So God doesn't like robots. He wants people to make their own choices freely and not control what anyone decides. This is important enough to Him that He does not intervene in human decisions.
(^ let's just take that as a given for the sake of this thread)
I attended my cousin's wedding this past weekend and something the pastor said during the ceremony got me thinking on the subject. The pastor was speaking about how God helps people out and guides them, and specifically mentioned how my cousin and her now-husband had been looking for a house and praying about finding one, and then they found a good one just like a month before the wedding. That was somehow being attributed to the assistance of God.
Now, this thread is not about the specific example of my cousin finding a house. I'm just using it here as an example of a broader issue I see. The issue (using my cousin's house as an example) is that there are humans all over the place in the process of making this prayer be granted. In order for God to make this prayer request be granted, wouldn't He have to meddle with someone's Free Will somewhere along the way (or more likely the free will of multiple "someones") or alternatively have nothing to do with the process?
The previous homeowner chose to sell the house at some point by their own free will, right? Did God/can God affect that person's decision to sell their house? There are tons of free will choices made along the way that ultimately led to my cousin and her now-husband to wind up getting the house: what price the seller wished to sell the house for, which Realtor to use, when to sell, how the Realtor would advertise the house, when my cousin would look at listings, which Realtor(s) they would work with, which listings my cousin would look at, the similar decisions of like 100 other people in the area looking for a home that ultimately led them to not get the home, and so on... In other words, God didn't have a house just pop into existence on the market and with the Realtor my cousin was using, there were many free will decisions that culminated in that scenario.
So my issue is, if all of these decisions were made with free will, what role does that leave for God in the process? Like, in what way did God help my cousin find that house?
And again, this is not specifically about my cousin and her house. In what way does God help answer prayers if everyone has Free Will? People pray for help finding a job, finding true love, doing good on an important test, dealing with the loss of a loved one, controlling bad habits, finding a lost set of keys, etc. The question for debate here is: Can God actually provide assistance towards reaching a goal in these sorts of things without interfering with people's free will? If so, how?
(Also, I know that prayer is not simply asking for stuff. It's also about expressing gratitude, admiration, fealty, etc. It's also about just talking with God. However, people often ask for stuff too and this is what the thread is about.)
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"For small creatures such as we the vastness is bearable only through love." --Carl Sagan
Did your proposed God create the Universe knowing all actions that would take place in it? Was he omniscient in the sense that he "knew the end before the beginning" as some scriptures claim.
If he created a free and open ended system where he did not have foreknowledge of events - then I'd say either he intervened and her free will was not complete - or he did not intervene and her free will was complete.
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“Thus strangely are our souls constructed, and by slight ligaments
are we bound to prosperity and ruin.”
― Mary Shelley, Frankenstein
Without getting into the tangle of this specific example, asking God for understanding, wisdom or compassion is one way people can ask God to guide them.
The previous homeowner chose to sell the house at some point by their own free will, right? Did God/can God affect that person's decision to sell their house? There are tons of free will choices made along the way that ultimately led to my cousin and her now-husband to wind up getting the house: what price the seller wished to sell the house for, which Realtor to use, when to sell, how the Realtor would advertise the house, when my cousin would look at listings, which Realtor(s) they would work with, which listings my cousin would look at, the similar decisions of like 100 other people in the area looking for a home that ultimately led them to not get the home, and so on... In other words, God didn't have a house just pop into existence on the market and with the Realtor my cousin was using, there were many free will decisions that culminated in that scenario.
So my issue is, if all of these decisions were made with free will, what role does that leave for God in the process? Like, in what way did God help my cousin find that house?
Why were all of those decisions made?
And I'm not talking about some metaphysical answer or whatever. I'm asking something like why did the previous owner want to sell the house in the first place?
And again, this is not specifically about my cousin and her house. In what way does God help answer prayers if everyone has Free Will? People pray for help finding a job, finding true love, doing good on an important test, dealing with the loss of a loved one, controlling bad habits, finding a lost set of keys, etc. The question for debate here is: Can God actually provide assistance towards reaching a goal in these sorts of things without interfering with people's free will? If so, how?
And I'm not talking about some metaphysical answer or whatever. I'm asking something like why did the previous owner want to sell the house in the first place?
I mean that would be a long list and I don't know all the answers anyways.
I think I may see where you're going here though (feel free to correct me if I'm wrong). Are you saying that it all basically comes down to God influencing things outside of human free will? For example: The owner decided to sell their house because they were moving due to relocating because of work. Work made them need to relocate due to demand at the primary earner's job falling off, which caused working conditions to become less desirable (pay or hours cut, or working extra hours for the same pay, loss of benefits, etc.) The new job, which the previous owners are relocating to had an opening due to another employee reaching retirement. Is that the sort of thing your saying?
The issue I have with something like that is that I don't see how that could be part of God's Plan because any of the humans in there could freely decided to do something else. Like the previous owners could've freely decided to just stay at the home anyways regardless of whatever compelling reason God put there to make them want to freely decide to sell.
I guess I'm kind of wondering how/if God's Plan can co-exist with free will. Can God have some sort of Grand Plan if humans can do whatever they want?
Did your proposed God create the Universe knowing all actions that would take place in it? Was he omniscient in the sense that he "knew the end before the beginning" as some scriptures claim.
Well, I'm not really sure how to answer that. I think what I'm really wondering is if God's Plan can really exist and work (flawlessly? most of the time? no better than chance?) if humans have free will. I don't understand how there can be a perfect plan with all the uncontrolled (unpredictable?) elements involved in the plan.
Or, alternatively, if the human elements are controlled or predictable, then is there really free will going on?
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"For small creatures such as we the vastness is bearable only through love." --Carl Sagan
So God doesn't like robots. He wants people to make their own choices freely and not control what anyone decides. This is important enough to Him that He does not intervene in human decisions.
Gods and Angels interfer with human life and choices. Also, it is hard to give human characteristics to a diety.
Did your proposed God create the Universe knowing all actions that would take place in it? Was he omniscient in the sense that he "knew the end before the beginning" as some scriptures claim.
Well, I'm not really sure how to answer that. I think what I'm really wondering is if God's Plan can really exist and work (flawlessly? most of the time? no better than chance?) if humans have free will. I don't understand how there can be a perfect plan with all the uncontrolled (unpredictable?) elements involved in the plan.
Or, alternatively, if the human elements are controlled or predictable, then is there really free will going on?
There are an uncountable number of "plans" God could have that ONLY work as long as he doesn't control our actions/choices.
There are an uncountable number of "plans" God could have that unravel completely if he doesn't control our actions/choices.
Here's the thing though, BOTH are unanswerable questions, because no one knows God's plans, God's will, God's desires, or even if there is a God.
Now, for the sake of the argument, I assumed the existence of God for you. Which brings me back to what I said before.
Either God intervened (changing the series of causal events) in such a way as to achieve the outcome you described - and if so, then the free will was not complete. They, and their choices, were manipulated.
Or - He didn't intervene, and all those causal events were free, and thus the choices made in response to them were free willed.
Again though, I must ask - do you believe in a God that created the Universe with infallible foreknowledge of all events, the "end before the beginning".
This is actually an important question, because I believe it makes or breaks the entire premise of free will.
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“Thus strangely are our souls constructed, and by slight ligaments
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― Mary Shelley, Frankenstein
I mean that would be a long list and I don't know all the answers anyways.
Don't worry, it was rhetorical.
I think I may see where you're going here though (feel free to correct me if I'm wrong). Are you saying that it all basically comes down to God influencing things outside of human free will? For example: The owner decided to sell their house because they were moving due to relocating because of work. Work made them need to relocate due to demand at the primary earner's job falling off, which caused working conditions to become less desirable (pay or hours cut, or working extra hours for the same pay, loss of benefits, etc.) The new job, which the previous owners are relocating to had an opening due to another employee reaching retirement. Is that the sort of thing your saying?
Yes.
The issue I have with something like that is that I don't see how that could be part of God's Plan because any of the humans in there could freely decided to do something else. Like the previous owners could've freely decided to just stay at the home anyways regardless of whatever compelling reason God put there to make them want to freely decide to sell.
They could have, yes.
I guess I'm kind of wondering how/if God's Plan can co-exist with free will.
What problem do you see?
Can God have some sort of Grand Plan if humans can do whatever they want?
Yes.
I mean think about it, people plan things around other peoples' actions all the time. If we can do it, why not God? God is infinitely smart, after all.
I guess I'm kind of wondering how/if God's Plan can co-exist with free will.
What problem do you see?
Can God have some sort of Grand Plan if humans can do whatever they want?
Yes.
I mean think about it, people plan things around other peoples' actions all the time. If we can do it, why not God? God is infinitely smart, after all.
Just to clarify, if:
a) God reaches into someone's mind to make them turn left, instead of going straight ahead, right, or back, that would be abrogating free will and he'd never do that?
b) God drops impassable barriers (let's call them tree trunks for the sake of argument, but their impassability is the important feature here) on the road - ahead, behind and to the right of this someone so they can't go in the other directions, that's not directly messing with free will and so he's not breaking his promise of free will?
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I am willing to bet my collection that Frozen and Solid are not on the same card. For example, Frozen Tomb and Solid Wall.
If Frozen Solid is not reprinted, you are aware that I'm quoting you in my sig for eternity?
I mean think about it, people plan things around other peoples' actions all the time. If we can do it, why not God? God is infinitely smart, after all.
Well we make loose plans around people's somewhat-predictable behaviors and reactions to things. An all-knowing God would be better at predicting reactions and behaviors, but could not do so flawlessly, right? That's the nature of free will, it can't ever really be known what the person will decide to do until they decide to do it. It would seem that a consequence of this is that people with free will are able to disrupt the plans of an omnipotent, omniscient God. I guess if someone is willing to concede that humans can mess up the plans of God, then I see no conflict.
And going back to the original example of my cousin getting the house because ultimately someone a few states away retired (...because the retiree decided to start saving for retirement at age 25 because they saw their parents struggling from not saving enough for retirement because their parents couldn't afford to set aside money for retirement because a tree fell on their house and they weren't insured because their kid got sick and medical bills took money away from buying good home insurance, and God intervened to get the kid sick and have the tree fall on the house so that my cousin could ultimately wind up getting the house before the wedding) That kind of remote causality seems very strange to attribute to God when there were so many intervening actions. It's like thanking the butterfly not flapping its wings in South Africa for the damage avoided by Hurricane Zoe not forming.
Again though, I must ask - do you believe in a God that created the Universe with infallible foreknowledge of all events, the "end before the beginning".
This is actually an important question, because I believe it makes or breaks the entire premise of free will.
Oh I'm just asking in like a theoretical sense IcecreamMan. Like if there's free will, could an omnipotent omniscient God have a plan that humans couldn't interfere with?
I personally think there's no extant gods, and that free will is a stubborn illusion.
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"For small creatures such as we the vastness is bearable only through love." --Carl Sagan
Again though, I must ask - do you believe in a God that created the Universe with infallible foreknowledge of all events, the "end before the beginning".
This is actually an important question, because I believe it makes or breaks the entire premise of free will.
Oh I'm just asking in like a theoretical sense IcecreamMan. Like if there's free will, could an omnipotent omniscient God have a plan that humans couldn't interfere with?
I personally think there's no extant gods, and that free will is a stubborn illusion.
Some plans don't necessarily require the planner to adjust for choice.
For example -
Free will can coexist with God's plan for the Sun to go supernova in a billion years.
Free will can coexist with God's Plan for Yellowstone to blow in 2022.
Free will can coexist with God's plan for all animals to evolve over time.
Free Will can coexist with God's plan to have gravity.
Not all plans are effected by choices made, free or otherwise.
One would have to argue first that God has plans for peoples individual lives, before we can argue whether or not our choices have an affect on those plans. Or that God has a plan for humanity before we can argue if humanity can affect that plan.
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“Thus strangely are our souls constructed, and by slight ligaments
are we bound to prosperity and ruin.”
― Mary Shelley, Frankenstein
I mean think about it, people plan things around other peoples' actions all the time. If we can do it, why not God? God is infinitely smart, after all.
Well we make loose plans around people's somewhat-predictable behaviors and reactions to things. An all-knowing God would be better at predicting reactions and behaviors, but could not do so flawlessly, right? That's the nature of free will, it can't ever really be known what the person will decide to do until they decide to do it.
I would not necessarily agree with that definition. Theoretically speaking, if someone could predict what you would do with 100% certainty, would that mean that you no longer have free will? I don't think it does. Someone else having knowledge of what you are going to do doesn't necessarily remove your ability to assert yourself free from their interference.
I would not necessarily agree with that definition. Theoretically speaking, if someone could predict what you would do with 100% certainty, would that mean that you no longer have free will? I don't think it does. Someone else having knowledge of what you are going to do doesn't necessarily remove your ability to assert yourself free from their interference.
It does mean you don't have free will if that entity that can predict your decisions with 100% certainty is also the entity that created the universe as it is.
If God created the universe as it is and can predict people's choices with absolute certainty, then he created the universe that necessitates the choices that I make. In this scenario, I don't have free will. Everything that happens to me and everything I "choose" to do in response has already been designed by a party that is not me.
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"[Screw] you and the green you ramped in on." - My EDH battle cry. If I had one. Which I don't.
Well we make loose plans around people's somewhat-predictable behaviors and reactions to things. An all-knowing God would be better at predicting reactions and behaviors, but could not do so flawlessly, right?
No, God would do so flawlessly. He's God. Omniscience.
That's the nature of free will, it can't ever really be known what the person will decide to do until they decide to do it.
No, that's not what free will means. Free will means that a person has the ability to make choices. It does not mean that person's choices can't be predicted. In fact, free will requires that a person's choices be able to be predicted, because those choices must stem from a person's will, and a person's will is not an indeterminate thing.
What you're describing seems to be pure randomness, which is antithetical free will.
It would seem that a consequence of this is that people with free will are able to disrupt the plans of an omnipotent, omniscient God. I guess if someone is willing to concede that humans can mess up the plans of God, then I see no conflict.
See above.
And going back to the original example of my cousin getting the house because ultimately someone a few states away retired (...because the retiree decided to start saving for retirement at age 25 because they saw their parents struggling from not saving enough for retirement because their parents couldn't afford to set aside money for retirement because a tree fell on their house and they weren't insured because their kid got sick and medical bills took money away from buying good home insurance, and God intervened to get the kid sick and have the tree fall on the house so that my cousin could ultimately wind up getting the house before the wedding) That kind of remote causality seems very strange to attribute to God when there were so many intervening actions. It's like thanking the butterfly not flapping its wings in South Africa for the damage avoided by Hurricane Zoe not forming.
It does mean you don't have free will if that entity that can predict your decisions with 100% certainty is also the entity that created the universe as it is.
If God created the universe as it is and can predict people's choices with absolute certainty, then he created the universe that necessitates the choices that I make. In this scenario, I don't have free will. Everything that happens to me and everything I "choose" to do in response has already been designed by a party that is not me.
No, in that scenario you do have free will, because you are choosing things. That means free will. You can't make choices without free will.
Indeed, what you are describing is a scenario in which free will and God's plan exist at the same time, thereby proving that it is possible for the two to coexist.
No, in that scenario you do have free will, because you are choosing things. That means free will. You can't make choices without free will.
Indeed, what you are describing is a scenario in which free will and God's plan exist at the same time, thereby proving that it is possible for the two to coexist.
Except I do not accept your loose definition of free will.
It isn't just making choices.
I go with
"The power of making free choices that are unconstrained by external circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will." http://www.thefreedictionary.com/free+will
or even
"(Philosophy) a. the apparent human ability to make choices that are not externally determined"
An omniscient creator God with infallible foreknowledge is incompatible with this definition.
This is the only definition I believe is acceptably "Free".
Your loose, and weak, definition may be "will" but it isn't "free", not to me.
1. God has infallible omniscient foreknowledge
2. A universe does not yet exist
3. God envisions a universe (U#581) in which Jim performs Q.
4. God creates precisely U#581
5. Because Jim performing Q is now necessary, otherwise it would not be U#581, Jim's choice was externally determined and is constrained by fate or divine will.
Conclusion - Jim doesn't have free will.
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“Thus strangely are our souls constructed, and by slight ligaments
are we bound to prosperity and ruin.”
― Mary Shelley, Frankenstein
Except I do not accept your loose definition of free will.
It isn't just making choices.
I didn't say it was just making choices. I said it was a person making choices that stemmed from that person's will.
I go with
"The power of making free choices that are unconstrained by external circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will." http://www.thefreedictionary.com/free+will
or even
"(Philosophy) a. the apparent human ability to make choices that are not externally determined"
An omniscient creator God with infallible foreknowledge is incompatible with this definition.
This is the only definition I believe is acceptably "Free".
Your loose, and weak, definition may be "will" but it isn't "free", not to me.
1. God has infallible omniscient foreknowledge
2. A universe does not yet exist
3. God envisions a universe (U#581) in which Jim performs Q.
4. God creates precisely U#581
5. Because Jim performing Q is now necessary, otherwise it would not be U#581, Jim's choice was externally determined and is constrained by fate or divine will.
Conclusion - Jim doesn't have free will.
Depends on why Jim is performing Q.
If Jim is just performing Q because God said so, then you're correct, that's not free will.
If Jim is choosing Q by his own volition, this is free will. In this case, it wouldn't matter whether or not God saw it coming. All that matters is that Jim has his own will and is making a choice. That's free will.
Except I do not accept your loose definition of free will.
It isn't just making choices.
I didn't say it was just making choices. I said it was a person making choices that stemmed from that person's will.
Sure, but if it's not the persons will, but God's will...
I go with
"The power of making free choices that are unconstrained by external circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will." http://www.thefreedictionary.com/free+will
or even
"(Philosophy) a. the apparent human ability to make choices that are not externally determined"
An omniscient creator God with infallible foreknowledge is incompatible with this definition.
This is the only definition I believe is acceptably "Free".
Your loose, and weak, definition may be "will" but it isn't "free", not to me.
1. God has infallible omniscient foreknowledge
2. A universe does not yet exist
3. God envisions a universe (U#581) in which Jim performs Q.
4. God creates precisely U#581
5. Because Jim performing Q is now necessary, otherwise it would not be U#581, Jim's choice was externally determined and is constrained by fate or divine will.
Conclusion - Jim doesn't have free will.
Depends on why Jim is performing Q.
If Jim is just performing Q because God said so, then you're correct, that's not free will.
If Jim is choosing Q by his own volition, this is free will. In this case, it wouldn't matter whether or not God saw it coming. All that matters is that Jim has his own will and is making a choice. That's free will.
Jim IS performing Q because God said so.
Dechs gets it.
In this scenario, the ONLY ONE making a free choice was God. He made the free choice of which Universe he would create. Jim is only doing precisely what he was created to do.
God said "this is the universe I'm creating, and in it, Jim will perform Q."
Yes, but WHY does Jim perform Q? Does he perform Q because Jim has an independent will, and chooses to perform Q? Or does he perform Q because he's being controlled?
The premise of the thread is the former, that God gives everyone free will and they are not being controlled directly. In this instance, Jim chooses Q because he has a free will and thus, of his own volition, chooses Q.
Then in that scenario, Jim does not have free will.
But that's not what the OP is talking about. The OP is talking about a scenario in which God gives people wills of their own. In which case, Jim would be performing Q because Jim's choosing Q of his own free will.
God said "this is the universe I'm creating, and in it, Jim will perform Q."
Yes, but WHY does Jim perform Q? Does he perform Q because Jim has an independent will, and chooses to perform Q? Or does he perform Q because he's being controlled?
The premise of the thread is the former, that God gives everyone free will and they are not being controlled directly. In this instance, Jim chooses Q because he has a free will and thus, of his own volition, chooses Q.
In this case, Jim has free will.
Jim didn't exist to have a will, or make a choice, when God decided what Universe he wanted to create.
God made those decision before he said "let it be so"
As soon as God made up his mind on which Universe he wanted, as soon as he said "let it be so" Jim was made TO DO Q. He has no choice, God made the choice for him.
Jim thinking he has free will is AN ILLUSION.
Then in that scenario, Jim does not have free will.
But that's not what the OP is talking about. The OP is talking about a scenario in which God gives people wills of their own. In which case, Jim would be performing Q because Jim's choosing Q of his own free will.
I already answered the OP's other questions adequately.
But when YOU come in here with your erroneous compatibilism, I'm sorry but it just pisses me off.
You make claims as if you know some **** we don't know, and feel all cool about yourself - you have it wrong. You believe in the illusion, and I'm here to stop you selling your snake oil.
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“Thus strangely are our souls constructed, and by slight ligaments
are we bound to prosperity and ruin.”
― Mary Shelley, Frankenstein
Just to clarify, if:
a) God reaches into someone's mind to make them turn left, instead of going straight ahead, right, or back, that would be abrogating free will and he'd never do that?
It would be abrogating free will, yes.
b) God drops impassable barriers (let's call them tree trunks for the sake of argument, but their impassability is the important feature here) on the road - ahead, behind and to the right of this someone so they can't go in the other directions, that's not directly messing with free will and so he's not breaking his promise of free will?
Jim is performing Q because that's what God created him to do.
No, you're not answering the question.
Does Jim have an independent will or doesn't he? Can Jim make choices or can't he?
Does Jim have free will and the ability to choose or not? If not, then that's not what the OP is talking about.
Jim didn't exist to have a will, or make a choice, when God decided what Universe he wanted to create.
If God created a universe without free will, then Jim doesn't have free will.
But if God created a universe with free will, then Jim would have free will.
We're addressing the second one in this thread, as detailed in the OP.
God made those decision before he said "let it be so"
As soon as God made up his mind on which Universe he wanted, as soon as he said "let it be so" Jim was made TO DO Q. He has no choice, God made the choice for him.
Jim thinking he has free will is AN ILLUSION.
Ok, but again, that's not what the OP is talking about.
I already answered the OP's other questions adequately.
No, you haven't. The OP specifically states that we're taking as a given that God created a universe with each human being having free will.
Saying, "Well, if God created a universe without free will, no one would have free will," doesn't address this idea at all. You're going on completely different premises than the ones the OP specifically outlined.
And to clarify, since you seem to miss this nuance: Yes, God can know what Jim chooses before he chooses it, but none of this changes the fact that Jim chooses it.
If Jim chooses something of his own volition, that is free will. It is irrelevant if God knows about it beforehand. (Indeed, God would have to know about it beforehand, because God's omniscient.) The part you miss is that God's knowledge of what happens is predicated on it actually happening, and whether or not "Jim chooses Q" actually happens is — in a universe with free will — predicated on Jim choosing it. The problem is, you seem to be confused on difference between something logically preceding something vs. something logically following something.
If it's God dictating that Jim does something, then Jim doesn't have a choice in the matter. But if it's God knowing Jim does something and then allowing it, the Jim has a choice, because God only knows Jim's going to choose do it because Jim chooses to do it. God's foreknowledge has no bearing on Jim's will.
No, in that scenario you do have free will, because you are choosing things. That means free will. You can't make choices without free will.
Indeed, what you are describing is a scenario in which free will and God's plan exist at the same time, thereby proving that it is possible for the two to coexist.
Except I do not accept your loose definition of free will.
It isn't just making choices.
I go with
"The power of making free choices that are unconstrained by external circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will." http://www.thefreedictionary.com/free+will
or even
"(Philosophy) a. the apparent human ability to make choices that are not externally determined"
An omniscient creator God with infallible foreknowledge is incompatible with this definition.
This is the only definition I believe is acceptably "Free".
Your loose, and weak, definition may be "will" but it isn't "free", not to me.
1. God has infallible omniscient foreknowledge
2. A universe does not yet exist
3. God envisions a universe (U#581) in which Jim performs Q.
4. God creates precisely U#581
5. Because Jim performing Q is now necessary, otherwise it would not be U#581, Jim's choice was externally determined and is constrained by fate or divine will.
Conclusion - Jim doesn't have free will.
I'm a 'compatibilist' ( - if determinism is true, we still might have free will) and tend to think incompatibilists ( - if determinism is true, free will is impossible) have asked the wrong question.
Setting aside 'god' for a moment:
Suppose the universe is deterministic. That means, given a complete state of the universe at a given time, there is exactly one possible complete state of the universe at any particular later time.
Now, suppose that Harry is a human in this deterministic universe. Harry wants some ice cream, so he gets in his car, drives to an ice cream stand, orders some ice cream, hands over some money, takes his ice cream and then eats it.
The universe is deterministic; the only possible universe given the initial state is the one in which Harry eats the ice cream. If you rerun the universe from the time at which Harry has his desire to eat ice cream (or *any* previous point, of course), he always ends up eating his ice cream. Nonetheless, Harry did exactly what Harry wanted to do - his desires just turn out to be the same in each of these universes.
-------------------------
Now suppose the universe is indeterministic. You can't predict future states given current ones (you can make predictions, with margin for error, depending what you're predicting - e.g. you can predict that 2+2 will still equal 4, you can predict that gravity will function, etc).
Larry is a human in this indeterministic universe. Larry wants some ice cream, so he gets in his car, etc... (as above), and then eats it.
This universe is indeterministic; given the initial state of the universe, there are many possible universes in which Larry does eat the ice cream, but many in which Larry does not eat the ice cream. Larry did exactly what Larry wanted to do.
Nevertheless, if you run the universe repeatedly from the starting point where Larry desires the ice cream, filtering out those where some major event forcibly prevents him (he gets in a car accident) or has new information (he receives a phone call informing him that he's lactose intolerant), in each of them, Larry ends up eating his ice cream (with one very important exceptional case which I will call out a bit later).
There's a good reason for this, and this good reason is the thing being missed by the incompatibilist: in both universes, Harry/Larry end up doing exactly what they wish to do. In either universe, for them to choose otherwise (filtering out external phenomena in Larry's case), their mind (whatever THAT is) would have to function differently. In a deeply meaningful sense, in either universe, for them to choose otherwise, they would have to be different people. Every aspect of their decision-making process(*same caveat as in the previous paragraph), including actually following through with their decision, functions identically whether the universe is deterministic or indeterministic.
Or, to put it another way: if the universe is deterministic with the sole exception of one person (i.e. the laws of physics work such that there are multiple possible futures, but every divergence between different possibilities is an eventual result of differences in that one person's behavior - and same caveat to be addressed momentarily), that person will behave as though their own behavior is deterministic, even though they're not technically determined. Their mind works the same way in any run through the universe, and the inputs are identical, so they eventually make the same decisions.
-------------------------------
Now to that one exception case, which I reserved because, on the most simplistic reading, it appears to be a counterexample. Larry might have had another impulse rise to the top in the meantime which overrides his desire for ice cream - he might suddenly think of his bank account, might suddenly desire a taco instead, might suddenly realize he can't afford the calories, or whatever.
The straightforward read of this situation is clear: an internal desire bubbles to the top and causes the person to make a different choice. It's not external, so, free will!
But consider where that apparent conscious differences in desires or urges has come from. There are three main possibilities. First, it's possible that they are just apparently random differences. Second, it's possible in some strange sense that the 'real' person is actually a combination of a conscious mind and a subconscious controller, so that 'you' unconsciously create those urges. Third, it's possible that they are the results of small differences in the external universe bubbling up.
The third possibility would clearly put an end to the straightforward read: these things represent your reaction to external differences, therefore the difference is external, therefore they don't do any important work in terms of giving you real possible options without variance in the external world. The second possibility reduces to either the first or the third, except with a layer of metaphysical weirdness and possibly an equivocating definition of self in the way.
The first case is the main case worth discussing, and this is the place where an incompatibilist will likely try to jump on me. The word random, they might say, was poorly chosen. They are not causeless; the person is the cause.
But, in the end, that amounts to pretty much the same thing. You can't control them, you can't make them happen (life would be much simpler if we could control our desires!). They just happen. They may not be actually random, or they might be, but either way they are apparently random. And this is the only difference between an indeterministic universe and a deterministic one which might have any crucial bearing on free will: in a deterministic universe, when you rerun the simulation, you always have the same apparently random urges, desires and inspirations; in an indeterministic universe, when you rerun the simulation, you might sometimes get different ones.
Now, this is not a proof of compatibilism, but it amounts to a fairly difficult challenge to incompatibilism: the incompatibilist has to demonstrate that A) there's a good reason to consider the source of these urges (not the desires themselves, mind, but the source of them) to be internal to a self. They have to B) demonstrate that free will crucially depends on them - that having them in the right way gives you free will, everything else being the same, while having them in the wrong way means you don't have free will. They have to C) demonstrate that having them deterministically is automatically the wrong way (that is, even in an indeterministic universe, a being which always has the same urges, desires and inspirations given a particular set of sensory inputs and configuration of matter does not have free will). I doubt all three of those propositions - I doubt that any definition of free will worth the name could end up crucially resting on how your urges are generated at all, expecting that it will turn out that only minor semantic points differ based on these things (heck, I doubt that having them at all could be a prerequisite for free will, though I suspect that something along these lines will in practice turn up in nearly anything we'd consider calling free willed because of the sheer computational complexity inherent to the kind of being which might have free will). I'm going to leave it at this level of doubt, though, because this post is getting way too long.
Saying, "Well, if God created a universe without free will, no one would have free will," doesn't address this idea at all. You're going on completely different premises than the ones the OP specifically outlined.
You're being more than a little bit uncharitable. If someone makes a thread saying, "Help with a possible world where 2+2=5", you're not failing to address the topic or missing the point of the discussion if you make an argument that the premise of there being a possible world where 2+2=5 is self-contradictory and impossible - you might even turn out to be wrong in a directly relevant sense, it might turn out that such a world ISN'T self-contradictory, but you still weren't off topic.
This is what IcecreamMan is arguing: that a universe in which people have free will but God knew exactly what their choices would be before he even created them is self-contradictory. It's not off topic at all. And when you consider that the original poster seems to be asking about exactly that tension, in a sense IcecreamMan is exactly, perfectly on topic. He's talking about exactly the issue at hand.
Drawmeomg, I read that post like three times now and have no idea what you're saying.
Determinism isn't the same thing as choice. It is antithetical to choice.
As you say:
Suppose the universe is deterministic. That means, given a complete state of the universe at a given time, there is exactly one possible complete state of the universe at any particular later time.
One possible complete state. But choice requires there to be more than one possible state. Otherwise, there would be no choice.
For free will to exist, there must be multiple possible states with a person being able to choose between them. If there is only one, no actual choice is being made.
Oh, also, I want to rescind a comment I made earlier:
Except I do not accept your loose definition of free will.
It isn't just making choices.
I didn't say it was just making choices. I said it was a person making choices that stemmed from that person's will.
I would like to take back this comment because it is redundant. A person can only make choices if they stem from that person's will. Otherwise, they would not be choices made by that person. They would be choices made by someone else, or else not at all.
Suppose the universe is deterministic. That means, given a complete state of the universe at a given time, there is exactly one possible complete state of the universe at any particular later time.
One possible complete state. But choice requires there to be more than one possible state. Otherwise, there would be no choice.
For free will to exist, there must be multiple possible states with a person being able to choose between them. If there is only one, no actual choice is being made.
I disagree. The person in the universe does not know a complete state of the universe. They don't even know for sure whether the universe is deterministic or not. They are presented with information and asked to make decisions about it. It's an interesting question whether a person within a universe, given complete information about that universe (which, incidentally, might be a metaphysical impossibility), could be said to have free will, but rather far afield.
Determinism means that you couldn't have chosen differently, not that you didn't choose this time around.
EDIT: How can I make this more clear? Take a basic definition of choice:
"an act of selecting or making a decision when faced with two or more possibilities." (from google)
Whether the universe is deterministic or not, I am routinely faced with two or more possibilities - from my perspective. I select one of them - using my priorities (and a whole bunch of heuristics that I don't really understand, which doesn't worry me perhaps as much as it should).
The thing that is different between a deterministic universe and an indeterministic one is that in the deterministic one, I am always exactly the same and always faced with exactly the same information, so I will always choose the same one. It isn't the process of choosing itself. The argument over free will or not in a deterministic universe is the argument over whether the fact that I will always make the same choice means I don't have free will.
Just to clarify, if:
a) God reaches into someone's mind to make them turn left, instead of going straight ahead, right, or back, that would be abrogating free will and he'd never do that?
It would be abrogating free will, yes.
b) God drops impassable barriers (let's call them tree trunks for the sake of argument, but their impassability is the important feature here) on the road - ahead, behind and to the right of this someone so they can't go in the other directions, that's not directly messing with free will and so he's not breaking his promise of free will?
Correct.
No worries - I only just got home from work anyway.
I do wonder, why do you draw a distinction between God controlling someone's choice by messing with neural activity and controlling someone's choice by acting on the world external to their brain?
Also, you say "God can know what Jim chooses before he chooses it, but none of this changes the fact that Jim chooses it."
But you also say "For free will to exist, there must be multiple possible states with a person being able to choose between them. If there is only one, no actual choice is being made."
Clearly God can know there is only one possible outcome, the one that Jim will choose. Yet you oppose the idea of determinism, which asserts (except replacing 'God' with 'hypothetical omniscient observer') much the same thing.
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(^ let's just take that as a given for the sake of this thread)
I attended my cousin's wedding this past weekend and something the pastor said during the ceremony got me thinking on the subject. The pastor was speaking about how God helps people out and guides them, and specifically mentioned how my cousin and her now-husband had been looking for a house and praying about finding one, and then they found a good one just like a month before the wedding. That was somehow being attributed to the assistance of God.
Now, this thread is not about the specific example of my cousin finding a house. I'm just using it here as an example of a broader issue I see. The issue (using my cousin's house as an example) is that there are humans all over the place in the process of making this prayer be granted. In order for God to make this prayer request be granted, wouldn't He have to meddle with someone's Free Will somewhere along the way (or more likely the free will of multiple "someones") or alternatively have nothing to do with the process?
The previous homeowner chose to sell the house at some point by their own free will, right? Did God/can God affect that person's decision to sell their house? There are tons of free will choices made along the way that ultimately led to my cousin and her now-husband to wind up getting the house: what price the seller wished to sell the house for, which Realtor to use, when to sell, how the Realtor would advertise the house, when my cousin would look at listings, which Realtor(s) they would work with, which listings my cousin would look at, the similar decisions of like 100 other people in the area looking for a home that ultimately led them to not get the home, and so on... In other words, God didn't have a house just pop into existence on the market and with the Realtor my cousin was using, there were many free will decisions that culminated in that scenario.
So my issue is, if all of these decisions were made with free will, what role does that leave for God in the process? Like, in what way did God help my cousin find that house?
And again, this is not specifically about my cousin and her house. In what way does God help answer prayers if everyone has Free Will? People pray for help finding a job, finding true love, doing good on an important test, dealing with the loss of a loved one, controlling bad habits, finding a lost set of keys, etc. The question for debate here is: Can God actually provide assistance towards reaching a goal in these sorts of things without interfering with people's free will? If so, how?
(Also, I know that prayer is not simply asking for stuff. It's also about expressing gratitude, admiration, fealty, etc. It's also about just talking with God. However, people often ask for stuff too and this is what the thread is about.)
Did your proposed God create the Universe knowing all actions that would take place in it? Was he omniscient in the sense that he "knew the end before the beginning" as some scriptures claim.
If he created a free and open ended system where he did not have foreknowledge of events - then I'd say either he intervened and her free will was not complete - or he did not intervene and her free will was complete.
Thanks to Xenphire @ Inkfox for the amazing new sig
“Thus strangely are our souls constructed, and by slight ligaments
are we bound to prosperity and ruin.”
― Mary Shelley, Frankenstein
Why were all of those decisions made?
And I'm not talking about some metaphysical answer or whatever. I'm asking something like why did the previous owner want to sell the house in the first place?
God controls everything else.
I mean that would be a long list and I don't know all the answers anyways.
I think I may see where you're going here though (feel free to correct me if I'm wrong). Are you saying that it all basically comes down to God influencing things outside of human free will? For example: The owner decided to sell their house because they were moving due to relocating because of work. Work made them need to relocate due to demand at the primary earner's job falling off, which caused working conditions to become less desirable (pay or hours cut, or working extra hours for the same pay, loss of benefits, etc.) The new job, which the previous owners are relocating to had an opening due to another employee reaching retirement. Is that the sort of thing your saying?
The issue I have with something like that is that I don't see how that could be part of God's Plan because any of the humans in there could freely decided to do something else. Like the previous owners could've freely decided to just stay at the home anyways regardless of whatever compelling reason God put there to make them want to freely decide to sell.
I guess I'm kind of wondering how/if God's Plan can co-exist with free will. Can God have some sort of Grand Plan if humans can do whatever they want?
Well, I'm not really sure how to answer that. I think what I'm really wondering is if God's Plan can really exist and work (flawlessly? most of the time? no better than chance?) if humans have free will. I don't understand how there can be a perfect plan with all the uncontrolled (unpredictable?) elements involved in the plan.
Or, alternatively, if the human elements are controlled or predictable, then is there really free will going on?
Gods and Angels interfer with human life and choices. Also, it is hard to give human characteristics to a diety.
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Jenara, Asura of War: ETB Value Town
Purphoros, God of the Forge: Global Punishment
Xenagos, God of Revels: Ramp, Sneak, & Heavy Hitters
Ghave, Guru of Spores: Dies_to_Doom_Blade's stax list
Edric, Spymaster of Trest: Donald's list
There are an uncountable number of "plans" God could have that ONLY work as long as he doesn't control our actions/choices.
There are an uncountable number of "plans" God could have that unravel completely if he doesn't control our actions/choices.
Here's the thing though, BOTH are unanswerable questions, because no one knows God's plans, God's will, God's desires, or even if there is a God.
Now, for the sake of the argument, I assumed the existence of God for you. Which brings me back to what I said before.
Either God intervened (changing the series of causal events) in such a way as to achieve the outcome you described - and if so, then the free will was not complete. They, and their choices, were manipulated.
Or - He didn't intervene, and all those causal events were free, and thus the choices made in response to them were free willed.
Again though, I must ask - do you believe in a God that created the Universe with infallible foreknowledge of all events, the "end before the beginning".
This is actually an important question, because I believe it makes or breaks the entire premise of free will.
Thanks to Xenphire @ Inkfox for the amazing new sig
“Thus strangely are our souls constructed, and by slight ligaments
are we bound to prosperity and ruin.”
― Mary Shelley, Frankenstein
Don't worry, it was rhetorical.
Yes.
They could have, yes.
What problem do you see?
Yes.
I mean think about it, people plan things around other peoples' actions all the time. If we can do it, why not God? God is infinitely smart, after all.
Just to clarify, if:
a) God reaches into someone's mind to make them turn left, instead of going straight ahead, right, or back, that would be abrogating free will and he'd never do that?
b) God drops impassable barriers (let's call them tree trunks for the sake of argument, but their impassability is the important feature here) on the road - ahead, behind and to the right of this someone so they can't go in the other directions, that's not directly messing with free will and so he's not breaking his promise of free will?
Well we make loose plans around people's somewhat-predictable behaviors and reactions to things. An all-knowing God would be better at predicting reactions and behaviors, but could not do so flawlessly, right? That's the nature of free will, it can't ever really be known what the person will decide to do until they decide to do it. It would seem that a consequence of this is that people with free will are able to disrupt the plans of an omnipotent, omniscient God. I guess if someone is willing to concede that humans can mess up the plans of God, then I see no conflict.
And going back to the original example of my cousin getting the house because ultimately someone a few states away retired (...because the retiree decided to start saving for retirement at age 25 because they saw their parents struggling from not saving enough for retirement because their parents couldn't afford to set aside money for retirement because a tree fell on their house and they weren't insured because their kid got sick and medical bills took money away from buying good home insurance, and God intervened to get the kid sick and have the tree fall on the house so that my cousin could ultimately wind up getting the house before the wedding) That kind of remote causality seems very strange to attribute to God when there were so many intervening actions. It's like thanking the butterfly not flapping its wings in South Africa for the damage avoided by Hurricane Zoe not forming.
Oh I'm just asking in like a theoretical sense IcecreamMan. Like if there's free will, could an omnipotent omniscient God have a plan that humans couldn't interfere with?
I personally think there's no extant gods, and that free will is a stubborn illusion.
Some plans don't necessarily require the planner to adjust for choice.
For example -
Free will can coexist with God's plan for the Sun to go supernova in a billion years.
Free will can coexist with God's Plan for Yellowstone to blow in 2022.
Free will can coexist with God's plan for all animals to evolve over time.
Free Will can coexist with God's plan to have gravity.
Not all plans are effected by choices made, free or otherwise.
One would have to argue first that God has plans for peoples individual lives, before we can argue whether or not our choices have an affect on those plans. Or that God has a plan for humanity before we can argue if humanity can affect that plan.
Thanks to Xenphire @ Inkfox for the amazing new sig
“Thus strangely are our souls constructed, and by slight ligaments
are we bound to prosperity and ruin.”
― Mary Shelley, Frankenstein
I would not necessarily agree with that definition. Theoretically speaking, if someone could predict what you would do with 100% certainty, would that mean that you no longer have free will? I don't think it does. Someone else having knowledge of what you are going to do doesn't necessarily remove your ability to assert yourself free from their interference.
It does mean you don't have free will if that entity that can predict your decisions with 100% certainty is also the entity that created the universe as it is.
If God created the universe as it is and can predict people's choices with absolute certainty, then he created the universe that necessitates the choices that I make. In this scenario, I don't have free will. Everything that happens to me and everything I "choose" to do in response has already been designed by a party that is not me.
Pristaxcontrombmodruu!
No, God would do so flawlessly. He's God. Omniscience.
No, that's not what free will means. Free will means that a person has the ability to make choices. It does not mean that person's choices can't be predicted. In fact, free will requires that a person's choices be able to be predicted, because those choices must stem from a person's will, and a person's will is not an indeterminate thing.
What you're describing seems to be pure randomness, which is antithetical free will.
See above.
Why is it strange?
No, in that scenario you do have free will, because you are choosing things. That means free will. You can't make choices without free will.
Indeed, what you are describing is a scenario in which free will and God's plan exist at the same time, thereby proving that it is possible for the two to coexist.
Except I do not accept your loose definition of free will.
It isn't just making choices.
I go with
"The power of making free choices that are unconstrained by external circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will."
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/free+will
or even
"(Philosophy)
a. the apparent human ability to make choices that are not externally determined"
An omniscient creator God with infallible foreknowledge is incompatible with this definition.
This is the only definition I believe is acceptably "Free".
Your loose, and weak, definition may be "will" but it isn't "free", not to me.
1. God has infallible omniscient foreknowledge
2. A universe does not yet exist
3. God envisions a universe (U#581) in which Jim performs Q.
4. God creates precisely U#581
5. Because Jim performing Q is now necessary, otherwise it would not be U#581, Jim's choice was externally determined and is constrained by fate or divine will.
Conclusion - Jim doesn't have free will.
Thanks to Xenphire @ Inkfox for the amazing new sig
“Thus strangely are our souls constructed, and by slight ligaments
are we bound to prosperity and ruin.”
― Mary Shelley, Frankenstein
I didn't say it was just making choices. I said it was a person making choices that stemmed from that person's will.
Depends on why Jim is performing Q.
If Jim is just performing Q because God said so, then you're correct, that's not free will.
If Jim is choosing Q by his own volition, this is free will. In this case, it wouldn't matter whether or not God saw it coming. All that matters is that Jim has his own will and is making a choice. That's free will.
The point of contention is that the universe was created with whatever external and internal stimuli would cause Jim to perform Q.
In essence, Jim has no choice but to perform Q, because that's how he and the universe around him was created.
Specifically:
God said "this is the universe I'm creating, and in it, Jim will perform Q."
Pristaxcontrombmodruu!
Sure, but if it's not the persons will, but God's will...
Jim IS performing Q because God said so.
Dechs gets it.
In this scenario, the ONLY ONE making a free choice was God. He made the free choice of which Universe he would create. Jim is only doing precisely what he was created to do.
Thanks to Xenphire @ Inkfox for the amazing new sig
“Thus strangely are our souls constructed, and by slight ligaments
are we bound to prosperity and ruin.”
― Mary Shelley, Frankenstein
But why is Jim performing Q? Is he choosing to perform Q, or is he being made to perform Q?
If he's got a will of his own, and he's choosing to perform Q, then he has free will.
That doesn't make any sense. Jim either has a choice, or he doesn't. He can't both have a choice and not have a choice, those are opposites.
Yes, but WHY does Jim perform Q? Does he perform Q because Jim has an independent will, and chooses to perform Q? Or does he perform Q because he's being controlled?
The premise of the thread is the former, that God gives everyone free will and they are not being controlled directly. In this instance, Jim chooses Q because he has a free will and thus, of his own volition, chooses Q.
In this case, Jim has free will.
Then in that scenario, Jim does not have free will.
But that's not what the OP is talking about. The OP is talking about a scenario in which God gives people wills of their own. In which case, Jim would be performing Q because Jim's choosing Q of his own free will.
Jim is performing Q because that's what God created him to do.
Jim didn't exist to have a will, or make a choice, when God decided what Universe he wanted to create.
God made those decision before he said "let it be so"
As soon as God made up his mind on which Universe he wanted, as soon as he said "let it be so" Jim was made TO DO Q. He has no choice, God made the choice for him.
Jim thinking he has free will is AN ILLUSION.
I already answered the OP's other questions adequately.
But when YOU come in here with your erroneous compatibilism, I'm sorry but it just pisses me off.
You make claims as if you know some **** we don't know, and feel all cool about yourself - you have it wrong. You believe in the illusion, and I'm here to stop you selling your snake oil.
Thanks to Xenphire @ Inkfox for the amazing new sig
“Thus strangely are our souls constructed, and by slight ligaments
are we bound to prosperity and ruin.”
― Mary Shelley, Frankenstein
It would be abrogating free will, yes.
Correct.
--------------
No, you're not answering the question.
Does Jim have an independent will or doesn't he? Can Jim make choices or can't he?
Does Jim have free will and the ability to choose or not? If not, then that's not what the OP is talking about.
If God created a universe without free will, then Jim doesn't have free will.
But if God created a universe with free will, then Jim would have free will.
We're addressing the second one in this thread, as detailed in the OP.
Ok, but again, that's not what the OP is talking about.
No, you haven't. The OP specifically states that we're taking as a given that God created a universe with each human being having free will.
Saying, "Well, if God created a universe without free will, no one would have free will," doesn't address this idea at all. You're going on completely different premises than the ones the OP specifically outlined.
And to clarify, since you seem to miss this nuance: Yes, God can know what Jim chooses before he chooses it, but none of this changes the fact that Jim chooses it.
If Jim chooses something of his own volition, that is free will. It is irrelevant if God knows about it beforehand. (Indeed, God would have to know about it beforehand, because God's omniscient.) The part you miss is that God's knowledge of what happens is predicated on it actually happening, and whether or not "Jim chooses Q" actually happens is — in a universe with free will — predicated on Jim choosing it. The problem is, you seem to be confused on difference between something logically preceding something vs. something logically following something.
If it's God dictating that Jim does something, then Jim doesn't have a choice in the matter. But if it's God knowing Jim does something and then allowing it, the Jim has a choice, because God only knows Jim's going to choose do it because Jim chooses to do it. God's foreknowledge has no bearing on Jim's will.
I'm a 'compatibilist' ( - if determinism is true, we still might have free will) and tend to think incompatibilists ( - if determinism is true, free will is impossible) have asked the wrong question.
Setting aside 'god' for a moment:
Suppose the universe is deterministic. That means, given a complete state of the universe at a given time, there is exactly one possible complete state of the universe at any particular later time.
Now, suppose that Harry is a human in this deterministic universe. Harry wants some ice cream, so he gets in his car, drives to an ice cream stand, orders some ice cream, hands over some money, takes his ice cream and then eats it.
The universe is deterministic; the only possible universe given the initial state is the one in which Harry eats the ice cream. If you rerun the universe from the time at which Harry has his desire to eat ice cream (or *any* previous point, of course), he always ends up eating his ice cream. Nonetheless, Harry did exactly what Harry wanted to do - his desires just turn out to be the same in each of these universes.
-------------------------
Now suppose the universe is indeterministic. You can't predict future states given current ones (you can make predictions, with margin for error, depending what you're predicting - e.g. you can predict that 2+2 will still equal 4, you can predict that gravity will function, etc).
Larry is a human in this indeterministic universe. Larry wants some ice cream, so he gets in his car, etc... (as above), and then eats it.
This universe is indeterministic; given the initial state of the universe, there are many possible universes in which Larry does eat the ice cream, but many in which Larry does not eat the ice cream. Larry did exactly what Larry wanted to do.
Nevertheless, if you run the universe repeatedly from the starting point where Larry desires the ice cream, filtering out those where some major event forcibly prevents him (he gets in a car accident) or has new information (he receives a phone call informing him that he's lactose intolerant), in each of them, Larry ends up eating his ice cream (with one very important exceptional case which I will call out a bit later).
There's a good reason for this, and this good reason is the thing being missed by the incompatibilist: in both universes, Harry/Larry end up doing exactly what they wish to do. In either universe, for them to choose otherwise (filtering out external phenomena in Larry's case), their mind (whatever THAT is) would have to function differently. In a deeply meaningful sense, in either universe, for them to choose otherwise, they would have to be different people. Every aspect of their decision-making process(*same caveat as in the previous paragraph), including actually following through with their decision, functions identically whether the universe is deterministic or indeterministic.
Or, to put it another way: if the universe is deterministic with the sole exception of one person (i.e. the laws of physics work such that there are multiple possible futures, but every divergence between different possibilities is an eventual result of differences in that one person's behavior - and same caveat to be addressed momentarily), that person will behave as though their own behavior is deterministic, even though they're not technically determined. Their mind works the same way in any run through the universe, and the inputs are identical, so they eventually make the same decisions.
-------------------------------
Now to that one exception case, which I reserved because, on the most simplistic reading, it appears to be a counterexample. Larry might have had another impulse rise to the top in the meantime which overrides his desire for ice cream - he might suddenly think of his bank account, might suddenly desire a taco instead, might suddenly realize he can't afford the calories, or whatever.
The straightforward read of this situation is clear: an internal desire bubbles to the top and causes the person to make a different choice. It's not external, so, free will!
But consider where that apparent conscious differences in desires or urges has come from. There are three main possibilities. First, it's possible that they are just apparently random differences. Second, it's possible in some strange sense that the 'real' person is actually a combination of a conscious mind and a subconscious controller, so that 'you' unconsciously create those urges. Third, it's possible that they are the results of small differences in the external universe bubbling up.
The third possibility would clearly put an end to the straightforward read: these things represent your reaction to external differences, therefore the difference is external, therefore they don't do any important work in terms of giving you real possible options without variance in the external world. The second possibility reduces to either the first or the third, except with a layer of metaphysical weirdness and possibly an equivocating definition of self in the way.
The first case is the main case worth discussing, and this is the place where an incompatibilist will likely try to jump on me. The word random, they might say, was poorly chosen. They are not causeless; the person is the cause.
But, in the end, that amounts to pretty much the same thing. You can't control them, you can't make them happen (life would be much simpler if we could control our desires!). They just happen. They may not be actually random, or they might be, but either way they are apparently random. And this is the only difference between an indeterministic universe and a deterministic one which might have any crucial bearing on free will: in a deterministic universe, when you rerun the simulation, you always have the same apparently random urges, desires and inspirations; in an indeterministic universe, when you rerun the simulation, you might sometimes get different ones.
Now, this is not a proof of compatibilism, but it amounts to a fairly difficult challenge to incompatibilism: the incompatibilist has to demonstrate that A) there's a good reason to consider the source of these urges (not the desires themselves, mind, but the source of them) to be internal to a self. They have to B) demonstrate that free will crucially depends on them - that having them in the right way gives you free will, everything else being the same, while having them in the wrong way means you don't have free will. They have to C) demonstrate that having them deterministically is automatically the wrong way (that is, even in an indeterministic universe, a being which always has the same urges, desires and inspirations given a particular set of sensory inputs and configuration of matter does not have free will). I doubt all three of those propositions - I doubt that any definition of free will worth the name could end up crucially resting on how your urges are generated at all, expecting that it will turn out that only minor semantic points differ based on these things (heck, I doubt that having them at all could be a prerequisite for free will, though I suspect that something along these lines will in practice turn up in nearly anything we'd consider calling free willed because of the sheer computational complexity inherent to the kind of being which might have free will). I'm going to leave it at this level of doubt, though, because this post is getting way too long.
You're being more than a little bit uncharitable. If someone makes a thread saying, "Help with a possible world where 2+2=5", you're not failing to address the topic or missing the point of the discussion if you make an argument that the premise of there being a possible world where 2+2=5 is self-contradictory and impossible - you might even turn out to be wrong in a directly relevant sense, it might turn out that such a world ISN'T self-contradictory, but you still weren't off topic.
This is what IcecreamMan is arguing: that a universe in which people have free will but God knew exactly what their choices would be before he even created them is self-contradictory. It's not off topic at all. And when you consider that the original poster seems to be asking about exactly that tension, in a sense IcecreamMan is exactly, perfectly on topic. He's talking about exactly the issue at hand.
Determinism isn't the same thing as choice. It is antithetical to choice.
As you say:
One possible complete state. But choice requires there to be more than one possible state. Otherwise, there would be no choice.
For free will to exist, there must be multiple possible states with a person being able to choose between them. If there is only one, no actual choice is being made.
Oh, also, I want to rescind a comment I made earlier:
I would like to take back this comment because it is redundant. A person can only make choices if they stem from that person's will. Otherwise, they would not be choices made by that person. They would be choices made by someone else, or else not at all.
I disagree. The person in the universe does not know a complete state of the universe. They don't even know for sure whether the universe is deterministic or not. They are presented with information and asked to make decisions about it. It's an interesting question whether a person within a universe, given complete information about that universe (which, incidentally, might be a metaphysical impossibility), could be said to have free will, but rather far afield.
Determinism means that you couldn't have chosen differently, not that you didn't choose this time around.
EDIT: How can I make this more clear? Take a basic definition of choice:
"an act of selecting or making a decision when faced with two or more possibilities." (from google)
Whether the universe is deterministic or not, I am routinely faced with two or more possibilities - from my perspective. I select one of them - using my priorities (and a whole bunch of heuristics that I don't really understand, which doesn't worry me perhaps as much as it should).
The thing that is different between a deterministic universe and an indeterministic one is that in the deterministic one, I am always exactly the same and always faced with exactly the same information, so I will always choose the same one. It isn't the process of choosing itself. The argument over free will or not in a deterministic universe is the argument over whether the fact that I will always make the same choice means I don't have free will.
No worries - I only just got home from work anyway.
I do wonder, why do you draw a distinction between God controlling someone's choice by messing with neural activity and controlling someone's choice by acting on the world external to their brain?
Also, you say "God can know what Jim chooses before he chooses it, but none of this changes the fact that Jim chooses it."
But you also say "For free will to exist, there must be multiple possible states with a person being able to choose between them. If there is only one, no actual choice is being made."
Clearly God can know there is only one possible outcome, the one that Jim will choose. Yet you oppose the idea of determinism, which asserts (except replacing 'God' with 'hypothetical omniscient observer') much the same thing.