable action. Whether you think any particular code of honor expressed is sensible has nothing to do with whether the concept of honor itself exists. The fact people have a concept of honor is proof that the concept exists. It often leads to ludicrous actions and those concepts of what should be considered an admirable (honorable) action can be challenged, but the concept is clearly proof of itself.
In the same way, religious beliefs are proven. People have religious beliefs. Whether what they BELIEVE in is real or not is what has no evidence supporting it. The belief in god is proven. The existence of God is not.
OP seems to think that Atheism = Moral Nihilism. Secular Humanist are not nihilist. There is three competing hypotheses here. Seems strangely silent on the third one. Now if you can get a Secular Humanists arguments as to why he / she rejects moral nihilism that would be interesting.
I'd be happy to answer that question. Luckily, you already have in your next paragraph.
If you ask me why I think Moral Nihilism is abhorrent I would say you need to look at the real life apllications of the philosophy in question. When deciding on what view you should hold the effect that this view would have on yourself and on the community in which it may operates must be important in your reflections. To me this is where Moral Nihilism falls short.
There we go. No god required to apply this logic. There are some additional reasons that moral nihilism is nonsensical, but this is the major one.
You could also ask a moral nihilist if he thinks that Joseph Mengele was not a bad person and also if he thinks Irena Sendler was not a good person. If he is willing to admit that then it says much of his worldview.
There's an important but subtle distinction between the situation you're describing and the one I'm describing.
My nihilist's goal is to live. That is a constraint of the hypothetical. So he is not permitted to suffocate himself while believing O, because he would no longer be working toward the goal "live." In order to suffocate himself while working toward the goal "live," he must believe ~O. A the same time, he is permitted to understand that this configuration of belief and action will not "cash out" metaphysically, because he has chosen to believe a statement that is not true. His reason for choosing to believe a false statement might be that he finds that statement more "poetic" or something of the sort.
Now you might say that normal people don't think and act this way. You might dislike the way I've used the term "believe." But these are descriptive objections, not prescriptive objections. You're saying "I don't normally observe the universe to work this way." But the crux of the debate here is about moral imperatives. Who/what dictates that a person can't or shouldn't think and act this way.
You might also say that the situation I've formulated is "nonsensical" or some other variation that basically boils down to arguing that what I'm describing is bad/wrong/incorrect. But that's begging the question. Why is is bad, wrong, or incorrect? Where does the moral imperative come from that allows you to make that judgment?
When we say his goal is living, that's a statement about the future state of reality. He must therefore act in a way that will "cash out" because his goal is a description of a reality in which he has cashed out. Otherwise, one of the following must be the case:
1) It's not actually his goal.
2) He does not believe O.
3) He does not believe that truth "cahses out".
However, you've stated that all three of these are true about your nihilist. So, I assert that your scenario is contradictory. The nihilist is certainly free to act in a contradictory manner, because he's a nihilist. But that doesn't translate into how we should describe the situation from the outside.
I never said he "believed" that truth cashes out. I said he "understands" that truth cashes out (ie he knows that "truth cashes out" is a true statement). But we have defined belief as something like a template or heuristic that guides actions. I assert he is not required to believe that truth cashes out, because he is not required to believe true statements. He may believe or not believe this statement as he chooses.
OP seems to think that Atheism = Moral Nihilism. Secular Humanist are not nihilist. There is three competing hypotheses here. Seems strangely silent on the third one. Now if you can get a Secular Humanists arguments as to why he / she rejects moral nihilism that would be interesting.
If you ask me why I think Moral Nihilism is abhorrent I would say you need to look at the real life apllications of the philosophy in question. When deciding on what view you should hold the effect that this view would have on yourself and on the community in which it may operates must be important in your reflections. To me this is where Moral Nihilism falls short.
I personally hold to the view that humanity is indeed fallen and if there is to be no adherence to good and evil and furthermore no imprtance to the thought that tries to decern what that would be then it would not be the blind leading the blind it would be the blind murderer leading the blind child molester with no way to say anything they do is wrong.
I never said he believed either of those things. I said he understood them. I am drawing a consistent dichotomy here. I "understand" a statement if I am aware of that statement and know its truth value. I "believe" a statement if select that statement to govern my behavior. The two concepts are completely independent. I can believe things I don't understand, I can understand things I don't believe.
I understand the distinction you've drawn between believe and understand. However, I still think your initial description is one in which he believes that breathing will cause him to live. Specifically, you said:
His desire is to defeat his own goals. What principle governs which action he selects in order to do that? Well, he chooses to strangle himself in order to defeat his goals. So he selects strangle with the expected result of death. This is O, and not ~O. Therefore he believes O because O governs his action. A person whose actions were governed by ~O would breathe to defeat their goal of living.
EDIT: Removed a stray "not"
You are correct that there is a contradiction given the way I phrased this in the post you quote. I corrected/rephrased the statement in a later post.
To be clear, what I should have said in the original post was:
He may choose to believe ~O because he considers
defeating his own goalsbelieving ~O to be "poetic" (to borrow your example), or for some other reason."Tiax's posts are poetic." - Is that statement true or false? Or, more likely, is it completely subjective and devoid of a truth value?
But regardless, it doesn't matter whether "~O is poetic" is true. It matters whether our nihilist believes "~O is poetic." I continue to assert that his beliefs can be independent of a statement's truth value.
If he is able to structure his actions on it, then it must have a truth value.
Well, there are two options for him. One is that it's beliefs regardless of truth all the way down. That every step of reasoning from "~O is poetic" to strangling himself is an arbitrary belief choice. There are any number of false beliefs about the nature of reasoning that he might adopt which would lead him to not strangling himself, and an equal number that would lead him to strangling himself. In this instance, it doesn't matter whether he believes ~O is poetic, because every step from their to action is a coinflip. For example, perhaps he believes that the way to strangle one's self is to instead breathe. Perhaps he believes that the way to attempt to strangle himself is to will his diaphragm to alternatingly expand and contract his lungs. Perhaps he believes that being alive is what constitutes death, and therefore breathes so that ~O will make him living and therefore dead. At this point, he is a total nihilist - every action is completely arbitrary.
Alternatively, he must at some point employ a series of truth-based steps of reasoning and action to decide on his goals and execute them. Once you state that his actions have some reason, you're implying that he is taking this truth-based steps and cares about the truth of the logical rules that get him from the reason to the action. Fundamentally, the concept of a reason is a truth statement: If A is a reason for B, and A is true, do B.
Now, the first nihilist might by completely arbitrary chance act exactly the same as the second one. But we as observes should not say he is doing so for a reason. He does have a concept of a reason.
If he is able to structure his actions on it, then it must have a truth value.
Well, there are two options for him. One is that it's beliefs regardless of truth all the way down. That every step of reasoning from "~O is poetic" to strangling himself is an arbitrary belief choice. There are any number of false beliefs about the nature of reasoning that he might adopt which would lead him to not strangling himself, and an equal number that would lead him to strangling himself. In this instance, it doesn't matter whether he believes ~O is poetic, because every step from there to action is a coinflip. For example, perhaps he believes that the way to strangle one's self is to instead breathe. Perhaps he believes that the way to attempt to strangle himself is to will his diaphragm to alternatingly expand and contract his lungs. Perhaps he believes that being alive is what constitutes death, and therefore breathes so that ~O will make him living and therefore dead. At this point, he is a total nihilist - every action is completely arbitrary.
Alternatively, he must at some point employ a series of truth-based steps of reasoning and action to decide on his goals and execute them. Once you state that his actions have some reason, you're implying that he is taking this truth-based steps and cares about the truth of the logical rules that get him from the reason to the action. Fundamentally, the concept of a reason is a truth statement: If A is a reason for B, and A is true, do B.
Now, the first nihilist might by completely arbitrary chance act exactly the same as the second one. But we as observes should not say he is doing so for a reason. He does have a concept of a reason.
See, earlier you said you weren't trying to adopt "total nihilism," but that's what this is. I had assumed you were advocating a slightly more interesting position. The problem with total nihilism is that it's an epistemic black hole. Anything that goes in disappears, and what comes out is nothing but white noise, carrying no information and bearing no relation to what has gone in.
But it seems to me that you do say essentially that when it suits you to do so! Observe:
Here you assert that a nihilist whose truthful goal is to live and who truthfully believes O(live, not suffocate) is "not permitted" (hint hint, that sounds like an imperative) to suffocate himself. I will disprove this by counterexample. A nihilist could:
1) Assert honestly that living is what he desires, hopes, wants, seeks, et cetera, and that he believes all of those things.
2) Assert honestly that he believes that if he wishes to live, then it is not the case that he ought to suffocate himself.
3) Assert honestly that he disbelieves that the standard inference rule of modus ponens applies to his beliefs, but instead believes a logical inference rule I'll call modus impotens: (P, P->Q) |- ~Q
4) Conclude from 1 and 2, by way of 3, that it is the case he ought to suffocate himself
5) Proceed to suffocate himself.
Thus it is possible for a nihilist to actually believe both of those statements and still proceed to suffocate himself. This contradicts your assertion.
If you want your assertion to be true, you're going to have to assign your nihilist an imperative. This is because your assertion is expressly imperatival in its character; it says that some or another action is impermissible! And of course at that point he'll cease to be a nihilist.
(Preview of coming attractions: the imperative you have to assign him will be functionally if not formally like "My beliefs ought to comport with truth.")
The fact that you think your granting this statement is charitable towards my position makes me think you and I are not on the same page. If you assign proper goal-seeking behavior to your nihilist (which I point out that you have in fact done) then, firstly, you contradict yourself because he's no longer a nihilist, and secondly, you make his position more coherent and thus harder for me to argue against.
It is far better for my position, it seems, that you leave your hypothetical character an actual nihilist whose behavior is disconnected from epistemology altogether. In fact, I almost don't have to argue for the irrationality of that position, because it seems to meet the definition of irrationality prima facie.
If, on the other hand, you are arguing from a position of extreme moral skepticism but not actual moral nihilism, that's a horse of a different color -- but in that case we have to agree that your guy is governed by a nonempty set of explicit moral imperatives before we move onward. And of course, once you agree to one moral imperative, it makes it substantially easier for me to get you to agree with others. Which is why I assign enormous dialectical value to us clearing this hurdle.
Which if thou dost not use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind
It will go and thou wilt go, never to return.
So, I tell you Moral Nihilism is false. How can you rebuttal this without contradicting your premise? How can you assert it's true that truth doesn't matter?
Your position is--literally--indefensible.
The idea that "love", "hope" and so one aren't "real" is ludicrous for all practical purposes.
Love, hope, joy, sadness and similar are self-defining. They're emotions we label and the experiences of those emotions are proof of themselves. You feel them, therefore the feeling is real. In truth, they can be said to be more assuredly real than a lump of sugar in front of you. While you can see, feel and taste the sugar - your senses might be fooled by hallucination or similar. The taste of sweetness itself, however, is evidence for itself. The taste of sweetness cannot be false - because the fact you are having the experience of sweet taste is self-proving that you are indeed having an experience of sweet taste.
The fact you are feeling hope is proof that the feeling of hope exists. The same goes for love (though that word carries wildly different definitions, and any individual definition would need to be agreed on for each discussion) Honor involves more of a value judgment of certain actions, and is also self-defining. If you do something that goes against the code required to maintain honor, as it is defined, you have obviously lost your honor by that definition. Another system might think you have done something honorable by breaking the first code, depending on their definition of what is labeled as an honorable action. Whether you think any particular code of honor expressed is sensible has nothing to do with whether the concept of honor itself exists. The fact people have a concept of honor is proof that the concept exists. It often leads to ludicrous actions and those concepts of what should be considered an admirable (honorable) action can be challenged, but the concept is clearly proof of itself.
In the same way, religious beliefs are proven. People have religious beliefs. Whether what they BELIEVE in is real or not is what has no evidence supporting it. The belief in god is proven. The existence of God is not.
I'd be happy to answer that question. Luckily, you already have in your next paragraph.
There we go. No god required to apply this logic. There are some additional reasons that moral nihilism is nonsensical, but this is the major one.
Remaking Magic - A Podcast for those that love MTG and Game Design
The Dungeon Master's Guide - A Podcast for those that love RPGs and Game Design
Sig-Heroes of the Plane